COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-431153-00CP
DATE: 2019/08/07
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
THE TRUSTEES OF THE LABOURERS' PENSION FUND OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN CANADA, THE TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 793 PENSION PLAN FOR OPERATING ENGINEERS IN ONTARIO, SJUNDE AP-FONDEN, DAVID GRANT, ROBERT WONG, DAVIS NEW YORK VENTURE FUND, INC. and DAVIS SELECTED ADVISERS, L.P.
Plaintiffs
- and -
SINO FOREST CORPORATION, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, BDO LIMITED (formerly known as BDO MCCABE LO LIMITED), ALLEN T.Y. CHAN, W. JUDSON MARTIN, KAI KIT POON, DAVID J. HORSLEY, WILLIAM E. ARDELL, JAMES P. BOWLAND, JAMES M.E. HYDE, EDMUND MAK, SIMON MURRAY, PETER WANG, GARRY J. WEST, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (CANADA), INC., TD SECURITIES INC., DUNDEE SECURITIES CORPORATION, RBC DOMINION SECURITIES INC., SCOTIA CAPITAL INC., CIBC WORLD MARKETS INC., MERRILL LYNCH CANADA INC., CANACCORD FINANCIAL LTD., MAISON PLACEMENTS CANADA INC., CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC and MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED (successor by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC)
Defendants
Daniel Bach for the Plaintiffs
Robert W. Staley, Jonathan G. Bell and Jason M. Berall for Cosimo Borrelli, in his Capacity as trustee of the SFC Litigation Trust
John Pirie, David Gadsden, and Michael Nowina for Pöyry Management Consulting (Singapore) Pte. Limited and Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited
Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992
HEARD: May 30, 2019
PERELL, J.
REASONS FOR DECISION - COSTS
A. Introduction
[1] In this proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992,[^1] the Defendants Pöyry Management Consulting (Singapore) Pte. Limited and Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited (collectively “Pöyry”) brought a motion for an Order:
a. that the “Releasors” as defined in a court approved settlement agreement are prohibited from: (i) participating, aiding, abetting or acting in concert in any manner whatsoever with the Litigation Trustee [Cosimos Borrelli] to pursue claims in an action in Singapore; and (ii) receiving any money recovered by the Litigation Trustee from Pöyry in the Singapore Action; and
b. declaring that Cosimo Borrelli, in his capacity as Litigation Trustee, has breached the Settlement Approval Order by commencing and pursuing the Singapore Action against Pöyry;
c. authorizing and empowering Pöyry to apply to any court, tribunal, or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of the requested Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of the Order, and
d. authorizing and empowering and that Pöyry to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside of Canada.
[2] I dismissed the motion.[^2] The Litigation Trust now seeks full indemnity costs of $208,590.73. These costs include $189,909.50 of fees and $18,681.23 of disbursements, including the fee of the Litigation Trust's Hong Kong counsel.
[3] Class Counsel on behalf of the Class appeared on the motion. The class was served but took no position on the motion. Class Counsel submitted that the Class was not a necessary party but had nevertheless undertaken a watching brief, for which it claimed costs. The Class submitted that its partial indemnity costs were approximately $12,000, but it claims costs of $6,000, all inclusive.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I grant both costs requests.
B. Factual Background
[5] For the present purposes of deciding the Litigation Trust’s and the Class’s claim for costs, the factual background is as follows:
a. The Plaintiffs are: Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada, the Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario, Sjunde AP-Fonden, David Grant, and Robert Wong.
b. In addition to Sino Forest Corporation (“Sino Forest”), the defendants included Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited.
c. Sino Forest was a forest plantation operator and production company with the majority of its business operations located in China.
d. From 2003-2010, Sino Forest engaged Pöyry Management Consulting (Singapore) Pte Limited and Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, Pöyry-affiliated companies, to prepare valuations of Sino Forest's forest assets.
e. On June 2, 2011, a short seller published a report alleging fraud by Sino Forest, (the "Muddy Waters Report"). The report alleged that Sino Forest did not own the forestry assets that it had represented as owning.
f. In 2011, Sino Forest’s noteholders and shareholders (the Class) commenced a class proceeding. The Plaintiffs and Class Members alleged that Sino Forest had made misstatements in its public filings and its financial statements, had misrepresented its timber rights, had overstated the value of its assets, and had concealed material information about its business operations from investors.
g. The class action claims against Pöyry Beijing, in particular, consisted of: (a) statutory causes of action under the Securities Act for primary and secondary market misrepresentations; and (b) a negligence claim on the basis that Pöyry Beijing owed and breached a duty of care to the Class Members who purchased Sino Forest’s securities to ensure that its evaluation reports reflected the true nature and value of Sino Forest’s assets.
h. On March 20, 2012, Pöyry reached a settlement in the class action. By Order on September 25, 2012, I approved the Pöyry Settlement Agreement.[^3]
i. The Settlement Approval Order contained bar order language that barred all claims for "contribution, indemnity or other claims over" relating to the "Released Claims" as that term is defined in the Pöyry Settlement Agreement, being generally any and all manner of claims that Settlement Class members had against Pöyry Beijing or its affiliates.
j. On December 10, 2012 pursuant to the CCAA, Sino Forest’s Plan of Compromise and Reorganization, dated December 3, 2012 was approved by order of Justice Morawetz. Under the CCAA Plan, the Sino Forest Litigation Trust Agreement was established for the purpose of pursuing Sino Forest's "Litigation Trust Claims," which are defined to include Sino Forest's claims except those advanced in the Class Actions.
k. Pursuant to the Litigation Trust, the Litigation Trustee commenced four proceedings against Pöyry entities: (1) on May 31, 2013, an action in Ontario; (2) on March 13, 2014, an action in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore; (3) on March 31, 2015, an arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre; and (4) on March 31, 2015, an action in the Supreme Court of Victoria at Melbourne, Australia.
l. In these actions, the Litigation Trust advanced the claims that were assigned to it from Sino Forest, including that the claim that Pöyry is liable to Sino Forest for breach of contract obligations and for negligence. In the Singapore Action, the Litigation Trust seeks total damages of US $593 million.
m. In the Singapore Action, Pöyry has pleaded reliance on the Pöyry Settlement Agreement as one of its defences to the Litigation Trust’s claims.
n. On March 28, 2014, in Ontario, Pöyry moved for, among other things, a declaration that the Litigation Trust’s Ontario Action against Pöyry was commenced in breach of the Bar Order provisions of the Pöyry Settlement Approval Order. On June 20, 2014, Justice Wilton-Siegel dismissed the motion.[^4] Leave to appeal to the Divisional Court was denied by Justice Sachs on November 4, 2014.[^5]
o. The effect of Justice Wilton-Siegel’s Order was that the Ontario Action against Pöyry could proceed. However, on June 28, 2016, the Litigation Trust and Pöyry entered a Standstill Agreement. The parties agreed to litigate the Singapore Action before all other actions. All other proceedings commenced by the Litigation Trustee were to be held in abeyance, except the Ontario Action, which was to be dismissed on consent in favour of another arbitration proceeding in Singapore, which was immediately commenced and stayed.
p. Under the Standstill Agreement, Pöyry and the Litigation Trust agreed that: (a) the Singapore Action would proceed until it has been finally and conclusively disposed of, settled or otherwise discontinued, (b) the other Litigation Trust proceedings against Pöyry would be either dismissed by consent without costs or stayed or tolled pending the outcome of the Singapore Action, and (iii) no other proceedings would be commenced or continued pending determination of the Singapore Action.
q. It is Section 5.1 of the Standstill Agreement that provides that no other proceedings would be commenced or continued pending the determination of the Singapore Action. Section 5.1 states:
5.1 During the Tolling Period, the Pöyry Parties and the LT shall not commence or continue any action, suit, arbitration or other proceeding of any nature whatsoever, anywhere in the world, other than as expressly set out in this Agreement, against each other or each other’s past and present direct and indirect Affiliates and their respective past, present and future partners, divisions, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors, assigns, agents, representatives, servants, employees, officers and directors, shareholders, trustees, insurers, attorneys, consultants, sub-consultants, heirs, executors, administrators and/or beneficiaries, and the predecessors, successors, purchasers, heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of each of the foregoing persons and entities with respect to any valuation or other services provided at any time by any of the Pöyry Parties or any of their Affiliates to SFC or any of SFC’s Affiliates, whether based on contract, tort, delict, under statute or otherwise under any theory of liability (the “Barred Proceedings”).
r. Section 5.2 of the Standstill Agreement provides that any party violating section 5.1 shall immediately discontinue the “Barred Proceedings” and be liable for full indemnity costs, and that the Standstill Agreement is a complete defence to any such proceeding: Section 5.2 states:
5.2 It is agreed and understood that if any party breaches the provisions of Clause 5.1 above, the breaching party(ies) shall immediately discontinue the Barred Proceedings and the breaching party(ies) will be liable to the opposing party(ies) for the legal costs incurred in the Barred Proceedings on a full indemnity basis. This Agreement shall operate conclusively as an estoppel in the event of any Barred Proceedings, which might be brought in the future by any of the Pöyry Parties or the LT contrary to Clause 5.1 above and it is hereby agreed and understood that this Agreement may be pleaded by the party(ies) against whom any barred Proceedings are brought, as (i) a complete defence; and (ii) a complete basis upon which to dismiss any barred Proceedings brought contrary to Clause 5.1 above, on a summary basis, and no objection will be raised by the breaching party(ies).
s. On its motion, Pöyry submitted that by bringing an action against Pöyry in Singapore, the Litigation Trust, breached the Pöyry Settlement Agreement because (a) the Litigation Trust must be taken to have released its claims against Pöyry; and, (b) under the Bar Order in the Pöyry Settlement Agreement the Litigation Trust is precluded from suing Pöyry.
t. In response to Pöyry’s motion, the Litigation Trust submitted that the motion should be dismissed for four reasons. First, the motion was brought in breach of the Standstill Agreement. Second, having regard to Justice Wilton-Siegal’s decision, Pöyry’s motion is barred as res judicata or as an abuse of process. Third, as a matter of comity, this court should not, in any event, determine the substantive issue, but should leave the issue to be determined by the Singapore courts. Fourth, the Litigation Trust submits that the motion should be dismissed on its merits because the Litigation Trust’s claims against Pöyry are not caught by the releases or by the Bar Order of the Pöyry Settlement Agreement.
u. In dismissing Pöyry’s motion, I decided to accept the forum non conveniens arguments that the effect of the Settlement Agreement should be determined in the Singapore action, where it was pleaded as a defence. I dismissed the motion based on forum non conveniens because: (a) there is a proceeding imminent in Singapore between the same parties in respect of the same subject matter; and (b) the Standstill Agreement is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, which is a very weighty, although not conclusive, factor.
v. In dismissing the motion, I did not comment about the Litigation Trust’s res judicata argument or its arguments about the interpretation and application of the Pöyry Settlement Agreement or of this court’s orders made in the class proceeding or in the CCAA proceeding involving Sino-Forest.
[6] In addressing, the Litigation Trust’s claim for costs, the following matters are also pertinent:
a. The Litigation Trust’s partial indemnity costs on a 60% scale amount to $132,626.93.
b. Pöyry initially sought a broad and different kind of relief including an anti-suit injunction to enjoin the SFC Litigation Trust from pursuing the US$593 million Singapore litigation that had been proceeding for approximately five years.
c. Pöyry amended its claim for relief several times. Although it withdrew its request for an anti-suit injunction, Pöyry’s ultimate claims for relief were intrusive on the jurisdiction and role of the Singapore court. Pöyry acknowledged that it sought for this court to inform the Singapore court about several issues.
d. The parties treated the motion as a very serious and significant matter. Both parties engaged downtown Toronto law firms and had three lawyers attend the motion. Pöyry brought three partners, whereas the SFC Litigation Trust brought two partners and an associate.
e. Although the ultimate outcome of the motion was to dismiss the motion based on forum non conveniens, which leaves the substantive issues undetermined, the motion was indeed a serious matter because had it been decided more on its merits, it either would have either undermined or conversely bolstered Pöyry’s defence in the Singapore action.
f. The motion was complex. It raised, among other issues, anti-suit injunctions, contempt, multi-jurisdictional proceedings, res judicata, the interpretation of court orders, bar orders, contribution and indemnity, and corporate separateness, and more. The motion record exceeded 4,000 pages. However, with the attrition of the claims for relief, there were no cross-examinations and the motion was argued over a single day.
C. The Submissions of the Parties
[7] Pöyry submits that the Class, which ultimately took no position on the motion, should receive no costs for its watching brief.
[8] The Class relies on Goodyear Canada Inc. v. American Insurance Cos.,[^6] where a party with a watching brief and who did not make submissions, was awarded costs, but Pöyry distinguishes the case because in that case, the party with the watching brief: (a) was co-operating with its co-defendants; (b) did take a position supporting the co-defendants, who were successful on the motion, and (c) any active participation by the party with the watching brief would have been redundant. Pöyry submits that, in contrast, in the immediate case, the Class did not align themselves with the Litigation Trustee in any manner and its watching brief was neutral.
[9] The Litigation Trust submits that it was the successful party and it is entitled to costs pursuant to the Standstill Agreement.
[10] In resisting the Litigation Trust’s arguments for costs based on the Standstill Agreement, Pöyry makes two alternative arguments with respect to the costs claim of the Litigation Trust.
[11] Its first argument is that the costs should be reserved pending the resolution of the issues within the Singapore trial.
[12] In support of its first argument, Pöyry submits that I should consider its uncontested expert evidence that the Singapore Court may still adjourn the trial to obtain this Court's interpretation of the Settlement Approval Order.[^7] With this possibility, it submits that it would be inappropriate to award costs at this time.
[13] Further, Pöyry submits that costs on a full indemnity basis under s. 5.2 of the Standstill Agreement is, in any event, unavailable because the applicability of the Standstill Agreement was not decided on the motion and the court made no decisions on either parties' contractual interpretation arguments on the Standstill Agreement.
[14] Pöyry’s alternative second argument is that in the circumstances of the immediate case, where the motion was ultimately narrowly decided, costs of $66,313.47 on a partial indemnity basis should be awarded for the Litigation Trustee's success on the forum non conveniens arguments, the other issues not having being resolved on their merits.
[15] In support of its second argument that the Litigation Trust should receive partial indemnity costs only for the forum non conveniens arguments that succeeded, Pöyry points out that I did not make findings concerning the parties' contractual interpretation arguments going to whether the Standstill Agreement applied. Pöyry's main arguments in this respect were: (a) the Ontario Class Proceeding is not listed in the definition of "existing proceedings" under the Standstill Agreement; and (b) the "No Further Proceedings" provision under s. 5.1 of the Standstill Agreement precludes a new "action, suit or arbitration" or "other proceeding of any nature". Pöyry submits that the Litigation Trustee should not be compensated for these portions of the motion as he did not succeed on these primary issues.
[16] Further, Pöyry submits that Pöyry position about the Settlement Agreement may be correct and validated by the Singapore Court, and in these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to award costs at this stage for the portions of the motion that dealt with the merits or the res judicata and issue estoppel defences.
[17] Further still, Pöyry adds that the efforts of both parties invested in developing submissions on the unresolved issues have now been recycled into the Singapore trial record, and a proper costs award in these circumstances would take into consideration the results at the conclusion of trial.
D. Analysis and Discussion
[18] Beginning the analysis of the costs claims with the Class’s claim for costs, I am satisfied that it is entitled to costs of $6,000 for its watching brief.
[19] Notwithstanding that previously Pöyry had not involved the Class in the similar motion before Justice Wilton-Siegel, this time Pöyry served the Class with the notice of motion. Perhaps it did so out of an abundance of caution so that all the possibly affected parties were before the court but it was Pöyry that brought the Class before the court. The extent to which the Class participated in the motion was then up to the class. Had the Class actively opposed Pöyry and had Pöyry been successful, the Class would have exposed itself to paying costs. However, by remaining neutral, and just having a watching brief, the Class did not per se entitle or disentitle itself from claiming costs for just assuming a watching brief.
[20] In my opinion, where a party is joined to a motion and responds with just a watching brief, it will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case whether he or she should be entitled to costs. In the immediate case, it was appropriate for Pöyry to have served the Class, and it was reasonable for the class to respond as it did. The thrust of the motion morphed over time and it was wise for Class Counsel to watch its progress to determine its effects, if any, on the rights and interests of the Class Members. In the circumstances of the immediate case, Class Counsel has justified a claim for costs.
[21] Turning to the Litigation Trust’s claim for costs, it was the successful party on the motion, and putting aside for the moment the matter of the Standstill Agreement, and just applying the norms of costs assessments, I would award it costs of $132,626.93 on a partial indemnity basis. The Litigation Trust was the successful party and costs follow the event. Pöyry did not dispute the Litigation Trust’s entitlement to some costs and save for submitting that the Litigation Trust should not recover for the undecided issues, Pöyry did not dispute the quantum of the partial indemnity scale costs. Pöyry did not suggest that the quantum of the Litigation Trust’s claim for costs was excessive on a partial indemnity basis.
[22] In my opinion, that the outcome left several matters or issues to be decided by the court in Singapore is not a reason to employ what would amount to a distributive costs award, where costs are allocated issue by issue. Generally speaking, that type of costs award is frowned upon by courts and courts rather prefer to award costs based on the ultimate outcome of the motion.
[23] In the immediate case, had Pöyry been successful on its motion without succeeding on every issue it argued, I rather expect that Pöyry would not have discounted its own claim for costs based on the unsuccessful or unresolved issues. Conversely, and more to the point, in the immediate case, it was within the reasonable expectations of Pöyry that it would be liable for partial indemnity costs for the whole motion, if its motion was dismissed on whatever ground or grounds.
[24] In my opinion, that certain issues remain to be decided by the Singapore court and that the Singapore court may seek an interpretation of the Settlement Agreement from this court is not a reason to defer, parse, or distribute the costs award based on issued decided and not decided. Future events and future contingencies are not a reason for me to depart from the normative principles of costs assessment.
[25] Thus, putting aside the matter of the Standstill Agreement, I am satisfied that applying the normative principles of costs assessment that the Litigation Trust is entitled at least to partial indemnity costs of $132,626.93, which I have no doubt was within the reasonable expectations of Pöyry, which did not disclose its own costs for the motion.
[26] The issue then becomes whether pursuant to the Standstill Agreement, the Litigation Trust is entitled to full indemnity costs.
[27] In this regard, I agree with Pöyry that: (a) the Standstill issue was raised by the Litigation Trust as a reason for me to dismiss, Pöyry’s motion; (b) the issue of the significance of the Standstill Agreement is a matter of contract interpretation; but (c) I dismissed the motion without deciding the matter of interpreting the Standstill Agreement; I dismissed the motion because I concluded that the effects of the Settlement Agreement should be determined by the Singapore court.
[28] However, I part company with Pöyry on the hidden premise of its submissions about determining the successful party’s entitlement to costs. The hidden premise of Pöyry’s argument is that since the Standstill Agreement was not interpreted for the purposes of dismissing Pöyry’s motion, the court cannot interpret it now for the purposes of deciding the scale of costs for the motion that was dismissed on other grounds.
[29] There are several very subtle points to note here that explain why I disagree that the Standstill Agreement is not relevant to the determination of costs.
[30] First, it needs to be noted that Pöyry did not bring a motion to interpret the Standstill Agreement. The heart of its motion was a request that this court interpret the release and the bar orders associated with the Settlement Agreement. It was the Litigation Trust - not Pöyry - that raised the alleged breach of the Standstill Agreement as a reason for the court to dismiss Pöyry’s motion to interpret the Settlement Agreement. I, however, did not decide the motion on this basis.
[31] The second subtle point is that the interpretation of the Standstill Agreement was not determinative of my decision that the appropriate forum to determine the effect of the Settlement Agreement is Singapore where the Settlement Agreement is being pled as a defence.
[32] In other words, although I decided that the Standstill Agreement was akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, which complemented my decision about the appropriate forum, that observation would not have in any event been a determinative factor in the forum conveniens analysis. Visualize, if I had decided that the Standstill Agreement was being breached, I would have, in any event, decided that Singapore was the most appropriate forum for the interpretation of the effect of the Settlement Agreement.
[33] The third subtle point to note, which is related to the second, is that while the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement is now before the Singapore Court, the interpretation of the Standstill Agreement is not an issue before the Singapore court. Put somewhat differently, whether Pöyry breached or complied with the Standstill Agreement is not a matter to be determined by the Singapore court.
[34] The fourth and final subtle point is that while I did not decide whether or not the Standstill Agreement had been breached for the purposes of deciding to dismiss Pöyry’s motion, I cannot avoid deciding the issue in the context of the Litigation Trust’s request for costs on a full indemnity basis as provided for under the Standstill Agreement.
[35] Turning then to the issue of interpreting the scope of the Standstill Agreement, I agree with the Litigation Trust’s argument that the Pöyry’s motion in Ontario was captured by the Standstill Agreement, and I disagree with Pöyry’s counterargument, which is set out above.
[36] As a general proposition, the court will respect a contractual entitlement to costs, but the agreement does not exclude the court’s discretion, and where there is good reason for doing so, such as inequitable conduct or special circumstances that would make the imposition of costs pursuant to the agreement unfair or unduly onerous, the court may refuse to enforce the contract and reduce the quantum of costs.[^8] It is a matter of contract interpretation whether the successful party is entitled to costs other than on a partial indemnity basis, and it is only when the contract clearly and unequivocally provides for a different scale of costs that the court should depart from the normal scale of costs.[^9]
[37] In my opinion, Pöyry’s motion about the effect of the release and the bar order was a “proceeding of any nature whatsoever … with respect to any valuation or other services provided at any time by any of the Pöyry Parties or any of their Affiliates to SFC or any of SFC’s Affiliates, whether based on contract, tort, delict, under statute or otherwise under any theory of liability …”. Pöyry’s motion is subject to the Standstill Agreement and under that Agreement, Pöyry is liable to pay a full indemnity for legal costs. There is no good reason for the court to refuse to enforce the agreement of the parties about the Litigation Trust’s entitlement to costs.
[38] For the above reasons, I award the Class partial indemnity costs of $6,000, all inclusive, and the Litigation Trust full indemnity costs of $208,590.73, all inclusive.
[39] Order accordingly.
Perell, J.
Released: August 7, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-431153-00CP
DATE: 2019/08/07
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
THE TRUSTEES OF THE LABOURERS' PENSION FUND OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN CANADA, THE TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 793 PENSION PLAN FOR OPERATING ENGINEERS IN ONTARIO, SJUNDE AP-FONDEN, DAVID GRANT, ROBERT WONG, DAVIS NEW YORK VENTURE FUND, INC. and DAVIS SELECTED ADVISERS, L.P.
Plaintiffs
- and -
SINO FOREST CORPORATION, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, BDO LIMITED (formerly known as BDO MCCABE LO LIMITED), ALLEN T.Y. CHAN, W. JUDSON MARTIN, KAI KIT POON, DAVID J. HORSLEY, WILLIAM E. ARDELL, JAMES P. BOWLAND, JAMES M.E. HYDE, EDMUND MAK, SIMON MURRAY, PETER WANG, GARRY J. WEST, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (CANADA), INC., TD SECURITIES INC., DUNDEE SECURITIES CORPORATION, RBC DOMINION SECURITIES INC., SCOTIA CAPITAL INC., CIBC WORLD MARKETS INC., MERRILL LYNCH CANADA INC., CANACCORD FINANCIAL LTD., MAISON PLACEMENTS CANADA INC., CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC and MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED (successor by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC)
Defendants
REASONS FOR DECISION – COSTS
PERELL J.
Released: August 7, 2019
[^1]: S.O. 1992, c. 6 [^2]: The Trustees of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada et al. v. Sino Forest Corporation et al., 2019 ONSC 3790. [^3]: The Trustees of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino Forest Corporation, 2012 ONSC 5398. [^4]: SFC Litigation Trust (Trustee of) v. Pöyry Forestry Industry Consulting Ltd., 2014 ONSC 2452. [^5]: SFC Litigation Trust (Trustee of) v. Pöyry Forestry Industry Consulting Ltd., 2014 ONSC 5824 (Div. Ct.). [^6]: 2012 ONSC 5712. [^7]: The Singapore Court of Appeal did so in Westacre Investments Inc. v. The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR, [2009] 2 SLR(R) 166 (C.A.). [^8]: Fares v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2019 ONSC 1043; Chapadeau v. Devlin, 2019 ONSC 241; Nelson Education Ltd., Re, 2015 ONSC 4225; Morguard Corp. v. Innvest Properties Ottawa GP Ltd., 2012 ONSC 1769; Toronto Common Element Condominium Corp. No. 1508 v. Stasyna, 2012 ONSC 1504; Bossé v. Mastercraft Group Inc., 1995 931 (ON CA), [1995] O.J. No. 884 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 205 (S.C.C.). [^9]: Aldgate Construction (1988) Limited v. Noreast Foods Ltd., 2019 ONSC 2935; Empire Life Insurance Co. v. Krystal Holdings Inc. [2009] O.J. No. 1095 (S.C.J.).