Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - ONCA

The appellant sought to challenge the dismissal of his appeal from convictions under the Highway Traffic Act after failing to pursue the appeal for many years.

He argued that the delay resulted from the court’s failure to produce a transcript he claimed to have ordered when filing his notice of appeal.

The appellate court accepted for purposes of the appeal that the transcript may have been ordered but held that the appellant nevertheless bore the responsibility to pursue the appeal with due diligence.

A delay of approximately 17 years without steps to follow up on the transcript did not meet the due diligence requirement.

The court found no error in the appeal judge’s decision dismissing the appeal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his application for an extension of time to appeal a speeding conviction under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

He had been convicted in absentia after failing to attend his trial due to illness and his paralegal's failure to appear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial of an extension of time to appeal in proceedings under Parts I and II of the Act, as established by binding precedent.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision reversing a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal judge had deducted 15 months of pandemic-related administrative adjournments and nearly 3 months of delay caused by an administrative mailing error as exceptional circumstances, bringing the net delay below the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the pandemic delay issue was already settled law and the administrative error did not raise a question of law alone or a failure of natural justice.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that overturned the respondent's conviction under the Endangered Species Act for damaging Blanding's turtle habitat.

The appeal judge had entered an acquittal after finding the circumstantial evidence of turtle sightings from prior and subsequent years insufficient to prove the land was habitat at the time of the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the appeal judge's conclusion raised a question of law alone, the Crown failed to demonstrate that granting leave was essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The decision below was highly fact-specific and unlikely to establish a binding precedent requiring direct evidence of habitat use.

Leave to appeal was denied, and the respondent's request for costs was dismissed.

The respondent tow truck driver was acquitted of municipal by-law offences for offering services and positioning his truck within 200 metres of an accident scene.

The lower courts found the municipal by-law inconsistent with s. 177(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, which exempts towing services from a general prohibition on commercial solicitation on roadways in an emergency.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 177(3) merely creates an exception to a prohibition and does not grant paramount permission to attend accident scenes.

The by-law was not inconsistent with the HTA.

Convictions were entered and fines imposed.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with orders under the Building Code Act requiring him to obtain building permits or remove structures.

At trial, he argued he had obtained permits for some buildings and no permits were required for others.

The appeal judge convicted him, finding these defences were impermissible collateral attacks on the orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that arguing compliance (having permits) is not a collateral attack, restoring those acquittals.

However, arguing no permits were required is an impermissible collateral attack, so those convictions were upheld.

The appellants were convicted of traffic offences under the Highway Traffic Act after their applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter were dismissed.

The net delay in each case was under 14 months.

The summary conviction appeals judge upheld the dismissals, finding that the 18-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan applied to Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings, and that the appellants failed to show they took steps to expedite their cases or that the delay was markedly longer than reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, confirming that the 18-month Jordan ceiling applies uniformly to all provincial court proceedings, including regulatory offences, and found no error in the lower court's refusal to grant a stay.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his convictions and sentence for dredging and filling shore lands without a work permit under the Public Lands Act.

He had been fined $3,000 for each conviction, placed on probation, and made subject to a rehabilitation order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal had no merit and did not meet the high threshold of raising a question of law essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her appeal from a conviction for contravening a municipal zoning by-law regarding accessory structures.

The appeal judge had dismissed her appeal after she failed to file an abandonment of various grounds of appeal as ordered.

The moving party argued the appeal judge was biased and that the justice of the peace erred regarding the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no evidence of bias or denial of natural justice, and noting the limitation period issue was a factual finding rather than a question of law.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that substituted a conviction for an acquittal on charges of failing to comply with building inspector's orders.

The moving party argued that his defence—that he had previously obtained the required permits—was not a collateral attack on the orders.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised a question of law respecting the interpretation and application of the doctrine of collateral attack, and that special grounds existed.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident following a November 2015 incident in which his vehicle struck a pedestrian.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to apply the W.(D.) test, in providing insufficient reasons, and in failing to adequately address the mens rea element of dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate and the convictions were clearly supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the trial judge committed no errors of principle.

The appellant sought judicial review by way of certiorari to quash an order of a justice of the peace in a speeding ticket prosecution.

The justice of the peace had adjourned the trial and reserved the appellant's right to argue a stay motion based on Crown non-disclosure at the resumed trial date.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the order was interlocutory and that there was no denial of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the justice of the peace's trial management ruling was within jurisdiction and did not preclude the appellant from pursuing his stay motion.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

He requested disclosure of the testing and operating procedures from the user manual for the Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device used to measure his vehicle's speed.

The prosecutor refused disclosure, taking the position that user manuals constitute third-party records requiring a third-party production application.

The justice of the peace ordered disclosure.

The prosecutor obtained a certiorari order quashing the disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the certiorari order was improper and that the disclosure was required as first-party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on a winery corporation that pleaded guilty to discharging material into a watercourse in violation of the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The trial judge imposed a fine of $600, invoking section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to relieve the defendant from the statutory minimum fine of $25,000.

The appeal judge increased the fine to $5,000, still below the minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and imposed the minimum fine of $25,000, holding that section 59(2) must be applied with appropriate restraint to avoid undermining the deterrent purpose of minimum fines in public welfare legislation.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Quinton Steel on charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) arising from the death of an employee who fell from a temporary welding platform.

The trial justice and summary conviction appeal judge found that the general duty clause in section 25(2)(h) of the OHSA could not be used to impose requirements beyond those specifically prescribed in the regulations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 25(2)(h) establishes an independent duty that is not limited by the regulations, and that the trial justice erred by failing to determine whether installing guardrails was a reasonable precaution in the circumstances.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act and was assisted by his brother-in-law, an unlicensed non-lawyer, in proceedings before a justice of the peace.

A stay of proceedings was granted due to the prosecutor's failure to provide proper disclosure in violation of Charter rights.

On appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice, the appeal judge refused to permit the brother-in-law to continue representing the appellant based on general concerns about non-licensed persons representing defendants in provincial offence matters.

The appeal judge set aside the stay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the appeal judge erred by failing to apply the proper legal test for disqualifying a representative and by relying on a blanket concern rather than examining the particular circumstances and competence of the representative.

The appellant died after leave to appeal a $95 traffic ticket was granted.

The appellant's counsel moved to substitute a personal representative to continue the appeal, while the municipal prosecutor sought to abate the appeal due to mootness.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its jurisdiction to continue the appeal, noting that the matter had no practical consequences for the estate, was not evasive of review, and lacked a sufficient factual record to decide an issue with province-wide implications.

The appeal was abated and the judgment below was stayed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the Justice of the Peace erred in finding he was functus officio.

The appellant had tendered evidence of valid insurance, but the Crown introduced fresh evidence on appeal proving the insurance letter was false.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the Justice of the Peace erred, there was no miscarriage of justice under section 120(1)(b) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The respondent was charged with failing to wear a seat belt contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the Justice of the Peace convicted the respondent, ruling that the offence was one of absolute liability.

On appeal, the Ontario Court of Justice found the offence to be one of strict liability and entered a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence is one of strict liability, which affords the driver a due diligence defence, as there is no clear legislative intent to rebut the presumption of strict liability for public welfare offences.

The appellant, a milk farmer, provided unpasteurized milk to individuals through a 'cow share agreement' and was convicted of selling and distributing unpasteurized milk contrary to the Health Protection and Promotion Act and operating an unlicensed milk plant contrary to the Milk Act.

On appeal, he argued the legislation did not apply to his private arrangement and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cow-share program was a public marketing scheme caught by the legislation.

The court also held that the prohibition on unpasteurized milk did not violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person, and was not arbitrary or overbroad given the scientific evidence of public health risks.