Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 3911-999-23-774-00

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: September 23, 2025

In the Matter of: An appeal under subsection 116 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended

Between:

Corporation of the Township of South Stormont Respondent

— And —

Stevie Beckstead Appellant

Before: Justice D.A. Kinsella

Heard on: April 25, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: September 23, 2025

Counsel:

• Kristen MacDonald, for the Respondent
• Brenda Hollingsworth, for the Appellant Stevie Beckstead

On appeal from: The decision of Justice of the Peace Bourbonnais on January 15, 2025

Judgment

KINSELLA J.:

Overview

[1] Ms. Beckstead was found to have contravened section 4(1) of the Dog Owners Liability Act ("DOLA") after a proceeding. As a result, she was ordered to take certain precautionary measures with respect to two dogs that she owned as well as pay fines. Ms. Beckstead appeals both the finding of guilt and the penalty.

[2] Ms. Hollingsworth, whose firm represented Ms. Beckstead at her trial, alleges the following grounds of appeal:

i. The learned Justice of the Peace erred in misapplying the burden of proof and furthermore in applying a different and stricter standard of scrutiny to the evidence of the Appellant;

ii. The learned Justice of the Peace erred in failing to properly consider the evidence of the neutral civilian witness Officer McCourt;

iii. The learned Justice of the Peace erred in over-emphasizing the testimony of witnesses Natalie and Joseph Chenier;

iv. The learned Justice of the Peace failed to apply the correct legal test or provide proper reasons for the non-suit motion bought by the Appellant;

v. The learned Justice of the Peace erred in failing to properly give any meaningful or adequate reasons for rejecting the defence of due diligence;

vi. The learned Justice of the Peace erred in misapprehending the evidence and in her conclusion that the Appellant was the owner of two dangerous dogs and in concluding that two dogs were the subject of the offence and the incident;

vii. The learned Justice of the Peace erred in failing to give adequate reasons for her conclusions concerning liability and penalty;

viii. The learned Justice of the Peace erred in imposing terms and penalties that were disproportionate, not sought for by the prosecution, nor which were available under the Provincial Offences Act ("POA") or DOLA; and

ix. The learned Justice of the Peace's verdict was unreasonable.

[3] The Respondent, the Corporation of the Township of South Stormont, submits that the Justice of the Peace applied the appropriate burden. The Respondent notes that, unlike a proceeding under s. 5.1 of DOLA, this is NOT a strict liability offence. Rather, the prosecution maintains that all that was required to secure a conviction was to prove one of the grounds set out in 4(1) on a balance of probabilities.

[4] The Respondent further submits that the Justice of the Peace acted within her authority and considered all necessary requirements in issuing the Order under clause 4(3)(b) of the DOLA.

[5] In essence, the determination of this appeal requires this court to answer the following questions:

a) What is the nature of this proceeding and what is the burden of proof?

b) What sanctions were available to the learned Justice of the Peace?

Summary of Facts

[6] The facts as heard at trial are as follows.

[7] In November of 2023, Stevie Beckstead was neighbours with Natalie Chenier in the town of Ingleside. Natalie Chenier had lived there with her husband Jordan Chenier and their children since March of 2023. The Beckstead and Chenier homes were semi-detached, with a shared driveway.

[8] At that time, Ms. Beckstead was the owner of three dogs: Dixie (a collie), Stella (an 8-year-old German shepherd) and Dolly (a 5-year-old German shepherd).

[9] On November 11, 2023, Ms. Chenier was sitting on a step outside of her home. As she was sitting there, one of Ms. Chenier's dogs came running up to her, bit her on her knee and dragged her onto the driveway.

[10] A photo of her injuries, consisting of 5 puncture wounds, was filed as exhibit 2 at the hearing.

[11] Ms. Chenier testified that the dog that bit her was the older, lighter-coloured German shepherd, which she described as having longer hair ("much fluffier") and being shorter than the other shepherd, although possibly heavier because of her coat. She also testified that the older shepherd was more aggressive than the younger one.

[12] She said that, after the dog bit her, Evan Moss came over and "clipped a leash on the dog" and led it away. She testified that he was not initially with the dog at the time that she was bitten.

[13] Mr. Chenier testified as well. He was able to describe in some detail all three dogs that lived next door. He was clear that his neighbours had an elderly collie (he noted the dog sometimes had difficulty on the stairs) and two German shepherds. He described one dog as being older and one younger. He testified the older dog was darker in its colouring than the younger one and was also clear that the older dog had much longer hair. His evidence was that it was the older dog who bit Ms. Chenier.

[14] He testified that he kicked at the dog to get it off Ms. Chenier, after which Evan Moss came over and got the dog on its leash.

[15] Both witnesses were clear that only one dog was involved and neither knew the name of that dog. Mr. Chenier, however, testified that he believed the dog's name was "Stella" as he remembered hearing Evan yelling her name "when the dog went."

[16] In court, Ms. Chenier was shown a photo of the younger dog by the prosecutor. That photo was made exhibit 1. Ms. Chenier's evidence was that photo was not of the dog that had bitten her.

[17] Mr. Chenier was shown the same photo. His answer was also unequivocal: "That's not the dog. I'll tell you right now, the picture you just put up there. That's not the dog, The dog that bit her is the older one with the longer hair": see transcript page 54 lines 12 - 15

[18] The prosecutor also called Mr. McCourt, the municipal enforcement officer who was called to investigate after the fact. His evidence was that he spoke with Ms. Chenier and Mr. Chenier and took a photo of her injuries.

[19] He then went to speak with Ms. Beckstead, who told him the dog involved was the younger German shepherd, Dolly. It was that dog that he took a photo of. He never saw any other dog but accepted Ms. Beckstead's word that Dolly was the dog involved.

[20] At the close of the Crown's case, counsel for Ms. Beckstead brought a non-suit motion on the basis that there was "conflicting evidence" about the dog involved and as to the owner of the dog. The learned Justice of the Peace, noting that there was "some evidence" concerning the three dogs owned by Ms. Beckstead and that one was involved, denied the motion.

[21] Evan Moss testified for Ms. Beckstead. Mr. Moss was the father of her children but did not live with her at the time, although he did stay over.

[22] He testified that he had taken Dolly, the younger German shepherd, out for a walk the morning of November 11, 2023. He testified that Dolly had "slipped her choke collar" and ran off over to the neighbour's house. He said he was "right behind her" the whole time. Despite this, his evidence was that he did not see Dolly bite Ms. Chenier, although he did see Ms. Chenier move her leg.

[23] In cross-examination he agreed that Stella, the older dog, had longer hair than the younger German shepherd.

[24] Ms. Beckstead testified. She was in the house when the incident occurred and did not see what happened. She testified that she heard Evan call out for Dolly to come back, which was the first time she realized that the dog was out. She testified that Stella "would have been" by her side as she was getting her children ready for school.

[25] In her reasons, Justice of the Peace Bourbonnais noted that the burden of proof for the hearing was a balance of probabilities.

[26] She concluded, based on the evidence that she had heard, that she had "no doubt" that one of the dogs owned by Ms. Beckstead had bit Ms. Chenier on the date in question. She concluded that the evidence of Ms. and Mr. Chenier was straightforward. She found that the dog attack was unprovoked.

[27] She entirely rejected the testimony of Mr. Moss, calling it "worthless", noting that in his initial statement he never mentioned which dog he was with.

[28] Her Worship noted that dog owners are required to exercise reasonable precautions to prevent their dogs from biting or attacking another person. While she noted that Ms. Beckstead took preventative actions (such as putting up a fence and muzzling one dog), those were done after the incident.

[29] Her Worship found on the evidence that, while the dog described by the Natalie and Jordan Chenier appeared to be Stella, the evidence from Mr. Moss and Ms. Beckstead was that it was Dolly. Based on that, her Worship concluded that there was evidence upon which she could conclude that both dogs were unpredictable.

[30] As a result, she imposed an order requiring both dogs to be muzzled and leashed at all times while outside of their enclosed property; that both be in the company of an adult physically capable of controlling them; that the dogs be tethered within their enclosed yard unless they were with an adult capable of controlling them; that Ms. Beckstead post a sign on her property warning of dangerous dogs; and that both dogs be spayed.

[31] In addition, the learned Justice of the Peace ordered fines totalling $800, $400 for each dog.

[32] During oral submissions I was told that Stella has since passed away.

Standard of Review

[33] This proceeding was initiated under Part III of the POA. This appeal, therefore, is governed by section 116. Unlike an appeal under section 135, which permits broad review, section 116 narrowly restricts judicial intervention.

[34] Pursuant to s. 120, this court may only allow an appeal if it is satisfied that any one or more of the three grounds have been met:

i. the finding should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence,

ii. the judgment of the trial court should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on a question of law, or

iii. on any ground, there was a miscarriage of justice.

[35] The wording of that section is identical to the appellate provisions in s.686(1)(a) -- (b)(iii) of the Criminal Code and so cases considering the scope of appellate review in relation to s.686 are of assistance in this context.

[36] An appellate court may review, re-examine, and re-weigh trial evidence, but only to determine whether it reasonably supports the decision of the Justice of the Peace: see R. v. Burns, at paragraph 14. If that threshold is met, the appellate court must not substitute its own view or allow any residual doubt to justify a new trial: Burns, supra, at paragraph 15.

[37] The appellate court must grant significant deference to a Justice of the Peace's factual findings and related inferences: see R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, at paragraph 24. To overcome this deference, the appellant must demonstrate that the findings are: tainted by some legal error; are the result of a material misapprehension of the evidence; or are unreasonable: see R. v. Le, 2018 ONCA 56 at paragraph 8.

Dog Owners Liability Act ("DOLA")

[38] DOLA was brought in to protect people and domestic animals from dog bites, attacks and other threatening behaviour, and empowers courts to intervene when a dog poses a risk to public safety.

[39] Under DOLA, there are several types of proceedings that can be initiated, the majority of which fall under Part III of the POA. Proceedings may be commenced against dog owners under section 4(1) of DOLA if it is alleged that:

(a) Their dog has bitten or attacked a person or domestic animal;

(b) The dog has behaved in a manner that poses a menace to the safety of the person or domestic animals; or

(c) The owner failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent such behaviour.

[40] The burden of proof is on a balance of probabilities: section 4(1.3) DOLA.

[41] If an owner is found to have a dog that exhibited one of the behaviours set out in section 4(1), the court can, under 4(3), order the following:

(a) that the dog be destroyed in the manner specified in the order; or

(b) that the owner of the dog take the measures specified in the order for the more effective control of the dog or for purposes of public safety.

[42] Section 5.1 of DOLA was added in 2005 as part of broader amendments aimed at enhancing public safety, particularly in response to concerns about certain breeds. This section clarifies a dog owner's responsibilities and is aimed towards preventative accountability.

[43] Under this section, a dog owner shall "exercise reasonable precautions to prevent it from,

(a) biting or attacking a person or domestic animal; or

(b) behaving in a manner that poses a menace to the safety of persons or domestic animals

[44] If the owner is alleged to have breached one of these obligations, a trial may be held pursuant to section 18 of DOLA. This is a strict liability offence which means the prosecution does not need to prove intent, only that the act as alleged occurred. If the prosecution proves the prohibited conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, the onus then shifts to the defence to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they exercised due diligence and took all reasonable steps to prevent the incident: R. v. Huggins, 2007 ONCJ 306.

[45] A finding of guilt under section 5.1 is an offence as defined by the legislation, and penalties can be imposed upon a finding of guilt: see section 18(1).

Misapprehension of Evidence

[46] As previously mentioned, appellate courts must grant trial courts considerable deference particularly regarding findings of fact.

[47] Not every misapprehension of evidence will justify interference by the appellate judge. To justify intervention, the appellant must demonstrate to a stringent standard some link between the misapprehended evidence and the trial judge's reasons that resulted in the conviction. The appellant court must be satisfied that (1) there has been a misapprehension of the evidence and, if so, (2) the misapprehension was so crucial to the reasoning process that it resulted in an unreasonable verdict or a miscarriage of justice: R. v. Lohrer, [2004] S.C.R. 732, at paragraph 2.

Sufficiency of Reasons

[48] It is well-established law that a trial judge has a duty to give adequate reasons. Sufficient reasons provide transparency, allowing the parties to see why the decision was made and permitting meaningful appellate review.

[49] As noted by the S.C.C. in R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, reasons are not intended to be driven by some "abstract notions of judicial accountability" (at paragraph 42). Rather, at paragraph 46, Binnie J. set out the following test:

Where it is plain from the record why an accused has been convicted or acquitted, and the absence or inadequacy of reasons provides no significant impediment to the exercise of the right of appeal, the appeal court will not on that count intervene.

[50] Reasons must be both factually and legally sufficient. Factual sufficiency is concerned with what the judge decided and why. This is considered ordinarily to be a "very low bar": see R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20.

[51] A review for sufficiency must be both "functional and contextual". It is wrong for an appellate court to "finely parse the trial judge's reasons in a search for error." Rather, the reasons must be read as a whole, with a consideration of the issues at trial, to determine if they adequately explain how and why the judge decided those issues: see R. v. G.F., supra, at paragraph 69.

[52] I am mindful that the trial courts presided over by Justices of the Peace are extremely busy. They are high volume courts that require the justices of the peace to deliver oral and sometimes even written judgments on a daily basis. It would be wrong to require them to explain in detail every essential point upon which they based their decision or verdict: see R. v. Boucher, 2005 SCC 72 at paragraph 29.

[53] Just as a judge is "presumed to know the law with which they work day in and day out" (see R. v. Burns, supra, at paragraph 18), "the trial judge is not required to recite pages of 'boilerplate' or review well-settled authorities in detail, and failure to do so is not an error of law": see R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, at paragraph 45.

[54] Even as it relates to seminal cases, such as R. v. W.(D.), a trial judge is not required to cite the case as a "sacrosanct formula". In fact, the assessment of credibility will not always "lend itself to the adoption of the three distinct steps suggested in W. (D.)". Rather, the appellant court must review the entire context. If it is evident from a review of the entire reasons why the trial judge rejected the evidence of the accused or was not left with a reasonable doubt by it, that is all that is needed: see R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24.

Non-Suit Motion

[55] A non-suit motion is one raised at the conclusion of the Crown's case where the defence alleges there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty: see R. v. Charemeski.

[56] This motion is different from a request for an acquittal based on reasonable doubt. The concept of reasonable doubt is not called into play until all the evidence is in so it cannot be considered unless the motion for a nonsuit has been denied and the accused has either elected not to call evidence or has completed its evidence.

[57] The trial judge may not take into account the quality of the evidence in determining whether there is some evidence offered by the Crown on each essential element of the charge so that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict: not "would" or "should", but simply "could": see R. v. Mezzo.

Grounds of Appeal

Nature of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

[58] This was a proceeding pursuant to section 4(1) of DOLA and, as such, the correct burden of proof was one on a balance of probabilities.

[59] As for the essential elements, including the appellant's concern that the process was unfair as they were never put on notice that any dog other than "Dolly" might be the subject of the proceedings, it is important to consider the requirements under Part III of the POA.

[60] Section 161(1)(a) requires that proceedings under statue, such as those pursuant to s. 4(1) of DOLA, commence by way of a statement rather than an information.

[61] In this case, the statement makes it clear that what the prosecutor was required to prove, namely that Ms. Beckstead was the owner of a dog and did not exercise reasonable precautions to prevent that dog from biting or attacking a person or domestic animal.

[62] The dog was not named. While it is obvious that the municipal enforcement officer assumed the dog involved was Dolly based on the information provided to him by Ms. Beckstead, it also seems clear that the evidence of the Cheniers, which presumably had been disclosed, suggested otherwise.

[63] It was open to Ms. Beckstead to bring an application pursuant to s. 35 of the POA for an order for particulars. If the court had been satisfied that such an order was necessary for a fair trial, the prosecutor would have been obligated to prove that particular fact: see R. v. Sadeghi-Jebelli, 2013 ONCA 747. But no such motion was brought.

[64] As such, the prosecutor was not required to prove the specific dog involved, only that it belonged to Ms. Beckstead and behaved in the prohibited manner described.

[65] The correct burden of proof was applied.

Assessment of the Evidence and Non-Suit Motion

[66] With the correct test, proof on a balance of probabilities, being applied, I turn to counsel's concerns about the learned Justice of the Peace's misapprehension of the evidence or any alleged errors with the non-suit motion.

[67] In short, these concerns are not supported by the factual record. Nor does the record support a finding that the learned Justice of the Peace applied a different standard of scrutiny to the testimony of Mr. Moss and Ms. Beckstead than to the evidence of Ms. and Mr. Chenier.

[68] As previously noted, considerable deference must be made to findings of fact and the trial justice is not required to list out every fact she relies on in coming to her decision.

[69] Counsel for Ms. Beckstead incorrectly summarizes the evidence at page 4 of her materials when she states that neither of the Cheniers was "able to confirm that the dog in Exhibit 1 was the dog involved in the incident." As summarized above, both were very clear in their evidence that the dog shown in the photo was the younger of the two German shepherds and not the dog that had bitten Ms. Chenier.

[70] That evidence was at least "some evidence" and, as such, there was no basis for a non-suit motion and the learned Justice of the Peace was correct to deny it.

[71] The record also reflects that the learned Justice of the Peace rejected the evidence of Mr. Moss entirely, both on the issue of which dog was involved, as well as it would seem his evidence on reasonable precautions.

[72] As for any errors in her consideration of the evidence of the "neutral" enforcement officer, it is important to note that Mr. McCourt did not see the incident and simply took Ms. Beckstead at her word that it was Dolly that was involved. While Mr. McCourt's evidence was certainly neutral, it can hardly be seen as probative, not only because it was hearsay but also because Ms. Beckstead herself did not witness the incident, and only concluded it was Dolly because of what Mr. Moss told her.

[73] Trial reasons will be sufficient if, read in their entirety, they show why the judge reached the conclusions she did. The object is not to show how the judge arrived at her conclusion, in a "watch me think" fashion. It is rather to show why the judge made that decision: R. v. R.E.M., supra, at para. 17.

[74] In the end, the learned Justice of the Peace was satisfied that Ms. Beckstead was the owner of a dog that had bitten someone and that she had failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent that. I am satisfied that those findings were capable of being made on the evidence before her.

[75] I agree, however, that the learned Justice of the Peace erred in failing to make a finding as to which dog was responsible, particularly considering the purpose of the legislation which is to put in pro-active measures to protect the public. Given Her Worship's certain rejection of the testimony of Mr. Moss, and to a lesser degree her apparent rejection of the testimony of Ms. Beckstead, the remaining evidence was clear that only one dog was involved in biting Ms. Chenier. It was equally clear from the evidence that that dog was the older German shepherd with longer hair, the dog known as Stella.

[76] The learned Justice of the Peace erred in not making that finding. Since that finding is clearly the correct one based on the evidence, and I have the jurisdiction to do so, I find that it was in fact the older, longer haired, and more aggressive dog known as Stella who bit Ms. Chenier on that date in November.

The Penalty Phase

[77] Counsel for Ms. Beckstead submits that the learned Justice of the Peace erred in concluding that two dogs were the subject of the incident and further erred in imposing terms and penalties that were disproportionate, not sought for by the prosecution, nor which were available under the POA or DOLA.

[78] As I have already concluded, the facts cannot support the finding made by the learned Justice of the Peace that two dogs were involved. Counsel for the Respondent concedes as much. However, Ms. MacDonald submits that, despite that, it was open to the court to make an order involving more than one dog for the "purposes of public safety".

[79] Ms. MacDonald may well be correct about this. While most of the remedies provided for under section 4(3) and 4(4) specifically relate to "the dog", which refers to the dog which is the subject of the hearing, 4(3)(b) is more broadly worded. It allows the court to order an owner to take measures "for the purposes of public safety".

[80] However, any such order must be grounded in the facts. That is a cornerstone of our system of justice and of procedural fairness: see Shahin v. Intact Insurance Company, 2024 ONSC 2024.

[81] In this case, there was no evidence before the learned Justice of the Peace to suggest that more than one dog from the Beckstead residence was a problem that warranted intervention by the court. In fact, any evidence regarding Dolly's demeanour was to the effect that she was not an aggressive dog.

[82] And so, the court's order requiring both Stella and Dolly to be muzzled, spayed and controlled was not justified nor supported by the evidence.

[83] The focus of section 4(1) of DOLA is for preventative and corrective measures, not punitive ones. The purpose of such a hearing is to bring in measures to ensure public safety. Section 4(1) does not create an offence. Counsel for the Respondent fairly concedes that there was no authority to issue fines under the POA or DOLA, as a fine cannot be related to any identifiable public safety measure.

Conclusion

[84] The appeal is granted in part. The penalty is varied as follows:

i. The fines totalling $800.00 are set aside;

ii. The restrictions placed on the German Shepherd known as Dolly are removed. Specifically, it is no longer necessary that Dolly be muzzled and leashed at all times while outside of her enclosed property; that she be in the company of an adult physically capable of controlling her; and that she be tethered within her enclosed yard unless they were with an adult capable of controlling her;

iii. If Dolly has not already been spayed, that order is also vacated; and

iv. As it relates to Dolly, Ms. Beckstead is no longer required to post a sign on her property warning of a dangerous dog.

Released: September 23, 2025

Signed: Justice D.A. Kinsella