Court File and Parties

CITATION: R. v. Chartier, 2007 ONCA 706

DATE: 20071018

DOCKET: C47038

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

WEILER, SHARPE and BLAIR

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Applicant/Appellant

and

MARIE ÉMILIE CHARTIER

Respondent

Megan Stephens for the appellant

Marie Émilie Chartier in person

Heard and released orally: October 12, 2007

On appeal from the decision of Justice Robert Maranger of the Superior Court of Justice dated April 2, 2007.

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This sentence appeal brought by the Attorney General of Ontario relates to the failure of the trial judge to impose any punitive condition as part of the conditional sentence of imprisonment.

[2] The respondent was convicted of four counts of abduction in contravention of a custody order and given fifteen months conditional sentence and two years probation.

[3] The respondent presents us with a last minute request for an adjournment to secure legal advice. We are very concerned by the respondent’s failure to have made this request in a more timely fashion.

[4] Although the Crown made every effort to bring this appeal forward in a timely fashion, having read the materials filed by the Crown , in our view, it is appropriate to dispose of this case today on the following basis.

[5] There is no doubt that Parliament intended the imposition of a conditional sentence to be more punitive than probation, and to be more restrictive of the offender’s liberty. Thus, except in rare cases, a conditional sentence must carry with it some form of punitive terms, such as house arrest and/or a curfew: see R. v. Proulx (2000), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 311 (S.C.C.) at paras. 28-29; and R. v. Smith [1999] O.J. No. 2694 (C.A.) at para. 11.

[6] We agree with the Crown that the trial judge erred in failing to impose such terms in this case. However, the respondent did serve approximately six weeks pre-trial custody and faced more punitive terms in relation to the closely related passport offences. As the respondent has now served a significant portion of the conditional sentence at issue in this appeal, we are not persuaded that justice would now be served by interfering with the sentence imposed.

[7] Accordingly, we grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.

“K.M. Weiler J.A.”

“Robert J. Sharpe J.A.”

“R.A. Blair J.A.”