WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act…
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person…
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
CITATION: R. v. D.M., 2008 ONCA 69
DATE: 20080204
DOCKET: C47361
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
FELDMAN, LANG and MacFARLAND JJ.A.
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
and
D.M.
Appellant
Vincenzo Rondinelli for the appellant
Deborah Krick for the respondent
Heard: January 23, 2008
On appeal from the order of Justice R. G. S Del Frate of the Superior Court of Justice dated May 1, 2007, upholding the committal order of Justice R. Humphrey of the Ontario Court of Justice dated January 23, 2007.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] We see no error in the conclusion of the certiorari judge that there is no basis to interfere with the decision of the preliminary inquiry judge to commit the appellant for trial for first degree murder.
[2] The appellant submitted that there was no evidence of planning and deliberation of murder. The evidence on the issue of planning and deliberation was circumstantial. Therefore the issue is whether planning and deliberation could reasonably be inferred from the available evidence.
[3] We agree that it was a reasonable inference from the evidence as a whole including: the appellant was carrying a very large kitchen knife; he first stated to a friend in the park that he wanted to fight someone or do something really stupid; at the house, he went to the end of the driveway to talk to some people then came back up the driveway and said to some other people that he almost did something stupid; he then told one of the guests that he should take his son home; he also said that he was not afraid of anyone who got in his way; he went back to the party and when he was again asked politely by the victim to leave and come back another time, he immediately pulled out the knife, said “what’s this?” then stabbed the victim and ran away; he met up with the friend he talked to earlier and told her or bragged to her that he had stabbed someone.
[4] From this evidence it could reasonably be inferred that the appellant came to the party with the intent to stab someone with his very large knife meaning to cause death or bodily harm that was likely to result in death.
[5] Although another reasonable inference may be that the act of pulling out the knife and plunging it into the victim was spontaneous or impulsive, the inference suggested by the Crown is also a reasonable one.
[6] We would therefore dismiss the appeal.
“K. Feldman J.A.”
“S.E. Lang J.A.”
“J. MacFarland J.A.”