Richard Stern

The defendant brought a motion requesting the presiding judge recuse himself because the judge, prior to his appointment, had briefly represented the defendant's counsel and had also represented the local police service in a matter involving the same counsel.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association intervened, arguing for an automatic disqualification rule when a judge's former client appears as counsel.

The court rejected the automatic disqualification argument, applying the standard test for reasonable apprehension of bias.

Finding that the prior retainers were over 20 years old and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, the court dismissed the recusal motion.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and related offences after a police officer observed a hand-to-hand drug transaction inside the accused's parked motor vehicle.

The officer made the observation while standing on a public sidewalk, looking through the open passenger window.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing that the officer's visual observation constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, holding that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his observable activities inside a motor vehicle parked on a public street, and therefore the observation did not constitute a search.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a non-suit on the classification of the murder.

The accused argued that the victim was already dead when the acts constituting the alleged sexual assault occurred, and therefore s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code could not apply.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'single transaction' principle from R. v. Paré and R. v. Westergard, which holds that the exact sequence of the murder and the underlying offence is irrelevant as long as they form a continuous sequence of events.

The court found sufficient evidence to leave the charge of first-degree murder with the jury.

The Crown sought to admit a confession made by the accused to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence, arguing that the surreptitious recording authorizations were invalid, that his right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter was violated, and that the confession should be excluded under common law principles of abuse of process and prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused was not in the functional control of the state, the police conduct was not abusive, the confession was highly reliable, and the wiretap authorizations were validly issued.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a constitutional challenge to s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provision permitting one‑party consent wiretap interceptions with prior judicial authorization is unconstitutional because it lacks an after‑the‑fact notice requirement.

Relying on R. v. Tse, the accused argued that accountability and reviewability require notice to persons whose private communications have been intercepted.

The Crown argued that the provision remains constitutional because it requires prior judicial authorization based on reasonable grounds.

The court held that the Charter’s s. 8 requirements are satisfied by prior judicial authorization and that the absence of a notice provision does not render s. 184.2 unconstitutional.

The constitutional application was dismissed.