Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-07-18
Docket: COA-24-CV-0138
Coram: S. Coroza, L. Madsen, M. Rahman

Between:
Mounia Hassani Alami (Applicant/Appellant)
and
Fadi Jamil Haddad (Respondent)

Appearances:
Mounia Hassani Alami, acting in person
Charles Baker, for the respondent

Heard: July 3, 2025

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Joanne Bruhn of the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 10, 2024.

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

[1] On January 10, 2024, the trial judge released a comprehensive judgment addressing all issues arising from the parties’ separation. The issues included a claim for resulting trust; equalization; sale of the home; child support; spousal support; and damages in tort in relation to alleged domestic violence. The trial was the culmination of years of litigation.

[2] The wife appeals virtually all aspects of the judgment, alleging numerous errors in fact and law. In oral argument, only the grounds related to the home were pursued.

[3] For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed.

A. Brief Background

[4] The parties were married in 1995, separated on January 1, 2017, and divorced on March 14, 2018. They have two adult children.

[5] The former matrimonial home was in the wife’s name solely. The home was refinanced by the wife three times without the husband’s knowledge or consent: twice during the marriage (the “first mortgage”); and once on April 30, 2018, well after separation (the “second mortgage”).

[6] The wife commenced the underlying proceedings in 2016. The husband did not claim a resulting trust interest in the home until January 31, 2020, after the parties were divorced.

[7] Throughout the course of the proceedings, numerous temporary orders were made, including for child and spousal support as well as an order restraining the wife from encumbering the home. On December 7, 2022, the wife’s pleadings were struck in relation to the valuation date for her failure to abide by numerous court orders and directions. Her appeal of that order was quashed by this court on July 25, 2023 for want of jurisdiction.

B. Trial Decision

[8] The matter proceeded to a five-day trial, during which the wife was self-represented.

[9] The pre-trial disclosure of both parties was woefully incomplete. The wife, for example, had produced no income tax returns or notices of assessment since 2019 despite claiming spousal support. Neither party provided supporting documentation for assets and debts other than the home.

[10] The trial judge also had great difficulty with both parties’ credibility, and approached their uncorroborated evidence with caution. She found the wife’s testimony “vague, unhelpful and/or contradictory, in particular regarding her income, her assets, and her debts.” She found that some of the husband’s testimony was also “evasive, unhelpful and/or inaccurate” and that he misrepresented his financial circumstances on his financial statement.

[11] After having carefully considered the evidence of both parties, the trial judge ordered that:

• The wife owned the home upon a 50% resulting trust for the husband; that the house should be sold; that neither would owe the other an equalization payment; and that the wife was to be solely responsible for the mortgage registered by her after the date of separation;
• Income should be imputed to both parties for the determination of child and spousal support at $50,000 per year (for 2017 and 2018) and $55,000 per year (thereafter) to the wife, and $50,000 per year (for 2017 and 2018) and $70,000 per year (thereafter) to the husband;
• Child support was payable in the amount of $218 per month from the husband to the wife for one child;
• Neither party should pay spousal support to the other; and
• The wife’s claim to damages arising from claims in tort was to be dismissed.

C. Analysis

[12] We address, first, the two arguments pursued by the appellant in oral submissions.

(1) Presumption of Resulting Trust

[13] The wife argues that the trial judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the husband had a beneficial interest in the former matrimonial home pursuant to the doctrine of resulting trust. She says that because the parties had already divorced by the time he claimed a resulting trust interest in the home, s. 14 of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, had no application because it refers to “spouses” and not “former spouses.” Further, she states that the trial judge erred in her application of the law to the facts.

[14] The trial judge did not err in applying the doctrine of resulting trust to the determination of ownership of the former matrimonial home. Section 10(1) of the Family Law Act authorizes the court to determine questions of title between spouses. This includes whether legal title actually reflects beneficial ownership. Before property can be equalized, a court must determine the net family property of each spouse. This requires that questions of title be settled: Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, para 47; Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, at p. 91. In other words, “property entitlements must be determined before they can be equalized”: Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578, para 25.

[15] The general rule for gratuitous transfers is that the rebuttable presumption of resulting trust applies. Where a transfer is made for no consideration, the onus is on the transferee to show that the gift was intended: Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, para 24. As previously set out by this court, “[t]he presumption of resulting trust flows from the principle that equity presumes bargains and not gifts”: Belokon v. Krygyz Republic, 2016 ONCA 981, para 56, leave to appeal refused, Entes Industrial Plants Construction & Erection Contracting Co. v. Kyrgyz Republic, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 74; Qu v. Zhang, 2025 ONCA 391, para 11. The presumption may be rebutted on a balance of probabilities by evidence that the transferor intended the transfer to be a gift: Qu, para 12; Pecore, paras 24, 43. The function of s. 14 of the Family Law Act is to codify this equitable doctrine for spouses specifically, and provide two exceptions to the presumption.

[16] On the evidence before her, the trial judge found that both parties contributed the funds used to purchase their first home in 1999, which was registered in the wife’s name alone. When the first home was sold, the proceeds were put towards the second home, which was purchased in 2004. She found it “highly improbable” that the wife alone had provided the funds for purchase of the first or second home, given her evidence that she was primarily responsible for the care of their young children and earned a modest income at that time. She considered the husband’s evidence that he was the primary breadwinner and that he paid most of the purchase price of the homes. She found as a fact that the husband had contributed financially to the acquisition of the second home, and that he did not intend to gift his interest to the wife. These findings were available to the trial judge and we see no palpable and overriding error.

[17] Having found that the general presumption of resulting trust as set out in Pecore applies, it is unnecessary to address the wife’s argument that s. 14 of the Family Law Act does not apply to former spouses or the reference by the trial judge to that section. In the circumstances of this case, it is of no consequence.

(2) The Second Mortgage

[18] The wife argues that the trial judge erred in relying on s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act to order the wife responsible for the portion of the current mortgage attributable to the second mortgage, which was registered by her on the home after separation and after the husband had filed his Answer requesting the sale of the matrimonial home, division of the proceeds of sale, and unequal division of net family property. She argues that, having found that no equalization payment was owing, the trial judge could not then proceed to invoke s. 5(6).

[19] The trial judge discussed unconscionability and unequal division under s. 5(6) when considering how best to address the amount owing on account of the third refinancing undertaken by the wife after separation and without the husband’s consent. Given that equalization and net family property are calculated as at the date of separation, the unequal division “lens” was not the appropriate framework within which to consider this issue. However, the trial judge ultimately and correctly treated the mortgage as a post-separation adjustment in the husband’s favour:

Because I do not know what is owing at this time on the current mortgage, nor do I know what will be owing by the time the former matrimonial home is sold, I will order that the parties’ net family property be equalized in the usual course (with the full amount of the current mortgage shared by the parties) but will allow for an adjustment out of the net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home to ensure that the wife is solely responsible for that portion of the current mortgage attributable to the second mortgage.

[20] This solely incurred post-separation debt was without question the wife’s sole responsibility. The trial judge’s mistake in framing the issue had no practical effect on its appropriate outcome. Accordingly, we reject this ground of appeal.

(3) Other Alleged Errors

[21] In her factum, the appellant alleges upwards of 50 errors on the part of the trial judge. The majority of these alleged errors challenge findings of fact that were available to the trial judge and/or determinations of credibility, which are also squarely within her purview. Others are based on misstatements or misunderstandings of legal principles and caselaw. None of the alleged errors, except as set out above, have been substantiated on appeal.

[22] Finally, notwithstanding that the appellant did not seek leave to appeal the cost order arising from the trial, she sought to challenge it in oral argument. The costs order was made on consent. There is no basis to interfere with that order.

D. Disposition

[23] The appeal is dismissed.

[24] Any accounting issues in relation to the implementation of the trial judge’s judgment should be addressed by appointment before her.

[25] Costs of the appeal are set at $15,000, payable by the appellant to the respondent within 30 days.

“S. Coroza J.A.”
“L. Madsen J.A.”
“M. Rahman J.A.”