Court of Justice

The mother and father brought cross-motions for temporary parenting orders regarding their two young children.

The mother sought sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence, while the father sought equal parenting time.

The court found that the parties' poor communication, high conflict, and mutual allegations of family violence made joint decision-making inappropriate.

The court granted the mother temporary decision-making responsibility for health and tutoring, and ordered a parenting schedule where the children reside primarily with the mother, with the father having parenting time three out of four weekends and one weekday overnight per month.

This decision addresses two motions: one by counsel to be removed from the record for the respondent mother and father, and another by the Children's Aid Society (CAS) to add the maternal grandmother (M.M.) as a party respondent.

The court granted the counsel's request for removal.

Regarding the CAS's motion, the court found that M.M., having had temporary care and custody of the child for 17 months, qualified as a "parent" under the expansive definitions in the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA).

This statutory parental status automatically conferred party status upon her, overriding common law criteria for adding parties.

Consequently, M.M. was granted status as a party respondent and directed to file an Answer.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding.

She had been granted temporary care and custody of her two grandchildren under a previous without-prejudice order.

The society opposed the motion, arguing she was not a statutory parent and that adding her would cause undue delay.

The court found that the grandmother qualified as a statutory parent under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act because she had lawful custody of the children pursuant to the temporary order.

Alternatively, the court held she should be added as a party under the Family Law Rules, as her participation was necessary to determine the issues and was in the best interests of the children.

The motion was granted.

The father brought a motion to change a 2014 final order that gave the mother sole decision-making and primary residence, with his parenting time at her discretion.

The father had almost no contact with the child for six years.

The court found a material change in circumstances and concluded that the mother had engaged in parental alienation, actively undermining the child's relationship with the father and causing the child to fear him.

The court ordered joint decision-making and implemented a temporary, stepped parenting time schedule that transitions to week-about shared parenting, while declining to order police enforcement at this stage.

The applicant sought the return of a 2018 Jeep Grand Cherokee seized by the Toronto Police Service, arguing that its continued detention was not required for investigation, trial, or forfeiture proceedings under s. 490(11) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the vehicle was used in an assault and exploitation, and intended to seek forfeiture if the accused (D.G.) was convicted.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the application, confirmed the applicant was the lawful owner and innocent of any complicity, and determined that the vehicle was not required for ongoing investigation or trial.

The court further concluded that any future forfeiture application by the Crown would inevitably be unsuccessful given the applicant's innocent third-party status under s. 490.4(3) of the Criminal Code.

The application for the return of the Jeep was allowed.

The accused stabbed a stranger in a hospital and advanced on a police officer with a knife, resulting in the accused being shot.

He had a long history of schizophrenia and substance abuse.

The central issue was whether his psychosis at the time of the offences was a disease of the mind or a self-induced state caused by voluntary drug consumption (Concerta).

The court applied the Bouchard-Lebrun framework and found that the accused's underlying mental health issues and substance abuse were inextricably linked.

The court concluded the accused was suffering from a mental disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing his acts were wrong, and found him not criminally responsible.

Patryk Myszka pleaded guilty to voyeurism (s. 162(1) Criminal Code) for secretly recording his common-law partner in their home for a sexual purpose.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of 5 months followed by 18 months probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the planned nature of the offence, breach of trust, and significant victim impact, alongside mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and engagement in counselling.

The judge determined that a conditional discharge was not in the public interest due to the seriousness of the offence, but a conditional sentence was also not necessary.

A suspended sentence with 18 months probation and a forfeiture order for the recording devices was imposed, emphasizing denunciation, general deterrence, and the victim's protection.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference following an encounter with his then-boyfriend.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in non-consensual sexual acts, while the accused maintained that all activity was consensual.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, finding the complainant's evidence inconsistent, exaggerated, and contradicted by external evidence, including a post-incident selfie and testimony from a witness present in the apartment.

The court believed the accused's evidence, found that the complainant consented, and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The accused, Danielle Anderson, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

She sought to exclude breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) related to the "forthwith" requirement for Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand and test, immediate right to counsel (RTC) upon arrest, and taking Approved Instrument (AI) breath samples "as soon as practicable." The court found that the ASD demand and test were made forthwith, the RTC was provided promptly upon arrest, and the police acted reasonably in taking breath samples.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty of the "Over 80" charge.

The applicant brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the child, Maddaline, to her primary care as per a separation agreement, after the respondent unilaterally withheld the child following a temporary COVID-19 arrangement.

The respondent sought to maintain primary care based on the child's stated preference.

The court found urgency due to the respondent's self-help actions in changing the long-standing status quo.

While acknowledging the child's views, the court determined that the views were potentially influenced by the circumstances created by the respondent and lacked sufficient consistency over time.

The court ordered the child's immediate return to the applicant's primary care and school in her catchment area, upholding the prior status quo.

Claims for temporary decision-making and a police assistance clause were dismissed without prejudice.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "exceed 79".

The trial focused on whether a qualified technician's certificate, stating that an alcohol standard was certified by an analyst, was sufficient proof for the presumption of accuracy under section 320.31 of the Criminal Code, or if direct analyst evidence was required.

The court also addressed the principle of stare decisis, specifically whether a lower court could revisit a settled legal issue based on a new interpretation or analysis from a non-binding higher court decision.

The court found that it was bound by existing Ontario Superior Court precedents and that a new interpretation alone does not permit departure from binding authority.

The defendant was found guilty.

This case provides no reasons for decision, stating only that the reasons are not available at this time.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm after a playground altercation involving his son and a group of older children.

The Crown alleged the accused grabbed and twisted the arm of a child who was running away, causing a buckle fracture to her wrist.

The accused denied touching the child, testifying she fell while running.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the Crown witnesses' evidence had frailties and inconsistencies.

Furthermore, medical evidence indicated the fracture was most likely caused by a forward fall rather than a twisting motion.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding both the commission of the assault and causation, resulting in an acquittal.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a final order for child support and contributions to special and extraordinary expenses.

The parties had consented to a child support amount lower than the Child Support Guidelines table amount, citing the respondent's obligation to a new family as a reason for undue hardship.

The court rejected the proposed consent order due to insufficient financial disclosure from the respondent and the principle that child support is a right of the child that cannot be contracted out of without proper justification.

The court issued an interim interim child support order and compelled the respondent to provide full financial disclosure.

The corporate defendant, operating a bar, pleaded guilty to regulatory offences under the Liquor Licence Act for permitting drunkenness and selling liquor to an intoxicated person.

A patron was over-served at the establishment and subsequently caused a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The court applied sentencing principles for corporate regulatory offences, emphasizing deterrence and prevention.

Weighing the severe aggravating consequence of death against mitigating factors including early guilty pleas, lack of prior record, and staff training, the court imposed a total fine of $40,000 plus a $10,000 victim surcharge.

The offender, Nam Nguyen, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

The victim sustained severe injuries including a broken jaw requiring surgery and metal plates.

The Crown sought an 18-24 month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, including denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restraint, particularly for a youthful first offender.

Despite the seriousness of the offence and the victim's injuries, the court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the offender's lack of prior record, employment, and low risk of re-offending, and that it could adequately meet sentencing objectives.

The accused faced charges of conspiracy to import and traffic cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and importing a Schedule 1 substance.

In a reverse onus bail hearing, the Crown sought detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found the accused met his burden on all grounds, noting his lack of criminal record, a strong surety release plan with a substantial financial pledge, and weaknesses in the Crown's case, which relied heavily on the uncorroborated statements of a co-accused.

The accused was granted release on strict conditions including house arrest and surety supervision.