Sarah Chênevert-Beaudoin

The applicants, federal public servants, sought judicial review of a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy before exhausting the statutory grievance process.

The respondent moved to strike the application as premature, which an Associate Judge granted.

One applicant appealed that order, alleging bias, procedural unfairness in refusing new evidence, and legal errors regarding the availability and adequacy of the grievance process.

The Federal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the applicant failed to demonstrate bias or any palpable and overriding error by the Associate Judge.

The Court found the additional evidence inadmissible and reaffirmed that Parliament intended for such employment disputes to be addressed first through the grievance procedure, absent exceptional circumstances.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, an independent contractor, sued for breach of contract and intentional infliction of mental suffering after his bid in a public procurement process was rejected.

The court found that the pleadings lacked the essential material facts to support either cause of action, particularly failing to identify any breached terms of 'Contract A' or specific outrageous conduct.

The motion to strike was granted, but the plaintiff was given 30 days limited leave to amend the claim regarding Contract A and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The appellant, a former federal public servant, appealed a decision refusing to set aside an earlier order that dismissed his wrongful dismissal action for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent brought a motion before the Divisional Court to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arguing the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court agreed it lacked jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act, as the appealed decision was a final order of a Superior Court judge.

Applying the Dunnington criteria, the court exercised its discretion to dismiss the appeal rather than transfer it, finding the appeal had no merit because the appellant's claims were barred by the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act and he failed to meet the test for setting aside an order made in his absence.