Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - ONCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal by Sally Darosa from her sentence for criminal negligence causing death, specifically challenging the seven-year custodial sentence and the imposition of a lifetime driver’s licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court upheld the custodial sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious facts and Darosa’s record.

However, the court set aside the lifetime licence suspension, holding that the trial judge did not have a full understanding of the legal consequences of such an order, and remitted the matter for reconsideration.

The applicants sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing their application for leave to appeal under s. 131(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, arguing jurisdictional error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding it barred by s. 131(3) of the POA, which prohibits appeals or reviews from leave decisions.

The court also found no jurisdictional failure even if the cited precedent applied.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of "employer" under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) following a fatal workplace incident.

The City of Greater Sudbury, which had contracted out road repairs, was acquitted at trial and on first appeal, with courts finding it was neither an "employer" nor "constructor." The Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed, holding that the City was indeed an "employer" under OHSA because its own employees (inspectors) were present and performing tasks at the project site, satisfying the first branch of the "employer" definition.

The case was remitted to the appeal court to consider the City's due diligence defence, which had not been addressed by the appeal judge.

The appellants, Daniel Tiffin and Tiffin Financial Corporation (TFC), appealed convictions for provincial offences under the Securities Act, including trading in securities without registration, distributing securities without a prospectus, and trading while prohibited.

The central issue was whether promissory notes issued by Tiffin to clients, while he was subject to a cease trade order, constituted "securities" under the Act.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellants by applying the American "family resemblance test" to conclude the notes were not securities.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, reversed this decision, declining to import the American test and finding the notes were indeed securities, thus substituting convictions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, agreeing that the "family resemblance test" should not be imported into Ontario securities law due to the distinct "catch and exclude" statutory scheme in Ontario.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, finding the six-month custodial term demonstrably unfit given mitigating factors such as the appellants' honesty in revealing their financial situation, their remorse, repayment efforts, and client support.

The probation and restitution orders were upheld.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death following a collision between two tractor trailers on Highway 11 near Val Gagne, Ontario on January 11, 2016.

The appellant was sentenced to three years' incarceration plus a five-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: that the trial judge erred in considering a near-miss incident with a Home Hardware truck as part of the dangerous driving offence; that the circumstances did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care; and that insufficient reasons were provided.

The appellant also sought to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

A self-represented appellant appealed his conviction for speeding (107 km/h in a 70 km/h zone) after two trials and an unsuccessful appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two substantive grounds: (1) the trial justice misapplied the W.(D.) principles by choosing between competing versions of evidence rather than determining whether guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the trial justice erred in restricting the appellant's cross-examination of the officer on prior inconsistent statements without requiring a transcript.

The court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, noting that the prosecutor should consider whether subjecting the appellant to a third trial on a speeding ticket serves the interests of justice.

The applicant moved for an extension of time to perfect his motion for leave to appeal a 2014 by-law infraction conviction.

The applicant had previously appealed to the Ontario Court of Justice, which dismissed the appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the extension request on the basis that the grounds of appeal raised only a question of fact (whether the driveway was too wide), which does not constitute a question of law or matter of general public importance required for leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The conviction arose from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, particularly the eyewitness testimony regarding the movements of the vehicles immediately before and at the time of the accident.

The court found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the mens rea component of the offence.

On the sentence appeal, the court upheld the 18-month custodial sentence and the 10-year driving prohibition as being within the appropriate range.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm and operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle accident on Dixie Road in Mississauga on October 19, 2013.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to introduce fresh evidence suggesting that another individual, "Volodya," was the actual driver of the van.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the motion to admit fresh evidence and the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence failed to meet the cogency component of the test for admission and that the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after his motorcycle collided with a southbound SUV at an intersection in Toronto, resulting in serious injuries to a pedestrian.

The trial judge sentenced him to 12 months in custody followed by two years' probation, with a five-year prohibition on driving motorcycles.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that expert evidence was inadmissible.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending the driving prohibition could not be limited to motorcycles and that the driving lessons requirement was improper.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, dismissed the appellant's sentence appeal with modifications, and allowed the Crown's sentence appeal.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of breaching a regulation under the Conservation Authorities Act.

At trial, they were sentenced to fines of $5,000 each and a two-year probation order requiring reconstruction of a seawall.

The Conservation Authority appealed to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, seeking removal of a home addition as a sentencing term.

The POAC judge allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, remitted the fines, and ordered removal of the addition.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arguing the POAC judge exceeded the scope of appellate review by reversing factual findings without identifying palpable and overriding error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the POAC judge impermissibly substituted his own findings regarding whether the conduct constituted a flagrant and deliberate breach of the regulations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, as well as a stayed charge of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The charges arose from the appellant's deliberate use of his vehicle to dislodge a person hanging from the passenger side door.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility, his inferences regarding vehicle speed and the appellant's knowledge of running over the victim, or his rejection of necessity and self-defence arguments.

The court also upheld the sentencing decision regarding the driving suspension.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While responding to an emergency at high speed, he drove through a small town at 178 kmph in a 50 kmph zone, passed a construction zone and school, and collided with another vehicle.

Trial counsel conceded the actus reus and causation.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the appellant's circumstances.

The trial judge found it did, and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence but was unsuccessful.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment.

The conviction arose from an incident involving an argument and physical interaction between the appellant and a passenger, during which the appellant's vehicle struck and injured the passenger and collided with a retaining wall.

The appellant was acquitted of aggravated assault and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no inconsistency between the acquittals and the conviction, and upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle warranting intervention.

The Regional Municipality of York sought leave to appeal a provincial court appeal judge's decision that set aside a stay of proceedings in a speeding charge against Steve Tomovski.

The appeal judge had found that while the delay breached the Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under the R. v. Jordan framework, the breach was attributable to the defendant.

The appeal judge also opined that the presumptive delay ceiling for Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings should be 13 to 15 months, rather than the 18 months established in Jordan.

York sought leave to appeal on questions of law regarding the appropriate presumptive delay ceiling and the application of Charter s. 11(b) to Part I POA proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that York was seeking to appeal the reasons for judgment rather than the judgment itself, and that the appeal judge's opinion on the presumptive delay ceiling was not a "judgment" appealable under s. 139 of the POA.

The appellant appealed a ten-year driving prohibition imposed following her conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

She argued the prohibition was manifestly unfit and sought a five-year prohibition, contending the trial judge erred in emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for a young, first-time offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the seriousness of the offence, the appellant's prior poor driving record, and the devastating harm caused to the victims.

The court upheld the sentence as a whole, noting the trial judge exercised restraint by reducing the custodial sentence while lengthening the driving prohibition to protect the public.

The appellant was charged with violations of the Building Code Act for failing to comply with six orders to comply issued in 2013.

At trial, the appellant sought disclosure of prior charges and prosecutions, including orders to comply issued in 1995 and 1996 that had resulted in withdrawn charges.

The justice of the peace granted the disclosure order.

The respondent municipality applied for certiorari to quash the disclosure order.

The Superior Court granted certiorari, finding the earlier orders were distinct due to different compliance deadlines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred by failing to apply the substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice test and by prematurely determining the relevance issue mid-trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.

The appellant appealed her conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While backing out of a parking spot at a Costco store, the appellant's vehicle accelerated in reverse and crashed into the store's front entrance, killing two individuals and injuring two others.

The appellant claimed her foot became stuck under the brake pedal, preventing her from stopping the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected this explanation as implausible and found the appellant created a dangerous situation by reversing at high speed and taking no corrective action for at least five seconds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for dangerous driving and that the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown's case relied on evidence that the appellant was driving at a very high rate of speed (40-50 km/h above the speed limit) and possibly racing another vehicle when he entered an intersection where a collision occurred with a vehicle making a left turn.

The appellant argued he was driving only somewhat over the speed limit and that the accident resulted from the other driver's illegal left turn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all four grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions on the fault component of dangerous driving were consistent with R. v. Roy, the expert evidence was properly admitted, the instruction regarding Highway Traffic Act convictions was harmless, and the verdict was reasonable.