CITATION: Chammah v. Legal Aid Ontario, 2026 ONSC 356
COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-427
DATE: 2026-01-19
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
TAREK THOMAS CHAMMAH
Plaintiff/Applicant
– and –
LEGAL AID ONTARIO
Defendant/Respondent
Self-Represented
E. Shepard, Counsel for the Defendant/Respondent
HEARD: January 16, 2026
M. BORDIN J.
Overview
[1] The self-represented applicant, Mr. Chammah, advises that he has autism spectrum disorder. He seeks an Order for an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a decision by Legal Aid Ontario ("LAO") dated April 23, 2025 (the “Decision”).
[2] Section 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (the “JRPA”), provides that unless another Act provides otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be made no later than 30 days after the date of the decision.
[3] Section 5(2) of the JRPA provides that the court may, on such terms as it considers proper, extend the time for making an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay.
[4] LAO opposes Mr. Chammah’s motion on the basis that his application does not have any “apparent grounds for relief”. LAO submits that the application for judicial review does not demonstrate any apparent grounds for relief because the decision that Mr. Chammah is seeking to review is not of a sufficiently public character to attract a right of judicial review.
Facts
[5] On September 10, 2025, Mr. Chammah had his first appearance on a criminal charge. He was self-represented. The parties agree that he met with duty counsel, Mr. Whitmer, who advised Mr. Chammah that he would be able to assist him when he obtained disclosure.
[6] Mr. Chammah’s evidence is that on October 6, 2025, Mr. Whitmer remained prepared to meet with him again but that his ability to meet with Mr. Whitmer was prevented by courthouse security. Mr. Chammah says that Mr. Whitmer abruptly changed course later that day and said that duty counsel would not meet with him and that a legal aid certificate had been issued for him.
[7] LAO’s evidence is that on October 6, 2025, unnamed staff in the duty counsel office observed Mr. Chammah being combative and argumentative with several court constables. There is no allegation that he was acting this way toward LAO staff. Rather, in support of their decision to stop providing duty counsel services to Mr. Chammah and providing him with a legal aid certificate, LAO relies on alleged historical conduct of Mr. Chammah toward LAO staff, his alleged conduct toward the court constables, the nature of the charges against him, and the alleged risk of a conflict given the close working relationship between the duty counsel office staff and the court constables.
[8] The alleged historical conduct of Mr. Chammah toward LAO staff is set out in LAO’s supporting affidavit. In his reply affidavit Mr. Chammah denies or explains many of LAO’s allegations. The information in the LAO affidavit is based on information from others who are not named. As a result, Mr. Chammah objected to this evidence, asserting that it is hearsay. The allegations in the LAO affidavit address the reasons for LAO’s decision. It is not necessary for the purposes of this application that they be true, nor is it my role on this application to determine the truth of the allegations. I do not accept the allegations as true, nor do I rely on the evidence for the truth of its contents.
[9] The issue with LAO’s allegations is that they all appear to predate September 10, 2025, and do not explain why Mr. Whitmer agreed to meet with Mr. Chammah on September 10, 2025, or first agreed to meet with him on October 6, 2025. Nor do they adequately explain the sudden change in position of Mr. Whitmer.
[10] LAO drafted an email on October 9, 2025, confirming that LAO would not provide duty counsel services, prohibiting Mr. Chammah from interacting with any LAO staff person or duty counsel at the courthouse, and advising him that a certificate had been issued to him. The email was not sent to Mr. Chammah as LAO did not have his address.
[11] On October 21, 2025, Mr. Chammah filed a complaint with LAO regarding courthouse security interfering with his meeting with duty counsel. He called the LAO office a number of times that day. LAO says these calls caused it to become increasingly concerned about his conduct on October 21, 2025, and caused LAO to send a revised version of its original email to Mr. Chammah on October 23, 2025. As noted, this email is the Decision for which he seeks judicial review. The entirety of the email is set out below:
Dear Tarek Thomas Chammah,
I am providing this response on behalf of Legal Aid Ontario and all personnel contacted by you.
Legal Aid Ontario has a mandate to assist low-income Ontarians to obtain access to justice. That mandate does not, however, mean that legal aid staff should be subject to what may be considered abuse or unreasonable requests which limit the ability of staff to serve other clients.
Some of your interactions have not been respectful of the staff who attempted to assist you. In addition, the frequency of your communications with Legal Aid Ontario staff has become excessive and has placed significant demands on the time and resources of our staff.
As an employer, Legal Aid Ontario has an obligation to ensure that our employees are not subjected to such behavior.
As a result, please be advised that you are prohibited from:
• attending the Duty Counsel and Legal Aid Ontario offices at Waterloo Region Courthouse, 85 Frederick Street, Kitchener, ON N2H0A7
• interacting with any Legal Aid Ontario staff person or Duty Counsel at that courthouse.
Failure to comply with these requests may impact Legal Aid’s ability to assist you in the future and may result in escalation to the authorities.
You have been issued a legal aid certificate (Certificate No. CE56718692, Client No. CLT1775529) for your criminal law matter.
When you find a lawyer to accept your certificate, please contact Legal Aid at 1-800-668-8258 for assistance in adding this lawyer to your file. Staff at this number can also assist in determining your eligibility for assistance if you have future legal needs. If you do not retain counsel for your matter, you will have to handle your matter on a self-represented basis.
As a certificate has been granted to you, Duty Counsel is unable to assist you.
Duty Counsel does not serve as an alternative to a roster lawyer for services covered within the authorizations of a legal aid certificate. Duty Counsel also does not provide services in relation to applications, certificates or changes to LAO client information.
Aside from these avenues outlined in this advisement, you are prohibited from interaction with any Legal Aid Ontario staff member. All telephone calls will be disconnected and voice mail messages will not be responded to.
Legal Aid Ontario expects that your future communications with staff will be courteous and respectful. I trust you understand our position in this matter and look forward to your future cooperation.
Sincerely,
[12] Mr. Chammah was placed on an internal “Direction Interactions” list on October 23, 2025.
[13] Mr. Chammah’s undisputed evidence is that based on information provided by staff at the civil counter at the Kitchener courthouse, he attended at the Kitchener courthouse on Friday, November 21, 2025, at approximately 3:50 p.m., to file paper copies of his judicial review application which included his Notice of Application for Judicial Review and unsworn affidavit. He was told that he had to file his materials through the Justice Services Online Portal (the “Portal”) with Hamilton as the appropriate courthouse. He did, however, receive a fee waiver for his application from the Kitchener civil office.
[14] When he returned home, Mr. Chammah attempted to file his application through the Portal but encountered issues which prevented him from filing it. These issues are outlined in his affidavit. As but one example of the issues he encountered, he had received a fee waiver, but the Portal would not accept the waiver and required payment.
[15] Despite repeated attempts to file his materials through the Portal, he was unable to do so. As a result, his application was not filed in time.
The test for an extension
[16] The parties agree that to be granted an extension of time to file his application, Mr. Chammah must establish two mandatory conditions: (1) the request for judicial review has “apparent grounds for relief”, and (2) no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any other person affected by reason of the delay. As the Divisional Court held in Unifor and its Local 303 v Scepter Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5683, at paras. 17-19, the court may consider other factors such as the length of the delay and any explanation for the delay. However, an extension of time is not automatic even where the two mandatory conditions are met. An extension of time is discretionary.
[17] To determine whether the judicial review has apparent grounds for relief, the court will engage in a limited inquiry into the merits of the underlying application, including the evidentiary record: Jonker v. Township of West Lincoln, 2023 ONSC 1948, 167 O.R. (3d) 544, at paras. 35 and 41. This is a more onerous standard than the test for striking pleadings and requires that the applicant demonstrate more than simply a “tenable” argument: Jonker, at para. 40; Wahbi v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2023 ONSC 3713, at para. 15. The apparent grounds for review should be assessed against the applicable standard of review, which is reasonableness: Jonker at para. 42.
[18] Where the underlying judicial review application does not have any “apparent grounds for relief,” the court can deny extension requests on this basis alone: Yan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1290, at para. 8; Jonker, at para. 35.
Position of the Parties
[19] Citing Yan at para. 9, the only prejudice LAO relies on is the prejudice that is presumed to flow from the delay.
[20] LAO acknowledges that it exercised state authority. However, citing Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v. Wall, 2018 SCC 26, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 750, at para. 14., LAO opposes the relief on the basis that the application has no apparent grounds for relief because the underlying decision that Mr. Chammah is seeking to review is not of a sufficiently public character to attract judicial review.
[21] LAO references the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in Khorsand v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2024 ONCA 597, 499 D.L.R. (4th) 717, at paras. 73 and 74. There, the court held that the factors in Air Canada v. Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347, [2013] 3 F.C.R. 605 can be used to tease out why, at a minimum, the Wall functional criterion had or had not been met in determining whether a decision is public or not, and that the Air Canada factors were not a “strict test or checklist” but “simply play a helpful role in focusing the court’s attention and reasoning process, especially when analyzing the second criterion from Wall”. The court added a caveat at para. 76 that the Air Canada factors should not be used to characterize a decision of a public body as public in function simply because a broad segment of the public may be interested in or impacted by it.
[22] LAO also references the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in West Whitby Landowners Group Inc. v. Elexicon Energy Inc., 2025 ONCA 821, at para. 43, where the court summarizes the three principles that can be derived from the JRPA and the cases of Wall, Khorsand, and Air Canada.
[23] LAO engages in an in-depth analysis of the Air Canada factors to establish that the Decision should not be characterized as sufficiently public in nature.
[24] Mr. Chammah submits he has met the test for an extension of time. He submits that the Decision is of a sufficiently public character to attract judicial review, and his underlying application meets the apparent grounds for relief test.
[25] Mr. Chammah raises numerous grounds in his underlying application. Among them are the following:
a. the Decision was made without notice, without an opportunity to respond, and without reasons, and contains on a conclusory assertion of abuse without specifying the details of the abuse;
b. the Legal Aid Services Rules were breached by LAO;
c. the Decision did not inform him of the reviewability of the Decision or of the timeframes and process for seeking review;
d. the Decision prohibited further interaction with LAO staff which meant that he could not exercise his review rights;
e. LAO failed to make a finding pursuant to s. 8(1)(c) of the Legal Aid Services Rules that services “cannot be provided effectively” and that he had successfully received duty counsel assistance at prior appearances; and
f. a legal aid certificate was issued without his application, consent, or signature and in violation of the asserted mandatory procedure requirements in ss. 6(1), 10, and 11.
Analysis and Conclusion
[26] In my view, “apparent grounds for relief” does not require a determination at this stage whether the decision is of a sufficiently public nature to attract judicial review. On a limited review, the evidence and materials filed and the arguments made before me support either conclusion. It is possible that a court may conclude that the decision to deny access to duty counsel to a self-represented party who is entitled to choose whether to be represented by counsel or not, and to require him to submit to a legal aid certificate instead, is of a sufficiently public character to allow for judicial review. I am not required to make that final determination on this application, and it is inappropriate to do so where it is not clear or obvious that the decision is not of a sufficiently public nature to be amenable to judicial review.
[27] Mr. Chammah intended to seek judicial review within 30 days of the Decision. The length of the delay is minimal. The presumed prejudice is nominal. No actual prejudice has been established.
[28] There is an explanation for the delay. But for the issues encountered by Mr. Chammah at the Kitchener civil counter and with the Portal, the application for judicial review would have proceeded in the ordinary course and this motion to extend the time would not have been required. He would have been entitled to commence the application for judicial review.
[29] Further, in my view, a limited inquiry based on the merits of the underlying application leads me to conclude that, for the purposes of the extension application, there exist apparent grounds for relief. Whether the decision is of a sufficient public character to meet the test for judicial review, and whether the application will be successful, is left for determination on a full record and a hearing of the issues.
[30] In his materials, Mr. Chammah sought costs in the cause, and they are so ordered.
[31] I make the following orders:
a. extending the time for commencing this application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 5(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1. 2 to January 30, 2026;
b. the applicant shall, if he has not already done so, issue the Notice of Application by January 30, 2026;
c. the applicant shall serve the Notice of Application on the respondent and the Attorney General of Ontario by February 6, 2026;
d. costs of this motion shall be in the cause.
Justice M. Bordin
Released: January 19, 2026
CITATION: Chammah v. Legal Aid Ontario, 2026 ONSC 356
COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-427
DATE: 2026-01-19
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
TAREK THOMAS CHAMMAH
Plaintiff/Applicant
– and –
LEGAL AID ONTARIO
Defendant/Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice Bordin
Released: January 19, 2026

