Rikin Morzaria

The applicant, a two-year-old child, was injured in a collision with a Polaris ATV operated by a seven-year-old on vacant land.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits.

The preliminary issue was whether the uninsured ATV was an 'automobile' under the Schedule, making the incident an 'accident'.

The arbitrator found that the ATV was an off-road vehicle required to be insured under the Off-Road Vehicles Act because the owner of the ATV was not an 'occupier' of the land where the collision occurred.

Therefore, the ATV met the statutory definition of an automobile, and the applicant was involved in an accident within the meaning of the Schedule.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a product liability action arising from a catastrophic motor vehicle accident in which the driver suffered quadriplegia after the driver’s seatback collapsed during a rollover.

The motion argued that the defendant seat assembler had no role in designing or manufacturing the allegedly defective recliner mechanism supplied by another manufacturer.

The court found that much of the evidence relied upon by the moving party was inadmissible, including transcripts from unrelated proceedings, discovery evidence of its own witness, and unsworn materials.

Applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court held that it lacked the necessary admissible evidence to make findings of fact or fairly resolve the dispute on a summary judgment motion.

The court declined to exercise expanded fact‑finding powers or conduct a mini‑trial, particularly given the presence of a jury notice and the possibility that negligence could be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

The moving defendants sought a determination that the substantive law governing liability for a skiing accident occurring in Colorado should be the law of Colorado rather than Ontario.

The plaintiff argued that Ontario law should apply because the parties’ relationship, contractual documents, and supervisory duties arose in Ontario.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Tolofson v. Jensen, the court held that the lex loci delicti rule governs tort claims and that the substantive law of the place where the tort occurred generally applies.

The court found no exceptional circumstances warranting departure from that rule despite the parties’ Ontario connections.

The liability issues, including negligence, standard of care, causation, and contributory negligence, were therefore to be determined under Colorado law.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision allowing the insured to claim income replacement and housekeeping benefits despite driving with an expired driver's licence at the time of the accident.

The arbitrator had applied the due diligence defence, finding the insured reasonably believed his licence was valid because he had not received a renewal notice.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate applied the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Lévis (City) v. Tétreault, holding that passive ignorance and reliance on administrative practices like renewal notices do not constitute due diligence.

The appeal was allowed, and the insured was precluded from claiming the benefits.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for physiotherapy treatment, an adjustable bed, and a scooter accessible van under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the claims.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's need for physiotherapy and an adjustable bed was related to pre-existing conditions, including fibromyalgia, rather than the accident.

Furthermore, the recommended aqua therapy and adjustable bed were not found to be reasonable and necessary.

The claim for a scooter accessible van was dismissed because the applicant already had an existing vehicle and the cost of modifying it did not exceed the cost of purchasing a new one.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment from her insurer for a catastrophic impairment assessment report and a psycho-vocational assessment.

The insurer denied payment, arguing the reports were not reasonable or necessary.

The arbitrator found that both assessments were reasonable and necessary under section 24 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The catastrophic impairment report was required to complete the application for determination of catastrophic impairment, and the psycho-vocational report was necessary to facilitate the applicant's reintegration into the labour market.

The insurer was ordered to pay the costs of both reports.