CITATION: Attri v. Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONSC 5592

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000423-00JR

DATE: 20241008

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: SILKY ATTRI

AND:

LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO

BEFORE: Justice O’Brien

COUNSEL: S. Attri, Self-Represented

A. Pinto, Counsel for the Law Society of Ontario

HEARD: In-writing

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] This endorsement provides my reasons for dismissing this judicial review application pursuant to r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as requested by the Law Society of Ontario (LSO).

[2] Ms. Attri is a licensed paralegal. She seeks to judicially review a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division in response to a motion she brought for the dismissal of the conduct application brought against her. For the following reasons, I find the application for judicial review should be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court pursuant to r. 2.1.01.

Background

[3] The background is somewhat complicated because Ms. Attri has been the subject of two investigations related to the same underlying facts but for different purposes. One of the investigations was impacted by a decision of this court.

[4] In November 2021, Ms. Attri wrote the LSO’s barrister and solicitor licensing examinations. Following the completion of those examinations, the LSO became aware the integrity of the exams had been compromised. A tutoring company had obtained copies of the exams and LSO obtained four copies of cheating keys.

[5] The LSO reviewed the exams and identified candidates, including Ms. Attri, suspected of benefitting from access to a cheating key. For those applicants, the LSO voided the exam results and their registration in the licensing process.

[6] Some of the applicants sought judicial review of the LSO’s decision to this court. The Divisional Court upheld the LSO’s decision to void the applicants’ exam results but quashed its decision to impose further measures, such as cancelling their registration in the licensing process, without having held a hearing: Mirza et al v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727. In addressing the question of remedy, the court did not foreclose the LSO from pursuing good character hearings against the applicants, though commented that if the LSO did not act promptly, the delay could be relevant in any abuse of process argument an applicant may raise.

[7] Ms. Attri was not one of the applicants in this court, but the LSO changed its response to her situation because of the court’s decision. During Ms. Attri’s initial licensing application, the LSO started a good character investigation because of the concerns that arose from the licensing examinations. This was discontinued when it quashed the registration process. Ms. Attri then started a second licensing application and the LSO started a second good character investigation. After the court’s decision, because the original registration process was reinstated, the second good character investigation was closed but the original good character investigation was reopened. That investigation remained in process at the time of the motion decision that Ms. Attri seeks to judicially review.

[8] In November 2022, the LSO also initiated a conduct investigation against Ms. Attri in respect of her practice as a paralegal. The LSO alleged that, because of her conduct related to the November 2021 examinations, Ms. Attri had engaged in conduct unbecoming a paralegal.

Motion before Hearing Division

[9] Ms. Attri brought a motion before the Tribunal’s Hearing Division seeking to have the conduct application dismissed. The Hearing Division dismissed the motion. It did not accept Ms. Attri’s submissions that the Mirza decision addressed her conduct application, that the conduct application violated the principle of double jeopardy, and that the conduct application should be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious due to an absence of evidence that she was not candid in the examination process. It also dismissed her submission in oral argument that it would be procedurally unfair for the conduct application to proceed while a decision in the good character investigation had not been made.

Submissions under r. 2.1.01

[10] I was the triage and case management judge assigned to this application. During the case management process, the LSO raised its position that the application was premature and asked that it be dismissed under r. 2.1.01. The court asked Ms. Attri to provide her position on whether the application was premature. In response, Ms. Attri then filed submissions addressing why she said the application should not be dismissed under r. 2.1.01. By directions, the court then advised that even though the registrar had not formally issued a r. 2.1 notice, since Ms. Attri had already provided responding submissions, the court would determine whether the application should be dismissed under that rule.

[11] In her submissions, Ms. Attri argues:

a. The Tribunal`s decision was not premature since she was seeking a final dismissal of the conduct investigation.

b. The LSO assumed her guilt when it said it had no basis to conclude the good character investigation would lead to different conclusions than would the conduct investigation.

c. The conduct investigation is a collateral attack on the directions of this Court in Mirza.

Dismissal under r. 2.1.01

[12] Rule 2.1.01 allows the court to stay or dismiss a proceeding where it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The application of r. 2.1 is “limited to the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, [2015] O.J. No. 5692, at para. 8; Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2023 ONCA 598, [2023] O.J. No. 3997, at para. 6.

[13] The rule “must be interpreted robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process”: Scaduto, at para. 8; Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690, at para. 8.

[14] In this case, Ms. Attri’s application is premature on its face. This court has repeatedly emphasized the longstanding principle that it will not intervene in administrative proceedings unless there are exceptional circumstances. Fragmentation causes delay and disruptions in administrative proceedings. It is preferable to allow administrative proceedings to run their full course and then consider legal issues arising from the proceeding at their conclusion: Isaac v. Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 10, 2021 ONSC, at para. 10.

[15] Ms. Attri brought this application from a motion decision declining to dismiss the conduct proceedings as an abuse of process. The fact that Ms. Attri sought dismissal of the conduct proceeding does not render the decision final, as she suggests. The Tribunal made an interlocutory decision declining to dismiss the proceedings. The conduct application must be permitted to run its course. The LSO may be unsuccessful at the hearing before the Tribunal. Or, if the Hearing Division finds Ms. Attri has engaged in conduct unbecoming a paralegal, she may appeal that finding to the Tribunal’s Appeal Division. Those steps should be taken, with recourse to this court available only if she is ultimately unsuccessful before the Tribunal.

[16] There are no exceptional circumstances that would justify the fragmentation of proceedings in this case. I do not agree that the Tribunal’s comments about having no basis to conclude the good character investigation would lead to a different result presumed her to be guilty. The comment was made as one of several factors explaining why it was not procedurally unfair to continue with the conduct application while a decision in the good character investigation was not yet made. It did not presume an outcome but did suggest the opposite outcome also could not be presumed. In any event, raising an allegation of procedural unfairness does not on its own constitute an exceptional circumstance that would justify fragmenting an administrative proceeding.

[17] The submission that the conduct investigation is a collateral attack on the court’s directions in Mirza also does not reflect exceptional circumstances. While the court’s reasons in Mirza may be relevant to the conduct investigation, they were not directed specifically at conduct investigations. The matters before the court in Mirza were limited to licensing applications. There is no lack of fairness or abuse of process that justifies the court’s intervention at this early stage.

[18] In dismissing this application under r. 2.1.01, I note that Ms. Attri is not foreclosed from ultimate recourse to the court. If the Tribunal Hearing and Appeal Divisions ultimately conclude Ms. Attri has committed unbecoming a paralegal, it will remain open to her to appeal that conclusion to this court.

Disposition

[19] The application is premature and there are no extraordinary circumstances that would justify interfering in the Tribunal’s processes. The application is doomed to fail and is therefore dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01.

O’Brien J

Date: October 8, 2024