CITATION: Dr. Rajiv Maini v. HPARB et al. 2022 ONSC 3326
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 037/20
DATE: 2022/06/08
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
McWatt A.C.J.S.C.J. and Stewart and Mew JJ.
BETWEEN:
DR. RAJIV MAINI
Applicant
– and –
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ONTARIO (“CPSO”)
Respondent
Valerie Wise and Mina Karabit, for the Applicant
Emily Graham, for the Respondent
– and –
HEALTH PROFESSIONS AND APPEAL REVIEW BOARD (“HPARB”)
Respondent
David P. Jacobs, for the Respondent
– and –
D. PERSAUD
Respondent
self-represented\did not attend the hearing
HEARD at Toronto (by videoconference): April 21, 2022
McWatt A.C.J.S.C.J.
REASONS FOR DECISION
OVERVIEW
[1] This is an Application for Judicial Review of a decision of the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee of the CPSO (“ICRC”) dated July 20, 2018, and the subsequent review decision of the Health Professions and Appeal Review Board (“HPARB” or “Board”) dated August 19, 2019. The ICRC determined, and the HPARB confirmed, that the Applicant should be cautioned regarding the need to provide patients full, accurate, and relevant information when they are deciding whether to undergo surgery.
[2] The Applicant seeks an order of certiorari to quash and set aside the Decision of the ICRC. He asks that a different panel be constituted to reconsider the matter, submitting that:
he was deprived of his right to procedural fairness before the ICRC; and
the ICRC decision was unreasonable.
[3] In the alternative, the Applicant asks for an order of certiorari quashing the HPARB Decision of August 19, 2019, and for the matter to be remitted to the Board consisting of a panel of experts able to understand Dr. Maini’s submissions.
COURT’S JURISDICTION
[4] The Court has jurisdiction to hear this Application for Judicial Review pursuant to sections 2 and 6 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[5] The parties agree that the standard of review for substantive issues is reasonableness. There is no standard of review for questions of procedural fairness. The Court must determine whether the duty of procedural fairness has been adhered to by assessing the specific circumstances giving rise to the allegation and determining what procedures and safeguards were required to comply with the duty to act fairly.
[6] For the Court to review a penalty, the Applicant must show that the ICRC made an error in principle or that the penalty was clearly unfit. To be clearly unfit, the penalty must be disproportionate or fall outside the range of penalties for similar offences in similar circumstances.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Persaud’s Complaint
[7] The Applicant is an ophthalmologist. Ms. Persaud was his seventy-two-year-old patient.
[8] In October 2014, Ms. Persaud saw an ophthalmologist in the same office as the Applicant who noted early cataracts in both her eyes. The Applicant then met with Ms. Persaud twice. In November 2015, the Applicant determined that Ms. Persaud’s visual acuity had worsened, discussed her cataracts and told her it was reasonable for her to consider surgery. In January 2016, the Applicant saw Ms. Persaud again. His clinical findings were unchanged, and they discussed her surgical options further. Ms. Persaud never returned to the Applicant and no treatment was provided by him.
[9] In August 2016, Ms. Persaud complained about the Applicant’s professionalism to the College of Physicians and Surgeons (“CPSO”). She listed four specific concerns. The Applicant responded to each complaint. They are summarized here:
Ms. Persaud’s Concerns
Applicant’s Responses
The Applicant told her she had cataracts in both eyes and needed surgery right away. However, she had consulted another “eye doctor” who advised she did not yet require surgery.
The Applicant told Ms. Persaud it was reasonable to consider surgery given her level of visual acuity, but that it was her decision.
When she asked about doing surgery through the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (“OHIP”), the Applicant advised her “OHIP is no good”.
The Applicant did not describe OHIP as “no good”; rather, he explained there was a difference in expected visual outcomes between intraocular lenses covered by OHIP and intraocular lenses available at an additional cost.
The Applicant initially told her the surgery would cost $300 per eye, and later told her it would cost $5600.
At the second appointment, the Applicant reviewed additional options with Ms. Persaud, including an astigmatism reduction package that she was interested in. The package would increase the cost by $2400 to $2800 per eye.
The Applicant’s staff told her that the Applicant did not “have any time to waste”.
The Applicant apologized for this, indicating that his staff is known for their caring and polite manner when dealing with patients, but that they had since received further instructions on dealing with patients.
The CPSO Investigation
[10] During the investigation of Ms. Persaud’s complaint, the CPSO obtained documents and information from three physicians other than the Applicant.
[11] On December 8, 2016, it obtained information from Dr. Shaun Singer, an ophthalmologist who had examined Ms. Persaud on one occasion five months after the Applicant had initially examined her. In Dr. Singer’s opinion, Ms. Persaud had “almost” 20/40 acuity with her current glasses and mild mixed cataracts with the left eye greater than the right”. His opinion was that she did not require any treatment but should undergo a re-evaluation in one year. The CPSO also obtained information from Dr. Agatha Cheung (the optometrist who had noted Ms. Persaud’s cataracts and referred her to an ophthalmologist) and from Dr. David Y.K. Chan (a family physician).
[12] The CPSO did not disclose to the Applicant that these individuals had been contacted or consulted as part of the investigation of this complaint, nor did it disclose any of the information or documentation they provided. The Applicant did not learn of Dr. Singer’s involvement until the ICRC decision was issued. these individuals had been contacted or consulted as part of the investigation of this complaint…
The ICRC Decision
[13] On July 20, 2018, the ICRC found that the first and third of Ms. Persaud’s concerns had merit.
[14] With respect to the first complaint (regarding the need for surgery), the ICRC was concerned about the discrepancy between the results of the Applicant’s examination and the results of Dr. Singer’s examination. Taking Dr. Singer’s assessment into account, the ICRC was not convinced the Applicant provided Ms. Persaud with accurate information to decide whether to have surgery.
[15] With respect to the third complaint, regarding the cost of surgery, the ICRC found that it was not apparent that Ms. Persaud’s astigmatism was sufficient to justify an astigmatism package. And, again, it was concerned about her ability to make an informed decision based on what the Applicant had told her.
[16] The ICRC ordered the Applicant to attend at the CPSO to be “cautioned in person with respect to providing patients with full, accurate, relevant information to allow patients to make an informed decision regarding surgery”.
[17] The ICRC took no action with respect to Ms. Persaud’s second and fourth concerns, as it was unable to determine, based on the evidence, what the Applicant and his staff had said.
The HPARB Review Decision
[18] The Applicant asked the HPARB to review the ICRC Decision. At that point, Dr. Singer’s records were disclosed to the Applicant. He also learned of Dr. Cheung’s involvement and saw her records. In written submissions before the HPARB, the Applicant provided additional submissions to address the accuracy of his and the others’ visual acuity measurements as well as the appropriateness of the astigmatism package.
[19] Nonetheless, on August 19, 2019, the HPARB confirmed the ICRC Decision, finding that the CPSO’s investigation was adequate and that the ICRC’s decision to require the Applicant to appear for a caution was reasonable.
[20] On January 24, 2020, the Applicant brought this Application for Judicial Review.
ANALYSIS
1. Was Dr. Maini Deprived of His Right to Procedural Fairness Before the ICRC?
(i) Did the ICRC Fail to Give Dr. Maini Notice of Dr. Singer’s Findings or an Opportunity to Respond Before Cautioning Him Based on Them?
Disclosure Before the ICRC
[21] The Applicant maintains that he is owed a high level of disclosure requirements even in the investigative phase before the ICRC, as confirmed by this Court in Gopinath v. The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 3143 (Div. Ct.), at paragraph 14. In that case, however, the applicant’s counsel had requested specific disclosure on multiple occasions, but the CPSO did not provide it. There is no evidence on this record that the Applicant requested disclosure that would justify the higher level of disclosure referred to in Gopinath.
[22] The Applicant also maintains that he was denied procedural fairness when the ICRC acted on clinical concerns that he was not reasonably anticipating. The ICRC failed to, first, give him notice of Dr. Singer’s findings and, second, an opportunity to respond to them before cautioning him and despite its heavy reliance on that evidence.
[23] The Applicant had ample opportunity to respond to the issues in the case. He did not require disclosure of Dr. Singer’s records to respond to the concerns in the complaint.
[24] The content of the duty of fairness applicable to any given set of circumstances is flexible and variable and will depend on the context. In the investigative context, the duty of fairness does not impose the same obligations as it does at a hearing stage, where the rights of a party are finally determined, and sanctions are potentially imposed. As the Supreme Court of Canada set out in Irvine v. Canada (Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), 1987 81 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181, paragraphs 78 and 87.
Fairness is a flexible concept whose content varies depending on the nature of the inquiry and the consequences for the individuals involved……
Courts must, in the exercise of this discretion, remain alert to the danger of unduly burdening and complicating the law enforcement investigative process. Where that process is in embryonic form engaged in the gathering of the raw material for further consideration, the inclination of the courts is away from intervention.
[25] The duty of procedural fairness at the investigative stage is limited. The ICRC exercises a screening and not an adjudicative function. The Committee does not conduct hearings nor listen to witnesses but decides issues before it on paper-based reviews. It does not find whether professional misconduct is warranted, and it has no authority to order sanctions or penalties. Its function is to screen the results of an investigation and determine whether the matter should be referred for adjudication, or whether some other remedy is appropriate, such as a requirement for educational upgrading (Code, s. 26(1) and (3); Silverthorne v. Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Services Workers, 2006 10142 (Ont. Div. Ct.), paras. 13-18; Botros v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Ontario), [2007] O.J. No. 3156 (Div. Ct.), paras. 30-31).
[26] This Court has recognized that “The standard of disclosure at the screening or investigative stage has been held to require adequate notice to ensure that a member has sufficient information to answer the case against him or her. It has also been held that it is adequate at the investigative stage for the member to know the allegations or substance of the complaint against him or her, not all of the information obtained during the course of the investigation.” (Gopinath, para. 12)
[27] As well, section 25(5) of the Code does not require Dr. Maini to have received full disclosure. The Code merely requires that he had “notice” of the complaint and an opportunity to respond (Botros, paras. 30-31). Had the Legislature intended a member to receive each document before the ICRC, it would have used express language to that effect. It did not.
[28] This case is distinguishable from the cases relied on by Dr. Maini. In Ajao v. College of Nurses of Ontario, 2011 ONSC 6061 (Div. Ct.) and Gopinath, the court found procedural unfairness in the regulators’ failure to provide the members an opportunity to respond to information they had no notice of. A similar conclusion was reached in another case upon which Dr. Maini relies. In Volochay v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, 2012 ONCA 541, the regulator breached the procedural requirements set out in the Code by disposing of the matter without having given the member notice of the complaint or an opportunity to make written submissions to the ICRC.
[29] In this case, however, the patient’s complaint, which was provided to Dr. Maini, raised her lack of understanding of the reason he recommended that surgery was required, as well as the basis on which he offered her more expensive surgical upgrades that were not medically necessary. This was the issue upon which the ICRC ultimately took remedial action.
[30] It is also the case that a breach of procedural fairness alone does not constitute a reviewable error. Even where there is a breach of procedural fairness, the matter need only be returned to the decision-maker for reconsideration where the breach had an impact on the decision (Geris v. Ontario College of Pharmacists, 2020 ONSC 7437 (Div. Ct.), para. 19). As recently confirmed by this Court, in Al-Kazely v. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 44 (Div. Ct.), at paragraph 48:
Where a breach of procedural fairness has had no impact on the decision, the matter need not be returned to the decision-maker for reconsideration. As set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Nagulathas v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1159, at para. 24; and the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, at para. 43), “Where there may be a breach of the rules of fairness, the court should assess whether the error ‘occasions no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice’ …… The breach of procedural fairness must affect the outcome for the court to find a reviewable error”.
[31] Indeed, Dr. Maini was given an opportunity at the Board Review to see Dr. Singer’s records. He also learned of Dr. Cheung’s involvement and saw her records. In written submissions before the HPARB, the Applicant provided additional submissions to address the accuracy of his and the others’ visual acuity measurements as well as the appropriateness of the astigmatism package. The Board found that his response had no impact on the decision of the Committee.
(ii) Was Dr. Maini Not Given Notice of a Need to “Justify” the Astigmatism Reduction Package?
[32] The Applicant complains that the ICRC cautioned him based on his offering Ms. Persaud the astigmatism reduction package, which issue he had no notice of. Ultimately, though, the HPARB dismissed these concerns on the basis that giving the Applicant notice and an opportunity to respond was unlikely to have changed the decision.
[33] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has recognized in Volochay, at paragraph 74, that the Board process can cure any denial of procedural fairness there might have been to a physician in the College proceedings. Prior to the Board’s review, Dr. Maini was provided the complete record of the College’s investigation and an opportunity to make additional submissions, which he ultimately did through counsel. The Board considered those additional submissions regarding the accuracy of his visual acuity readings and his clinical justification for offering the astigmatism reduction package, but still concluded that the ICRC’s investigation was adequate and reasonable, and that Dr. Maini’s additional information would not have affected the ICRC’s decision.
[34] With respect to the visual acuity measurements, the ICRC was concerned not with the accuracy of the absolute values of them, but rather that the significant, unexplained discrepancy between Dr. Maini’s and Dr. Singer’s measurements supported diametrically opposed treatment plans. Dr. Maini provided no explanation before ICRC for his having recommended Ms. Persaud surgical upgrades.
[35] The ICRC’s concern about the astigmatism was not whether it was severe enough to warrant attention. Instead, it was whether Dr. Maini had adequately explained its rationale to the patient, especially considering the extra expense. The Applicant’s response was that the extent of the complainant’s astigmatism was yet to be determined after additional uninsured testing.
[36] The ICRC had concerns based on the content of the Applicant’s response. They found that it did not satisfactorily answer the issues raised by the complainant. That concern did not give rise to any further notice entitlements. (Fielden v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2013 ONSC 4261 (Div. Ct.), para. 9; Geris v. Ontario College of Pharmacists, 2020 ONSC 7437 (Div. Ct.), para. 26-29).
[37] Dr. Maini relies on the decision in K.W. v. L.G., 2012 62556 (ON HPARB), at paragraph 25 and several other Board decisions citing it, for the proposition that the ICRC must advise the physician when it identifies “substantive new issues or interprets the issues differently than the member”.
[38] In the subsequent decisions JS v. DF, 2018 4568 2018 4568, at paragraph 40 and MT v. TW, 2018 67074 (ON HPARB), at paragraph 23, the standard for procedural fairness has been clarified. The ICRC is not required, prior to rendering its decision, to provide the physician with advance notice of its specific conclusions or concerns that arise after the ICRC analyses the information before it.
[39] Where the ICRC has given the physician notice of the complaint and an opportunity to respond, it is entitled to develop concerns based on the information that has been provided to it, including the content of the physician’s response.
[40] For the reasons set out, we find that Dr. Maini was not deprived of his right to procedural fairness before the ICRC.
2. Was the ICRC Decision Unreasonable?
(i) Was the ICRC’s Decision Unreasonable Due to Improper Findings?
[41] The Applicant argues that the ICRC’s disposition is unreasonable because it was based on improper findings that Dr. Singer’s visual acuity measurements were accurate whereas his were not, and that the patient did not require an astigmatism reduction package. Further, the Applicant submits that the ICRC did not explain why the Applicant’s measurements were inaccurate while Dr. Singer’s were accurate. Dr. Maini points to the fact that the record includes results from himself, Dr. Singer, and Dr. Cheung, all of which are different despite Dr. Singer and Dr. Cheung making their measurements within a few days of one another.
[42] We disagree with the Applicant’s submission that the ICRC made such findings. The ICRC was concerned that Dr. Maini had not provided the patient with full and accurate information to enable her to make an informed decision about proceeding with surgery or subjecting herself to uninsured surgical upgrades. In arriving at that conclusion, it conducted some limited weighing of the facts before it.
[43] As an aside, despite his reliance on his assessment of the severity of the patient’s visual acuity in recommending surgery, Dr. Maini agrees that the nature of visual acuity testing is “Inherently subjective” and can be subject to wide variability. Yet, there is no indication that he informed Ms. Persaud of this, or that he counselled the patient about how that factor might impact her decision to proceed with surgery or to incur large expenses for uninsured upgrades.
[44] An expression of concern on the part of the ICRC with respect to an aspect of a physician’s conduct does not amount to the Committee’s making ‘findings’ about that conduct (Lum, Konjarski. v. Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee of the College of Physiotherapists of Ontario, 2015 ONSC 7227 (Div. Ct.), paras. 4-7).
[45] In considering and disposing of the patient’s complaint, the ICRC did not make any improper findings. The ICRC fulfilled its statutory function as a screening committee, to reach one of the dispositions available to it under s. 26 of the Code. This is its role and is consistent with the scope of ICRC’s powers as set out in the Code and the jurisprudence (Fielden, paras. 5 and 8; McKee v. Ontario (Health Professions Appeal and Review Board), 2009 55293, paras. 36 and 39).
(ii) The Clinical Issues were Beyond the Expertise of the ICRC Panel
[46] The Applicant also complains that the ICRC did not have expertise in the clinical issues before it and did not obtain an independent opinion from an ophthalmologist as past HPARB decisions encourage. He submits that the ICRC did not understand the information on the record.
[47] The reasonableness of the Board’s affirmation of the remedial action taken by the ICRC is not, as submitted by Dr. Maini, affected by the surgical specialties of the individual members of the ICRC panel deciding this matter.
[48] The Board has recognized that the composition of the ICRC is within the discretion of the College (KW, para. 21), and that the ICRC itself is in the best position to determine whether its members have sufficient expertise to assess the complaints that come before it (DSH v. RP, 2021 75026 (ON HPARB), para. 56; KW, para. 21).
[49] There is no requirement that all members be from different specialties or from specialties similar to that of the member subject to the complaint (KW, para. 21). That a physician disagrees with the ICRC’s assessment or has researched the issues himself and provided academic studies to support his opinion, is not a sufficient reason to conclude that the ICRC lacked the knowledge required to consider the complaint where, as here, the record supports the conclusions it reached (DSH, paras. 58, 68).
[50] As the Board noted in its reasons, the ICRC’s knowledge and expertise had to be assessed considering the complaint screening function it performed. At paragraphs 30 and 32, the Board concluded that the ICRC possessed the requisite medical knowledge to assess the sufficiency of Dr. Maini’s process for obtaining informed consent for surgery - a matter applicable to all surgeons regardless of specialty. We agree with that finding.
[51] Surgical Panels of the ICRC, regardless of the qualifications of their individual members, are well-placed to consider issues that are of general application across surgical specialties, such as obtaining informed consent (SVK v. CPC, 2020 36281 (ON HPARB), para. 34); professional communication with patients and their families (MF v. KS, 2015 106293 (ON HPARB), paras. 28-30); reviewing medical imaging, assessing progress notes, considering opinions from consulting specialists (DCW et al. v. SC, 2014 39861 (ON HPARB), paras. 27, 30, 46-47, 65); and post-surgical follow-up care (AA v. CG, 2017 15519 (ON HPARB), para. 40).
[52] The ICRC’s may also obtain an independent medical report if it is necessary and appropriate to do so in a particular case (KW, para. 21; KW, paras 21, 56; MF, para. 26).
[53] The ICRC is similarly free to reject the opinions of independent experts whose reports it obtains, even those that are favorable to the member, so long as it explains its reasons for doing so (DCW, para. 48).
[54] Deference is owed to the College’s expertise in determining what is relevant to the subject matter of its investigation and its determination of the scope of its investigation, including its requests for information (Beitel v. The College of Physicians and Surgeons, 2013 ONSC 4658 (Div. Ct.), para. 40). Exercising its discretion not to obtain an expert opinion does not render an ICRC’s decision unreasonable. The ICRC made no error in exercising its discretion in this case not to obtain an expert opinion.
(iii) Is the Public Nature of The Caution a Factor in Assessing Reasonableness?
[55] Dr. Maini submits that a caution in person is a public disposition. We disagree in the circumstances of this case.
[56] The public nature of a caution is irrelevant to the reasonableness analysis here. A caution “is not a sanction or a penalty. A caution is entirely remedial in nature” (Griffith v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2021 ONSC 5246, para. 81; Silverthorne v. College of Social Workers & Social Services Workers, 2006 10142, para. 16; Fielden para. 10; Greenwald v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2008 63184 (Ont. Div. Ct.), para. 13), even when it is firmly worded or may contain “strong language” (Ren v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 2758 (Div. Ct.), paras. 13-15). The public nature of cautions “does not fundamentally alter the preventive, educational and remedial nature of such orders” (Geris, para. 34; Griffith, para. 93; Longman v. Ontario College of Pharmacists, 2021 ONSC 1610 (Div. Ct.), paras. 44-45)
[57] Dr. Maini maintains that the public nature of the caution will threaten his livelihood and therefore attracts a heightened degree of scrutiny. The Applicant asserts that it “has particularly harsh consequences” such as those that “threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood” as set out by Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, para. 133).
[58] A caution in person, however, is a remedial disposition involving a discussion with one’s peers about the conduct at issue. The objective of such a discussion is to improve a physician’s practice and ensure the protection of the public. There is no evidence in this matter that Dr. Maini is at risk of a disciplinary suspension, or of losing his employment. His “perceptions” that an advisory caution may have an effect on his career are insufficient to impose a higher standard of Reasons than would otherwise be required (Griffith, para. 92).
3. Was the Board’s Decision to Uphold the Conclusion of the ICRC Investigation Reasonable?
[59] This Court owes substantial deference to the expertise of the ICRC in determining the appropriate scope of education or remediation. It is not our role on judicial review to re-weigh the relevant factors and come to a different result from that reached by the ICRC and upheld by the Board (Beitel, para. 57).
[60] In its decision, the ICRC identified several interrelated factors among the information it had gathered that logically led it to the conclusion that Dr. Maini would benefit from a remedial caution, and it was open to most of the Board to affirm the ICRC’s conclusion that he could benefit from some direction.
[61] The ICRC’s decision, in conjunction with the record, supports the Board’s conclusions that the ICRC’s central concern related to the quality of the information that Dr. Maini provided to the patient about the condition of her eyesight and the surgical options available to her. The HPARB stated that the ICRC’s primary concern was that the complainant was left confused or uncertain, rather than the Applicant’s results not being accurate.
[62] The Board’s conclusion that the ICRC was primarily concerned with the patient’s confusion and uncertainty as to Dr. Maini’s surgical recommendations was raised in the patient’s letter of complaint. The Board noted that the patient’s complaint clearly set out that even after two appointments with Dr. Maini, she still felt it necessary to consult another ophthalmologist for a second opinion. That doctor recommended against surgery. The patient’s complaint stated that, considering the second opinion, she understood neither Dr. Maini’s advice that she was a candidate for urgent cataract surgery, nor his justification for offering her $5,000 uninsured surgical upgrades. In addition, as the ICRC noted, Dr. Maini’s documentation did not shed light on what information he may have communicated to the patient in this regard, particularly with respect to the astigmatism reduction package.
[63] Where a patient’s complaint expresses disagreement with a decision the physician says was clinically indicated, the Board has held that it is reasonable for the ICRC to conclude that the complaint raises a communications issue, in the sense that the complainant has demonstrated she did not understand the justification for the physician’s decision (KAL v. TM, 2020 15349 (ON HPARB), paras. 34-35).
[64] The ICRC considered the range of dispositions available to it then went on to find that the information it had gathered warranted some remedial action to assist Dr. Maini in the future. The Board reasonably upheld this outcome as being within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes that are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.
DISPOSITION
[65] The application is dismissed. The Applicant has failed to show that the ICRC made an error in principle. The Board did not err in its decision to uphold the ICRC.
COSTS
[66] Upon agreement of the parties, the successful party shall receive $5000 in costs. Therefore, the Applicant shall pay the Respondent College of Physicians and Surgeons $5000 costs inclusive. The HPARB asks for no costs and will not be awarded any.
McWatt A.C.J.S.C.J.
I agree _______________________________
Stewart J.
I agree _______________________________
Mew J.
Released: June 8, 2022
CITATION: Dr. Rajiv Maini v. HPARB et al. 2022 ONSC 3326
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 037/20
DATE: 2022/06/08
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
McWatt A.C.J.S.C.J. and Stewart and Mew JJ.
BETWEEN:
DR. RAJIV MAINI
Applicant
– and –
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ONTARIO (“CPSO”)
Respondent
– and –
HEALTH PROFESSIONS AND APPEAL REVIEW BOARD (“HPARB”)
Respondent
– and –
D. PERSAUD
Respondent
REASONS FOR Decision
Released: June 8, 2022