Samir Singh Chhina

The defendants moved to set aside a noting in default, which the plaintiff did not substantively oppose but contested on costs.

The court granted the motion, finding the defendants' delay in defending was adequately explained and they had arguable defences.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants' partial indemnity costs of the motion, deeming the plaintiff's refusal to consent to setting aside default without substantial indemnity costs for a prior ex parte substituted service motion unreasonable and an abuse of process.

The applicants entered into an agreement to purchase a property from the respondent.

Prior to closing, the applicants' lawyer discovered open building permits and an active investigation by the municipality, and requisitioned that they be resolved.

Due to delays, including those related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the respondent was unable to resolve the issues or discharge certain encumbrances by the closing date.

The applicants refused an extension and demanded the return of their deposit.

The court held that the requisitions were valid matters of conveyance and requisitions simpliciter.

Because the respondent acted in good faith but could not satisfy the requisitions, the applicants were entitled to the return of their deposit, but not to damages.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property, alleging an unconscionable mortgage transaction and fraud.

The defendants Shayna Dallas and 2697909 Ontario Inc. opposed, claiming to be bona fide purchasers without notice.

The court applied the two-part test for CPLs, finding a triable claim to an interest in land and that the balance of factors favored granting the CPL, particularly due to the defendants' lack of credible evidence and questionable conduct regarding the property's transfer and value.

Following the dismissal of three related proceedings as an abuse of process, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court found that the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of fraud and intentional wrongdoing, combined with their attempt to relitigate matters barred by prior releases, justified an elevated costs award.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixing the total amount at $227,532.72, apportioned among the plaintiffs and the various defendants to ensure proportionality and reasonableness.

The moving parties (appellants) sought an order setting aside the Registrar’s dismissal of their appeal and an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The responding party (respondent) requested an adjournment to file responding materials, which was granted.

The motion judge also addressed the arguable jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over the appeal, noting that the underlying orders had both interlocutory and final elements, and that leave to appeal might not be required given the interrelationship of the issues, citing relevant case law.

The motion was adjourned to a new date to allow the responding party to prepare.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss three proceedings commenced by the plaintiffs regarding a long-standing family business dispute.

The plaintiffs alleged fraud, conspiracy, and misappropriation of funds dating back to the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The court granted the motions, finding that the actions were an abuse of process as they attempted to relitigate issues that had been resolved in prior litigation and settlements.

The court also held that the claims were barred by broad releases signed by the plaintiffs in 2005, 2012, and 2015, and were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Trustee Act.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an application where the Applicant successfully set aside a default judgment in a foreclosure action, and a subsequent unsuccessful motion by one of the Respondents to vary that order based on new evidence.

The Applicant sought full indemnity costs against one respondent and its director, and partial indemnity from another.

The court assessed the costs based on factors under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts of Justice Act, declining to pierce the corporate veil to award costs against a non-party director.

The court awarded the Applicant $50,000 in costs for the original application, apportioned between two respondents, and an additional $7,500 for the motion to vary, payable by one respondent.

The applicant sought to set aside a default judgment for foreclosure obtained by a private mortgage lender after she missed a single $650 payment.

The property, valued at $575,000, was sold to a third-party corporation for $425,000.

The court found that the equities favoured the applicant, noting the disproportionate consequences of her default and that the purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

The court also found the default judgment was irregularly obtained because the assignee of the mortgage failed to give the applicant written notice of the assignment before foreclosing.

The application was granted, the default judgment set aside, and the property ordered to be sold at fair market value.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, a dispute arose regarding the amount required to discharge the second mortgage and stop the power of sale.

The applicant tendered the amount in the Notice of Sale plus interest, but the respondents demanded all legal fees incurred to date pursuant to the mortgage terms.

The court clarified that payment of the Notice of Sale amount plus interest would stop the sale, and the issue of liability for the respondents' costs would be addressed in the requested costs submissions.

The applicant and respondents were business partners who co-owned a property.

The applicant defaulted on a second mortgage, which was subsequently assigned to a corporation owned by one of the respondents.

The corporation initiated power of sale proceedings.

The applicant sought an urgent injunction to stay the sale, arguing he was owed money from other business ventures and wanted an accounting before paying the mortgage.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant admitted the debt, failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for an injunction, and could not use section 12 of the Mortgages Act to achieve Mareva-type relief.