CITATION: Housh v. Rayvals, 2026 ONSC 1780
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE No.: DC-25-00002975-0000
DATE: 2026/03/24
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Backhouse, Fregeau, and Schreck JJ.
BETWEEN
KENDRA HOUSH
Appellant
– and –
JOSHUA RAYVALS
Respondent
Self-Represented
Self-Represented
HEARD: February 24, 2026, by videoconference
Reasons For Decision
Fregeau J.
Overview
[1] Kendra Housh (the “Appellant”) appeals the December 3, 2024, Final Order (the “Order”) of Somji J. (the “motion judge”). The Order dismissed the Appellant’s Motion to Change the Final Order of Abrams J., dated June 26, 2023 (the “June 26, 2023, Order”). The Order also granted, in part, the relief sought in Joshua Rayvals’s (the “Respondent”) Motion to Change the June 26, 2023, Order.
[2] The Appellant advances numerous grounds of appeal, none of which were addressed in oral argument. The Appellant’s arguments may be summarized as follows:
that the motion judge erred in finding that there had been a material change in circumstances in relation to the Appellant’s s. 7 expenses (third-party transportation costs) for the children of the marriage;
that the motion judge erred in finding that the parties’ eldest daughter’s attendance at university amounted to a material change in circumstances, allowing for a variation of the Respondent’s child support obligations and s. 7 obligations (post-secondary education expenses); and
that there was there a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the motion judge toward the Appellant.
[3] The Appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence at the hearing of the appeal. This relief was not pursued by the Appellant at the hearing of the appeal, and, in any event, it was without merit. The motion for fresh evidence will not be addressed in these Reasons.
Background
[4] The parties separated in March 2010. They have three children: K.H.R., born October 1, 2005, S.H.R., born November 15, 2007, and G.H.R., born July 6, 2009 (collectively, the “children”). When the Motions to Change were heard in December 2023, K.H.R. was in her first year of post-secondary education at the University of Ottawa, and the other two children were in high school and residing with the Appellant.
[5] The parties entered into a separation agreement on May 20, 2016 (the “Agreement”). The Agreement provided, among other things, that the parties were to have “joint custody” of the children, that the children were to reside primarily with the Appellant and that the Respondent was to have alternating weekend “access” and “access on Fridays overnight on non-access weekends”.
[6] The Agreement also includes the following provisions relevant to this appeal:
Paragraph 5.6:
The parties will only contribute to a child’s special or extraordinary expenses if the parties consent to the expenses in advance. Neither party will unreasonably withhold consent. If the parties cannot agree, they will use the section of this Agreement entitled “Dispute Resolution” to resolve this issue.
Paragraph 5.7:
Child Support ends for each child when:
(a) The child ceases to be a “child” as defined in the Divorce Act;
(b) The child no longer resides with the custodial parent, (“resides” includes the child living away from home for school, summer employment or vacation);
(c) The child turns 18, unless he or she is unable to become self-supporting due to illness, disability, education or other cause;
(d) The child becomes self-supporting;
(e) The child obtains one post-secondary degree or diploma;
(f) The child turns 23 years of age;
(g) The child marries;
(h) The child dies; or
(i) A party dies, provided that the security in the section of this Agreement entitled “Life Insurance” is in place at the time of death.
Paragraph 5.8:
Prior to determining each party’s obligations to the child’s post-secondary educational costs, Kendra and Joshua shall first deduct a reasonable contribution to these expenses expected from the child. A child’s contribution may be funded from savings (RESPs [sic] established by third parties), trust funds, investments, gifts, summer or part-time employment, scholarships, loans, bursaries etc. It is anticipated that the children will be expected to cover 1/3 of their post-secondary costs on an annual basis. In the event that Kendra and Joshua cannot agree on the child’s reasonable contribution to these expenses, they will use the section of this Agreement entitled “Dispute Resolution” to resolve the issue.
Paragraph 5.9:
The parties shall divide the remaining 2/3rds of post-secondary education expenses between themselves on an equal basis.
[7] On January 12, 2023, the parties consented to the terms of a Final Order, (the “January 12, 2023, Order”), varying the parenting schedule set out in the Agreement, including making the Respondent’s time with the children subject to their views and preferences.
[8] The January 12, 2023, Order further stipulated that post-secondary expenses for the children remain subject to the terms of the Agreement, and that transportation costs paid by third parties for the children’s travel to and from activities and work was subject to various conditions.
[9] The January 12, 2023, Order reserved the issue of the Respondent’s child support obligation from January 1, 2023, forward, and the determination of the parties’ respective proportionate shares of the children’s s. 7 expenses, for further argument.
[10] On June 26, 2023, the parties consented to the terms of an order addressing child support and s. 7 expenses. The June 26, 2023, Order required the Respondent to pay child support in the amount of $1,401.00 per month for the children commencing January 1, 2023, and established that the Appellant’s and Respondent’s respective obligations for s. 7 expenses were 45% and 55%.
[11] On September 27, 2023, the Appellant filed a Motion to Change the June 26, 2023, Order, requesting that the Respondent pay retroactive and ongoing post-secondary education expenses for K.H.R. and third-party transportation costs for the two children residing with her. On October 26, 2023, the Respondent filed a Response to the Appellant’s Motion to Change. The Respondent requested termination of child support for K.H.R. and confirmation that the payment of her post-secondary education expenses be pursuant to the Agreement. The Respondent further sought dismissal of the mother’s claim for retroactive third-party transportation costs for the two younger children.
[12] The motion judge framed the issues before her as follows:
What, if any, retroactive s. 7 expenses is the father responsible for with respect to his teenage daughters, and should the clauses relating to s. 7 expenses [third-party transportation costs] be amended going forward due to a material change in circumstances?
Did K.H.R.’s attendance at university constitute a material change in circumstances and, if so, how should the father’s support obligations be determined?
[13] In thorough and comprehensive Reasons for Decision on Motion to Change, the motion judge held as follows:
The unwillingness of the two children who resided with the Appellant to accept transportation from the Respondent constituted a material change in circumstances in relation to s. 7 expenses (third-party transportation costs); and
K.H.R.’s attendance at university in the fall of 2023 and the Appellant’s failure to abide by the terms of the Agreement with respect to financial disclosure regarding K.H.R.’s funding sources for the purposes of determining the parties’ respective contributions for her post-secondary education costs also constituted a material change in circumstances.
[14] Having found a material change in circumstances, the motion judge made the following orders relevant to this appeal:
Child Support payable by the Respondent for K.H.R. is terminated as of January 1, 2025;
Commencing January 1, 2025, the Respondent is required to pay to the Appellant child support for the two younger children in the amount of $1,111.28 per month based on his projected income for 2024 of $73,152;
Commencing December 1, 2024, the Respondent is required to pay to the Appellant $120 per month for third-party transportation costs as s. 7 expenses, for the two younger children, for their attendance at extracurricular activities, appointments, and employment; and
The Respondent’s obligation for the post-secondary education costs for K.H.R. is to be determined directly with K.H.R. on an annual basis and paid directly to K.H.R.
Court’s Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
[15] This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.
[16] The standard of review on this appeal is set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235. Questions of law are to be reviewed on the standard of correctness. Questions of fact, and questions of mixed fact and law, are both to be reviewed on the standard of palpable and overriding error.
[17] In Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at paras. 10-12, the Supreme Court observed the high threshold which governs on the appeal of a family law decision with respect to support orders:
• These decisions involve the exercise of considerable discretion by trial judges and, given their fact-based and discretionary nature, trial judges must be given considerable discretion by appellate courts.
• An appeal court should not overturn support orders unless the reasons disclose an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or unless the award is clearly wrong; this is stated otherwise as requiring a material error, a serious misapprehension of evidence, or an error in law.
[18] In the recent case of Najm v. Najm, 2026 ONCA 13, at para. 20, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, citing Cronier v. Cusack, 2023 ONCA 178, at para. 8, which in turn cited Hickey, at para. 12, directed that, in an appeal of an order resolving financial disputes in a family law case, an appeal court should only intervene “when there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law”.
[19] In T.J.L. v. E.B., 2021 ONCA 75, at para. 6, the Court of Appeal for Ontario observed that the threshold for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias is high, and that there is a presumption of fairness, impartiality and integrity in the performance of the judicial role. The grounds and evidentiary support for an alleged apprehension of bias must be substantial.
Issue 1: Did the Motion judge Err in Finding That There Had Been a Material Change in Circumstances in Relation to the Appellant’s s. 7 Expenses (Third-Party Transportation Costs) For the Children of the Marriage?
[20] The Appellant’s submissions did not directly address this alleged error. Her position on this issue, as I understand it, is that the facts do not support a finding that there had been a material change in circumstances in relation to third-party transportation costs for the two children residing with her. The Appellant further submits that the motion judge was “biased and unjust, demonstrating palpable, overriding error” in relation to this issue.
[21] The Respondent submits that the Appellant has failed to identify any error of the motion judge in relation to this issue. The Respondent contends that the Appellant is simply unhappy with the motion judge’s decision and is attempting to re-argue her case.
[22] The motion judge noted that the January 12, 2023, Order addressed how third-party transportation costs for the children were to be managed, namely that reasonable efforts were to be made to ensure that the children’s activities or work commitments requiring transportation were scheduled when one of the parties was available to provide transportation, and that the Respondent was to provide notice of his availability to assist with transportation on a weekly basis.
[23] The motion judge found that the father had complied with this arrangement. The motion judge further found that the Appellant provided no satisfactory explanation for why this plan, put in place to minimize third-party transportation costs, collapsed, other than deposing that the children did not want to see their father and would not get in a car with him.
[24] The motion judge held that the Appellant’s failure to give the Respondent an opportunity to determine if he could transport the children himself was fatal to the Appellant’s claim for retroactive third-party expenses related to transportation of the children.
[25] The motion judge found that the children’s unwillingness to get in a car with the Respondent constituted a material change in circumstances which made the third-party transportation provisions of the January 12, 2023, Order “unmanageable”. Recognizing that the Appellant would reasonably incur some travel costs for the children, and that the Respondent had a continuing obligation to support the children, the motion judge struck the relevant provisions of the January 12, 2023, Order and ordered as follows:
The [Respondent] will pay $120/month for third-party transportation costs as s. 7 expenses for [the two children] for their attendance at extracurricular activities, appointments, and employment shifts. The [Appellant] is not required to provide receipts for these third-party travel costs.
[26] The motion judge specifically noted that this variation “should serve to minimize communications and conflict between the parties”.
[27] I see no material error, no error in law and no misapprehension of the evidence in the motion judge’s decision on this issue. The motion judge repeatedly referred to this case as being “high conflict”. The motion judge’s finding that there had been a material change in circumstances which made the previous provisions regarding third-party transportation costs “unmanageable” is fully supported by the facts.
[28] The motion judge’s ruling on this issue is a practical solution to an ongoing issue, made with the intention of minimizing communications and conflict between the parties in a high conflict family law case. It is entitled to considerable deference.
[29] This ground of appeal is dismissed.
Issue 2: Did the Motion judge Err in Finding That K.H.R.’s Attendance at University Was a Material Change in Circumstances, Allowing For a Variation of the Respondent’s Child Support and s. 7 (Post-Secondary Education Expenses) Obligations?
[30] The Appellant submits that the motion judge erred in finding that K.H.R.’s attendance at university was a material change in circumstances. The Appellant contends that the motion judge’s finding that there had been a material change in circumstances was based entirely on the factual finding that she and K.H.R. had failed to provide the financial disclosure in relation to K.H.R.’s funding sources, as required by the Agreement, in order for the parties to determine their respective reasonable contributions to her post-secondary educational expenses.
[31] The Appellant submits that the Agreement does not require that she and/or K.H.R. disclose the funds available to K.H.R. for her university expenses. The Appellant contends that the Agreement expressly requires that she and the Respondent pay 2/3, and K.H.R. pay 1/3, of K.H.R.’s post-secondary education expenses, regardless of the amount of funds K.R.H. has available to her.
[32] The Appellant submits that the motion judge’s finding on this issue was a palpable and overriding error, absent which the motion judge had no jurisdiction to vary the terms of the Agreement addressing the Respondent’s obligation toward K.H.R.’s post-secondary education costs.
[33] The Respondent submits that the motion judge did not err in finding that K.H.R.’s attendance at university and the ongoing lack of disclosure of K.H.R.’s funding sources was a material change in circumstances. The Respondent contends that the Agreement imposes an implied obligation on the Appellant and/or K.H.R. to provide this disclosure to determine K.H.R.’s “reasonable contribution” to her own expenses given that, in the Agreement, it was “anticipated that the children will be expected to cover 1/3 of their post-secondary costs on an annual basis”.
[34] The Respondent submits that the Appellant disagrees with the motion judge’s interpretation of the Agreement in relation to this disclosure issue but fails to point out any reviewable error.
[35] The motion judge reviewed paragraphs 5.8 and 5.9 of the Agreement and found that the Appellant had failed to provide the Respondent with financial disclosure about K.H.R.’s other funding sources, as referenced in paragraph 5.8 of the Agreement. The motion judge found that the Respondent always intended to contribute to K.H.R.’s post-secondary education expenses and that he had requested this disclosure. The motion judge further found that, without this disclosure, the Respondent was unable to calculate his “reasonable contribution” to K.H.R.’s university expenses.
[36] The motion judge noted that the Respondent continued to provide Guideline child support to the Appellant for K.H.R., even though K.H.R. was away from home at university and “notwithstanding [the Appellant’s and K.H.R.’s] failure to provide adequate financial disclosure regarding funding sources for post-secondary costs”.
[37] In finding that K.H.R.’s attendance at university in the fall of 2023 and the Appellant’s failure to abide by the terms of the Agreement with respect to financial disclosure, as set out above, was a material change in circumstances, the motion judge rejected the Appellant’s position that the Respondent was not entitled to disclosure of K.H.R.’s funding sources as being “inconsistent with the terms of the [Agreement] and the law governing support obligations for adult children”.
[38] The motion judge observed that determining a parent and child’s respective contributions to post-secondary education costs is a “fact-specific determination requiring consideration of both the parent and child’s means”, which cannot be done without “proper disclosure of the available sources of funding”. The motion judge rejected the Appellant’s submission, repeated on this appeal, that the Agreement should be interpreted to mean that the post-secondary education costs should simply be divided by three.
[39] I see no error in the motion judge’s finding that the Agreement implicitly requires disclosure of K.H.R.’s funding sources to determine the child’s and the parties’ respective “reasonable contributions” to K.H.R.’s post-secondary expenses. This is a simple matter of contractual interpretation. I also see no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the Appellant’s failure to abide by the terms of the Agreement with respect to this financial disclosure was a material change in circumstances.
[40] Having found that the Appellant failed to provide financial disclosure as to K.H.R.’s funding sources as required by the Agreement and, given that the Respondent nonetheless continued to pay Guideline child support to the Appellant while K.H.R. was away at university, the motion judge held that the Respondent was not required to pay any retroactive s. 7 expenses for K.H.R. for the 2023/2024 school year. The motion judge’s exercise of discretion on this issue is entitled to considerable deference.
[41] The motion judge’s finding that K.H.R.’s attendance at university and the Appellant’s ongoing non-disclosure of K.H.R.’s funding sources was a material change in circumstances necessitated a variation of the Respondent’s Guideline child support obligation and a variation of how the Respondent was to calculate and pay his share of K.H.R.’s post-secondary education costs.
[42] The practical solution arrived at by the motion’s judge, who once again noted the “high level of conflict between the parties and the ongoing resort to litigation”, was as follows:
Terminate the Respondent’s child support obligation for K.H.R. as of January 1, 2025;
Adjust the Respondent’s child support obligation for the other two children based on his “projected” 2024 income; and
Require that the Respondent and K.H.R. directly determine the Respondent’s reasonable contribution for K.H.R.’s post-secondary expenses, with the Respondent’s share to be paid directly to K.H.R.
[43] The Appellant was clearly unhappy with this result. At the hearing of the appeal, she continued to assert, without pointing to any reviewable error, that disclosure of K.H.R.’s funding sources was not mandated by the Agreement.
[44] As noted by the Supreme Court in Hickey, at para. 10, family law decisions involve the exercise of considerable discretion by trial judges and, given their fact-based and discretionary nature, trial judges must be given considerable deference by appellate courts. In Najm, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, citing Cronier, at para. 8 and Hickey, at para. 12, directed that, in an appeal of an order resolving financial disputes in a family law case, an appeal court should only intervene “when there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law”. I see no such error in the motion judge’s decision on this issue.
[45] This ground of appeal is dismissed.
Issue 3: Was There a Reasonable Apprehension of Bias on the Part of the motion judge Towards the Appellant?
[46] The Appellant’s assertion that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias towards her on the of the motion judge appears to be based primarily on the findings that the Agreement required the Appellant to provide the financial disclosure of K.H.R.’s funding sources, that the Appellant had repeatedly refused to do so, and that the Appellant had created a high level of conflict and ongoing litigation as a result.
[47] In my view, these findings were fully supported by the evidence before the motion judge. The Appellant’s allegation of bias is simply not reasonable in the circumstances of this case. The motion judge comprehensively reviewed the evidence and the applicable law, fashioned a practical solution consistent with the law, designed to minimize conflict and future litigation, and provided extremely thorough reasons for her decision.
[48] The Appellant’s allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias is dismissed.
COSTS
[49] The parties shall each bear their own costs of this appeal.
Fregeau J.
I agree_______________________________
Backhouse, J.
I agree_______________________________
Schreck, J.
Released: March 24, 2026
CITATION: Housh v. Rayvals, 2026 ONSC 1780
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-00002975-0000
DATE: 2026/03/24
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Backhouse, Fregeau, and Schreck JJ.
BETWEEN
KENDRA HOUSH
Appellant
Applicant
– and –
JOSHUA RAYVALS
Respondent
REASONS For Decision
Released: March 24, 2026 Fregeau J.