ONCA 2026

The appellant purchasers appealed a judgment enforcing a limitation of liability clause in a pre-construction condominium agreement of purchase and sale that restricted their damages for the respondent developer's breach to the return of deposits with interest.

The appellants argued the clause was unconscionable, contrary to the consumer protections of the Tarion Addendum, and that the respondent should have brought it to their attention.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the appellants were sophisticated purchasers represented by counsel who negotiated significant changes to the agreement, and that the Tercon analysis provided an effective safeguard against abuse of limitation clauses.

The appellant challenged a decision declining to enforce a pre‑marriage agreement and ordering an equalization payment following the parties’ separation.

The application judge concluded the document did not qualify as a valid domestic agreement under the Family Law Act and, in any event, should be set aside under s. 56(4).

The agreement was found to be unclear, failing to identify the property to which it applied or address equalization, and the respondent did not understand its nature and consequences.

The Court of Appeal held these findings were open to the application judge on the evidentiary record and were supported by credibility assessments.

No error of law, principle, or palpable and overriding factual error was established.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for firearm and drug-related offences, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the impact of incarceration on his relationship with his children and resulting family separation.

The appellant requested a modest three‑month reduction from the imposed four‑year sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge was aware of the appellant’s parental status and the inevitable interruption to family relationships caused by incarceration.

The court found no error in principle and concluded that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed a Family Court order compelling compliance with prior security-for-costs and costs orders in ongoing family proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction because the order was a final Family Court order made only under provincial legislation, engaging s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court emphasized that such appeals lie to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

It also noted procedural options to avoid delay where jurisdictional transfer issues arise, including consent transfer orders or motions to quash.

On a motion concerning appellate jurisdiction, the court held that paragraph one of an order dated June 20, 2025 was interlocutory and did not prevent the respondents from relying on prior findings made in related proceedings.

Because the order was interlocutory, the appeal could not proceed and was quashed.

The court awarded costs of the motion to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

A law firm appealed an application judge’s decision interpreting a contingency fee retainer agreement and rejecting its claim to a share of damages awarded on appeal.

The client had retained new counsel for the appeal, which resulted in a substantial damages award after an unsuccessful trial.

The firm argued it was entitled to fees under the retainer or alternatively on a quantum meruit basis.

The Court of Appeal held that the retainer expressly limited fee entitlement to damages recovered by settlement or judgment at trial and did not include recovery obtained on appeal.

The court also held that quantum meruit relief was unavailable where the parties had expressly defined the circumstances of payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.01 order dismissing his action concerning the respondent's mortgage.

The court held the action raised no valid issue and found the motion judge's reasons were thorough.

No error warranting appellate intervention was established.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs fixed to the respondent.

The appeal concerned a dispute over interpretation of a will and administration of testamentary trusts.

The appellant challenged the application judge's interpretation and sought appellate intervention on factual, legal, and discretionary grounds.

The court found no palpable and overriding error, no error of law, and no error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

On costs, the court directed that one trust absorb the corporate respondent's costs and the appellant's personal costs on a full indemnity basis without recoupment from the appellant personally due to an arguable ambiguity in the will.

The appellant sought to reduce a global nine-year sentence for armed robbery-related offences by relying on fresh evidence of pre-sentence custody lockdowns and triple bunking.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but held that harsh-custody mitigation required evidence of actual impact, which was not provided.

Applying the governing approach to custody conditions as a mitigating factor within overall fitness analysis, the panel found no error in principle and no demonstrable unfitness.

Given the appellant’s extensive robbery record, parole status at the time of the offences, and the already low-end fit sentence for armed robbery, a reduction would have made the sentence unfit.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion, arguing the respondent's claim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 rather than the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court held the claim, as pleaded, sought recovery of an interest in land or damages in lieu of that interest and therefore fell under the 10-year limitation period in the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court rejected new appellate arguments about contractual performance because those issues were not raised on the summary judgment motion.

It confirmed that an appeal from a failed summary judgment motion is not a vehicle for advancing fresh issues.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs awards to both responding parties and costs to the appellant on the stay motion.

In a conviction appeal, the appellant sought production of a post-Hason Crown communication, plus a list of cases reviewed by the prosecution service concerning a forensic psychiatric expert and reasons for selection.

The court applied the two-step appellate production framework requiring a reasonable possibility the materials could assist a fresh-evidence motion and a reasonable possibility of eventual admissibility as fresh evidence.

It held the request was speculative, case-specific concerns from prior proceedings did not establish relevance in this record, and the requested internal review rationale was privileged.

The court further held that any standalone direction, divorced from justification, would not satisfy the relevance threshold.

The production motion was dismissed.

On a motion panel review, the moving party sought to overturn a single-judge order dismissing his stay and ancillary requests.

The court held the moving party failed to show any error in the finding that the appeal lacked merit and therefore failed to establish entitlement to a stay.

The court also rejected additional relief requested before the panel for lack of legal entitlement and admissible supporting evidence.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

In a commercial lease dispute, the appellants challenged findings that the landlord breached the lease and acted in bad faith by terminating access to loading facilities central to the tenant’s business operations.

The court upheld the application judge’s lease interpretation, including that contractual improvements and related access rights could not be nullified through redesignation of common areas.

The court also upheld the finding of repudiatory breach, rejecting the argument that temporary restoration under a without prejudice consent order cured the breach.

A new argument that the tenant had irrevocably affirmed the lease was not entertained on appeal and was unpersuasive in any event.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs to the respondent.

In an estate appeal, the court held that the judgment under appeal was, on its face, made under the Succession Law Reform Act.

Because s. 76 grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Divisional Court for appeals under that Act, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed on that basis.

The court also ordered costs payable to the respondent by the estate in an agreed all-inclusive amount.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order refusing an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in high-conflict family litigation.

The court applied the deferential standard under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act and confirmed intervention is limited to legal error, error in principle, or an unreasonable result.

It held the motion judge applied the correct legal framework, including the best interests of the children as the overarching consideration.

The court found no error in assessing the proposed appeal's limited merit, the five-month delay, and prejudice from continued uncertainty in parenting arrangements.

The review motion was dismissed with costs.

On an estate appeal, the appellants challenged findings that upheld a later will, dismissed their application, and refused costs relief.

The court found legal and palpable-and-overriding errors in the trial-level analysis of suspicious circumstances, knowledge and approval, conflict concerns surrounding the drafting solicitor, and undue influence evidence.

The court held the impugned will invalid, granted related relief dismissing the connected Small Claims Court action, and set aside the costs order.

Applying modern estate-costs principles, the court ordered a blended costs result, including substantial indemnity costs personally against the respondent for part of first-instance costs, with the remaining amounts payable from the estate.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal in a sexual assault case, finding no reversible misapprehension of evidence, no misuse of the complainant's voice note despite the absence of a voir dire, and no uneven scrutiny.

It granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal as the sentence was fit and within range.

The appellant challenged his jury conviction for sexual assault offences and a five-year penitentiary sentence, arguing the jury charge on motive was unbalanced and the sentencing judge improperly treated lack of insight or remorse as aggravating.

The court held the charge, read functionally and as a whole, accurately and sufficiently instructed the jury, including on motive to fabricate and motive to offend, and any imperfections did not create legal error.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle affecting fitness and no improper reliance on lack of remorse.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The respondents sought dismissal of the appellant's appeal under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court held that an appeal from a default judgment was outside its jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory and the proper route was a motion to set aside default under r. 19.08.

The panel also noted that a party noted in default is restricted from taking further steps absent leave or consent under r. 19.02(1)(b).

Concluding the appeal was jurisdictionally barred and abusive, the court dismissed the appeal without costs.