COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: R. v. White, 2020 ONCA 639
DATE: 20201013
DOCKET: C66614
Pardu, Paciocco and Harvison Young JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
John Masson Maxwell White
Appellant
Richard Litkowski, appearing as duty counsel
Hannah Freeman, for the respondent
Heard: October 7, 2020 by video conference
On appeal from the sentence imposed on February 15, 2019 by Justice Graeme Mew of the Superior Court of Justice.
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] The appellant appeals from the 16-year period of parole ineligibility fixed by the trial judge in relation to the life sentence imposed for second degree murder.
[2] In able submissions on behalf of the appellant, duty counsel argues that the sentencing judge committed two errors in principle:
He failed to explain why he imposed a period of parole ineligibility at the high end of the range.
He treated the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor.
[3] This was a brutal killing. The appellant shot his step-mother in the head at point blank range. She was defenseless, seated in an armchair with her phone in her lap. The shooting took place in front of her husband, the appellant’s father, who described the victim as the pride and joy of his life, and in front of the appellant’s former partner.
[4] The sentence imposed is acknowledged to be within the range established by cases such as R. v. McKnight, 43 O.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.), and R. v. Czibulka, 2011 ONCA 82, 275 O.A.C. 64.
[5] R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 11, stipulates that a departure from the range is in itself insufficient to open the door to appellate intervention. Here, the sentencing judge explained why he arrived at his decision and his reasons are sufficient. He concluded that the appellant was more blameworthy than the appellant in McKnight.
[6] Reading the reasons as a whole, we are not persuaded that the sentencing judge used remorse as an aggravating factor. Rather, he referred to remorse to distinguish this case from McKnight, where this court reduced the period of parole ineligibility from 17 years to 14, in light of numerous mitigating factors. There, the appellant had killed his wife while affected by a serious depression. There was evidence that the homicide would not have occurred but for the appellant’s mental health problems and that the appellant was profoundly remorseful. No similar mitigating factors are present in this case.
[7] The sentence is not demonstrably unfit, nor affected by error which had an impact on the ultimate period of parole ineligibility imposed. There is no basis for appellate intervention.
[8] Leave to appeal sentence is granted but the appeal from sentence is dismissed.
“G. Pardu J.A.”
“David M. Paciocco J.A.”
“A. Harvison Young J.A.”