Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCC

The appellant was charged under s. 33(2) of the Fisheries Act after spilling 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into tidal waters.

The appellant sought an order of prohibition, arguing that s. 33(2) was ultra vires the federal Parliament as it related to general water pollution rather than fisheries, and that the information was multiplicitous.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 33(2) is intra vires as its true nature and character is the protection and preservation of fisheries, a valid exercise of federal power under s. 91(12) of the B.N.A. Act.

The Court also found the information was not multiplicitous, as the accused was not prejudiced in preparing a defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a member of the regular armed forces, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of trafficking and possession of narcotics under the Narcotic Control Act, pursuant to section 120 of the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the grounds that trial by a military tribunal for ordinary criminal offences deprived him of his right to an independent and impartial tribunal and his right to equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military justice system was established pursuant to a valid federal objective under section 91(7) of the British North America Act and did not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The accused was convicted of theft for using a university computer without authorization to access internal programmes and files, allegedly contrary to s. 287(1)(b) of the Criminal Code which prohibits the fraudulent use of a telecommunication facility.

The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding that a computer is not a telecommunication facility.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a computer is a data processing facility rather than a telecommunication facility, as its primary function is not the channelling of information to outside recipients.

The Court applied the principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favour of the accused.

The appellant was charged with rape.

During the preliminary inquiry, the presiding judge refused to allow the appellant to question the complainant about her sexual conduct with others during an in camera hearing under section 142 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was committed for trial and sought to quash the committal by way of certiorari.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that certiorari to quash a committal for trial is only available for lack of jurisdiction, such as a complete denial of the right to cross-examine or call witnesses.

The judge's refusal to compel the complainant to testify at the in camera hearing was an exercise of discretion and did not amount to a denial of natural justice or a jurisdictional error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents, treaty Indians, were convicted of hunting deer at night with spotlights in a wildlife management area.

The convictions were upheld by the County Court but overturned by the Court of Appeal, which found s. 49 of The Wildlife Act ultra vires.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 49 is ultra vires because it singles out Indians and attempts to unilaterally amend the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement.

The Court further held that since the province allowed limited hunting in the area, Indians had a right of access to hunt for food at all seasons under paragraph 13 of the Agreement.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta that quashed the accused's robbery conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge did not commit an error of law in his jury charge regarding the need for corroboration of certain witnesses' evidence.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal erred by allowing the appeal based on an inadequate charge without finding an error of law or invoking the specific powers under section 613(1)(a)(i) or (iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal by a judge alone on a charge of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Chief Justice McGillivray in the Court of Appeal.

The Court declined to express an opinion on the applicability of section 16(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to the evidence of the child witness.

The appellant was charged under s. 33(3) of the Fisheries Act for depositing logging debris into a stream that flowed into fish-bearing waters.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the subsection ultra vires the federal Parliament.

The County Court and Court of Appeal upheld the legislation as valid under the federal power over sea coast and inland fisheries.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 33(3) is a blanket prohibition of activities subject to provincial jurisdiction without linking the proscribed conduct to actual or potential harm to fisheries.

Therefore, it is not necessarily incidental to effective fishery legislation and is ultra vires.

The appellant, an Indian, was charged with fishing during a closed season contrary to the federal Fisheries Act.

He argued that clause 13 of the 1929 agreement between Canada and Manitoba gave him the right to fish for food at all seasons.

The trial judge dismissed the charge, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that clause 13 only applied to provincial laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the agreement did not exempt the appellant from the federal Fisheries Act, following its previous decision in Daniels v. White and The Queen.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with more than 80 mgs of alcohol in his blood, challenging the interpretation of the requirement for an interval of at least fifteen minutes between breathalyzer samples under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in a restricted drug, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of intercepted private communications.

The appellant contended there was no evidence upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed this ground of appeal, holding that even if such an authorization is reviewable by a trial judge, the Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings that there was some evidence to support the authorization.

The appellant was convicted of contempt in the face of the court after repeatedly calling the Crown Attorney corrupt during proceedings.

The trial judge held a show cause hearing and convicted the appellant, imposing a fine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in proceeding summarily, that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that he was denied the opportunity to make final submissions.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the summary procedure, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no denial of natural justice.

The appellant, convicted of possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, filed an appeal and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the habeas corpus petition on the basis that the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court could have been raised by way of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that habeas corpus does not lie in these circumstances, noting that the legal issues would be addressed in the appellant's separate appeal on the merits.

The appellant was convicted of rape.

He appealed on the ground that the trial judge failed to put the defence of mistake of fact to the jury.

The appellant claimed the complainant consented, while the complainant testified she was raped over her protests and struggles.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a trial judge is only required to put a defence to the jury if there is some evidence that conveys a sense of reality to it.

In this case, the conflicting testimonies presented a simple issue of consent versus no consent, with no evidentiary basis to support a mistaken but honest belief in consent.

The respondent, a treaty Indian, was convicted of hunting deer during a closed season and at night with a light on a public road.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions, holding that Indians have a right of access to public roads for hunting.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding that a public road is occupied Crown land and the general right of access to roads does not include a right to hunt.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams.

At trial, the Crown introduced a certificate of analysis from a breathalyzer test.

The defence called an expert witness who testified that the technician's failure to record the room temperature during the calibration check could result in an inaccurate reading.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, and the acquittal was upheld on appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the certificate was admissible and that the expert's testimony regarding a mere possibility of inaccuracy did not constitute 'evidence to the contrary' sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a majority judgment of the Court of Appeal for Quebec that had reversed his acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Montgomery J.A. at the Court of Appeal.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the appellant's acquittal was restored.

The appellant was acquitted at trial on a charge of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the trial judge's decision was based on his assessment of the evidence and no error in law was shown.

The appellant was acquitted at trial on a charge of conspiracy to use forged documents after the trial judge excluded wiretap evidence following an extensive voir dire.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal regarding the proper scope of a voir dire for wiretap evidence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of several motor vehicle dealers charged under the Combines Investigation Act with conspiring to lessen competition unduly by adding common freight charges and surcharges to captive automobile parts.

The trial judge found that while agreements existed, they did not unduly lessen competition.

The Court of Appeal quashed the Crown's appeal on the basis that the grounds of appeal involved questions of fact rather than law alone.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's conclusions were based on factual findings and did not constitute errors of law.