Christopher Leafloor

The accused was charged with firearm and drug offences after police found a loaded handgun and drugs in the center console of a vehicle he was driving.

The vehicle was registered to his mother.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found a violation of s. 10(b) due to a 2.5-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

At trial, the court acquitted the accused of all charges, finding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the contraband was in the vehicle, as it was not in plain view and the Crown did not call the vehicle's owner to testify.

The accused was charged with multiple drug and firearm offences following the execution of a search warrant at an apartment unit.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused resided in the unit and possessed the contraband found inside, as well as marijuana found in the hallway.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's testimony, but ultimately found the Crown's circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused resided in the unit or possessed the marijuana in the hallway.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The three accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The police entered an apartment, detained the accused, and later arrested them, seizing crack and powder cocaine.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, failure to inform of reasons for arrest, and denial of the right to counsel.

During the trial, it was revealed that an arresting officer falsely attributed a chunk of crack cocaine to one of the accused and gave false testimony.

The court found this constituted an abuse of process and stayed the proceedings against that accused.

For the other two accused, the court found their s. 10(b) rights were violated due to unreasonable delays in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the remaining two accused.

The offender was convicted of producing methamphetamine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking after a chemical fire at a makeshift laboratory.

Police seized over 500 grams of methamphetamine with a significant street value.

The Crown sought 5 to 8 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 4 to 5 years, noting the offender's strict bail conditions and lack of evidence regarding his specific role in the operation.

The court sentenced the offender to 4.5 years imprisonment, balancing the need for denunciation and deterrence with the offender's rehabilitative prospects and time spent under strict bail conditions.

The defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of trafficking cocaine to an undercover police officer.

He subsequently brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the officer entrapped him during their initial telephone conversation by providing an opportunity to commit an offence before forming a reasonable suspicion.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the officer's use of coded street vernacular elicited responses from the defendant that established reasonable suspicion before any offer to purchase drugs was made.

Furthermore, the court held that the targeted investigation of a tip was bona fide and did not involve unfair tactics.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and related offences after a police officer observed a hand-to-hand drug transaction inside the accused's parked motor vehicle.

The officer made the observation while standing on a public sidewalk, looking through the open passenger window.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing that the officer's visual observation constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, holding that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his observable activities inside a motor vehicle parked on a public street, and therefore the observation did not constitute a search.