Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: 2025-07-16
Docket: M56065 (COA-25-CV-0644)
Judge: Peter Lauwers (Motions Judge)
Parties
Between:
Shinder Pal Kaur Sidhu
Plaintiff (Respondent/Responding Party)
and
Sachindra Jain, Soneil Lincoln Inc., and Norman Sidhu
Defendants (Appellants/Moving Parties: Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc.; Respondent/Responding Party: Norman Sidhu)
Counsel:
- James Zibarras and Erin Craddock, for the appellants/moving parties Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc.
- Harinder Dhaliwal, for the respondent/responding party Shinder Pal Kaur Sidhu
- Evan Moore, for the respondent/responding party Norman Sidhu
Heard: July 14, 2025
Endorsement
Background
[1] The motion judge consolidated two actions and dismissed a summary judgment motion, finding that one of the actions was governed by the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15.
[2] The operative parts of the order follow:
ON READING the Notice of Motion and Affidavits filed and on hearing the submissions of the lawyers for the Plaintiff and Defendants, in attendance,
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Actions bearing Court File Nos. CV-24-00001055-0000 and CV-16-00004750-0000 shall be heard and tried together.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the parties shall adhere to the following timetable:
(a) The Defendants, Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc. shall deliver their Affidavits of Documents within 21 days.
(b) Examinations for Discoveries shall be completed by May 31, 2025. Any further examination for discovery in the Action in Court File No. CV-16-00004750 shall be conducted jointly with the within Action.
(c) Undertakings shall be answered by June 30, 2025.
(d) The Plaintiff shall set the matter down by filing the trial record by July 31, 2025.
(e) Upon this matter being set down for trial, the parties shall attend assignment court to schedule a trial in both matters.
- THIS COURT ORDERS that the Defendants, Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc’s motion seeking summary judgment and security for costs is dismissed.
Issues
[3] I must determine two issues. The first is whether the order under appeal is final or interlocutory. If it is final, then the appeal properly lies to this court under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. If not, then the Divisional Court has jurisdiction under s. 19(1)(b).
[4] The second issue is whether I should stay the operation of the schedule in the motion judge’s order pending the outcome of this appeal.
Issue One: Is the Order Final or Interlocutory?
[5] The governing principle is an old one. The law is clear that not every unsuccessful motion under r. 20 automatically gives rise to a right of appeal, only those that “finally dispose of the issue raised by that defence, and thereby [deprive] the defendant of a substantive right which could be determinative of the entire action”: Ball v. Donais, 13 O.R. (3d) 322 (C.A.).
[6] As explained in Charlebois v. Enterprises Normand Ravary Ltee, 79 O.R. (3d) 504 (C.A.), at para. 11:
In Ball v. Donais (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 322, [1993] O.J. No. 972 (C.A.), ... the issue was whether a plaintiff’s action for damages arising from a collision between a motor vehicle driven by the defendant and a snowmobile operated by the plaintiff was barred by the two-year limitation period prescribed by s. 180(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, supra. On a pre-trial motion by the defendant for the determination of a question of law, the motion judge found in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the action was not statute-barred. On appeal, this court stated at p. 324 O.R.:
The effect of the order of [the motion judge] was to preclude the defendant’s entitlement to raise thereafter, as a defence to this action, the plaintiff’s failure to sue within the limitation period prescribed by the Highway Traffic Act. While that order did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties to the litigation, it did, subject to appeal therefrom, finally dispose of the issue raised by that defence, and thereby deprived the defendant of a substantive right which could be determinative of the entire action. Viewed from that perspective, the order of [the motion judge] was a final order within the contemplation of the decisions of this court.
[7] In this case the motion judge set out the issue and the law:
Is the Plaintiff’s action statute barred?
[24] Section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA) States:
- No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrue to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 4.
[25] Section 23 of the RPLA states:
- (1) No action shall be brought to recover out of any land or rent any sum of money secured by any mortgage or lien, or otherwise charged upon or payable out of the land or rent, or to recover any legacy, whether it is or is not charged upon land, but within ten years next after a present right to receive it accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for, or release of it, unless in the meantime some part of the principal money or some interest thereon has been paid, or some acknowledgment in writing of the right thereto signed by the person by whom it is payable, or the person’s agent, has been given to the person entitled thereto or that person’s agent, and in such case no action shall be brought but within ten years after the payment or acknowledgment, or the last of the payments or acknowledgments if more than one, was made or given R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 23 (1).
[Emphasis in original removed.]
[8] The motion judge applied the law this way:
[29] In 2006, Mrs. Sidhu agreed to purchase a one-third interest in the land known by the parties as Lot 16. Mr. Jain sold Lot 16 in 2016 without Mrs. Sidhu’s knowledge and without her knowing what he did with the net proceeds of sale. When questioned during Discovery, he refused to answer questions relating to the net proceeds of sale of Lot 16. In 2024, Mrs. Sidhu filed a claim against Mr. Jain seeking damages for the unilateral sale of Lot 16.
[30] Is Mrs. Sidhu’s 2024 action statute barred, as claimed by Mr. Jain’s counsel because it was initiated 8 years after 2016? In my view, the applicable statute is the Real Property Limitation Act (“RPLA”) rather than the Limitations Act, 2002. The former relates to land while the latter relates to a claim to remedy an injury loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act or omission. Arguably, this latter definition is broad enough to cover the loss of an interest in land. However, section 4 of the Limitations Act specifically states that the Act applies unless some other limitation periods is prescribed.
[31] In my view, section 4 of the RPLA applies given that it relates to the issue of land. Section 42 of the RPLA states that a party can make a claim under there when property is sold: see Khan v. Taji, 2020 ONSC 6704, paras. 57-77.
[9] The question before me is whether the limitations defence under the RPLA has been decided against the appellants. It plainly has. In the consolidated action going forward, that limitation defence is gone and cannot be raised again by the appellants. Accordingly, in line with Ball, the order under appeal is a final order and this court has jurisdiction: See also R.S. v. R.H., 52 O.R. (3d) 152 (C.A.), para. 21.
Issue Two: Should the Operation of the Schedule in the Motion Judge’s Order Be Stayed Pending the Outcome of This Appeal?
[10] In my view, if this court were to allow the appeal, the litigation context of the consolidated action would be fundamentally changed. There is no point in incurring the cost of litigation steps that might prove unnecessary in a situation where there is no additional prejudice arising from a stay. I therefore stay the order pending appeal.
[11] The costs of this motion are reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.
“P. Lauwers J.A.”