Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - ONCA

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing bodily harm, and causing bodily harm while being over 80.

The respondent had collided with an oncoming vehicle on Lakeshore Boulevard in Toronto, causing serious injuries to three occupants.

The Crown's case was hampered by the unavailability of blood alcohol evidence due to continuity concerns and a malfunctioning breathalyzer.

The only evidence of alcohol consumption was the respondent's own statement to paramedics that she had consumed two glasses of wine.

The trial judge acquitted on all counts.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to consider all evidence regarding impairment and whether the driving constituted a marked departure.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated thorough consideration of all evidence and that the Crown had failed to prove a marked departure beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in death, and blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in bodily harm.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The primary defence theory was that the Crown failed to prove the appellant was driving the van, suggesting the appellant and a passenger could have switched positions.

The appellate court found no misapprehension of evidence and no failure to consider relevant evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

An appeal by the Ministry of Labour from a provincial offences appeal court decision that reduced sentences imposed on a small furniture warehouse company and two of its directors for Occupational Health and Safety Act violations.

The defendants pleaded guilty to failing to provide fall protection equipment and safety training to an epileptic employee who fell to his death from an elevated order picker.

The sentencing judge imposed a $250,000 fine on the company and 25-day intermittent sentences on the directors.

The appeal judge reduced these to a $50,000 fine and $15,000 fines respectively.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that while the appeal judge made errors in principle regarding moral blameworthiness and the rarity of incarceration for regulatory offences, the sentences ultimately imposed were not demonstrably unfit.

The court affirmed that moral blameworthiness is a relevant sentencing consideration for regulatory offences and that incarceration is not per se unavailable for first offenders, but upheld the reduced sentences based on changed circumstances and the principle of restraint.

The Municipality of the Northern Bruce Peninsula appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that had quashed convictions for breaches of the Building Code Act, 1992.

The appeal judge had applied an outdated limitation period under section 36(8) of the BCA, relying on R. v. Pickles, which held that the one-year limitation period ran from the date construction was completed.

However, section 36(8) had been amended on July 1, 2010, to provide that the limitation period commenced from the date the facts first came to the knowledge of an officer or chief building official.

The Court of Appeal found that the prosecution was instituted within one year of the Municipality's initial knowledge of the structure and that the appeal judge had erred in law by applying the wrong limitation period.

The convictions and sentences were reinstated.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent drove his vehicle onto a sidewalk, colliding with multiple objects and fatally striking a pedestrian.

The trial judge found the respondent had suffered a momentary lapse of attention and that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea.

The sole ground of appeal concerned whether the respondent's status as a suspended G1 driver who violated the conditions of his licence by driving unaccompanied and during prohibited hours was relevant to establishing mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the G1 licence restrictions were irrelevant to the modified objective test for dangerous driving unless they indicated an incapacity to appreciate or avoid the specific risk involved.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death following a judge-alone trial.

After a hockey game in Pembroke, Ontario, the appellant accelerated from a traffic light at a high rate of speed on a city street where heavy pedestrian traffic was crossing mid-block.

His vehicle struck two pedestrians, killing one.

The trial judge found the appellant was driving at approximately 60 km/h in a 50 km/h zone and that the manner of driving was dangerous to the public.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the trial judge properly analyzed the actus reus of dangerous driving, he failed to adequately analyze the mens rea element by not explaining how and in what way the appellant's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Provincial Offences Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for speeding.

The applicant was charged with speeding on Highway 2 in the Region of Durham, clocked at 107 km/h in a 70 km/h zone.

He was convicted at trial and again at a retrial after his first conviction was overturned due to a misapplication of the rule in R. v. W.(D.).

The motion judge granted leave to appeal on three grounds: (1) misapplication of the W.(D.) rule by the Justice of the Peace; (2) improper restriction of cross-examination regarding prior inconsistent testimony; and (3) failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented accused.

The appellant was charged with speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision that resulted in a fatality.

At the first appearance, the justice of the peace noticed that the information contained a defective date (November 18, 2017 instead of November 18, 2016) and quashed the information of his own motion without considering amendment procedures or granting the Crown an opportunity to make submissions.

The Crown sought certiorari, and the Superior Court judge found the justice of the peace had committed jurisdictional error.

The appellant appealed, arguing the circumstances were analogous to London v. Young and that sections 34 and 36 of the Provincial Offences Act did not apply at a first appearance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the justice of the peace erred in law by quashing the information without following the statutory amendment and quashing procedures, and by failing to afford the Crown procedural fairness.

The applicants sought leave to appeal their convictions under the Environmental Protection Act following a 14-day trial and a subsequent appeal to the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicants were convicted of nine provincial offences related to discharging contaminants into the environment and failing to comply with lawful orders issued following catastrophic propane explosions at their facility that killed one employee and displaced approximately 12,000 residents.

The Court of Appeal considered whether leave to appeal should be granted under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, which requires identification of a pure question of law that is essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The court found that the two grounds of appeal raised by the applicants were fact-laden and did not identify pure questions of law transcending the unique factual circumstances of the case.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on dangerous driving causing bodily harm under section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in his analysis of the mens rea component by relying on the respondent's lack of deliberate intention to create danger and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the established test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, properly considered whether the respondent had deliberate intention to cause danger, and appropriately applied the modified objective test in concluding there was no marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent person.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

He was convicted in absentia at trial and his conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, a statutory declaration from an insurance company employee established that the vehicle was covered by a valid policy of insurance at the time of the alleged offence.

The Crown conceded that the statutory declaration was admissible evidence and that it proved the appellant did not commit the offence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice that dismissed her appeal from a conviction for operating a rental unit without a valid licence.

The applicant contended that she had entered an uninformed guilty plea at trial, arguing this raised a question of law essential to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's complaint was fact-based rather than a question of law, and that she had failed to meet the very high threshold for granting leave to appeal under section 131 of the POA.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant fell asleep at the wheel while driving under the influence of alcohol, cannabis, and cocaine, causing a serious collision that injured two victims.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's arguments that the sentence was unfit, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered the relevant principles, the serious nature of the offence, the appellant's status as a novice driver, and the catastrophic consequences of the accident.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds following a jury trial where he was convicted of failing to stop after an accident, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and attempt to obstruct justice.

The appellant's main defense was that a third party, Derek Rego, was the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions regarding the third party suspect defense, treatment of the sister's evidence, and comments concerning another witness's evidence were adequate when read as a whole.

The court also found the impaired driving conviction was reasonable based on evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath, bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and erratic driving.

Both the appellant and Crown abandoned their sentence appeals.

The appellant was convicted at trial of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death, and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment and whether the operation constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent operator.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in adequate evidentiary foundation and entitled to deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the six-year term fell within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The appellant, a small family-run grocery store, was convicted of operating food premises in a manner permitting a public health hazard contrary to Ontario Food Premises Regulation 562.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $6,255.

The appeal concerned sentence only.

The Crown conceded that the sentence was based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding the duration of the violation.

The parties jointly requested a reduction to $1,500 payable over two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the justice of the peace had misapprehended the evidence, ignored the fact that the store had been sold, failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay, and lacked information about previous convictions.

The applicant brought three motions seeking extensions of time to seek leave to appeal from dismissals by lower appeal courts of his convictions on three separate charges: one assault on a police officer conviction from 1993, and two provincial offences convictions from 2014-2015 under the Trespass to Property Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three motions.

For the 1993 conviction, the applicant's delay of nearly 23 years was found to be inordinate and unjustifiable, with no bona fide intention to appeal demonstrated within the prescribed time.

For the two provincial offences convictions, the applicant's delay of over three months was inadequately explained, and the proposed appeals failed to meet the high threshold for granting leave to appeal under the Provincial Offences Act, as they involved questions of fact rather than law alone.

The appellant appealed convictions under s. 259(4)(b) of the Criminal Code for driving while disqualified.

The appellant also challenged a forfeiture order that included his pick-up truck, alleged that police seized items outside the scope of the forfeiture order, and sought variation of a probation condition prohibiting possession of housebreaking tools that prevented him from working in construction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and forfeiture order but approved a variation of the probation condition to permit possession of tools required for his livelihood, subject to prior written approval of his probation officer.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of dangerous driving while racing causing bodily harm and dangerous driving while racing causing death.

The Crown's case was that the appellant and Tyler Dodd were racing their vehicles on Highway 21 near Owen Sound when Dodd lost control, crossed into oncoming traffic, and struck another vehicle, killing Dodd and injuring the other driver.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: challenging the finding that the vehicles were racing at the time of the accident, challenging the admissibility of his statement to police, and challenging the causation finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding all findings of the trial judge.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that quashed convictions for minor traffic offences on the ground that officers had amended certificates of offence after serving offence notices but before filing the certificates with the court.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Provincial Offences Act does not expressly authorize such amendments, nothing in the statute precludes officers from correcting information on certificates before filing.

The validity of proceedings is preserved under section 90 of the Provincial Offences Act where the defendant has not been misled or prejudiced by minor clerical corrections.

The convictions were restored.