Hunt v. Peel Mutual Insurance Company

[Indexed as: Hunt v. Peel Mutual Insurance Co.]

Ontario Reports Court of Appeal for Ontario Paciocco, Harvison Young and Zarnett JJ.A. August 14, 2019

146 O.R. (3d) 749 | 2019 ONCA 656

Case Summary

Insurance — Automobile insurance — Action against insurer

Father was sued by his daughter for personal injury for negligent parenting for allowing her to be a passenger in a vehicle with an impaired driver. The father, being an occupant of the vehicle at the time of the alleged injury, moved for a declaration of a duty to defend by the driver's insurer. There was no coverage as the father's liability for loss or damage did not arise from anything he did or failed to do as an occupant of the vehicle.

Insurance — Automobile insurance — Definitions — "Insured person"

Father was sued by his daughter for personal injury for negligent parenting for allowing her to be a passenger in a vehicle with an impaired driver. The father, being an occupant of the vehicle at the time of the alleged injury, moved for a declaration of a duty to defend by the driver's insurer. There was no coverage as the father's liability for loss or damage did not arise from anything he did or failed to do as an occupant of the vehicle.

Insurance — Automobile insurance — Duty to defend

Father was sued by his daughter for personal injury for negligent parenting for allowing her to be a passenger in a vehicle with an impaired driver. The father, being an occupant of the vehicle at the time of the alleged injury, moved for a declaration of a duty to defend by the driver's insurer. There was no coverage as the father's liability for loss or damage did not arise from anything he did or failed to do as an occupant of the vehicle.

Facts

The appellant was being sued by his daughter, a minor, for personal injury damages for negligent parenting. He was alleged to have allowed his daughter to be a passenger in a vehicle with an impaired driver, being the father's girlfriend. The girlfriend had an automobile policy with the respondent insurer. The father moved for a declaration that the insurer had a duty to defend him as an "insured person" under the policy as he was an occupant of the vehicle at the time of the alleged injury. The motion was dismissed.

Decision

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

In order to be covered, an occupant's liability had to be for loss or damage arising from the use or operation of the automobile. Although the daughter's injuries arose from the use of a vehicle, the father's liability for her loss or damage did not. Rather, his liability was alleged to be the result of negligent parenting, not from anything he did or did not do as an occupant of the vehicle.

Statutes Referred To

Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 239 [as am.], (1), (a)

Procedural History

APPEAL from the order of P.J. Flynn J. of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 7, 2019.

Counsel:

• Richard Campbell, for appellant
• M. Edward Key, for respondent

Reasons for Decision

[1] BY THE COURT (orally): The appellant, Bradley Hunt's daughter, A., a minor, is suing him for negligent parenting. She alleges that he was negligent in permitting her to be transported in the motor vehicle of an impaired driver, a vehicle in which Mr. Hunt was also an occupant.

[2] The driver alleged to have been impaired was Mr. Hunt's girlfriend, Tammy-Lynn Dingman, who held an automobile insurance policy at the time with the respondent, Peel Mutual Insurance Company ("Peel Mutual"). Mr. Hunt moved for a declaration that Peel Mutual has a duty to defend him against his daughter's lawsuit, as he is an "insured person" within the meaning of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 239, or at the very least, there is a very real possibility that he is insured, triggering the duty to defend.

[3] The motion judge denied Mr. Hunt's motion. Mr. Hunt appeals that decision, claiming that the motion judge misinterpreted the plain and ordinary meaning of s. 239, by construing s. 239 narrowly against coverage and by applying an improper causation test.

[4] We would dismiss Mr. Hunt's appeal. Peel Mutual is not required to defend Mr. Hunt against his daughter's claim.

[5] Section 239(1), the applicable section, provides, in relevant part, as follows:

239 (1) Subject to section 240, every contract evidenced by an owner's policy insures the person named therein, and every other person who with the named person's consent drives, or is an occupant of, an automobile owned by the insured named in the contract and within the description or definition thereof in the contract, against liability imposed by law upon the insured named in the contract or that other person for loss or damage,

(a) arising from the ownership or directly or indirectly from the use or operation of any such automobile; and

(b) resulting from bodily injury to or the death of any person and damage to property.

[6] The plain and ordinary meaning of s. 239(1)(a) precludes recovery. It makes clear that to be covered, an occupant's liability must be for loss or damage arising from the use or operation of the automobile. Even though A.'s injuries arose from the use of a vehicle, Mr. Hunt's liability for her loss or damage does not. His liability is alleged to arise from negligent parenting, not from anything he did or did not do as an occupant connected to the use or operation of the automobile. When the motion judge spoke of the absence of a causal connection this is what he was alluding to -- the statutory requirement that the occupant's liability must be caused by or connected to the use or operation of the automobile.

[7] As the motion judge pointed out, on Mr. Hunt's theory his liability for negligent parenting arising from a decision to put his daughter in an automobile operated by an impaired driver would be covered if he also got into the car, but not if he did not. The plain language of the provision prevents the absurdity of coverage linked to his fortuitous and immaterial occupancy. Nor can the plain language of s. 239 be overcome by the fact that the Insurance Act is consumer protection legislation, or that policies should be construed in favour of coverage.

[8] The appeal is dismissed. Costs in the appeal to the respondent are ordered in the amount of $2,500, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

Disposition

Appeal dismissed.

End of Document