Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention and dismissed the appeal.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The court found that the trial judge properly considered planning and deliberation as an aggravating factor without requiring a Gardiner analysis, as defence counsel at trial did not dispute the Crown's submission on this point.

The appellants challenged the validity of a clause in the will of Jeanne Dagenais Gravelle that granted her daughter Jocelyne Gravelle an option to purchase the family home for the amount of the remaining mortgage.

The appellants argued the clause was unenforceable because the mortgage had been fully paid at the time of the testator's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding the option clause valid and enforceable.

The court determined that the testator's intention was to allow Jocelyne to purchase the home even if the mortgage balance was zero, and that Jocelyne would be responsible for mortgage discharge fees as consideration for the purchase.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple criminal offences involving domestic abuse and sexual assault of his former domestic partner.

He appealed his convictions on two grounds: (1) that the jury charge on myths and stereotypes was imbalanced and insufficient, and (2) that the jury instruction on prior consistent statements was inadequate.

He also sought leave to appeal his five-year sentence for sexual assault, arguing it was excessive and based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding his conduct in other relationships.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge, while not perfect, was functional and equipped jurors to decide the case according to law.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the five-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the severity of the offence and the offender's moral culpability.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by holding that the conditions of the appellant's incarceration while completing his conditional sentence were not relevant in assessing Duncan/Marshall credit.

However, the court concluded that this error did not affect the fitness of the sentence given significant aggravating factors.

The appellant also complained about the failure to implement a plea deal, but the record showed the Crown was not prepared to proceed with it and defence counsel did not pursue it at trial.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect a cross-appeal against a Divisional Court decision regarding the Law Society of Ontario's voiding of licensing exam results and registrations following a security breach.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld the LSO's decision to void registrations as procedurally fair, finding the decision to be administrative rather than adjudicative in nature.

The moving party sought to challenge the fairness of the voiding of her barrister exam result and the LSO's failure to disclose a key statistical report (the Caveon Report).

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed cross-appeal lacked merit and that the justice of the case did not favour granting an extension of time.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000 following a trial by judge and jury, and was sentenced to five and one-half years' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction on four grounds: that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that character could not be considered; that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to consider smaller quantities of a different drug; that the trial judge failed to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address; and that the trial judge erred in his instruction regarding the mistake of fact defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and also dismissed the leave to appeal sentence application.

The appellant, a bar manager, was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism after sexually assaulting a female employee in the bar basement while intentionally having the incident recorded by a security camera.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the trial judge over-relied on the complainant's demeanor when assessing credibility; (2) the trial judge misapplied the adopted admissions rule by relying on text messages between the appellant and his co-accused; and (3) the trial judge misapplied the doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision, the mother challenged the appeal judge's order upholding an extended society care order and varying her access status from access recipient to access holder.

The mother argued that the appeal judge should have ordered a new trial on all issues due to a finding of procedural unfairness regarding the access holder determination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a breach of procedural fairness on a discrete issue does not require a new trial on all matters when the appellate court can properly decide the issue based on the evidentiary record.

The court admitted fresh evidence but found it did not change the outcome, as the evidence supported the extended society care order.

Appeal of a summary judgment motion decision in a family law matter.

The respondent sought equalization of net family property and rejected the appellant's claims for spousal support and unequal division of family property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claims regarding the value of family assets, alleged misappropriation of funds, and spousal support entitlement.

The court also rejected the appellant's late request to file an additional notice of appeal regarding costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for repayment of money transferred to the respondents over a period of years.

The appellants alleged the transfers were loans and investments, including a $100,000 investment in real estate that appreciated significantly.

The respondents contended the transfers were payments for room and board and other expenses for the appellants' daughter.

The trial judge dismissed all claims and ordered costs against the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's treatment of evidence, her dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, or her application of the Limitations Act.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 42 months imprisonment (less 6 months Downes credit and 12 days presentence custody credit) imposed for possession of 450 grams of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The appellant alleged the trial judge made various errors in principle rendering the sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was entirely fit and the Downes credit fell within the broad range of discretion afforded to the trial judge.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel pursuant to s. 684 of the Criminal Code to represent him on appeal of a lifetime weapons prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to possessing ammunition while subject to a s. 110 prohibition order and possessing explosive substances.

The applicant advanced two grounds of appeal: first, that the Crown failed to provide notice of the lifetime ban as an enhanced penalty prior to his guilty plea, contrary to s. 727(1); and second, that his prior s. 110 prohibition did not constitute a prior conviction sufficient to trigger the mandatory lifetime prohibition under s. 109(3).

The Crown conceded the applicant lacked financial means but opposed the application on grounds that the appeal was not legally complex.

The court granted the application, finding the issues were arguable and involved questions of mixed fact and law beyond the applicant's capacity to advance without counsel.

This is the third appeal brought by the respondent in a family law proceeding concerning equalization payments and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The appellant sought to appeal an order of eviction from the matrimonial home and a power of sale granted by the trial judge due to the appellant's intransigence in the sale process.

The appellant also appealed a costs award of $36,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the eviction and power of sale order as an abuse of process, noting it was an attempt to circumvent two previous appeals that had been dismissed for delay.

The appeal was also found to be moot as the matrimonial home had already been sold.

The costs appeal was dismissed as the trial judge committed no reviewable error in awarding substantial indemnity costs based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition dated January 29, 2025, concerning whether the Board erred in declining to add a community living clause to a detention order.

The appellant argued that the majority of the Board focused exclusively on public safety and dismissed the attending psychiatrist's opinion that the clause would be therapeutically beneficial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's majority was entitled to determine that adding a community living clause would be therapeutically harmful on balance in the specific circumstances of the case, notwithstanding the psychiatrist's contrary opinion.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related offences for firing shots at a female acquaintance, striking her twice.

The sole issues at trial were the identity of the shooter and intent to kill.

The trial judge rejected direct identification evidence and limited-weight photo identification evidence, instead relying almost entirely on circumstantial evidence including GPS data from the suspect vehicle, security camera footage with timestamps, and DNA evidence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in accepting the accuracy of security camera timestamps without proper authentication and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no legal error in the trial judge's application of the law regarding measurement devices in common usage and concluding that the verdict was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The appellant RSA appealed a motion judge's decision regarding insurance policy priority following a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff was struck by a vehicle owned by D'Souza and driven by Lamoureux.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff's OPCF 44R underinsured motorist endorsement or D'Souza's personal umbrella liability policy (PLUP) would respond after the primary automobile policy limits were exhausted.

The motion judge determined that the OPCF 44R took priority over the PLUP, that RSA could not deduct the PLUP limits from its OPCF 44R payments, and that RSA could not issue a third-party claim against Certas or subrogate against the defendants.

The Court of Appeal upheld all of these determinations.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and related offences.

The sole ground of appeal concerned an unsuccessful application to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay.

After accounting for defence delay, the trial judge found net delay of over 18 months and identified two exceptional circumstances, including pandemic-related backlog.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to articulate how pandemic delay specifically impacted the case and by speaking in generalities.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's reasoning, finding it was open to her to rely on her familiarity with the jurisdiction and the pandemic delay it was experiencing, and that she was not required to assign the delay to a particular period of time.

The appellants brought a motion seeking directions on whether the Court of Appeal for Ontario has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a trial judgment dismissing a solicitor's negligence action.

The trial judge had dismissed the claim but assessed damages at $1,400, significantly less than the $4.8 million claimed.

The respondent contended that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction under section 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants requested that if the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, it should constitute itself as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction and declined to constitute itself as a Divisional Court panel, quashing the appeal with costs.