W A R N I N G
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:
- (7)The court may make an order,
(a) excluding a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;
(b) excluding all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
(8)No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9)The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
G.M. v. Alter, 2007 ONCA 703
CITATION: G.M. v. Alter, 2007 ONCA 703
DATE: 20071022
DOCKET: C46212
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
MOLDAVER, FELDMAN and LAFORME JJ.A.
BETWEEN:
G.M., BABY G.S. by her litigation guardian, G.M. and BABY G.J. by his litigation guardian, G.M.
Plaintiffs (Respondents)
and
DR. LARRY ALTER and DR. DENNIS K. CHU and DR. VIVIAN P.T. LEE
Defendants (Appellant)
Counsel:
Peter H. Griffin and Nina Bombier for the appellants
Jerome R. Morse and Lori Stoltz for the respondents
Heard and endorsed: October 17, 2007
On appeal from the judgment of Justice Mary Anne Sanderson of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 10, 2006.
APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT
[1] Having regard to the language of the rule 49.10 offer and the context of this case, we are of the view that Sanderson J. did not err in her interpretation of the accepted offer. In particular, we accept her reasoning in paragraph 20 where she said:
In my view, the accepted Offer cannot be said to preclude a structure. An offer to pay $6,000,000 ‘damages’ contemplates not only a lump sum payment but also a structure or both, so long as the Defendants’ obligations would end with the payment of the $6,000,000 plus costs. At the time of accepting the Plaintiffs’ Offer, the Defendants should have understood that the Plaintiffs might choose to take the $6 million in a lump or to structure part or all of that amount.”
[2] We note that in coming to the conclusion she did, Sanderson J. was careful to ensure that there were no added financial or legal obligations placed on the appellant. The appellant does not suggest otherwise.
[3] Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
[4] Costs to the respondent fixed at $12,000 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements.