D’Angelo v. Landlord and Tenant Board, 2026 ONSC 1909

CITATION: D’Angelo v. Landlord and Tenant Board, 2026 ONSC 1909

OSHAWA DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-26-1755-00JR

DATE: 20260330

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: ANNETTE D’ANGELO, Applicant

AND:

LANDLORD AND TENANT BOARD, LAURA HARTSLIEF and RENEE LANG, Respondents

BEFORE: The Hon. Mr. Justice R.E. Charney

COUNSEL: Annette D’Angelo, Self-Represented

Brandon Fragomeni and Maija-lisa Robinson, Counsel for the Respondents

HEARD: In Writing

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This proceeding relates to the Applicant’s application to judicially review two decisions of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (HRTO): D’Angelo v. Landlord and Tenant Board, 2025 HRTO 2812 and D’Angelo v. Landlord and Tenant Board, 2026 HRTO 103.

[2] On March 17, 2026, I directed the Registrar to give notice to the Applicant that the Court was considering making an order staying or dismissing this Application for Judicial Review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[3] That direction stated as follows:

The Application for Judicial Review seeks to review the decision of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (HRTO) dismissing the Applicant’s complaint under the Human Rights Code filed against the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) and two of the LTB adjudicators who dealt with the Applicant’s proceedings under the Residential Tenancies Act. The HRTO concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of other tribunals or the adjudicators who made those decisions.

The HRTO held that if the Applicant has concerns about the decisions of the LTB, the correct procedure is to appeal or apply to judicially review those decisions in the Divisional Court.

Indeed, the Applicant did appeal and judicially review the impugned decisions of the LTB in the Divisional Court. That combined appeal/judicial review was dismissed by the Divisional Court on March 11, 2026: D’Angelo v. Dahmer, 2026 ONSC 1428.

The Notice of Application for Judicial Review appears on its face to be an abuse of process for two reasons:

a) The Human Rights Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of other tribunals or the adjudicators who made those decisions.

b) The Divisional Court has already dismissed the Applicant’s appeal/judicial review of the impugned LTB decisions, and it is an abuse of process to ask the HRTO to consider the merits of the same LTB decisions.

[4] The Notice - Form 2.1A was sent to the Applicant as per that direction.

[5] On March 19, 2026, the Applicant forwarded her response under Rule 2.1 to the Registrar. That response states:

• The Application raises a pure question of law: whether the HRTO erred in declining jurisdiction over a claim alleging discrimination by an administrative tribunal. This is a recognized ground of judicial review and cannot be dismissed summarily.

• The HRTO mischaracterized the Applicant’s claim. The Applicant did not seek to overturn the LTB’s eviction decisions. The Applicant alleged that the LTB discriminated by refusing to consider disability-related evidence and refusing to adjudicate an accommodation request. The HRTO’s jurisdiction extends to such claims.

• The HRTO’s decision fails to address the Applicant’s central allegation and therefore lacks justification, transparency, and intelligibility. This constitutes a reviewable error.

• The Applicant does not seek to relitigate the eviction. The Applicant seeks review of the HRTO’s refusal to hear a discrimination claim. This is a distinct cause of action.

[6] On the issue of jurisdiction, the Applicant asserts that the HRTO has jurisdiction to review the decisions of administrative tribunals, including the LTB and its adjudicators, if there are allegations that the tribunal/adjudicators breached the Human Rights Code.

[7] The Applicant argues that the HRTO’s decision to decline jurisdiction would insulate administrative tribunals from scrutiny when they fail to consider disability-related needs.

Analysis

[8] Rule 2.1.01 allows for the determination of whether the action is frivolous or vexatious at the very outset of the action. The process is in writing without an evidentiary record. It is aimed at clear cases. The process is not for “close calls”. The action is to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 only if the frivolous, vexatious, or abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading: Scaduto v. LSUC, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8.

[9] Although proceedings which are clearly frivolous or vexatious on their face should not be permitted to proceed, care must be taken to ensure that a claim which includes a legitimate complaint is not summarily dismissed. As noted in Gao v. Ontario WSIB and Ontario Ombudsman, 2014 ONSC 6497, at para. 18:

While rule 2.1 should be applied robustly to bring an early end to vexatious proceedings, the matters should not [be] considered lightly or dismissively. Care should be taken to allow generously for drafting deficiencies and recognizing that there may be a core complaint which is quite properly recognized as legitimate even if the proceeding itself is frivolously brought or carried out and ought to be dismissed.

[10] The Court’s “task in deciding a motion brought pursuant to R. 2.1.01 is to look beyond drafting deficiencies to determine the nature of the Plaintiff’s complaint and whether that complaint is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process”: Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2021 ONSC 3494.

[11] The HRTO dismissed the Application. It concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider the Application as against the LTB, the Adjudicator and the Vice Chair of the LTB, because any claims against the LTB must be pursued through the appropriate judicial channels, either by statutory appeal under s. 210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (RTA) or by application for judicial review.

[12] This decision of the HRTO is consistent with previous decisions confirming that the HRTO has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the LTB. See, for example, Peever v. Landlord and Tenant Board, 2023 HRTO 1539; King v. Landlord and Tenant Board, 2025 HRTO 3150; Fernandes v. Landlord Tenant Board, 2025 HRTO 3078. The HRTO has consistently held that it has no jurisdiction to hear applications against courts and tribunals based on the execution of adjudicative duties or decision-making because of the doctrine of judicial or adjudicative immunity: see Cartier v. Nairn, 2009 HRTO 2208; Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered Corp., 2009 HRTO 2180; Seberras v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2012 HRTO 115.

[13] In Peever, the HRTO relied on the decision of the Superior Court in Daly v. Landlord and Tenant Board, 2022 ONSC 2434 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2023 ONCA 152), which found that the LTB could not be sued except by way of judicial review or the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

[14] Technically, a proceeding before the HRTO is not the same as a civil suit, and it is theoretically possible for the legislature to give the HRTO supervisory authority over other provincial tribunals, but it is clear from the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 19 that the HRTO has no such jurisdiction. As the HRTO explained in Peever, at paras. 18 - 21:

I note that my determination that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the Application is further supported by the provisions of the Code itself. The Code defines who is a “person” and who therefore may be a party to an Application under section 36.

Pursuant to section 46 of the Code, the term “person,” in addition to the extended meaning given it by Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, includes an employment agency, an employers’ organization, an unincorporated association, a trade or occupational association, a trade union, a partnership, a municipality, a board of police commissioners established under the Police Act, being chapter 381 of the Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1980, and a police services board established under the Police Services Act.

Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006 extends the definition of “person” to include a corporation.

Notably, neither the definition of “person” under the Code nor the extended meaning given it by the Legislation Act, 2006 includes a tribunal or cluster of tribunals.

Moreover, section 36 of the Code sets out who the parties to an Application are. With the exception of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, each party is described as a “person.” As the respondents are not “persons,” they cannot be parties to an Application.

[15] This conclusion does not, as argued by the Applicant, insulate the LTB from scrutiny if it fails to consider disability-related needs. Pursuant to s. 210 (1) of the RTA, a party to an LTB proceeding has the right to appeal a decision of the LTB on a question of law. In addition, a party may also bring an application for judicial review: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8. Either (or, as in this case, both) proceed to the Divisional Court, which may consider any allegation that the LTB failed to appropriately accommodate a party to the proceeding.

[16] Indeed, that is exactly what the Applicant did in this case: D’Angelo v. Dahmer, 2026 ONSC 1428. The Applicant appealed and sought judicial review of the LTB decision that was also the subject of her complaint before the HRTO. That was her opportunity to raise any concerns about the LTB process. The Divisional Court held, at para. 10, that there was no procedural unfairness in the hearing before the LTB and dismissed her appeal and application for judicial review. The Court stated, at para. 12:

We also note the pattern of litigation conduct by Ms D’Angelo, which has included multiple applications to the LTB, a claim to the Small Claims Court, and a claim to the Human Rights Tribunal, all arising out of the same events. Pursuing so many proceedings in respect to the same, or overlapping issues, is a sign of vexatiousness.

[17] It is an abuse of process to ask the HRTO to consider the same LTB decision that was reviewed by the Divisional Court.

Conclusion

[18] For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that this Application for Judicial Review is, on its face, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. It is dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.01.

Justice R.E. Charney

Date: March 30, 2026