Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCJ

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an unreasonable delay in his trial for impaired driving offences.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the projected end of trial was 673 days (22 months and 3 days).

The Crown argued that several periods were attributable to the applicant, which would bring the net delay below the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court cases.

The court found that delays caused by the applicant's absence, requests for adjournments, and prolonged settlement discussions were attributable to him.

However, a period of delay related to the applicant's request for a French trial was not attributable to him, as the court had failed to inform him of his linguistic rights as required by the Criminal Code.

Ultimately, the court calculated the net delay at 519 days, which is below the 18-month (548-day) ceiling.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion in a child protection application concerning two children, MA (4) and MH (3), who had a history of being in and out of society care due to parental instability, substance abuse, and criminal involvement.

The mother, C. B.-H., was the only participating respondent, seeking placement of the children in her care or increased access.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the mother's chaotic lifestyle, incarceration, and failure to address protection concerns rendered her unable to provide a safe and stable home.

The court granted the society's request for extended society care for both children, with discretionary access for the mother (minimum three times annually) and paternal aunt (minimum two times annually if requested), and no access for the father and paternal uncle.

Sibling access was ordered a minimum of twice monthly.

The applicant sought to bring a motion to change a final order concerning a high-conflict family matter, specifically regarding reunification therapy for the child, N.L. The motion was dismissed due to lack of proper service on the respondent.

The court emphasized the critical importance of the child's emotional well-being and the need for the parties to cooperate with therapeutic recommendations, noting that the previous reunification therapy was cancelled due to alleged interference.

The court also clarified its ongoing jurisdiction over contempt and change motions in this case.

A mid-trial Charter application was brought by the accused, Brook-Lynn Beal-Clark, alleging breaches of her fair trial rights (sections 7 and 11(d)) due to significant failures in court recording equipment, resulting in inaudible audio and indiscernible portions of the trial transcript.

The Crown proposed alternative remedies, including an agreed statement of facts or proceeding without certain evidence, or a mistrial.

The court found that the technological failures compromised the fairness of the trial and the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, determining that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy in this "clearest of cases."

The applicant, Mr. Ali, brought a motion to change support and parenting terms.

The respondent, Ms. Laboni, brought a cross-motion for parenting.

Mr. Ali failed to comply with disclosure orders for his support motion and did not attend the focused hearing, leading to the dismissal of his support motion.

Ms. Laboni sought costs.

The court, applying the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, found Mr. Ali's conduct regarding the support issues unreasonable.

Considering factors such as the parties' behaviour, the complexity of issues, and the applicant's modest means, the court awarded Ms. Laboni costs of $3,600, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable in monthly installments.

The court issued an evidentiary ruling regarding the proper use and interpretation of Requests to Admit and Responses to Requests to Admit under Rule 22 of the Family Law Rules in a child protection status review case.

The ruling clarified that a Request to Admit should be tailored to each party's knowledge, and that gratuitous corrections or qualifications in responses are not permitted.

The court held that a fact or document is only deemed admitted if all served parties admit it or fail to respond; if even one party denies or refuses to admit with a reason, the fact or document is not deemed admitted and must be proven otherwise.

This decision addresses an ex parte application for a publication ban under section 486.4(2.2) of the Criminal Code, brought by police officers in Intake Court.

The Justice of the Peace dismissed the application, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction.

The primary reasons were that the application was not made by a Crown attorney, and that publication bans, even if mandatory when requested by the Crown, cannot be granted ex parte in Intake Court, which is not an open court proceeding.

The court emphasized the strong public policy favoring open courts and judicial accountability, stating that such orders require public notice.

The applicant sought a restraining order under section 35 of the Children's Law Reform Act against the respondent following the end of a short-term intimate relationship.

The respondent initially challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing the parties were not spouses or cohabitants.

The applicant presented evidence of persistent harassment including threatening text messages about contacting Children's Aid Society, unauthorized circulation of intimate photographs, surveillance at the applicant's residence, and continued contact despite explicit requests to cease.

The respondent, appearing self-represented, filed an unsigned and undated answer denying the allegations and providing an implausible account of events.

The court found the respondent's evidence lacked credibility and granted a final restraining order prohibiting all direct and indirect contact and requiring the respondent to remain 200 metres from the applicant and her children.

This is a costs decision in a child protection case concerning a motion by the mother for expanded access to two children.

The mother was substantially successful in obtaining a court-ordered schedule for expanded and unsupervised access, though the order included provisos allowing the Children's Aid Society to suspend access if safety concerns arose.

The mother sought costs on a full recovery basis against both the Society and the father.

The court declined to award costs against either party, applying the established principles that child protection cases are exceptions to the presumptive entitlement to costs, and that neither the Society nor parents should be penalized for acting in good faith within the statutory framework.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order making them crown wards with access in the Society's discretion.

The respondent father opposed the motion and filed responding materials.

The court found that while the statutory findings under section 37(2)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act (based on the mother's abandonment) were supported by the evidence, the Society failed to meet its onus on the summary judgment motion regarding disposition.

The court dismissed the disposition aspect of the motion and directed a trial, finding that genuine issues requiring trial existed concerning the Society's duty to provide services and support family reunification, the viability of the father's plan, and whether less disruptive alternatives to crown wardship were available.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to terminate the father's access to twin Crown wards (M.M. and D.M.).

The father had missed numerous access visits due to work schedule conflicts and other factors.

The society argued that the father's inconsistent access created instability and negatively impacted the children's behaviour.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, including questions about the quality of the father-child relationship, the society's conduct in suspending access without court order, and the children's actual preferences regarding contact with their father.

The defendant corporation was charged with failing to obtain a building permit for modifications to a hangar at Oshawa Airport, contrary to the Building Code Act, 1992.

The defendant raised a constitutional challenge based on federal exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.

The court found the Building Code Act provisions invalid as applied to the defendant's hangar and dismissed the charge.

Subsequently, the court awarded costs against the City of Oshawa as prosecutor, finding the prosecution exhibited flagrant departure from reasonable standards, including tunnel vision, witness bias, failure to disclose relevant documents, and refusal to accept established jurisprudence on federal aeronautics jurisdiction.

This is a costs decision following a seven-day trial regarding parenting time for the parties' child.

The respondent mother was completely successful at trial, obtaining an order for continuation of the temporary parenting arrangement while the applicant father's request for equal parenting time was denied.

The court awarded costs to the successful respondent, considering factors including the importance and complexity of the issues, the reasonableness of each party's behaviour, counsel's hourly rates, time properly spent, and the existence of settlement offers.

The court rejected the applicant's argument that costs should not be awarded and instead fixed costs at a level approaching full recovery, accounting for deductions related to prior cost orders and adjustments for duplicate counsel attendance.

The applicant mother brought a motion to strike the respondent father's pleadings, for payment of child support arrears and outstanding costs orders, and for security of costs.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The court found that the respondent had engaged in a pattern of non-compliance with court orders, misrepresentation, and manipulation of the court system throughout the high-conflict family law proceedings.

Despite the general caution against striking pleadings in family law cases involving children, the court determined this was an exceptional case warranting such relief because the Office of the Children's Lawyer was appointed to represent the children's interests.

The court struck the respondent's pleadings, ordered security for costs, and addressed a transportation issue regarding school drop-offs.

A costs decision following an interim motion and cross-motion concerning child residential schedule, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent mother achieved greater success on the motion, particularly regarding spousal support entitlement despite a marriage contract waiver.

The applicant father sought to deprive the respondent of costs based on alleged bad faith in failing to comply with a prior consent order for mediation.

The court found the respondent's behaviour unreasonable but not in bad faith, and awarded partial costs to the respondent.

This is a costs endorsement following motions to change a child support order.

The court previously reduced the respondent father's support arrears by $6,468 and revived his child support obligation as of September 1, 2014, while ordering him to contribute to the child's special expenses.

The court found divided success at trial, with the father slightly more successful due to the arrears reduction.

Despite both parties behaving unreasonably by failing to make settlement offers, the court ordered the mother to pay the father's costs of $1,200, payable at $100 per month, considering the mother's unreasonable refusal to terminate support and her obligation to report to the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicant sought costs arising from the dismissal of the respondent's motions for contempt and for permission for her step-father to act as agent at trial, as well as costs thrown away from two adjournments of the custody/access trial.

The applicant claimed full recovery costs of $3,217.49.

The respondent sought no costs order or alternatively, costs on a less than full recovery basis.

The court found the applicant was the successful party on the motions and entitled to costs.

While the respondent acted reasonably, she was not exempt from a costs award.

The court awarded costs of $2,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, with payment and enforcement suspended pending the trial judge's further direction.

The applicant mother brought two motions: one seeking to strike the respondent father's case for failure to comply with a disclosure order, and another seeking security for costs of a custody trial estimated at $50,000 on private retainer or $20,000-$30,000 with Legal Aid.

The father opposed both motions and sought dismissal.

The court found that while the mother established grounds for a security for costs order based on the father's non-Ontario residence and lack of sufficient financial disclosure, a trial was not necessary.

The father's joint custody claim was characterized as a nuisance claim due to his persistent secrecy about his circumstances, lack of legal status in Canada, and failure to provide adequate disclosure despite repeated court orders.

The court made the mother's temporary custody order final and stayed the father's joint custody claim under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

A costs decision arising from a motion to change a separation agreement regarding child support and shared nanny expenses.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's counsel based on an alleged conflict of interest.

The motion was ultimately withdrawn after court attendances and preparation of materials.

The court awarded costs to the applicant for the wasted attendance at a case conference and the motion hearing, finding that the respondent's counsel unreasonably delayed raising procedural issues and failed to follow proper procedures to minimize costs and delay.

The respondent brought a motion to change child support orders dated October 4, 2010 and October 25, 2010.

The applicant opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion asking the court to decline jurisdiction, arguing that the appropriate forum was a U.S. state where she had relocated with the child after being served with the motion to change.

The court dismissed the applicant's jurisdictional motion, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction and that the applicant had not satisfied her onus to show that the foreign jurisdiction was more appropriate.

The court granted the respondent's motion to change in part, reducing the imputed income from $53,000 to $32,203 per annum, resulting in ongoing child support of $271 per month, and reducing arrears by $4,500 with a repayment schedule.