Richard Morris

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference following an alleged incident on May 2-3, 2015, when the complainant, a 15-year-old girl, was sleeping at a friend's house.

The complainant testified that she awoke to find the defendant with his fingers inserted under her shorts and underwear, touching her crotch.

The defendant denied entering the room or having any contact with the complainant.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, noting multiple corroborations and inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony.

The defendant was convicted of both sexual assault and sexual interference.

The court also addressed the legal issue of whether the Crown must prove the defendant's knowledge of the complainant's age for the sexual interference charge, concluding that the Crown bears no such burden unless the defendant introduces evidence of his belief regarding the complainant's age.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on two counts of breach of probation following a roadside RIDE stop where police demanded identification from vehicle passengers and conducted a CPIC check.

The trial judge had found Charter breaches, including unlawful detention and unreasonable search and seizure, after concluding that the demand for identification and retention of the respondent’s birth certificate amounted to detention without lawful grounds.

Evidence of the probation breach was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter and the respondent was acquitted.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s findings of detention and Charter breaches were supported by the evidence and that his exclusion of evidence under the Grant framework was entitled to deference.

The Crown failed to demonstrate any reversible error in the trial judge’s reasoning or application of legal principles.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexually assaulting two minor complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility under the W.(D.) framework and in refusing to allow his counsel to cross-examine the complainants on their victim impact statements at sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence and his reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by effectively denying defence counsel the opportunity to establish an 'air of reality' to justify cross-examining the complainants on their victim impact statements.

The matter was remitted for a fresh sentencing hearing.

The accused was charged with breach of probation for consuming alcohol while prohibited from doing so.

The Crown conceded that the accused should be found guilty if the Charter application was unsuccessful.

The court found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms arising from police conduct during a R.I.D.E. program stop.

The officer demanded identification from the accused as a passenger and ran it through CPIC to discover probation conditions, without lawful authority or consent.

The court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter arising from the fatal stabbing of his common-law partner during an argument.

After inflicting a deep abdominal wound with a kitchen knife, the accused failed to obtain medical assistance for approximately 24 hours despite clear signs of serious injury, prioritizing concerns about breaching probation conditions over the victim’s welfare.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the stabbing involved moderate to severe force and that the accused knowingly chose not to seek medical attention despite the obvious need.

Aggravating factors included domestic violence, the use of a weapon, extensive prior criminal history including prior assaults on partners, and multiple breaches of probation conditions at the time of the offence.

The guilty plea was treated as a mitigating factor.

A sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment for manslaughter was imposed, with a concurrent 12‑month sentence for breach of probation and credit for pre‑sentence custody.