Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - ONCJ

Olavo Williams-Cordeiro was convicted of careless driving causing death in the context of a street race on Highway 403, where his vehicle was driven at speeds between 141-193 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone.

The race culminated in a fatal collision involving a motorcycle driven by Mr. Chen.

The court considered aggravating factors including the street racing context, the defendant’s troubling driving record with multiple speeding convictions post-incident, and the need for general and specific deterrence.

Mitigating factors included the defendant’s remorse, youth, difficult upbringing, and positive family support.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 9 months, followed by 18 months probation with conditions including a prohibition on driving, and a four-year driving prohibition.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a motion to quash a Part I certificate of offence charging Muhammad Butt with failing to stop at a red light contrary to section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defence argued the certificate was defective for not including the informant’s name, relying on case law to support quashing the certificate.

The Court held that minor defects, such as the absence of the informant’s name but presence of an officer identifier ("PC 10429") and signature, do not justify quashing under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court emphasized the broad discretion to amend certificates to ensure cases are decided on their merits rather than technicalities, citing binding precedent including R. v. Massicotte and York v. Winlow.

The motion to quash was dismissed.

This decision addresses an appeal by Antonio Dimilta against his conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign under s.136(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal challenges the validity of the Certificate of Offence on the basis that the indicated place of offence was incorrect, arguing that the Certificate was not “complete and regular on its face” as required by s.9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act (POA).

The court reviewed the statutory framework and jurisprudence concerning default proceedings and the interpretation of “complete and regular on its face.” It concluded that the alleged error regarding the municipality was not sufficient to mislead or prejudice the defendant, especially given the totality of information before the Justice of the Peace.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction.

The defendant, Madeline Di Santo, was charged with careless driving causing bodily harm under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act following a collision with a pedestrian.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The court, after a one-day trial, found that the prosecution failed to prove the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge determined that the defendant was not driving at an unreasonable speed, had an advance green light, and the complainant pedestrian was outside the crosswalk, leading to the conclusion that the defendant's driving did not fall below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver.

The collision was deemed an accident, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused, Paul Greenberg, was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after a collision on the Don Valley Parkway.

The Crown relied on dash-camera footage and police testimony, while the accused testified in his defence, claiming he was driving marginally above the speed limit and was cut off by another vehicle.

The court rejected the accused's characterization of his speed and driving, finding that he drove at an excessive speed, repeatedly overtook vehicles by changing lanes, and failed to adjust his driving despite the presence of another speeding vehicle.

The court concluded that his driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver and endangered the public, leading to a conviction.

The defendant, Roberto Russo, was charged with driving while holding a handheld communication device under the Highway Traffic Act.

He pleaded not guilty, asserting the defence of necessity.

Russo, a diabetic, testified that he used his cell phone to check his blood sugar via an implanted sensor and an app (LibreLink) after receiving an urgent alert and feeling unwell, while stopped at a red light.

The court found both the officer and the defendant credible.

While the statutory exemptions for device use did not apply, the court found that Russo successfully established the common law defence of necessity.

The court determined there was clear and imminent peril to his well-being, no reasonable legal alternative given the urgency of a diabetic event, and that the harm avoided (potential incapacitation while driving) was proportional to the harm inflicted (brief phone use while stationary).

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with careless driving, brought a s. 11(b) Charter motion for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The central issue was whether the 12-month period taken to schedule an early resolution meeting constituted defence delay.

The court found this period to be institutional delay, not defence delay, as early resolution meetings are a legitimate procedural step and defendants have no control over the meeting date.

With a total delay of 18 months and 29 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Provincial Offences Act matters, and the respondent failing to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, the motion was granted, and proceedings were stayed.

This judgment concerns a trial for a Highway Traffic Act offence where the defendant was charged with making a right turn not in safety, resulting in a pedestrian fatality.

The court heard testimony from civilian and expert police witnesses.

The defence challenged witness credibility, identity, and the correctness of the HTA section under which the defendant was charged.

The court found the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in making the turn, striking and killing a pedestrian who was properly crossing.

The defence of due diligence was rejected, and a conviction was entered against the defendant under section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged under subsection 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for an unsafe right turn, resulting in a collision with a cyclist.

The prosecution proved the actus reus of the offence.

The defendant raised the defence of due diligence and reasonable belief in a mistaken set of facts, arguing that factors such as the cyclist's dark clothing, lack of e-bike headlight, insufficient lighting, and the e-bike's speed contributed to his inability to see the cyclist.

The court found that the defendant failed to prove his due diligence or that his belief in a mistaken set of facts was objectively reasonable, emphasizing the heavy onus on drivers to ensure turns are made safely.

A conviction was registered.

The Ministry of Labour charged A & L Hammer Workforce Management Inc. and its sole director, Liwayway Coluna Miranda, with failing to comply with orders to pay employee wages and recruitment fees under the Employment Standards Act and Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act.

The defendants pleaded not guilty, with the corporation's trial proceeding ex-parte.

Ms. Miranda raised a due diligence defence, claiming her business was destroyed and accounts frozen due to a CBSA raid and subsequent criminal charges (later withdrawn).

The court found that Ms. Miranda failed to demonstrate due diligence, as she continued to recruit foreign nationals despite financial difficulties and did not make reasonable efforts to secure funds or engage with the Ministry.

Both the corporation and Ms. Miranda were found guilty on all counts.

The defendant, Olavo Williams-Cordeiro, was charged with careless driving causing death and stunt driving following a high-speed incident on Highway 403.

The court found that the defendant, along with a motorcyclist and another car, were engaged in a joint enterprise of racing, driving at speeds significantly exceeding the limit (up to 193 km/hr for the defendant's vehicle).

The motorcyclist collided with a vehicle lacking rear lights and died.

The court determined that the defendant's driving behaviour, characterized by excessive speed, tandem driving, and dangerous lane changes in the dark, fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, constituting careless driving.

The court rejected the defence argument that the collision occurred through no fault of the defendant, emphasizing that the dangerous activity of racing created a foreseeable risk, and the presence of a vehicle without lights was a foreseeable highway hazard.

The defendant was found guilty of both charges, with the Kienapple principle to be considered for sentencing.

The defendant, Cynthia Kirschner, was found guilty of careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from a collision where Kirschner, making a left turn at an uncontrolled intersection, failed to yield to an oncoming e-bike, resulting in the rider's death.

The court determined that Kirschner's conduct fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, concluding she failed to see the e-bike despite clear visibility and did not take evasive action.

Arguments regarding the e-bike's modifications or sun glare were dismissed as not excusing the defendant's duty of care.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control of a conveyance and exceeding the legal blood alcohol concentration, along with a provincial offence for having open liquor in a motor vehicle.

The central issue was whether the defendant was in "care and control" of the vehicle for the criminal charges.

The court found that the defendant successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control by demonstrating he did not intend to drive.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove actual care and control beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was no realistic risk of danger from the stationary vehicle or that the defendant would change his mind and drive.

Consequently, the criminal charges were dismissed, but the defendant was found guilty of the provincial offence.

The defendant, Joseph John Nazark, was charged with careless driving causing bodily harm or death under the Highway Traffic Act after colliding with a cyclist, Raymond Girard, during a left turn.

The defense argued the cyclist was improperly riding on the sidewalk and in the crosswalk, and that obstructions hindered visibility.

The prosecution contended the defendant failed to ensure a safe turn and that the cyclist had the right of way.

The court, applying the strict liability standard for careless driving, found that the defendant's driving fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, regardless of the cyclist's actions, as the defendant failed to see what ought to have been seen and adjust to changing circumstances.

Nazark was found guilty.

The defendant, Madison Biggar, was convicted of careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act after a two-day trial.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering victim impact statements, a pre-sentence report, and principles of specific and general deterrence, as well as proportionality and parity with similar cases.

The court imposed a fine, probation, community service, and a driving prohibition, balancing the gravity of the offence with the defendant's youth and lack of prior record, while noting her failure to take responsibility by pleading not guilty.

The defendant, Madison Biggar, was charged with careless driving under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in bodily harm and death to a motorcyclist.

The collision occurred when the defendant made a left turn, striking a northbound motorcycle.

The prosecution presented expert collision reconstruction evidence and civilian witness testimony.

The defendant testified she did not see the motorcycle and her memory of the event was unclear, claiming she went unconscious upon impact.

The court found the defendant's testimony inconsistent and unreliable.

Applying the standard of care for careless driving and the requirements for left turns under section 141(5) of the Highway Traffic Act, the court determined that the defendant failed to exercise due diligence and provide a reasonable opportunity for the motorcyclist to avoid the collision.

The court found the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a finding of guilt.

The accused, François Gauthier, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 17.

The court found Gauthier's testimony regarding mechanical issues and controlled maneuvers to be incredible, concluding that his driving was objectively dangerous and a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver, largely due to his excessive speed and unsafe lane changes.

However, the court acquitted Gauthier on the impaired driving charges, finding that the expert toxicological evidence, while showing the presence of drugs, could not definitively establish impairment at the time of driving due to individual variability and lack of specific testing.

Ryan Burke appealed his conviction for transporting cannabis in a motor vehicle contrary to s. 12(1) of the Cannabis Control Act.

The appeal raised four grounds related to the statutory interpretation of "baggage" and "fastened closed" under s. 12(2)(b) of the Act.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation, did not err in defining "baggage" to exclude small pill bottles or the vehicle's center console, and was not required to make findings on whether the containers were "fastened closed" once they were determined not to be "baggage."

The defendant, Edward Milligan, applied for multiple extensions of time to pay fines for various Highway Traffic Act and Provincial Offences Act convictions, including driving suspended and other licence infractions.

The application was rejected by the Clerk of the Court due to a lack of good faith efforts to pay.

The Justice of the Peace upheld the Clerk's decision, noting the absence of a realistic payment plan and the defendant's history of disregarding driving responsibilities, treating driving as a right rather than a privilege.

The court emphasized the principles of specific and general deterrence.

Peter Hiebert pleaded guilty to careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act.

The incident involved failing to stop at a clearly marked intersection, resulting in a fatal collision.

The court accepted a joint submission for sentencing, which included a $4,000 fine, two years of probation with 150 hours of community service, and a three-year driving suspension.

Victim impact statements from the deceased's family were heard, emphasizing the profound loss and their desire for the defendant to learn and become a better person.

The judgment highlighted specific and general deterrence, noting the defendant's remorse and the importance of driver diligence.