Vieira v. Vieira, 2015 ONSC 2928
COURT FILE NO.: FS-14-397190
DATE: 20150505
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: Filipe Francisco martins vieira, Applicant
AND:
Marina Martins Vieira, Respondent
BEFORE: C. Horkins J.
COUNSEL: Alla Koren, for the Applicant
Marina Martins Vieira, acting in person
HEARD at Toronto: April 27, 2015
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The parties married on January 19, 2013. They have one child born on July 18, 2013. The parties separated on August 3, 2014.
[2] The respondent mother alleges that the applicant father uttered death threats and assaulted her in August 2014. He was charged with three counts of uttering death threats and two counts of assault. The pending criminal charges against the father are due to proceed to trial this June.
[3] The applicant father commenced this application on August 28, 2014. He seeks a divorce, custody of the child, an unequal division of net family property and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.
[4] The respondent mother filed an Answer that she amended early in 2015. She seeks custody, child support, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and sale of that property.
[5] This dispute quickly became high conflict. The Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) conducted an investigation and the report is now available. Numerous motions and orders have been made. Recently the parties consented to an order giving the respondent mother interim sole custody of the child and the father unsupervised access.
[6] There are two long motions before the court. I will deal with the applicant father’s motion first and the relief that he seeks in his amended notice of motion dated April 16, 2015. Since both parties seek relief concerning the matrimonial home, I will deal with this together.
The Applicant’s Permission to Travel
[7] Justice Perkins issued a consent order on March 3, 2015. This order gave the mother interim sole custody of the child and removed the requirement for the father’s access to be supervised. By this point in time the OCL report was available. The order set out a detailed holiday schedule and gave each parent two non-consecutive weeks of vacation with the child in the summer months. These weeks are to start after the child turns two on July 18, 2015. Since this limits the available summer weeks in 2015, the parties have agreed to the following vacation weeks for 2015. Mother shall have vacation time with the child on July 30 to August 6, 2015 and September 29 to October 6, 2015. Father shall have vacation time with the child on August 17 to 24, 2015 and September 14 to 21, 2015. Going forward the summer weeks will be in July or August.
[8] The father wants to travel to Portugal with his son for one of his holiday weeks. Mother will not consent to travel outside of Canada. She believes that father will not return to Canada with the child. Father has never taken any steps to try and abduct the child. He insists that the mother’s fears are unfounded and assures the court that he will return to Canada after the vacation. He is prepared to post a bond to evidence his intention to return.
[9] The father was born in Portugal. He came to Canada in 2008 and is a permanent resident. He has an application for Canadian citizenship in process. The father holds a Portuguese passport. Portugal is a signatory to the Hague Convention.
[10] The father’s parents live in Portugal. When the parties were married they travelled to Portugal with their son to see his family. The trip was without incident.
[11] The status of the applicant father’s residency and application for citizenship is addressed in a letter dated June 6, 2015 from his immigration lawyer. If the applicant is found guilty of any of the above criminal charges and is imprisoned for a term of six months or more he could be found “inadmissible” under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. If found to be inadmissible, a deportation order could be issued. Once the trial of the charges commences, the applicant is not entitled to receive his Canadian citizenship. It is not known when the applicant might receive his Canadian citizenship.
[12] The applicant insists that he has roots in Canada and has no intention of leaving. He is self-employed and runs a renovation business with a partner. He started this business last year. He does not own any property other than the condominium where the respondent and child reside. His brother resides in Ontario.
[13] To support her fear of abduction, the respondent alleges that the applicant has tried to obtain a Portuguese passport for the child. The applicant denies this.
[14] The circumstances of this case are unique. I accept that the applicant has been here since 2008 and seeks citizenship. This is evidence of his intention to stay in Canada. However, the outcome of the criminal charges and the impact that this will have on his resident status and application for citizenship is yet to be determined. In my view, it is in the best interest of the child that I err on the side of caution and require the applicant to spend his vacation with the child in Canada. Based on the circumstances as they currently exist, there is a risk that the applicant will not return to Canada with the child. It is always open to the applicant’s parents to visit him and the child in Canada.
[15] This travel restriction is imposed pending further order of the court or an agreement of the parties to allow travel outside of Canada. The restriction may be reviewed when the criminal charges are resolved and/or the applicant has received his Canadian citizenship.
Relief re Matrimonial Home
[16] Each party seeks relief dealing with the matrimonial home. This property is a condominium located at 399 Adelaide Street West, Unit 704, Toronto (“Adelaide condominium”). As a result, I will deal with this part of their motions together.
[17] The applicant seeks exclusive possession and the respondent wants an order that the matrimonial home be sold and the equity divided. Some background evidence is required to provide context for the matrimonial home issue.
[18] Before the parties married, they signed a Cohabitation Agreement (“the Agreement”) dated November 20, 2012. They each received independent legal advice. A summary of the Agreement is set out below.
[19] The Agreement covers equalization of property, their debts and custody of the child. The property that each party owned at the time is recorded.
[20] The applicant owned a house at 3043 Weston Rd and a property at 1135 Royal York Road, Unit 903. The parties intended to reside at 3043 Weston Rd. It was appraised at $1,000,000. The Royal York property had about $100,000 of equity.
[21] The respondent owned two properties: a condominium on Lakeshore Blvd and a townhouse in Aurora. The first had equity of about $40,000 and the second had equity of about $70,000. She still owns these properties and both are rented.
[22] “Primary residence” is defined in the Agreement as the Weston Road property or any successor property purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the Weston property. After the Agreement was signed the Weston property was sold and the proceeds were used to purchase the Adelaide condominium. As a result, this condominium became the primary residence under the Agreement.
[23] Section 7 of the Agreement deals with the Primary Residence. I note that the Agreement uses the phrase Primary Residence and Principal Residence. This is likely a mistake. I will refer to it as the Primary Residence. The Agreement sets out the following with respect to the “primary residence”:
• The parties shall share the day to day expenses of the primary residence including taxes utilities and mortgage payments.
• If there is a breakdown in the relationship, the respondent agrees to vacate the primary residence within 30 days.
• The applicant agrees to transfer 50% of his interest in the primary residence to the respondent as joint tenant at the time of execution of the agreement in consideration of a $30,000 payment from the respondent.
• The respondent waives all rights to the equity in the primary residence available as of the date of the Agreement.
• In the event of separation, divorce or sale of the primary residence, the applicant agrees to pay back to the respondent the amount of her investment in full, up to $30,000 plus 50% of the value of the primary residence in excess of $1,000,000.
• The respondent waives all claims that she may have against the primary residence.
[24] The respondent never made the $30,000 payment. The Weston property was sold for less than $1,000,000. The proceeds were used to buy the Adelaide condominium on July 3, 2014. The parties lived in this condominium together for one month and then they separated. On title, the respondent is a 40% owner of the Adelaide condominium.
[25] The respondent states in her affidavit that the Agreement defines primary residence as the Weston property and any new property that is bought using the sale proceeds from the sale of Weston. She agrees that based on the Agreement, she has no claim against the primary residence. However, she states that the parties agreed to amend this part of the Agreement because the applicant wanted her to have an interest in the matrimonial home. She does not say that they agreed to amend the clause requiring her to vacate the primary residence on separation.
[26] According to the respondent, the amendment to the agreement was achieved through the transfer of a 40% in in the Adelaide condominium to the respondent. There is no written agreement to amend the Agreement. The respondent says that the rest of the Agreement remains in force.
[27] The applicant states that the respondent is required to vacate the primary residence within 30 days of separation. She has failed to do so.
[28] The respondent continues to be the sole owner of the two properties that she owned when the Agreement was signed. They are both rented and she is the recipient of this rental income.
[29] There is a dispute as to what rights, if any, the respondent has to the Adelaide condominium. The Agreement states that the respondent “waives all of her rights to the equity in the Principal Resident available as the date of this agreement”. The respondent alleges that this was amended when she was registered on title as a 40% owner of the Adelaide condo. The applicant disputes her position. However, if the respondent’s position is accepted then the applicant seeks an unequal division of the equity in the Adelaide condominium.
[30] The applicant seeks exclusive possession of the Adelaide condominium. He is living in a basement apartment. The respondent and child have had sole occupation of the Adelaide condominium since the date of separation.
[31] The applicant paid 100% of the mortgage, taxes and condominium related expenses until the consent order of Justice Mesbur dated January 15, 2015. This order allowed the respondent and child to remain in the Adelaide condominium pending return of these motions. The respondent was ordered to pay 40% of the mortgage, property taxes, property insurance and maintenance fees. She has done so.
[32] The respondent wants an order that the Adelaide condominium be sold so that she can receive her 40% share of the equity. During the motion, I explained to the respondent that if the court ordered the sale of the Adelaide condominium, the net proceeds would be held in trust pending a settlement or court order. When the respondent realized this, she withdrew her request for a sale and stated that she wants to remain in the Adelaide condominium.
[33] The applicant disputes that the respondent has a right to any share of the equity. He relies on the Agreement. He does not want the property sold and the funds held in trust pending resolution of this dispute. He explained that this would trigger a large interest penalty if the mortgage had to be paid early. He says that he cannot afford to pay such a penalty. He believes that if the condominium is sold the net equity will be minimal.
[34] The applicant wants to move back into the Adelaide condominium and use it as his residence. He had to sell the Royal York property to pay for his legal fees. He cannot afford to rent an apartment, pay child support and 60% of the Adelaide expenses. In contrast, the respondent owns two rental properties, she collects the rent and until recently she did not pay any of the Adelaide condominium expenses. I acknowledge that these circumstances are unfair to the applicant.
[35] The issue of whether the respondent has an interest in the Adelaide condominium is disputed and cannot be decided on a motion given the conflicting evidence. Failing settlement it is an issue that must proceed to trial.
[36] During the motion, I questioned whether the applicant should have exclusive possession of the Adelaide condominium given the conflicting evidence. However, after careful consideration, I have concluded that the applicant should be granted this relief on terms.
[37] The respondent was prepared to move out of the Adelaide condominium since she brought this motion for a sale. This is not a case where there is concern about disrupting the child. The child’s best interests will not be interfered with if the respondent is required to vacate the Adelaide condominium.
[38] This was an extremely short marriage. The Adelaide condominium was purchased in July 2014 and the parties separated the next month. If the Agreement is binding, then the respondent has no interest in the Adelaide condominium. Under the Agreement, she was required to move out of the Adelaide condominium 30 days after separation. The respondent alleges that the Agreement was amended to give her a 40% interest. If true, then the applicant asserts a claim for unequal division (i.e. he should have 100% of the Adelaide condominium.) Based on the evidence set out above, the unequal division claim may have merit. The respondent can pursue her claim for a 40% interest whether she lives in this condominium or not.
[39] The respective financial circumstances of the parties differ. The respondent is employed by a bank and earns $85,000. The applicant’s self-employed income fluctuates. He started his business shortly before separation and estimates that his earnings are approximately $65,000.
[40] The applicant asked the respondent to make arrangements to move into one of her two rental properties or elsewhere. She has options concerning where she can live whereas the applicant does not. The applicant is prepared to give the respondent time to make arrangements to move out of the Adelaide condominium. The respondent offered no explanation for why she must stay in the Adelaide condominium. This is not surprising since she brought a motion for sale of this property. She clearly has given some thought to where she will live.
[41] The circumstances of this case are unique. The evidence favours the applicant. Pursuant to s. 24 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.3, I exercise my discretion and grant the applicant exclusive possession of the Adelaide condominium. The following terms apply:
(i) The respondent shall vacate the Adelaide condominium no later than August 31, 2015
(ii) The applicant shall have exclusive possession of the Adelaide condominium the day after the respondent vacates the condominium and no later than September 1, 2015.
(iii) The parties shall make best efforts to agree on the division of the household contents 30 days before the respondent vacates the condominium. Such agreement shall be in writing. Failing an agreement, the issue shall be decided by the court.
(iv) The parties shall continue to share the Adelaide condominium expenses as set out in para. 4 of Justice Mesbur’s order dated January 15, 2015. This sharing shall continue until the respondent vacates the Adelaide condominium. Thereafter the applicant shall pay 100% of these expenses.
(v) Para. 5 of Justice Mesbur’s order dated January 15, 2015 continues to apply to all payments made under para. 4 of her order and to those payments made pursuant to this order relating to the Adelaide condominium.
(vi) The applicant shall not further encumber or sell the Adelaide condominium without the written consent of the respondent or a court order.
(vii) The respondent’s interest in the Adelaide condominium shall be decided at trial if the issue is not settled in advance.
[42] Finally, the applicant seeks an order in paras. 7 and 9 of his amended notice of motion that the respondent reimburse him for various expenses associated with the Adelaide condominium (mortgage, property taxes, condominium fees and utilities). This issue is best dealt with at trial when the issue of the respondent’s claim for an interest in the Adelaide condominium is decided.
The Costs of Supervised Access
[43] The applicant wants the respondent to pay half of the costs that he incurred to exercise supervised access. Supervision was ordered by Justice Perkins on September 16, 2014. This order followed the criminal charges. The supervision term was removed on consent in the order of Justice Perkins dated March 3, 2015 after the OCL report was released.
[44] The issue of whether the respondent should share in the cost of the supervision should be decided after the applicant’s criminal charges are dealt with since the outcome may be relevant to whether the respondent should bear some of the expense. If the charges are still outstanding when this matter proceeds to trial, the trial judge will decide the issue.
Disclosure
[45] The applicant presented a chart setting out the disclosure that he requested from the applicant and has not received. The chart also lists those items that have been produced. A copy of the chart dealing only with outstanding requests is attached to these reasons and marked as Appendix “A”. I have included my notations for each item that is outstanding. The disclosure is relevant to the relief that is claimed.
[46] The respondent is ordered to produce the outstanding disclosure set out in Appendix A. This disclosure must be completed in 30 days.
Miscellaneous Relief
[47] The applicant seeks an order directing that paras. 6 and 7 of Justice Perkins order dated September 16, 2014 remain in full force and effect.
[48] Paragraph 6 states that neither party shall remove the child from Ontario except under an agreement in writing or with a court order. This paragraph is varied to the extent of my orders as set out in this endorsement. In summary, the applicant may travel with the child for his vacation time within Canada only. The respondent may travel with the child within and outside of Canada for her vacation time.
[49] Paragraph 7 of the September 16, 2014 order states that the respondent shall not relocate the child’s residence outside of Toronto except by consent or court order. This order is not time limited and it remains in effect. Since I have ordered the respondent to vacate the Adelaide condominium, it is important to emphasize that the respondent must comply with this order and relocate within the City of Toronto.
The respondent’s motion
[50] Most of the relief that the respondent seeks in her notice of motion dated April 19, 2015 has been dealt with on an interim basis. There is no compelling reason to vary these interim orders particularly given the conflicting evidence that exists.
[51] Interim orders provide an interim solution pending trial. In the vast majority of cases the parties should not return to the court and seek a variation of an interim order. Instead, they should focus their attention and resources on resolution of their dispute or a trial if necessary.
Custody and Access
[52] The respondent seeks an order implementing the recommendations of the OCL. The key provisions of this report have been included in the order of Justice Perkins dated March 3, 2015. Pursuant to this order, the respondent has interim sole custody, the applicant has unsupervised access and there is detailed access schedule. The respondent appears to be seeking an order that these key issues be decided on a final basis.
[53] The respondent is critical of the applicant’s ability to parent the child. She wants to suspend visits if the child is ill because she doubts the applicant’s ability to care for the child. Of course the applicant disputes this criticism.
[54] The applicant has just started to enjoy unsupervised access. It seems from the affidavit evidence that both parents are continuing to feed the conflict between them.
[55] The applicant continues to seek joint custody of the child. This is what the parties agreed to in the Agreement. It is a live issue that should not be decided on a motion. The respondent’s motion for an order implementing the recommendations of the OCL is dismissed.
[56] The continued conflict between these parents is concerning. It is time for these parents to eliminate the intense conflict that has fueled the numerous motions that have been brought. If they fail to understand the importance of this message then they will continue to expose their young son to endless conflict. This would not be in the best interests of their son.
[57] Pending trial the parties must cooperate and act in the best interests of their child. The March 3 order addresses the need to start communicating and the necessity of varying the applicant’s bail conditions. Hopefully this variation can be obtained without delay so that these parents can start to communicate as directed in the March order. Both parents are expected to communicate about matters concerning their son in a responsible manner. To do otherwise is not in their child’s best interest.
[58] I note that the OCL encouraged the parties to communicate through Our Family Wizard (https://www.ourfamilywizard.com/). Neither party has bothered to even investigate this very useful on line communication tool. This is a specific tool that must be used as soon as the applicant’s bail terms allow him to communicate with the respondent. I make the necessary order that they communicate through Family Wizard. The cost of Family Wizard shall be shared equally.
Child Support
[59] The respondent seeks an order that the applicant pay child support based on an income of $150,000. This income is far greater than the income that the applicant has reported on his income tax returns. The parties are in the process of exchanging documentation. This issue of the applicant’s income should be decided on a full record at trial. The respondent’s motion for an order that the applicant pay child support based on an income of $150,000 is dismissed subject to the following.
[60] The applicant pays the respondent interim child support of $500 pursuant to the consent order of Justice Perkins dated September 16, 2014. This is based on the applicant’s estimated income of $65,000 a year. However, the Federal Child Support Guidelines show that table child support for one child is $594 a month and not $500. Effective June 1, 2015, the applicant shall pay Guideline child support of $594 based on an income of $65,000.
[61] The respondent seeks an order that the applicant maintain life insurance to secure his current and future child support obligations. She requested this relief in her notice of motion heard before Justice Mesbur on January 15, 2015. The order does not include this relief. She now seeks the relief again. No submissions were made on this issue and there is no affidavit evidence before me regarding what insurance if any the applicant has or is able to secure. There is a dispute about his income and aside from the interim child support order it is not possible to quantify his future obligation for the purpose of identifying how much insurance would be sufficient. This part of the respondent’s motion is adjourned sine die.
Daycare Expense
[62] The respondent seeks an order that the applicant pay his proportionate share of the child’s daycare costs. Prior orders have not addressed any s. 7 expenses. Both parents work and this is a necessary expense.
[63] The respondent offers no evidence about the cost of the daycare. During the hearing of the motion the court was advised that the applicant has been paying his share. The amount is unknown. He should continue to pay his proportionate share of the daycare expense.
[64] It seems that there is no dispute concerning the reasonableness of the daycare expense. If the parties require an order they can submit a consent and draft order to me. Evidence of the actual expense and daycare must be provided.
Consent to Travel
[65] The respondent wants to travel outside of Canada with the child on one of her vacation weeks. She is hoping to take a beach holiday in the south and may go to Cuba.
[66] The applicant will not consent to travel outside of Canada. While there are reasons to restrict his travel with the child, concerns regarding mother’s travel outside Canada do not exist.
[67] I order that the respondent may travel outside of Canada with the child for her vacation weeks. She shall give the applicant a copy of her travel itinerary and the applicant shall sign the necessary travel consent within two days of the request. If the applicant fails to comply with this order, the respondent is authorized to travel with the child without the applicant’s written consent.
Costs
[68] In the September 16, 2014 order, Justice Perkins ordered the applicant to pay the respondent costs of $6,000, payable as directed by a judge hearing the contested custody or access issues at a motion or trial. The respondent wants this court to direct that the monies be paid now, characterized as support and paid through the Family Responsibility Office.
[69] This was not a contested custody or access hearing. There are temporary orders in place and this costs order will be dealt with at trial or otherwise on consent.
[70] The costs of part of the motion before Justice Mesbur were adjourned to the hearing of this long motion. The applicant brought a motion to remove the need for supervision of his access. Justice Mesbur ordered that the issue be returned after the OCL report was produced. This issue took one hour to argue. The parties have since consented to an order allowing unsupervised access (order of Justice Perkins dated March 3, 2015). On that occasion, the parties agreed to reserve all outstanding costs to the next step. Given that the parties were able to agree on unsupervised access, I conclude that no order as to costs will be made. This is fair in the circumstances.
conclusion
[71] I make the following orders on the motions:
(1) The applicant’s request for an order allowing him to travel outside of Canada with the child is dismissed. The applicant shall stay in Canada when exercising access and vacation time with the child. This travel restriction is imposed pending further order of the court or an agreement of the parties to allow travel outside of Canada. The restriction may be reviewed when the criminal charges are resolved and/or the applicant has received his Canadian citizenship.
(2) The applicant shall give the respondent a copy of his travel itinerary within Canada for his vacation weeks. He shall do so 30 days before the vacation starts.
(3) Pursuant to s. 24 of the Family Law Act, I exercise my discretion and grant the applicant exclusive possession of 399 Adelaide Street West, Unit 704, Toronto (the Adelaide condominium). The following terms apply:
(i) The respondent shall vacate the Adelaide condominium no later than August 31, 2015.
(ii) The applicant shall have exclusive possession of the Adelaide condominium the day after the respondent vacates the condominium and no later than September 1, 2015.
(iii) The parties shall make best efforts to agree on the division of the household contents 30 days before the respondent vacates the condominium. Such agreement shall be in writing. Failing an agreement, the issue shall be decided by the court.
(iv) The parties shall continue to share the Adelaide condominium expenses as set out in para. 4 of Justice Mesbur's order dated January 15, 2015. This sharing shall continue until the respondent vacates the Adelaide condominium. Thereafter the applicant shall pay 100% of these expenses.
(v) Para. 5 of Justice Mesbur's order dated January 15, 2015 continues to apply to all payments made under para. 4 of her order and to those payments made pursuant to this order relating to the Adelaide condominium.
(vi) The applicant shall not further encumber or sell the Adelaide condominium without the written consent of the respondent or a court order.
(vii) The respondent's interest in the Adelaide condominium shall be decided at trial if the issue is not settled in advance.
(4) The relief that the applicant seeks in paras. 7 and 9 of his amended notice of motion shall be decided at the trial.
(5) The respondent’s motion for sale of the Adelaide condominium is dismissed.
(6) The applicant’s motion for an order that the respondent pay half of the cost of the supervised access shall be decided at the trial.
(7) The respondent is ordered to produce the outstanding disclosure set out in Appendix A. This disclosure shall be provided by May 31, 2015.
(8) Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Justice Perkins order dated September 16, 2014 remain in full force. Paragraph 6 is varied only to the extent that I have allowed the parties to travel with the child outside of Ontario for their vacation time.
(9) The communication set out in the order of Justice Perkins dated March 3 2015 shall be done using Our Family Wizard (https://www.ourfamilywizard.com/) pending further order of the court. The cost of Family Wizard shall be shared equally.
(10) The respondent’s motion for a final order seeking implementation of the OCL recommendations is dismissed.
(11) Effective June 1, 2015, the applicant shall pay interim Guideline child support of $594 based on an income of $65,000.
(12) The respondent’s motion for an order that the applicant maintain life insurance to secure his current and future child support obligations is adjourned sine die.
(13) If the parties have settled the daycare expense they shall provide the court with a consent and draft order that identifies the daycare expense and the proportionate share that each party has agreed to pay.
(14) I order that the respondent may travel outside of Canada with the child for her vacation weeks. She shall give the applicant a copy of her travel itinerary and the applicant shall sign the necessary travel consent within two days of the request. If the applicant fails to comply with this order the respondent is authorized to travel with the child without the applicant's written consent.
(15) The issue of the $6,000 costs in para. 10 of Justice Perkins September 16, 2014 order shall be dealt with at trial or otherwise on consent.
(16) I order that no costs shall be paid by either party arising from para. 15 of Justice Mesbur’s order dated January 15 2015.
(17) If either party is requesting cost of these motions they shall exchange brief written submissions and file them with the court by May 25, 2015.
C. Horkins J.
Date: May 5, 2015
Appendix A
Disclosure Requested from Marina Berger
Requested on December 19, 2015
No.
Disclosure Requested
Status
Comments and Order
Copies of complete
income tax returns for the years 2011,2012,2013 and 2014, when
available, with all attachments (and notices of assessment).
OUTSTANDING
Produce income tax returns and notices of assessment
Copies of all 1ease agreements with tenants in each property owned by the respondent for the years 2013 and 2014 and proof of rent paid by each tenant in those two years.
OUTSTANDING
Produce
Tenant names may be redacted from the lease.
In the event that the lease agreements do not specify the expenses for which the landlord or the tenant is responsible, an explanation of why the respondent (as the landlord) is paying utilities and other expenses on behalf of the tenants occupying the rental properties.
OUTSTANDING
Produce
If contained in lease agreements then the request is answered.
An explanation of how the respondent meets annual expenses of $155,193.96 or $156,411.96 on an annual salary of $85,000.
OUTSTANDING
Produce explanation
-
Copies of all documents for registration or incorporation of any company or corporation registration in which the respondent had any interest on the date of marriage, the date of separation and today.
OUTSTANDING
Produce registration documents.
Financial statements for each such entity for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014.
OUTSTANDING
To be produced if not part of personal income tax returns.
A copy of the respondent's Equifax report, to be obtained after the date of this request.
OUTSTANDING
To be produced
A copy of every application for any form of credit for which the respondent applied from Nov 20, 2012 to date and ongoing until trial.
OUTSTANDING
Any applications listed on the Equifax report shall be produced.
An authorization for the release of the records of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto to both counsel.
OUTSTANDING
Authorization to be provided.
Statements from each account, student loan facility (including National Student Loan), credit card, line of credit, mortgage, investment, etc., held in the name of the respondent alone, jointly with anyone else, personally or on behalf of a corporation or company from January I, 2013 to date.
The following has been provided:
BMO chequing - Nov, 2012- Nov 17, 2014
Produce as follows:
BMO LOC - Nov 2012- current
Dec 2012, Dec 2014, Nov 2013, Sept 2014
CIBC RRSP- ***2477- December 31, 2014
Jan 2013- Dec 2013
CIBC RRSP ****4926-
Sept 2012 - December,
2014
CIBC Visa - Jan 2013-
Jan 2015
BMO Mastercard- May, 20 14 to March, 2015
Jan 2013 - May 2014
AMEX - Jan 2013- Mar
2015
TD Visa - Jan 2013-
Mar 2015
TO LOC - Sept 2012 -
Feb 2015
Lowes Credit Card- April
2015
January 2015 -
April 2015
TD Joint Account - Oct
2012- close
Standard Life Pension
Summary - March 2015
2014 Student Loan
Account Summary
2013 Summary
HSBC Summary of
accounts- Nov, 2014-
March 2015
January - Oct, 2013
HSBC Credit card - Dec
2014- March 2015
January, 2013- Dec
2014
Hudson Bay Credit Card -May, 2014
Jan 2013- May, 2015 and June 2014 - current
Hudson Bay Credit Card
- May, 2014
Produce the mortgage statements for Lakeshore Blvd and Aurora Properties
OUTSTANDING
Produce the mortgage statements for the two properties that the Respondent owns for the period January 1 2013 to date of separation
An appraisal of the value of each property in which the respondent had an interest on the date of
marriage, date of separation and today.
OUTSTANDING
Produce all evidence that the respondent will rely upon at trial.
Statements from each insurance company where the respondent owns a policy of insurance (including
Great West Life, Sun Life and Industrial Alliance), showing the face amount of the value of each policy, the designations of beneficiary and cash surrender value for each policy as of the date of marriage and the date of separation.
OUTSTANDING
Produce a letter confirming there is no cash surrender value
In the event that the respondent is pursuing her position that the cohabitation agreement is to be set aside, a copy of the entire file created by her counsel, Alan Fenster.
OUTSTANDING
To be produced.
Contact information for any witnesses anticipated to have relevant evidence at trial, including but not limited to Olena Maksimenko
OUTSTANDING
To be dealt with at the Settlement Conference