COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Beseiso, 2020 ONCA 686

DATE: 20201029

DOCKET: C68268

Watt, Roberts and Jamal JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Alex Beseiso

Appellant

Alex Beseiso, acting in person

Randy Schwartz, for the respondent

Heard: in writing

On appeal from the order of Justice Clayton Conlan of the Superior Court of Justice, dated March 9, 2020.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] The appellant appeals from the order dismissing his application for certiorari to quash the committal order of Justice G. Paul Renwick of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated October 11, 2019. Following a three-day preliminary inquiry at which the appellant was represented by counsel and testified, the appellant was committed to stand trial in the Superior Court of Justice on two counts of intimidating a justice system participant and three counts of criminal harassment. The Crown withdrew two counts of breaching two distinct probation orders, and the preliminary inquiry judge discharged the appellant on one additional count of intimidating a justice system participant.

[2] Pursuant to the Crown’s request, the registrar referred the appellant’s appeal to this panel for summary determination in writing under s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The appellant requests an oral hearing.

[3] For the reasons that follow, given the record before us, including the voluminous materials submitted by the appellant, which we have reviewed, and the nature of the issues raised, we are satisfied that the appeal can be determined without being adjourned for a full oral hearing before a panel of this court.

[4] The charges against the appellant arose as a result of his abusive and threatening communications with a now former Crown prosecutor, who had successfully prosecuted the appellant for threatening and harassing a court transcriptionist, and with two courthouse administrative staff members regarding the assignment of judges to his cases. These individuals are the three complainants in this matter.

[5] The appellant submits that the application judge erred in dismissing his application for certiorari. From our review of the documents that the appellant has submitted, including his recent response to the Crown’s request under s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code, we determine that the appellant’s main grounds of appeal are as follows:

i. While the appellant concedes that the other essential elements of the offences have been satisfied to the requisite standard at a preliminary inquiry, he argues there is no evidence to support the essential element of the offences that his actions were “without lawful authority”: Criminal Code, ss. 264(1), 423.1(1). According to the appellant, the preliminary inquiry judge failed to make such a finding.

ii. The appellant argues that the application judge was biased because he sits in the same region in which the two courthouse administrative staff members work. Therefore, the application judge must have regular and frequent dealings with these complainants, which gives rise to bias.

[6] Section 685(1) of the Criminal Code allows this court to dismiss an appeal summarily, “without calling on any person to attend the hearing” or “appear for the respondent on the hearing”, “if it considers that the appeal is frivolous or vexatious and can be determined without being adjourned for a full hearing”. This appeal satisfies those criteria.

[7] In our view, the appellant’s appeal is “frivolous”, as that term is used in s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code, because it is “completely devoid of merit”: see Lochner v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 730, at para. 21; R. v. Mehedi, 2019 ONCA 387, at para. 6, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 280.

[8] The appellant’s first ground of appeal was thoroughly considered by the application judge. We see no basis to interfere with his dismissal of the appellant’s application for certiorari. As the application judge correctly pointed out, and as demonstrated by the preliminary inquiry judge’s reasons, the preliminary inquiry judge reviewed the essential elements of the offences in issue. The preliminary inquiry judge determined that there was evidence to support the essential element that the appellant’s abusive and harassing behaviour was without lawful authority. We agree with the application judge’s conclusion that there was no error in this determination.

[9] The appellant’s second ground of appeal similarly has no merit. Given the strong presumption of judicial impartiality, the test for demonstrating judicial bias is a stringent one: Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 357, at para. 20; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, at para. 59. The test asks whether “an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically ‒ and having thought the matter through – [would] conclude”, whether consciously or unconsciously, that the matter was not decided fairly: Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394, per de Grandpré J. (dissenting). The grounds for this apprehension of bias must be “substantial”: Committee for Justice and Liberty, at p. 395. The appellant has not met this high standard.

[10] The record before us shows no evidence of bias. There is nothing in the record showing that the application judge had any communications with the courthouse administrative staff members in question concerning the charges against the appellant. That the application judge might know and have professional dealings with these complainants does not on its own give rise to the appearance of bias, let alone actual bias. Moreover, the application judge’s reasons demonstrate that he treated the appellant respectfully and considered his application fairly and, as we noted, came to the correct conclusion.

[11] The remaining allegations in the appellant’s materials do not raise any arguable ground of appeal. They consist of the appellant’s expression of his ongoing general grievances against the administration of justice, including judges, court administrators, and Crown counsel, as well as his personal beliefs and philosophies about life and other matters. These issues are not before us on this appeal, and we do not have jurisdiction to deal with them.

Disposition

[12] The appellant has not raised any arguable ground of appeal that has any merit. The appeal is therefore frivolous. As a result, the appeal is dismissed.

“David Watt J.A.”

“L.B. Roberts J.A.”

“M. Jamal J.A.”