ONSCDC 2026

The self-represented moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Edwards J. dated November 27, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the total amount of $7,000, payable by the moving parties.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated December 12, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 24, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable to the responding party in the amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of Koehnen J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

The court declined the responding party's request to restrict the moving parties from bringing further motions, noting that such a request must be brought by a separate motion under Rule 2.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure appropriate procedural protections.

The appellant appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision finding she was not an 'insured person' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The appellant's uninsured son was in an accident, and they sought benefits under her brother's spouse's policy, requiring proof of dependency.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the LAT did not breach procedural fairness by holding a written hearing and made no error of law in applying both a 'big picture' and mathematical approach to conclude the appellant was not principally dependent on the named insured.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $35,000 in damages for breach of a commercial lease.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to apply the Highway Properties principles, exceeding her jurisdiction by granting declaratory relief regarding real property, and providing inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent provided proper Highway Properties Notice, the trial judge merely made necessary findings of fact to award monetary damages within her jurisdiction, and the reasons were sufficient given the informal nature of the Small Claims Court.

The appellant appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision finding she failed to establish catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The appellant argued the LAT adjudicator breached procedural fairness by imposing strict time limits on witness examinations, making unequal evidentiary rulings regarding expert psychiatric testimony, and admitting a late surveillance report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator's procedural choices were within her discretion to control the tribunal's process and did not result in unfairness.

The court also found no error of law in the LAT's application of the test for catastrophic impairment.

The appellant was injured in a workplace accident and received WSIB benefits while retraining at an architectural firm.

He was subsequently injured in a motor vehicle accident, rendering him a paraplegic and unable to continue his retraining, which reduced his WSIB benefits.

He applied for income replacement benefits under the SABS, but his insurer denied the claim on the basis that he was not 'employed' at the time of the accident.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal erred in its interpretation of 'employed' by requiring an exchange of wages for services, and held that the appellant's employment relationship and receipt of employment-related income satisfied the statutory requirement.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim decision and a reconsideration decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) that dismissed most of her discrimination and reprisal application for delay.

The HRTO had directed a combined summary hearing (to assess reasonable prospect of success) and preliminary hearing (to assess delay).

The Divisional Court found that the HRTO breached procedural fairness and rendered an unreasonable decision by conflating the two hearings, specifically by making substantive determinations about the merits of the applicant's timely allegations during the delay hearing without permitting viva voce evidence on the merits.

The application for judicial review was allowed, the HRTO decisions were set aside in part, and the matter was remitted to the HRTO.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that dismissed her discrimination complaint against the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) and its adjudicators.

The HRTO had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to review LTB decisions or the conduct of its adjudicators.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the applicant had already unsuccessfully challenged the same LTB decisions through a combined appeal and judicial review.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that barred her application for statutory accident benefits based on res judicata.

The Tribunal had previously determined her injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The appellant argued the insurer failed to provide proper notice under s. 38(9) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and that new medical evidence warranted waiving res judicata.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the insurer had previously provided the required notice and was not obligated to issue repeated notices.

The court also upheld the Tribunal's finding that the proposed fresh evidence could have been obtained earlier and did not justify waiving res judicata.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondents sought partial indemnity costs.

The City sought $27,699.06 and the developer sought $43,176.94, while the appellant argued costs should be fixed at $25,000.00 total.

The Divisional Court noted the appellant's own bill of costs was over $59,000, indicating its reasonable expectations.

The court awarded costs of $25,000.00 to the City and $30,000.00 to the developer, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the municipality's application for an order to demolish above-ground construction on a contaminated property.

The appellants had proceeded with above-grade construction without a full building permit, having failed to obtain the required Record of Site Condition.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings and concluding that the demolition order was a proper exercise of discretion to enforce compliance with the Building Code Act.

The court previously dismissed the appellants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order finding that their occupation of a cottage at the respondents' campground was a seasonal lease exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act.

In this costs endorsement, the respondents sought $8,308.89 on a substantial indemnity basis, while the appellants argued for no costs or costs in their favour.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01, the court awarded the respondents costs fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis, noting the appellants' reasonable offer to settle costs.

The applicant sought to be relieved of its obligation to pay interest at the contract rate of 11.2% on a prompt payment determination, arguing that its payment of funds into court as security stayed the interest clock.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that the payment into court was merely security and did not vary the terms of the determination.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction to calculate the balance owing and ordered the applicant to pay the remaining interest accrued, less the income earned on the funds held in court.

The applicant, a self-represented off-reserve First Nations member, sought judicial review of a decision by the Chiefs of Ontario (COO) declining to intervene and provide political advocacy regarding his personal legal disputes and broader systemic concerns.

The COO brought a motion to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious that the application would fail.

The court held that the COO is a private voluntary association, and its decision was not public in nature, thus falling outside the scope of judicial review.

Furthermore, the political remedies sought by the applicant were deemed non-justiciable.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent municipality's decisions to approve planning applications and a demolition permit for the respondent theatre company's heritage theatre, located in a heritage conservation district.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant, a local building corporation, lacked both private and public interest standing to challenge the decisions.

In the alternative, the court held that the municipality's decisions to permit the demolition and exempt the new theatre from parking requirements were reasonable, as they were based on extensive consultation, expert reports, and a balancing of heritage conservation with accessibility and economic benefits.

The applicant, a secondary-school teacher, sought judicial review of Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decisions dismissing his reprisal application under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The OLRB had dismissed the application as a collateral attack and abuse of process because the applicant had already elected to pursue the same matters through grievance arbitration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the OLRB did not breach procedural fairness and reasonably concluded that the second application was an impermissible attempt to relitigate matters already determined.

The proposed intervenor sought leave to intervene as an added party in the defendant's motion for leave to appeal a Mareva injunction.

The proposed intervenor argued he had an interest in the proceeding because the motion judge made significant adverse findings about his integrity and conduct, including allegations of operating a Ponzi scheme.

While the Divisional Court found the proposed intervenor had an interest in the subject matter, it declined to exercise its discretion to permit intervention.

The court noted that the defendant would likely advance the same arguments and the proposed intervenor would have other opportunities to defend his reputation in related ongoing litigation.

The motion to intervene was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a motion judge's order varying child support and section 7 expenses.

The motion judge had found a material change in circumstances due to the children's refusal to accept transportation from the respondent father, and the eldest child's attendance at university combined with the appellant's failure to disclose funding sources.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no material error, misapprehension of evidence, or error in law in the motion judge's discretionary decisions, and rejected the appellant's claim of a reasonable apprehension of bias.