Michel v. Karmiris, 2025 ONSC 2280

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00034785-00
DATE: 2025-04-30
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: Amandine Julie Michel, Applicant
AND: Gary Karmiris, Respondent
BEFORE: M.D. Faieta
COUNSEL: Kathryn Kumka, for the Applicant
Gary Karmiris, on his own behalf
HEARD: April 8, 2025

Endorsement

[1] The respondent father brings a motion for contempt. He submits that the applicant mother has breached an interim order made in August 2023 as he has not had parenting time with their 11-year-old daughter (the “Child”) since February 28, 2025. The respondent father submits that the applicant has withheld the Child without justification and that her actions have caused significant emotional harm to the Child. The respondent father seeks an order for equally shared parenting time and sole decision-making authority.

[2] The August 2023 interim order provides that the respondent father has supervised parenting time one day every alternate weekend. With the agreement of the parties, such supervision was provided by the respondent’s mother in her home. The applicant mother states that the Child has expressed and displayed anxiety before her visits which, at least during 2025, have occurred every Friday after school. On both February 14, 2025, and February 21, 2025, the Child left her grandmother’s house following her parenting time with the respondent, appearing visibly emotional before getting into the applicant mother’s car. On February 28, 2025, the applicant mother received a call from the respondent’s mother asking her to pick up the Child as she was crying and wanted to be picked up. The Child has told the applicant mother that she is afraid of the respondent father and does not wish to see him. As a result, the respondent father has not had parenting time with the Child since February 28, 2025. The applicant mother brings a cross-motion for an order that the respondent father’s parenting time be professionally supervised or an order that his parenting time with their daughter occur by way of enrolling in reunification therapy with such therapy to proceed in accordance with the recommendations of the reunification therapist. The respondent father seeks unsupervised parenting time.

Background

[3] The parties were married in August 2011. After the Child was born in March 2014, the parties moved into the home of the respondent’s mother. In November 2016, the applicant moved out of the home and the parties maintained an equally shared parenting arrangement. In about 2016/2017 the applicant started a new relationship which lasted about four years.

[4] On January 30, 2018, the parties entered into a separation agreement whereby they would jointly parent the Child. The Child was to spend two weekdays with each parent per week and alternate weekends with each parent. At that time, the applicant mother estimated that her income was $53,000 per year and the respondent father estimated that his income was $60,000 per year. The respondent father was discharged from bankruptcy on March 20, 2016.

[5] Around 2021, the respondent father started a new relationship with Sofia Tsiotsikas and they moved in together in Markham. Ms. Tsiotsikas has a 14-year-old son from a previous relationship.

[6] During the COVID-19 pandemic the parties decided that the respondent father would homeschool the Child. In about the second year of this arrangement, the applicant told the respondent that homeschooling was no longer working for their daughter who reported being distressed as a result of being yelled at by the respondent. The relationship between the parties deteriorated. The applicant stated that the respondent was controlling, verbally abusive and manipulative. The respondent stated that the applicant was emotionally unstable, untruthful and was alienating him from their daughter.

Application – March 6, 2023

[7] This application was commenced in March 2023 for an order that the Child primarily reside with the applicant mother, that the respondent father have parenting time with the Child as the court may determine, that the applicant mother have primary decision making responsibility for the Child, that the respondent father be restrained from attending within 500 metres of the applicant mother’s home and workplace and be restrained from attending within 500 metres of the Child’s school, subject to the terms of a parenting order, a section 30 assessment or alternatively an order that the OCL investigate and report on the Child’s best interests, and an order for child support if appropriate.

[8] The applicant mother states during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Child was in junior kindergarten. The parties decided they would homeschool the Child in the respondent father’s home. The respondent father had lived in his mother’s home until September 2021. The homeschooling arrangement continued until June 2022 when the applicant mother expressed concern with the respondent father’s behaviour.

[9] In the six months prior to this application being commenced, the Child’s behaviour significantly deteriorated. She exhibited symptoms of anxiety and, at times, would cry hysterically. The respondent father also homeschooled his girlfriend’s son, N, who was about 6 years older than the Child, as well as three other boys. The Child told the applicant that the respondent father would yell, scream and mock her as well as swear at her.

[10] The background facts and steps in this proceeding are further described in the following Endorsements.

TBST Court – July 24, 2023

[11] At TBST court, an urgent motion was scheduled for the applicant’s motion for an interim parenting order.

[12] Kraft J.’s Endorsement states:

[1] The applicant mother asks permission to bring an urgent ex parte motion or motion on short notice to the respondent, granting her temporary decision-making responsibility in relation to the parties’ child, age 9.

[2] The child has been sharing her parenting time with both parties pursuant to the terms of a separation agreement reached in 2018, where she spends two days during the week with each parent and alternating weekends with each parent, on a 2/2/5/5 schedule.

[3] Initially, the parties agreed that their daughter would be homeschooled when the Covid 19 health crisis began. She continues to have been homeschooled for the 2020/2021, 2021/2022 and 2022/2023 academic years. The mother wishes for the child to attend in person school for Grade 4 commencing September 2023. The father would not agree to allow the child to attend school for the 2022/2023 academic year.

[4] Recently, the mother has been highly concerned about the child’s safety, physically and emotionally, when she is in the care of the respondent father. The child is demonstrating tremendous anxiety and does not wish to spend time with the father. Accordingly, the mother commenced the within Application.

[5] In response to the mother’s Application, the father prepared a document in which he refers to himself as a deity; he challenges the jurisdiction of this court, indicating that the only court jurisdiction he accepts is the King’s High Courts; the child is in the custody of the Minister of Finance, Chrystia Freeland; he resides in a shattered house of mirrors; and the child is his property.

[6] The respondent did not appear today. The Court telephoned the respondent at his cell phone and there was no answer.

[7] The mother’s worries about the child’s state of mind are concerning to the court, as is the father’s response to the mother’s court application. The issue of whether the child will attend school in-person commencing September 2023 is also of tremendous concern to the court, given that she has fallen behind her grade level in her academics. The CAS has an open file. The matter is urgent and needs to be addressed.

[8] The mother was encouraged to provide CAS with a Consent to allow them to release the notes from their file to her counsel for the next court attendance.

ORDER

[9] This court makes the following order:
a. Pursuant to Rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, the applicant has leave to have her motion heard prior to a case conference on the grounds of urgency.
b. The applicant’s motion shall be returnable on August 3, 2023, on the regular motions list, to commence at 10:00 a.m.
c. Counsel for the applicant shall serve a copy of this Endorsement on the respondent by email and by registered mail and courier on the respondent. [Emphasis added]

Motion – August 3, 2023

[13] The respondent father did not attend the hearing of this motion despite being served.

[14] Akazaki J.’s Endorsement states:

[1] This motion, brought by the applicant mother, was authorized by Justice Kraft in her endorsement of July 24, 2023. The respondent father did not attend the hearing before Justice Kraft, and he did not attend the hearing of the motion, either. One procedural consequence of refusing to attend a hearing of this nature is that the party relinquishes the opportunity to tell his or her side of the story, and to explain why the absent party’s evidence should be preferred over the other party’s evidence.

[2] The ground for urgency identified by Justice Kraft was the fact that the child of the marriage, age nine, has not attended school since the start of the Covid-19 lockdown measures in 2020. The mother seeks to re-enroll the child in the local public school, and the father has objected. She is also concerned by the effect on her child of the father’s increasingly erratic and abusive conduct. For the reasons that follow, I have signed a temporary order granting the mother primary care of the child, decision-making authority, and supervised parenting time for the father. …

[5] The parties took the child out of school although, by the mother’s admission, neither were teachers and neither were familiar with the school curriculum for her age. The mother did arrange for some testing in late 2022 which revealed that the child was about a year behind in major subjects. In his affidavit, the father denied his lack of competence in education. He deposed that he followed a popular home-schooling curriculum called Well-Trained Mind. He also alleged that it was the mother, not him, who exhibited violent behaviour during the marriage, in that she punched him in the face and broke a television set.

[6] The mother arranged for a professional tutor to help her daughter. This seems to have triggered the child confiding about verbal and emotional abuse while in the father’s care. The tutor called the Toronto Children’s Aid Society. (According to the father, “Amandine called CAS on us.”). The father denies any such abuse and states in his affidavit that he loves his daughter and that he “as a man, have a duty, to protect and defend my daughter from any and all harm.”

[7] On the substantive part of the competing evidence of the factual events and reported observations of the daughter, the evidence is necessarily subjective, viz. in the eye of the beholder. The court must therefore inquire into the two beholders.

[8] The mother’s evidence was rather straightforward. It disclosed her belief that she lacks the ability to provide her daughter with the instruction available from an institutional setting with professional teachers. She also expressed her personal disappointment that she may have participated in a situation that has caused her daughter emotional upset and depression, as well as compromised her education. Some of the clarity of her statements can be attributed to the aid of a trained lawyer. Presentation of clear evidence is one of the services for which clients seek lawyers’ help.

[9] The father’s affidavit began with an oath with a declaration “as a man.” Because he did not attend the hearing, I could not ask him whether this was a reference to his gender or to his taxonomy among living things. The affidavit then set out his birthright to property rights, as evidenced in his birth certificate, as if it were a Crown patent to exploit land or other property. He quoted extensively from the English Enlightenment philosopher John Locke about “Paternal Power” over children. He later stated that “I as a man, do not consent to an administrative process being used to harm me or my property as it infringes on my intrinsic rights and does not provide equitable relief for a man.”

[10] The father’s affidavit referred back to the answer filed in response to the application, entitled “Judicial Notice of the Facts.” In paragraph 9 of this document, he stated that “I am co-creator of my daughter, and that my daughter is my property.”

[11] Finally, the father filed affidavits from character references vouching for his abilities as a parent. Reading through them, however, they were, in fact, lengthy attempts to characterize the mother as unfit and as an antisocial person. Apart from taking them into consideration as addendums to the father’s evidence, I am unsure what weight I can attach to their affidavits since the father has not brought a motion to restrict the mother’s parenting time or to curtail her decision-making abilities. …

[19] The father’s sworn statement that he considers his daughter his “property” is troubling and does not reflect a proper understanding of Ontario society in the 21st century, or even in the second half of the 20th century, informing the instruction of a young person of the role of an individual in a civil society. Nevertheless, I need not delve into the merits of his position for the purpose of the decision-making part of the motion, because the status quo entails shared parenting with the mother.

[20] It is the mother who has stated her lack of competence to home school the child. Her realization that she may have been responsible for her daughter being behind the developmental standards of the Ontario school curriculum is enough to tip the scales in favour of granting the motion. … Therefore, on the educational piece, the mother must be granted decision-making authority to enroll the child in school and to authorize all ancillary functions related to that re-enrollment. Joint decision-making that allows the father to veto the enrolment would be contrary to the compulsory enrolment legislation.

[21] The more difficult analysis is the part of the motion requesting the interim curtailment of the father’s parenting time to limited supervised time. The case law is clear that this type of order is to be made sparingly and for a limited time. Supervision, in most instances, does not last very long and allows the supervised parent to build an evidentiary case for a return to shared parenting. In this instance, it is important that the father engage in the legal process and apply to demonstrate that supervision is unnecessary. Until he does so and faces the scrutiny of open court, the mother’s evidence that the father’s influence may be harming the child will persuade the court to err on the side of causing less harm to the child than the restriction of the father’s parenting time. Indeed, the father’s court filings regarding his belief of absolute dominion over his daughter must be seen as a red flag of abuse of parental authority.

[22] I have therefore signed the order in the form provided, with some modifications. The father’s evidence that he does not believe he is subject to the court’s jurisdiction warrants a clause directing police enforcement. Even if he, in his mind, is not subject to the court’s direction, the police forces of Ontario are so bound. … [Emphasis added]

Interim Order

[15] The Order states:

1. On an Interim basis, the Applicant Mother, Amandine Michel, commencing immediately, shall have primary residence/sole residence/care of the Child …

2. On an Interim basis, pending further order or written agreement between the parties, the Respondent Father shall have parenting time with the Child only in the presence of a third party who is agreeable to the Applicant Mother (such agreement shall not be withheld), and which third party may include the Respondent’s mother [if] she is willing, or the Respondent’s sister if willing, or such other family or other third party as the Applicant Mother and Respondent Father agree to in writing. If the parties cannot agree to a suitable third party, then either may return the issue (i.e. who shall supervise parenting time by the Respondent Father pending further order or agreement) back to this court for determination.

3. On an Interim basis, the Respondent Father’s parenting time shall occur on alternate weekends, but which days/times being dependent on the third-party supervisor’s willingness/availability. If the parties cannot resolve this issue between them in writing, again either party may bring this back to court for determination.

4. On an Interim basis, the Applicant Mother shall have sole/primary decision making authority in terms of all major decisions affecting the Child, including but not limited to, primary/sole decision making authority over any and all educational decisions affecting the child (such that the Applicant Mother is hereby permitted specifically to enroll the Child in full time, in person school at a school of her choosing commencing September 2023 without the need for the Respondent Father to consent), as well as other required/reasonable educational decisions; sole/primary decision making authority over the Child’s major extracurricular activities; and sole/primary decision making authority over any and all major non emergency medical/dental decisions affecting the Child.

5. There shall be an immediate release of all Children’s Aid Society records as it pertains to the Child.

6. This court order may be enforced by Toronto Police Services and Ontario Provincial Police to locate, apprehend and deliver the child to the mother in order to give effect to the terms of this order. … [Emphasis added]

Subsequent Events

[16] Several months after the Interim Order was issued, the respondent father sought to change the parenting terms of the Interim Order.

Case Conference – March 13, 2024

[17] A Case Conference was held on March 13, 2024. The Court explained to the respondent father that if he wants different parenting time arrangements with the Child, then he could bring a motion for that relief if there had been a material change in circumstances since the time that the Interim Order was made. The Court also requested the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

Report of OCL Clinical Investigator – October 11, 2024

[18] A report, dated October 11, 2024, was prepared by an OCL clinical investigator. Three interviews were held with the Child from June 2024 to August 2024.

[19] Amongst other things, the clinician noted:

• In the records of the York CAS, the Child reported feeling upset that her parents badmouthed each other.
• According to both parents, the other was angry, untruthful, egocentric and emotionally unstable.
• During the evaluation, there did appear to be some indication that the respondent displayed some controlling, temperamental and volatile behaviour both from the Child and collateral sources.
• Both the respondent and Ms. Tsiotsikas declined to engage with the York CAS.
• While the applicant was a very committed mother “it does not appear that she excluded [the respondent] from being involved or influenced [the Child] about her thoughts towards him.
• “During the evaluation, [the Child] described clear and consistent views about her mother and father and while it would appear that there were periods of time when they had a more positive relationship, she also described a troubling and upsetting connection with him. [The Child] shared a positive description of her mother and their relationship but explained that when she was homeschooled by her father, he was unkind, demanding, unable to listen, yelled at her and made her cry. Stating clearly that she no longer wanted to be homeschooled, [the Child] said he never listened and that when she was with him, he never looked after her, played or engaged with her, leaving that responsibility to either her grandmother or partner, Ms. Tsiotsikas.
• “[The Child] was engaged in counselling from December 2023 to April 2024 and according to the notes provided, she described feeling embarrassed, disregarded and unheard by her father and fearful he would yell at her. In counselling, [the Child] also stated that she did not enjoy parenting time and would prefer supervised visits”.
• “During this evaluation, [the Child] expressed that she used to feel disinterested and disappointed in parenting time with her father as he rarely did things with her but more recently, has felt the visits were better as he was spending time with her. It would appear from the observation visit [on May 26, 2024], that [the Child] seemed smiley and able to joke and laugh with her father although she said he was not usually engaged with her like that. While she stated not really wanting to spend the whole visit alone with him, fearful he would take her to his home with Ms. Tsiotsikas, [the Child] advised that she would like to see him and could spend some time within the community, but only with her father and grandmother and not at his home or to stay overnight”.
• Although the parties had a shared parenting time arrangement when they separated, since August 2023 the respondent has had supervised parenting time with the Child at his mother’s home on alternate Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays for a total of 10 hours. It does not appear that the applicant has withheld the Child from the respondent and it does seem that the Child is presenting with clear and consistent views and wishes about her parenting time.

[20] The clinician made recommendations including the following:

• The respondent shall have parenting time with the Child for 3 to 4 hours during the week and on alternate Sundays for 4 to 5 hours in the afternoon. The days and times shall be determined by the parties and in accordance with the schedule of both parents, the Child and her paternal grandmother. Parenting time shall occur at the respondent’s mother’s home and the respondent shall be responsible for all caregiving tasks. During parenting time, there may be a portion of the visit that is spent in the community, to be decided and agreed upon by the respondent and the Child. The applicant shall encourage and support the Child’s parenting time with the respondent. Any amendments to the parenting time schedule, including frequency, duration, location and/or level of supervision, shall be as agreed upon by the parties and in accordance with the Child’s wishes.
• The respondent shall consider participating in counselling in order to explore his thoughts and feelings about his relationship with the Child and receive support in order to rebuild and strengthen their connection.
• The applicant shall consider participating in counselling in order to explore her thoughts and feelings about the new dynamics and how best to support the Child.
• The Child shall consider participating in further counselling in order to have an opportunity to express her thoughts and feelings about parenting time with her father, their relationship and the family dynamic.

[21] The respondent disagrees with many of the statements found in the OCL report.

Settlement Conference – October 22, 2024

[22] A Settlement Conference was held on October 22, 2024. In her Endorsement, Justice A.P. Ramsay noted that the respondent father stated that his evidence was misconstrued by Justice Akazaki and that the respondent father wishes to repair his relationship with his daughter. The Endorsement states:

[3] The respondent father will be filing an objection to the OCL report and is aware of the deadline for doing so. He has shared some of the objections with me.

[4] The respondent father has expressed his intention to take the appropriate steps to ensure that his relationship with his daughter is repaired. Both parties recognize that they must focus on what would allow their daughter K. to flourish and are to be commended for their willingness to attempt to work out a parenting arrangement, and steps to be taken by the respondent father, to re-engage with his daughter.

[5] If they are unable to do so, leave is granted to the respondent father to bring a motion to vary the parenting order of Akazaki J. dated August 3, 2024. The respondent father had not appeared at the motion but had made written submissions. He says that he was distressed to see that his statements had been taken out of context and have been misconstrued. Having heard his explanation, it is evident that he wishes to repair his relationship with his daughter and should be given an opportunity to do so.

[6] I have urged the respondent father to seek legal advice, even on a limited basis, with respect to some of the issues raised.

[7] The parties will attempt to work out an arrangement on child support. …

[11] Leave granted to either party to vary the order of Akazaki J. dated August 3, 2024, on parenting.

[12] The Trial Management Conference is scheduled for March 19, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. The parties must file a jointly completed Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form with the Confirmation form.

OCL Report Dispute Statement

[23] Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Family Law Rules, on November 7, 2024, the respondent delivered an 89-page statement disputing the OCL report. The respondent states that the clinician “accepted everything the applicant mother said at face value” and “ignored all the respondent father’s (my) concerns” and ignored his Form 10 Answer and Form 35.1. Amongst other things, the respondent states that the clinician failed to learn why the Child has expressed negative feelings toward him. The respondent states that the Child’s “main bad guy” has changed over time – starting with the respondent during talks with CAS, then her friend A during talks with her therapist and then his current partner and her son, N, during talks with the OCL clinician. Having read the OCL report, it appears that the Child has had a difficult relationship both now and at the time that the CAS was engaged.

Motion – December 12, 2024

[24] Stevenson J.’s Endorsement states:

[1] This is the Respondent Father’s motion to vary the temporary interim order of August 3, 2023 which provides him with supervised access with his daughter, age 10. He also seeks orders to give him temporary full decision-making responsibility, to compel the Applicant Mother to attend anger management therapy etc. and related Orders. He also seeks “punitive justice” against the wife’s lawyer.

[2] He says the mother and her counsel agreed to today’s date for his motion. They disagree. He says a case conference has been held before Justice Kraft on these substantive issues.

[3] The Mother intends to file evidence, especially on the issue of the child’s welfare and safety. The Mother initially suggested Dec 19, 2024 as a return date but that is not available to the court. She then suggested Jan 2, 2025 which is 3 weeks hence.

[4] In oral argument the Mother had reconsidered the return date and counsel suggested that the Father’s motion is likely to be a long motion. When combined with the Mother’s related motion, counsel says it will inevitably be a long motion.

[5] The father does not agree. In opposition to the adjournment request he filed a 55 para. affidavit which was more in the nature of argument about why the adjournment should be denied. He argues the issues he has raised are urgent.

[6] I have decided to grant an adjournment of today’s motion.

[7] I direct that the Father’s motion and the Mother’s motion shall be dealt with together in a half-day motion which has been booked in the court’s schedule for the next available date; which is May 15, 2025.

[8] The Father shall file any amended or supplementary materials on his motion within 30 days.

[9] The Mother shall file the materials on her own motion within 30 days.

[10] The Father is considering whether to withdraw the very serious allegations he has made against the Mother’s counsel. This would be with a view to focusing on the supervised parenting and related issues. This is up to him, but he need to make sure that his materials and issues together with the Mother’s motion can be dealt with in half a day. He will only have a finite amount of time, as already booked.

[11] He might also consider whether it is better to go straight to trial on all appropriate issues with a full evidentiary record. A trial management conference is scheduled for March 19, 2025.

[12] I urged the Father to seek some legal advice, even if it is on a limited retainer basis.

[13] In adjourning this motion I determined that there is nothing urgent today.

[14] The child has been in the mother’s primary care since early Aug 2023 without incident, although I acknowledge that the father does not agree.

[15] He alleges the mother and her counsel have alienated the child and have wilfully misled the court with false accusations of abuse and educational neglect. He says the CAS investigated and found no issues on his part. He seeks temporary full decision-making authority because of the mother’s unilateral decisions, and he suggests she has withheld therapy and schooling from their daughter.

[16] The Husband had filed a rambling and repetitive factum on the motion. He may wish to redraft this to focus on the important issues. As it stands, the preamble starts by arguing there is a lack of public confidence in the legal profession. Para. 5 suggests the wife’s lawyer engaged in professional misconduct and worse. He says the wife’s counsel misled the courts and that the system is biased against fathers. He says his right of access to his child is being improperly limited. He says the current status quo “trend” must be corrected.

[17] He says there has been premeditated irreparable harm to the child, father, and others, caused by the malice of the applicant mother and her counsel.

[18] He says that he is not an abuser.

[19] The wife relies on a relatively recent OCL report dated Oct 11, 2024, the details of which are contested by the husband. The report makes seven recommendations, none of which raise any urgent issues of concern today.

[20] On the plus side the father says he hopes to move the current situation to low conflict and “to promote our daughter’s best interest with honourable equity.”

[21] The father understands that the best interests of the child are determinative. However, I disagree that there is any urgency based on his motion record, having regard to the OCL report. There is little to suggest that changing the status quo is in the child’s best interests at this stage, based on the limited evidentiary basis he presents in support of varying the August 2023 Order.

[22] The father would be well advised to consider whether his issues of alleged child abuse, parental alienation, inappropriate decision making, and perjury should be dealt with at trial on a proper record rather than on a motion.

[23] The costs of this adjournment are reserved to the Judge dealing with both motions.

Offer of Reunification Therapy

[25] The applicant states that she has worked hard to try to support the respondent’s relationship with the Child. In October 2024, the applicant offered to waive any and all child support arrears owed for the last 15 months in which the Child has lived with the applicant if the respondent engaged in reunification therapy with the Child. The respondent declined. While the applicant states that the respondent has done nothing to work on himself, the respondent states that he is seeing a counsellor.

Counselling

[26] The respondent father states that he has participated in numerous seminars/programs since April 2024:

• New Beginnings Online Family Law Seminar – Catholic Family Services, Toronto
• Mastering Your Separation Workshop – Jewish Family and Child Services
• Protecting Youth from Human Trafficking & Internet Exploitation – York Regional Police
• High Conflict Divorce Workshop - Jewish Family and Child Services
• The Changing Family Program - Jewish Family and Child Services (April 1, 2025, April 7, 2025)
• Nurturing Your Child’s Emotional Well-Being – Parent engagement – York Region Catholic District School Board
• Successful Step Parenting - Jewish Family and Child Services

[27] Aside from the second and third last items, it is not apparent how the other items might serve to improve the respondent’s relationship with his daughter or otherwise respond to the recommendations made by the OCL clinician that the respondent participate in counselling to receive support in rebuilding his relationship with his daughter.

Events in 2025

[28] The applicant mother states that the Child has expressed and displayed anxiety before her visits which, at least during 2025, have occurred every Friday after school.

[29] On both February 14, 2025, and February 21, 2025, the Child left her grandmother’s house following her parenting time with the respondent, appearing visibly emotional before getting into the applicant mother’s car.

[30] The applicant states:

On Friday, February 28, 2025, less than 30 minutes after I dropped [the Child] off at her grandmother's home for time with the Respondent, I received a call from the Respondent’s mother asking me to return, as [the Child] was crying and wanted to be picked up. I immediately went back. Upon my arrival, I noticed that the Respondent’s car was no longer in the driveway. When [the Child] came out, her face was red with tears streaming down, and she was visibly shaken. [The Child] told me – and I believe – that after her birthday was mentioned, the Respondent began yelling at his mother, which caused [the Child] to start crying. Despite this, he continued to escalate, turning his anger toward [the Child]. He yelled at her, demanded answers to questions, and grew even angrier when she responded. He accused her of lying and made disparaging remarks about me, including saying that I was “putting thoughts into her head”. Still visibly angry, the Respondent left his mother’s home, leaving [the Child] behind in a state of distress – crying and shaking.

[31] Nevertheless, on March 8, 2025, the respondent showed up uninvited at the Child’s birthday party, attended by the Child’s friends, wearing a body camera.

[32] On March 8, 2025, the Child sent a two-page email to the respondent father describing her feelings. The respondent father suggests that it was written by the applicant mother given its language; however, there is nothing in that language, including the details, which suggests that it was written by the applicant. In that email the Child states:

• She does not want Ms. S and her son, N, to be involved in all of their time together.
• She states that in the photos taken when they went, she presented a happy face because she felt that she had to do so.
• She did not like how she was treated differently from N.
• She did not like how N called the applicant a “mental person” and that he was not called out by an adult.
• She gave up telling him how she felt because he never believed her and because she is afraid of him.
• She feels that she is being interrogated when she speaks with him.
• She does not like it when he yells at her.
• She lies to him because she is afraid of him and does not want to upset him.
• He never took part in any of her organized activities and places she went.
• “And last but not least to answer the question you ask me this week on Friday the question was (if you don’t want to see me anymore let me know) and to answer your question its no maybe it hurts but I don’t want to see you anymore and you have to respect that”.

[33] The respondent father states that the applicant mother has been “relentlessly restricting, manipulating, coercing, and cancelling access, disregarding our daughter’s well-being”. He also continues to assert that the Interim Order was obtained by “fraud”. The respondent’s allegations do not appear to be supported by any other evidence filed.

Issue #1: Is the Applicant Mother in Contempt of Court for Breach of the Interim Order?

[34] The principles for determining whether a parent is in contempt of court were described in Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, para 10 as follows:

The following general principles govern the use of the court's power to find a party in civil contempt of court for breaching a court order:

1. For a party to be found in contempt of court for breaching a court order, three elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the order alleged to have been breached must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done; (2) the party alleged to have breached the order must have had actual knowledge of it; and (3) the party allegedly in breach must have intentionally done the act that the order prohibits or intentionally failed to do the act that the order compels: Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, paras 32-35; Greenberg v. Nowack, 2016 ONCA 949, paras 25-26.

2. Exercising the contempt power is discretionary. Courts discourage the routine use of this power to obtain compliance with court orders. The power should be exercised cautiously and with great restraint as an enforcement tool of last rather than first resort. A judge may exercise discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice. As an alternative to making a contempt finding too readily, a judge should consider other options, such as issuing a declaration that the party breached the order or encouraging professional assistance: Carey, at paras. 36-37; Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, paras 9-12; Valoris pour enfants et adultes de Prescott-Russell c. K.R., 2021 ONCA 366, para 41; and Ruffolo v. David, 2019 ONCA 385, paras 18-19.

3. When the issue raised on the contempt motion concerns access to children, the paramount consideration is the best interests of the children: Ruffolo, at para. 19; Chong, at para. 11; and Valoris, at para. 41.

[35] In Godard v. Godard, 2015 ONCA 568, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:

28 Although a child's wishes, particularly the wishes of a child of S.'s age, should certainly be considered by a court prior to making an access order, once the court has determined that access is in the child's best interests a parent cannot leave the decision to comply with the access order up to the child. As stated by the motion judge, Ontario courts have held consistently that a parent "has some positive obligation to ensure a child who allegedly resists contact with the access parent complies with the access order": …

29 No doubt, it may be difficult to comply with an access order, especially as children get older. Parents are not required to do the impossible in order to avoid a contempt finding. They are, however, required to do all that they reasonably can. In this case, the motion judge inferred deliberate and wilful disobedience of the order from the appellant's failure to do all that she reasonably could: she failed to "take concrete measures to apply normal parental authority to have the child comply with the access order". [Emphasis added]

[36] A parent that engages in alienating behaviour, such as communicating inflammatory and untrue statements about the child’s access parent, and expresses to that child an intense dislike of the access parent, is in contempt of court when the child refuses to have parenting time with the access parent: Bors v. Bors, 2021 ONCA 513, paras 23-29.

[37] There are several reasons why the respondent father’s contempt motion should be dismissed.

[38] First, a contempt motion is an enforcement power of last resort rather than first resort. The respondent could have, but did not, bring a motion for enforcement of the Interim Order pursuant to Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules. A contempt motion should not have been brought in these circumstances, particularly as the respondent’s own behaviour has led to the Child’s refusal to have parenting time with him.

[39] Second, the respondent father’s notice of motion does not specify the dates on which the applicant mother is to have breached the Interim Order. Detailed evidence is required of the specific violations of a parenting order. In K. (L.) v. G. (T.), [2006] O.J. No. 2307, at para. 51, Wildman J. stated:

Because of the criminal nature of the proceedings, the notice of motion is akin to an information in a criminal case. It must set out clear, concrete, specific particulars of the breaches and "concrete facts of a nature to identify the particular act which is charged"

[40] The Interim Order does not specify the dates for the respondent father’s parenting time other than it occur on a day to be determined by the parties every other weekend. It appears that the respondent father was afforded more frequent parenting time by the applicant mother as he had parenting with the Child on a weekly basis in February 2025.

[41] Third, I am not satisfied that the Child’s estrangement from the respondent is as a result of the applicant’s behaviour. Other than the respondent’s own assertions, there is no evidence of alienating behaviour by the applicant. In fact, the offer made by the applicant to waive child support arrears so long as the respondent engaged in reunification therapy with their daughter is indicative of a parent who seeks to support, rather than undermine, her daughter’s relationship with the respondent. As noted, a parent is required to make all reasonable efforts to a child’s relationship with the other parent but should not bear responsibility for the consequences of the other parent’s poor behaviour with their child. I find that the applicant has not breached the parenting time provisions of the Interim Order.

[42] For these reasons, the respondent’s contempt motion is dismissed.

Issue #2: Has there been a material change in circumstances? Should the Respondent father’s motion for 50/50 Parenting Time and Sole Decision Making Authority be Granted? Should the Respondent father’s motion to have unsupervised parenting time be granted? Should the Applicant mother’s motion for the respondent father’s parenting time to be professionally supervised be granted?

[43] In Zavaleta v. Zavaleta, 2024 112743, the principles to be applied when determining whether an interim parenting order should be varied were described by Vella J. as follows:

21 The purpose of a temporary parenting order is to provide stability to the child pending a trial. The decision must necessarily be made on the basis of a written evidentiary record which will likely become more fulsome at trial.

22 In assessing the best interests of the child, the Court must give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security and wellbeing (s. 24(2), Children's Law Reform Act, RSO 1990 (CLRA); s. 16(2), Divorce Act, RSC 1985 (Divorce Act))

23 In determining the child's best interests, the Court will consider all factors relating to the circumstances of the child as set out by s. 24(3) of the CLRA and s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act.

24 The Court must ascertain a child's best interests from the perspective of the child, rather than that of the parents (Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC)).

25 No one factor listed in the statutory definition of a child's best interests is given paramountcy over another. However, certain factors may be more influential than others in the particular circumstances of the child whose best interests is at issue.

26 The status quo will generally be maintained unless there is cogent evidence that such a situation will not be in the best interests of the child. This is because the court is making a preliminary determination to create a stable and predictable situation for the child, pending a trial where a full evidentiary record will be available.

27 Therefore, a motion to vary an existing interim or temporary parenting order generally requires the moving party to demonstrate that a material change in circumstances that affects or will likely affect the best interest of the child has occurred. This is irrespective of whether the order was made on consent or at a contested motion. However, there are two exceptions. The first is when the temporary parenting order was made expressly on a without prejudice basis. The second is when the temporary parenting order was made, expressly or implicitly, on a time limited basis; e.g.: the court has built into the order a review mechanism. (Kirichenko v. Kirichenko, 2021 ONSC 2833, paras 12, 26-30). [Emphasis added]

[44] The Interim Order contemplates that the parties return to the Court for directions if they are unable to agree on a supervisor. The respondent has brought this contempt motion instead. A draft Order was not provided although his Confirmation of Motion states that he seeks the following orders: “Finding of Contempt, Lift Supervised Visitation, Reinstate the Previous 50/50 Custody Arrangement, Temporary Full Decision-Making Authority”. In his Factum, the respondent father also specifies that he seeks an order to reinstate 50/50 shared parenting time and full decision-making authority.

[45] I find that the deterioration of the Child’s relationship with the respondent father amounts to a material change in circumstances. While she was once willing to have parenting time supervised by her paternal grandmother, that approach has not protected the Child from the respondent father’s behaviour. Now, the Child no longer wishes to have parenting time with the respondent father even in what was assumed by the Interim Order to be the “safe space” of her grandmother’s home. Given recent events, her home can no longer be viewed as such.

[46] Given the circumstances, I find that granting the respondent’s request for sole decision-making authority and equal shared parenting time does not promote the Child’s best interests. The OCL notes that the Child is well-taken care of by the applicant and the evidence before this Court reflects that conclusion. There is no child-focused reason to change the status quo, in this regard, prior to trial.

[47] Turning to each party’s request to alter the terms in the Interim Order related to supervised parenting, the relevant principles were described by Justice Kraft in Gerasimopoulos v. Sambirsky, 2024 ONSC 2368 as follows:

25 A parent seeking supervised parenting time for the other parent bears the burden of establishing that supervision is necessary: W.H.C. v. W.C.M.C., 2021 ONCJ 308; Klymenko v. Klymenko, 2020 ONSC 5451.

26 In Stec v. Blair, 2021 ONSC 6212, paras 22-24, Fowler Byrne J. reviewed the law related to supervised access and explained the reason that it is not automatically granted:

a. Supervised access is a great intrusion into the relationship between a child and parent and its continued imposition must be justified: Young v. Hanson, 2019 ONSC 1245, para 32, also cited in G. v. F., 2021 ONSC 1362, para 47.

b. The intrusion is less striking when supervision is by a family member in a home setting, but nonetheless, it is not a long-term solution. Supervised access is designed to provide a temporary and time-limited measure, to resolve a parental impasse over access, rather than provide a long [term] solution: M. (B.P.) v. M. (B.L.D.E.), 1992 8642 (ON CA), para 33.

c. The onus lies on the person seeking that parenting time be supervised, to show that such supervision is necessary. The greater the restriction on regular parenting time, the more important it is to show why the restriction is necessary: Liu v. Xie, 2021 ONSC 222, para 69; Docherty v. Catherwood, 2015 ONSC 5240, para 38.

27 Supervised access "is beneficial for children who require gradual reintroduction to a parent, or whose safety requires it until such time as the parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and a child is no longer in danger or physical or emotional harm." Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi, 2004 ONCJ 374.

28 The Courts have taken the view that because supervised access creates an artificial environment, it should not be ordered as a long-term arrangement: Hunt v. Hunt, 2023 ONSC 5411, para 43.

[48] The respondent father’s motion for unsupervised access proceeds on the basis that the Child’s refusal to see him is caused by the applicant and contradicted by the Child’s seemingly happy photographs and videos in his presence. There is no evidence that the applicant has sought to alienate the Child from the respondent and it is more likely that the opposite is true. Further, the Child explained in her email that she is afraid of the respondent and that her expressions of happiness were on display because she felt compelled to do so. In my view, it is in the child’s best interests to maintain the status quo of supervised parenting time pending a final determination of this proceeding at trial.

[49] Given that the respondent is almost 57 years old, I assume that his mother is at least in her late 70s. As supervisor of the respondent’s visits with her granddaughter, in her own home, she is placed in a difficult position. It does not appear that she is unable to provide an emotionally safe space for her granddaughter. The Interim Order also provides that the respondent’s parenting time may be supervised by his sister; however, the respondent father states he does not have a good relationship with his sister and thus this additional supervision option is not viable.

[50] The applicant mother’s motion for parenting time to be supervised either by a professional agency or by a reunification therapist should be granted. The respondent has rejected the sensible approach of obtaining the assistance of a reunification therapist and thus it is impractical to order that he do so. Nevertheless, that option will be made available.

[51] I order that the Interim Order shall be amended by replacing paragraph 2 with the following:

2. On an interim basis, pending further order or written agreement between the parties, the Respondent Father shall have parenting time with the Child for two hours, twice each week, at a date, time and place to be determined by the Applicant Mother in the presence of:

(a) A reunification therapist;

(b) A supervisor from a professional supervision firm such as Brayden Supervision Services; or

(c) Any other person that the applicant and the respondent both agree upon.

Order

[52] The respondent father’s motion for a contempt order and an order varying the Interim Order is dismissed.

[53] The applicant mother’s motion for professionally supervised parenting time is granted in part on the terms described above.

[54] Costs submissions no greater than three pages in length shall be submitted by the applicant mother within one week. The respondent father shall deliver his responding costs submissions within two weeks. Each costs submission shall be no more than three pages in length excluding any offers to settle and an outline of costs.

[55] The trial management conference that was scheduled for March 19, 2025 was not held. It shall be held on a date to be provided by the Trial Coordinator. The earliest available trial date is October 6, 2025. The parties expect that this trial should not take longer than one week. This family law proceeding, and particularly the parenting issues, should be determined on a full evidentiary record and brought to a conclusion. Subject to any order of the trial management conference judge, I direct that this trial be scheduled to commence on October 6, 2025 for up to one week.

M.D. Faieta
Date: April 30, 2025