ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: 33889/11

DATE: 2015-08-19

B E T W E E N:

PAUL MARTIN DOCHERTY

Audrey A. Shecter, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

DEBRA MICHELLE CATHERWOOD

Shannon Beddoe, for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD: August 19, 2015,
at Brampton, Ontario

Price J.

Reasons For Order

NATURE OF MOTION

[1] On July 1, 2015, almost two years after Justice Donohue of this court made an order, following a 12 day trial of the family law issues arising from Paul Docherty’s and Debra Catherwood’s separation, setting out the access that Mr. Docherty was to exercise to the parties’ two sons and ordering Ms. Catherwood not to relocate the children more than 30 kilometres from Milton, Ms. Catherwood was evicted from her home and relocated the children temporarily to her parents’ home in Alliston, Ontario, 108 kilometres from Milton. This re-ignited the conflict between the parties and on July 16, 2015, Ms. Catherwood’s lawyer notified Mr. Docherty’s lawyer that Ms. Catherwood was withholding access from Mr. Docherty as a result of concerns she had arising from an inappropriate conversation that Mr. Docherty had with their children. She invited Mr. Docherty to propose “how contact can continue in light of these concerns.”

[2] Although Ms. Catherwood has agreed to return the children to a residence within the distance from Milton Justice Donohue specified in her order, she continues to withhold Mr. Docherty’s access to the children except during the daytime and supervised by a third party. Mr. Docherty has moved to have Ms. Catherwood found in contempt of Justice Donohue’s order for withholding his access to the children. Ms. Catherwood has brought a cross-motion to change the terms of Justice Donohue’s order and to require that access now be supervised.

[3] For the reasons that follow, I find Ms. Catherwood in contempt and order that she immediately resume compliance with the access schedule set out in Justice Donohue’s order, and that she make up the access that Mr. Docherty has lost by reason of her unilateral action. I will grant leave for her to bring a motion to vary the order of Justice Donohue in accordance with Rule 15 of the Family Law Rules, and will request the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to up-date the investigation they conducted for the purpose of the trial in 2013.

BACKGROUND FACTS

[4] On August 15, 2013, following a 12 day family law trial, Justice Donohue made an order which set out the parenting schedule that Paul Docherty and Debra Catherwood were to follow, with the days and times when Mr. Docherty was to exercise access to their sons, Ethan and Gabriel. She also ordered that Ms. Catherwood not relocate the children’s residence further than 30 kilometres from Milton, where the parties then resided.

[5] In late June 2015, relations between Mr. Docherty and Ms. Catherwood worsened. Ms. Catherwood faced eviction from her home in Milton and asked Mr. Docherty to make a lump sum payment of the support Justice Donohue ordered him to pay on a monthly basis, so that Ms. Catherwood could buy a home for herself. Mr. Docherty offered an amount that adjusted the lump sum downward, to reflect the fact that he would not be able to deduct the support from his income for tax purposes if he paid it in a lump sum, and Ms. Catherwood would not be taxed on the payment, as she would on monthly support. Ms. Catherwood hung up the phone.

[6] On July 1, 2015, Ms. Catherwood relocated herself and the children to Alliston, Ontario, 108 kilometres from Milton, and took up temporary residence at her parents’ home. For the next two weeks, the parties’ lawyers negotiated the location where Ms. Catherwood would settle, and how Mr. Docherty would continue to exercise access to Ethan and Gabriel, who are now nine and seven years old, respectively.

[7] On June 14, 2015, Ms. Catherwood gave her lawyer an audiotape recording of a conversation between Mr. Docherty and his children that she alleged had been left on her telephone answering machine the night before, but which Mr. Docherty says had actually taken place approximately three months earlier. In the conversation, Mr. Docherty, while telling the boys that he loved them and treated them equally, added that their maternal grandfather had “put in papers to the court” that he treated them differently. He added, “I would never fight in court…I would never have your fat little fat fucken Popa…which I would drive my thumb through his heart with this hand…”

[8] When Ethan gasped and asked him why he would do that, Mr. Docherty replied, “Because he’s a fucken arsehole. He doesn’t, he doesn’t understand how you…how how, I love you…and how he di… Do you know what he said? He said that I love you more than Gabriel.”

[9] On July 14, 2015, Ms. Catherwood informed her lawyer that she would be withholding access from Mr. Docherty, and instructed her to negotiate a change in the terms of Mr. Docherty’s access. Her then lawyer, Stephanie Giannandrea, wrote a letter to Mr. Docherty’s lawyer, in which she stated that Ms. Catherwood had notified her local Child, Youth and Family Services of Mr. Docherty’s remarks to Ethan and Gabriel, and informed her that they were not proceeding with an investigation “because they are aware that Mr. Catherwood is prepared to take steps to protect the children from Mr. Docherty, including withholding them today.” She then added:

Ms. Catherwood will be seeking appropriate assistance and support for the children and will be formulating a position regarding whether and what contact with Mr. Docherty is in the children’s best interests. We would welcome Mr. Docherty’s proposal as to how contact can continue in light of these concerns.

[10] Mr. Docherty served a motion on Ms. Catherwood on July 23, 2015, to have Ms. Catherwood found in contempt for removing the children from Milton and withholding access to the children from him. Ms. Catherwood responded with a cross-motion, which she served on Mr. Docherty on July 27, 2015, “for directions on the procedure that the parties ought to follow with respect to the Motion to Change that the Respondent Mother intends to bring, in the form annexed hereto as Schedule ‘A’”, a request for involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer for an up-dated clinical investigation, and an order that, pending the return of the motion, Mr. Docherty not have overnight access to the children and that his daytime access be supervised by a family member or other agreed-upon third party.

ISSUES

[11] The motions require the court to determine the following issues:

(a) Is Ms. Catherwood in contempt of Justice Donohue’s order by withholding access from Mr. Docherty except on a restricted and supervised basis?

(b) If she is in contempt, what penalty should be imposed or remedy granted?

(c) Should Ms. Catherwood’s cross-motion for direction as to a motion to change Justice Donohue’s order be entertained at the present time, before a case conference has been held?

PARTIES’ POSITIONS

[12] Mr. Docherty asserts that Ms. Catherwood is in contempt of Justice Donohue’s order by unilaterally withholding the access that the order granted him, except on the conditions she has unilaterally imposed, which eliminate overnight access and require that his daytime access be supervised. He asks for an order reinstating the access regime which the parties have followed for the past two years and granting him extended access to make-up for access that he missed during the summer as a result of Ms. Catherwood’s breach of Justice Donohue’s order.

[13] Ms. Catherwood asserts that she did not “wilfully breach” Justice Donohue’s order or, in the alternative, that she was lawfully justified in doing so, by reason of the risk that Mr. Docherty’s actions pose to the children. She argues that his misconduct requires that his access now be supervised, and asks that her motion for directions be heard, on the ground of urgency, before a case conference is held.

[14] Mr. Docherty argues that the circumstances do not meet the test of urgency and that Ms. Catherwood should be required to follow the prescribed procedures for a Motion to Change a Final Order, and attend at a case conference before making a motion for a temporary order varying Justice Donohue’s order.

ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE

b) Is Ms. Catherwood in contempt of Justice Donohue’s order?

[15] The Family Law Rules provide that an order may be enforced by a contempt motion, even if another penalty is available.[^1]

[16] The court applies a three-part test to determine whether a party is in contempt:

(a) The order that was breached must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done;

(b) The party who disobeys the order must do so deliberately and willfully; and

(c) The evidence must show contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.[^2]

[17] Justice Donohue’s order clearly and unequivocally states what should be done. It states:

3. The Applicant Paul Docherty (“Paul”) shall have access on the following schedule:

(a) Week 1: Tuesday from after school (3:00 p.m.) to 7:30 p.m.; and Thursday from after school (3:00 p.m.) to Monday morning drop-off at school, daycare or camp;

(b) Week 2: Thursday from after school (3:00 p.m.) to Friday morning drop off at school, daycare or camp;

[18] There is no dispute that, according to the schedule set out in paragraph 3 of the order, Mr. Docherty was to exercise access on July 16, 2015. There is also no dispute that Ms. Catherwood caused her lawyer to write the letter to Mr. Docherty’s lawyer which stated, “...they are aware that Ms. Catherwood is prepared to take steps to protect the children from Mr. Docherty, including withholding them today.” There is also no dispute that Ms. Catherwood has prevented Mr. Docherty from exercising unsupervised access in accordance with Justice Donohue’s order since July 16th.

[19] Ms. Catherwood asserts that, while she deliberately withheld the access that Justice Donohue’s order had granted to Mr. Docherty, she did not “wilfully or deliberately” breach the order, because she considered it necessary, in the children’s interests, to require that the access be supervised. I find that there is no justification for Ms. Catherwood’s position in this regard. Where there is no dispute that there has been conduct that, objectively speaking, is in breach of an order, the only thing that can save the behaviour from amounting to contempt is legal justification, in the form of a serious risk of harm to the children.

[20] Justice Spence, in R.(S.) v. S.(J.), in 2013, rejected the father’s attempt to justify his disobedience of an order granting the mother access, by blocking her access to the parties’ two children on two occasions. There was no dispute that the father had prevented the mother from exercising her court-ordered access. The issue that Justice Spence had to decide was whether he was legally justified in doing so. He stated:

As I noted at the outset of these reasons, there is no dispute that father disobeyed the access order. Counsel agreed that the only thing that could save this disobedience from a finding of contempt, is a legal justification for disobedience, in this case, the legal justification that exposing P. to the continuing stress he allegedly felt as a result of having seen Mr. V. on November 12, 2012, would be emotionally harmful to him. However, the only evidence in support of that purported justification comes from father’s assertions. And since I have found those assertions to be untruthful, there remains no evidence that would support the argument that the father was legally justified in disobeying the court order.[^3]

[21] In the present case, I find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Catherwood wilfully prevented Mr. Docherty from exercising his court-ordered access. I do not find any evidence that the children suffered emotional harm from their father’s words. Mr. Docherty uttered the words to his sons in the course of a conversation in which he told them that he loved and treated them equally. He did not threaten them or their mother. While he stated that he “would” drive his thumb thorough their grandfather’s heart, he did not say he “will” do so, or that he intended to do so. There is no evidence that the children believed that he would harm their grandfather, or that they suffered emotional distress from their father’s hyperbole.

[22] I do not accept Ms. Catherwood’s evidence that she fears Mr. Docherty or that there is any basis for such fear. Ms. Catherwood asserted repeatedly at the trial before Justice Donohue that she was afraid of Mr. Docherty, and argued unsuccessfully that he should not have access to the children because he was dangerous and violent.

[23] Mr. Docherty tendered in evidence an excerpt of the transcript of his lawyer’s cross-examination of Eileen Spraggett, the clinical investigator with the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. Ms. Spraggett testified that she had received from a psychologist the results of four psychological tests Mr. Docherty had undergone. They disclosed that he displayed minimal levels of depression and mild levels of anxiety. On the clinical anger scale, designed to measure various psychological symptoms which are relevant to the understanding and treatment of clinical anger, he fell well below the normal range, indicating that he demonstrated minimal clinical anger.

[24] Justice Donohue noted, in her reasons, that there had been “various physical assaults” between Mr. Docherty and Ms. Catherwood during their relationship. “Foul language in their communication has been a common occurrence.” However, Justice Donohue stated in her reasons for judgment that neither the CAS nor the OCL had suggested that the children were unsafe with Mr. Docherty, and that the OCL had found that he was a “competent and caring parent”, had a good relationship with his sons, and used boundaries appropriately.

[25] Mr. Docherty’s undisputed evidence is that initially, following Justice Donohue’s order, relations between the parties were friendly, and Ms. Catherwood accompanied Mr. Docherty and the children on vacations to Mexico and Jamaica in December 2013 and March 2014, and attended at his home and sold him a water softener. He states that in October 2014, when he told Ms. Catherwood that he had a new partner, Brenda, about whom he was serious, her approach toward him suddenly changed, and she became hostile, uncooperative, and argumentative.

[26] Mr. Docherty admits that the audio recording contains a conversation between him and his sons, but he says that the conversation occurred at least three months earlier than the date in mid-July when Ms. Catherwood alleges the message was left on her phone. I make no finding as to when the conversation occurred, or as to how or when it came to be left on Ms. Catherwood’s voice messaging system. Mr. Docherty produced records from Bell, his cell phone service provider, which disclose that he did not call Ms. Catherwood’s number on July 14th, as the letter from her lawyer initially asserted. He states that Cogeco, his landline service provider, refused to release his call logs except to the police or by court order, but that its technical support team confirmed to him orally that no calls were made from his home telephone between 6:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on July 14th.

[27] Ms. Catherwood now acknowledges that she did not, in fact, receive the message on July 14th, as her then lawyer initially asserted. She now states that the message was left on July 13th, and has produced a “snapshot” of her cell phone, showing the message from an “unknown caller” on that date. Her counsel attributes the error by Ms. Catherwood’s then lawyer, who referred to July 14th because that was the date when Ms. Catherwood informed her of it. However, Mr. Docherty’s cell phone records do not disclose the call being made on July 13th, either, and he states that Cogeco’s service representatives, whom he identifies, confirmed to him that there were no outgoing calls to Ms. Catherwood’s number on July 13th.

[28] I am suspicious of Ms. Catherwood’s account as to when she received the alleged message, for the following reasons:

(a) After the parties separated, according to Mr. Docherty’s uncontradicted evidence, Ms. Catherwood surreptitiously placed tape recorders in his truck, house, and cottage, and recorded over 16 hours of his conversations, and then used extracts from them in their litigation;

(b) Mr. Docherty has demonstrated that it is easy to create the kind of text message that Ms. Catherwood relies on in support of her account;

(c) The audiotape captures an entire conversation, which I find unusual if the recording resulted from a telephone call that Mr. Docherty made and did not properly terminate; and

(d) The alleged message followed two weeks of negotiations between the parties’ lawyers following Ms. Catherwood’s relocation of the children to Alliston on July 1, 2015, and Mr. Docherty’s insistence that they be returned.

[29] I find on a balance of probabilities that Ms. Catherwood does not have a genuine fear of Mr. Docherty or a belief that her children’s safety is at risk with him, but is using the tape recording to advance her interest of reducing Mr. Docherty’s access to them. I find that she had no lawful justification for withholding the access that Justice Donohue granted to Mr. Docherty and I find beyond a reasonable doubt that she wilfully disobeyed the order.

c) What penalty or remedy is appropriate?

[30] Mr. Docherty has requested a fine of $2,000 and an uninterrupted period of access for five days to make up for the five days he lost during the three non-consecutive weeks of uninterrupted summer access that paragraph 3(g) of Justice Donohue’s order provided for. The remedy of make-up access is appropriate in the circumstances, notwithstanding that Justice Donohue’s order provided, in paragraph 4, that there be no make-up time for either parent in the event of missed visits or holiday time. I am satisfied that Justice Donohue did not contemplate a deliberate and extended withholding of access, in breach of her order, as has occurred since July 16th. For the reasons that follow, I am not imposing a further penalty on Ms. Catherwood, except as may be reflected in an order for costs.

d) Should the court give directions at this time for Ms. Catherwood’s proposed motion to change?

[31] Rule 15 of the Family Law Rules prescribes the procedure to be followed in a motion to change a final order. The rule prescribes special forms, including a motion to change form (Form 15) and a change information form (Form 15A). If the motion includes a claim for custody of or access to a child, the parties are required to deliver the documents referred to in Rule 35.1. Ms. Catherwood has not followed these procedures or used the prescribed forms.

[32] Ms. Catherwood requests a temporary order imposing supervised daytime access pending the hearing of her motion to change Justice Donohue’s order. Rule 15(28) provides that a motion for a temporary order under Rule 14 may be made on a motion to change a final order.[^4] Mr. Docherty submits that there is no urgency in the present case that requires a motion for a temporary order to be heard before a case conference has been held.

[33] Where a motion for a temporary order is made, Rule 14(4) provides that it shall not be heard before a conference dealing with the substantive issues in the case has been completed. Rule 14(4.2) permits a motion to proceed prior to a case conference if the court is of the opinion that a situation of urgency exists.

[34] Justice Belch, in Hood v. Hood, in 2001, refused to hear a motion before a case conference. He stated:

It is my decision that an urgent motion within a court proceeding contemplates issues such as abduction, threats of harm, dire financial circumstances and these can be addressed prior to a case conference.[^5]

[35] Wildman J., in Rosen v. Rosen, in 2005, agreed with Justice Belch’s interpretation of urgency. He stated that the first step in demonstrating the need to proceed with an urgent motion before a case conference should be an inquiry as to when case conference dates are available to deal with the matter.[^6] No such inquiry appears to have been made in the present case.

[36] For the following reasons, I find that there are no circumstances of urgency that justify hearing a motion for a temporary change of Justice Donohue’s order before a case conference is held:

a) For the reasons set out above, I do not believe that Ms. Catherwood fears Mr. Docherty. If she did fear him, I would find such fear to be unjustified;

b) Mr. Docherty has no criminal record;

c) It is not disputed that Ms. Catherwood telephoned the Halton Regional Police three times in the past three months to complain about him, and that each time they attended at his home and left without taking any action;

d) Although Ms. Catherwood notified Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth, and Family Services about the alleged July 14th message, and her lawyer asserted in her letter to Mr. Docherty’s lawyer on July 16, 2015, that they were not proceeding with an investigation “because they are aware that Ms. Catherwood is prepared to take steps to protect the children from Mr. Docherty, including withholding them today”, there is no letter from the Child, Youth and Family Services concerning Ms. Catherwood’s complaint, or requiring or recommending that steps be taken to restrict Mr. Docherty’s access; and

e) While the Nottawasaga detachment of the Ontario Provincial Police laid a criminal charge of threatening against Mr. Docherty in connection with his recorded conversation with his sons, they released him on an Undertaking to an Officer in Charge with no conditions other than to abstain from communicating with Ms. Catherwood’s father, to notify the police of any change of address, and to abstain from possessing any firearms. The police did not impose a condition that Mr. Docherty not communicate with Ms. Catherwood or the children.

[37] I decline to make a temporary change to the access terms of Justice Donohue’s order for the following reasons:

(a) Mr. Docherty exercised unsupervised access to his children for almost two years following Justice Donohue’s order;

(b) Ms. Catherwood is in contempt of Justice Donohue’s order;

(c) Ms. Catherwood brought her motion in response to Mr. Docherty’s motion to have her found in contempt for her unilaterally withholding access from him;

(d) Ms. Catherwood did not follow the procedure set out in Rule 15; and

(e) There are no urgent circumstances that justify hearing a motion for a temporary change before a case conference is held.

[38] Even if I were to entertain Ms. Catherwood’s motion for a temporary change of access at this time, I would not eliminate his overnight access to the children or require that his access be supervised. In Folahan v. Folahan, I confirmed the basic principles that the court applies with regard to supervised access. In that case, I denied the mother’s motion to change an order for unsupervised access by requiring supervision. I relied on the decision in A.(M.) v. D.(J.), in which Justice Spence stated:

With very few exceptions, all children benefit from having a loving relationship with both parents. In those unfortunate cases where parents separate and the child must live with only one parent, either the parents or the court will usually attempt to provide for “typical” or “normal” access to the non-custodial parent. This may be something like: alternate weekends, sharing of holiday time, special occasions, and so on. A parent who seeks to reduce normal access will usually be required to provide a justification for taking such a position. And the greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. The most restrictive form of access is supervised access.[^7] [Emphasis added]

[39] Supervised access is “a tool reserved for exceptional circumstances.” In such exceptional circumstances where supervised access is ordered, it is intended to be temporary.[^8]

[40] While the circumstances of the present case are not urgent and do not, based on the present evidentiary record, justify an order requiring supervision, there is evidence that suggests that Mr. Docherty is abusing the access that Justice Donohue gave him in her order. Mr. Docherty may be in breach of the order himself, in ways that negatively impact on the well-being of the children, not to mention that of Ms. Catherwood.

[41] Repeated breaches of the access provisions of an order can, in themselves, amount to a material change of circumstances justifying a variation of the order. In Laurin v. Martin, in 2005, Mackinnon J. granted a mother’s motion to vary a final order to which she had consented two years earlier for the custody and access of the parties’ eight year old daughter. Justice Mackinnon found that the father’s repeated breaches of the order, which had caused frequent absences from school, amounted to a material change of circumstances affecting the child’s best interests, necessitating a change in the custodial arrangements. He stated:

It is found in the father’s protracted non-compliance with the terms of the existing order in a material way, especially in the important area of the child’s education. It is regrettable that Mr. Martin’s failure to abide by terms he himself agreed to necessitates this change. The custody disposition and living arrangements for Alaina must be such to enable her to have a continuing, stable school environment and regular school attendances.[^9]

[42] The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Martin’s appeal from Justice Mackinnon’s Order. It rejected his argument that the motions judge had erred in basing her decision on her view as to his wrongdoing. The Court stated:

The appellant submits that the motions judge’s decision was based on the blameworthiness of the father’s conduct with school authorities. We disagree. The motions judge quite properly focused on the best interests of the child. She found that the father’s adverse relationship with the school had impacted adversely on the child. She considered this in the context of three years of an unusually high number of absences from school and lateness for school while the child was in the father’s custody. She concluded on the basis of these two factors and the school reports that the child’s academic performance/achievement was impaired. She next identified a number of breaches by the father of the provisions of the consent custody order of Gauthier J. and concluded that there had been a material change in circumstance that necessitated a change in the custodial arrangement. This is a discretionary order and we find no error in the analysis and foundation of her order.[^10] [Emphasis added]

[43] Children are entitled to have access to both their parents, to the extent consistent with their best interests.[^11] However, this principle is not a license to non-custodial parents, however, to act in an abusive manner toward the custodial parent. While custody and access issues are to be determined based on the best interests of the children, and not the interests of roles of the parents, abusive conduct by one parent toward another cannot help but be injurious to the long term interests of the children.

[44] The separation of parents deprives children of their major source of security, derived from an intact family. That security can only be replaced by the security they derive from strong and healthy relationships with each parent separately. Children’s positive self-image, crucial to their ability to navigate the changes in their family successfully, depends in large measure on the positive regard they have toward each of their parents. If their respect for either parent is diminished, their regard for themselves may also suffer.

[45] Ms. Catherwood makes the following assertions regarding Mr. Docherty’s conduct since Justice Donohue made her order:

(a) Justice Donohue’s order provides for pick-ups and drop-offs at a “mutually agreeable” location. Ms. Catherwood asserts that this loose language has led Mr. Docherty to dictate the location of access transitions, including demanding that Ms. Catherwood pick the children up at his own home, which the Order does not provide for;

(b) Mr. Docherty creates the need for extra in-person exchanges; i.e. in Week 1, he will refuse the pick the children up from school on Thursday, instead demanding that they be delivered to him; and in Week 2, he will often keep the children home from school on the Friday and then demand that they be picked up at a location of his choosing;

(c) Mr. Docherty attends at the agreed location early and then leaves before or sometimes as Ms. Catherwood arrives, and then insists that she return to his house to collect the children;

(d) Mr. Docherty is rude, crude, and inappropriate to Ms. Catherwood at every access transition, i.e. giving her the middle finger, pulling down his pants and “mooning” her, or calling her names such as “fucking retard”, “effing retard”, “Todd” (i.e. retard), “asshole”, “bitch, “tramp”, and “fucking idiot”;

(e) Mr. Docherty misuses the evening telephone calls with the children as an occasion for abusive conduct toward Ms. Catherwood and inappropriate communication with the children:

(i) Mr. Docherty lies about telephone calls, claiming Ms. Catherwood did not answer the phone when, in fact, he did not call;

(ii) Mr. Docherty speaks inappropriately to the children when he telephones them, including using foul language and speaking to them about the parents’ litigation;

(iii) Mr. Docherty disparages Ms. Catherwood to the children when he calls them on the phone, i.e. “Tell your mommy she’s an effing retard”;

(iv) Mr. Docherty telephones Ms. Catherwood late at night, sometimes repeatedly; and

(v) Mr. Docherty ends e-mails to Ms. Catherwood in ways that are rude, hurtful, and abusive.

(f) Mr. Docherty has developed a pattern of keeping the children home from school on Fridays in both Week 1 and Week 2, without basis or explanation;

(g) Mr. Docherty has lied to third parties about Justice Donohue’s order, telling the children’s school principal and medical professionals that he has “joint custody” in order to instruct them as if he was a custodial parent;

(h) Mr. Docherty unilaterally decides how long his holidays with the children will be, without regard to the order. During Christmas 2014/2015, he took the children to Cuba then claimed to have lost their passports while in Cuba, keeping them there for 15 days instead of the 7 to which he was entitled. At the last minute at the end of the trip, he wrote to Ms. Catherwood claiming that the passports had reappeared. On returning, he refused to drop the children off to Ms. Catherwood’s home;

(i) Mr. Docherty has sabotaged the children’s participation in sports. For instance, he refused to cooperate with Ms. Catherwood in the pick-up and drop-off of the children’s hockey equipment through the school. He demanded that Ms. Catherwood drive to Milton to hand deliver the hockey equipment to his home. Later, he claimed that the hockey equipment had been “stolen” from his front porch. The children never returned to hockey; and

(j) Mr. Docherty is almost always late with his monthly child and spousal support payments. Some payments are arbitrarily reduced by him, others are skipped. Payments are never made on the 1st of the month. Because of this, Ms. Catherwood was unable to make her monthly rent payments on time at her former residence in Georgetown, and as a result she was evicted. Sh