Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CRIMJ(P)-24-179

Date: August 14, 2025

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

His Majesty the King

K. Holmes and T. Kim, for the Crown

– and –

Linval Ritchie

S. Pieters, for Mr. Ritchie

Heard: May 14, 15 and 16, 2025

Reasons for Sentence

J.M. Woollcombe J.

Overview

[1] On June 25, 2024, Mr. Ritchie entered a guilty plea to the second degree murder of his former domestic partner, Vanessa Virgioni. He is before me for the imposition of sentence.

[2] Section 745(c) of the Criminal Code provides that a person convicted of second degree murder is to be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until after serving at least 10 years of the sentence, or such greater number of years as has been substituted under s. 745.4, to a maximum of 25 years. The factors to consider are: (1) the character of the offender; and (2) the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission.

Positions of the Parties

[3] The parties take very different positions on the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

[4] An unusual aspect of this sentencing is that Mr. Ritchie makes a number of very serious allegations of violations of his Charter rights while detained in Maplehurst Correctional Centre ("Maplehurst"). Mr. Ritchie's Charter arguments are related primarily, though not exclusively, to the treatment he received at Maplehurst in the days following an incident that occurred on December 20, 2023.

[5] It is agreed that on December 20, 2023, another Maplehurst inmate assaulted a correctional officer in different wing of Unit 8 than Mr. Ritchie was in. On December 21, 2023, the Superintendent of Maplehurst authorised the deployment of the Institutional Crises Intervention Team ("ICIT") into all wings of Unit 8, including where Mr. Ritchie was housed. Mr. Ritchie submits that his treatment after this ICIT deployment violated his ss. 7, 8, 9, 12 and 15 Charter rights. As a s. 24(1) remedy, he seeks the reduction of his parole ineligibility period to 10 years.

[6] Correctional Services Oversight and Investigation (CSOI) is the intelligence and investigative arm of the Ministry of the Solicitor General. It conducted an initial investigation into this ICIT deployment. It has released two Reports that made findings as to what occurred. In short, it concluded that Maplehurst supervisors did not complete the requisite threat level assessment before deploying the ICIT and that the ICIT deployment was unnecessary, excessive, and disproportionate to the threat posed by inmates.

[7] The Crown acknowledges that the ICIT deployment breached Mr. Ritchie's s. 8 Charter rights, and that it would not be unreasonable to also find a s. 12 violation for what occurred. It also accepts that the s. 24(1) remedy ought to be a reduction of Mr. Ritchie's parole ineligibility. The Crown opposes a finding that Mr. Ritchie's ss. 7, 9 and 15 rights of the Charter were violated. The Crown position is that an appropriate period of parole ineligibility would be 20 years, but that as a Charter remedy for the breaches from the ICIT incident, this should be reduced to 18 years.

[8] In these reasons I will address the following:

• The nature and circumstances of the offence;
• Victim impact;
• The character of the offender;
• The legal principles respecting parole ineligibility;
• The appropriate range of parole ineligibility;
• Mr. Ritchie's Charter claims – from the ICIT incident and his other claims;
• The aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and
• The sentence to be imposed

a. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offence

[9] An Agreed Statement of Facts ("ASF") was read and filed as an exhibit at the time of the plea. It provides the detailed facts, summarized below.

[10] Mr. Ritchie and Ms. Virgioni met in grade 8 and became involved in an intimate relationship in 2011. Their son was born in 2014. Their relationship then deteriorated for several years. By 2021, Ms. Virgioni viewed their relationship as completely over but they remained in contact to co-parent their son.

[11] The relationship between Mr. Ritchie and Ms. Virgioni was marked with violence and threats.

[12] On February 16, 2021, while on a surety release in relation to offences alleged against Ms. Virgioni, with a no contact condition, Mr. Ritchie sent her an audio message threatening to cut off her head.

[13] On May 17, 2021, he sent her an audio message telling her, again, that he would cut off her head if she crossed him.

[14] Mr. Ritchie was arrested on May 27, 2021 for breaching his release order. He remained in custody until March 7, 2022, when he resolved a significant number of criminal allegations, several of which related to Ms. Virgioni.

[15] On March 7, 2022, Mr. Ritchie pleaded guilty to multiple offences. He admitted facts relating to Ms. Virgioni going back years in time, including that:

• In November 2011 he went through her phone and discovered a conversation she was having was having with another male. As a result, he threw the phone at her and when she ran from the room, he threw a metal shoe rack at her. A few hours later, while she was in the car with him, he drove erratically, at a high rate of speed, yelling at her and threatening to kill her. He also struck her in the face;

• On March 8, 2017, he punched her in the face when she refused to give him her cell phone. After she put their child down, he choked her and threw her to the ground;

• On November 9, 2017, during an argument over allegations that she was unfaithful, he pushed her against the wall and choked her while pushing his thumb into her eyes. He then pushed her to the ground, and held her head to the floor while he screamed at her;

• On March 10, 2019, during an argument, he told her he was going to shoot her in the head. He then pointed at their son and said, "I'm going to have to do that to you too"; and

• On March 12, 2019, he damaged the entrance to her home in an attempt to get inside.

[16] On March 7, 2022, in addition to being credited for time served, Mr. Ritchie was placed on probation for 2 years with a condition that he have no contact with Ms. Virgioni except by court order, or for access to their child, or with her written revokable consent, which had to be provided in advance to his probation officer.

[17] Just five days later, on March 12, 2022, Mr. Ritchie made the first of numerous attempts to contact Ms. Virgioni in violation of the court order that he not do so. Over the months that followed, she led him to believe that she would file a consent with his probation officer for them to have contact, but never did so. She was clear to him that she only wanted to co-parent with him.

[18] On June 17, 2022, Ms. Virgioni sent a message to Mr. Ritchie that she could not take their son over as she had a client meeting she had forgotten about. He was upset. That evening, they had two eight minute calls in which their son overheard his mother arguing with his father.

[19] At 9:00 p.m. that night, Mr. Ritchie sent a message saying, "my bad" and that he had a lot on his mind. She responded "ok" at 9:12 p.m.. This was their final exchange.

[20] In June 2022, 29 year old Ms. Virgioni lived in a basement apartment in Brampton with their son. At 1:35 a.m. on June 18, Mr. Ritchie arrived at the back yard of the home where Ms. Virgioni lived. He is captured on surveillance video. He had a hood over his head, a mask covering his mouth and nose, and gloves. He had a knife in its sheath in his front shorts pocket.

[21] At 1:38 a.m., Mr. Ritchie removed the screen from the basement window of the living room of Ms. Virgioni's apartment. He snuck into the apartment at 1:40 a.m., leaving the knife sheath outside and taking the knife in.

[22] The surveillance captures screaming, starting at 1:46 a.m., and continuing with yelling and crying until 2:02 a.m. Neighbours heard arguing.

[23] Their son was at home asleep and was woken by screaming. He went to the living room and saw his dad do something to his mum's head, and heard him say, "you're done". His dad told him to go back to bed and his mum told him to run. He went to bed hoping it was a nightmare.

[24] Mr. Ritchie killed Ms. Virgioni by trying to cut her head off with the knife he had brought. She died from an incise wound which was near decapitation. Her head was barely attached. She also had multiple, non-fatal injuries and defensive wounds.

[25] Mr. Richie went to the bathroom to wash off the blood and then left through the side door at 2:15 a.m. He was carrying a garbage bag that appears to have had his bloody shoes, clothes, knife and phone. He disposed of them and they were never recovered.

[26] At 6:00 a.m., their son awoke to discover his mother dead in the living room.

[27] Mr. Ritchie fled to Hamilton. He was arrested on June 18, 2022 for stealing a car. He misidentified himself, but later correctly identified himself and was arrested for this murder.

[28] He has been in custody since June 18, 2022.

b. Victim Impact

[29] At the sentencing hearing, victim impact statements were provided by Ms. Virgioni's adopted aunt, her maternal aunt, her mother, and her son. They powerfully convey the devastation this murder has caused to all of them, and the enormous loss that this family has suffered.

[30] Vanessa Virgioni was a strong and independent woman who treasured her role as a mother above all else. She was a loving and committed mother who valued every moment she had with her son. She was kind, warm, loyal and sympathetic. She was a person who lit up a room with her smile and laughter. She had other passions, including gardening and cooking.

[31] Ms. Virgioni clearly had a vital role in her close-knit family. She was a much loved daughter, niece, cousin, sister and mother. The lives of those who loved her are forever altered. They have suffered post traumatic stress, depression and anxiety. They are angry, hurt, sad and devastated. They ache. For them, there is a part of life that is just over. They are all profoundly and forever affected by what Mr. Ritchie did.

[32] Special attention must be given to Ms. Virgioni's son. He is, understandably, deeply traumatized by what he experienced. While he lives with his grandmother, he writes in his victim impact statement that he misses his mum every day. It makes him sad to think about her. He tries not to think about what happened "because it was horrible". He is scared about losing someone else. It is heart-breaking, cruel and unfair that any child has to endure what this boy has: knowing your father killed your mother while you slept in the nearby room, and then waking up to find her lifeless body. As loved and supported as I heard that he is by the family who treasures him, he carries with him a haunting memory of what he witnessed, a memory that no person, much less a child, should ever have imposed on them by a parent.

[33] There is nothing that the court can say or do to bring the bright light that Vanessa was back into the arms of those who loved her. No sentence can change the terrible history this family has lived through. I hope that with the imposition of sentence today, those of you who have been and continue to be so powerfully affected by this horrific offence, and by the ongoing stress of the criminal proceedings, will start to find some peace and a path forward, for yourselves and for that young boy who so needs your love.

c. The Character of the Offender

[34] Character of the offender pursuant to s. 745.4 is more than simply an examination of Mr. Ritchie's personal circumstances and personality traits. It involves a consideration of his character as revealed through his actions: R. v. Singh, [2013] B.C.J. 810, at para. 28; aff'd 2015 BCCA 123.

[35] The evidence that sheds light on Mr. Ritchie's character, all of which I have carefully reviewed, includes:

• An Impact of Race and Culture Assessment ("IRCA") Report prepared at the request of the defence;
• Mr. Ritchie's criminal record;
• Medical reports, both from before Mr. Ritchie's time at Maplehurst and from his time in custody;
• A Psychiatric Report dated September 16, 2024 prepared by Dr. Roland Jones at CAMH, following an Assessment Order that was requested by the defence;
• Letters of support; and
• Mr. Ritchie's letter of apology.

i) Mr. Ritchie's Background

[36] Mr. Ritchie is now a 32 year old Black African-Canadian male who practices the Moorish Faith, an offshoot of the Muslim faith.

[37] He was born in Jamaica in August 1992. His parents separated when he was a toddler and he and his sister were initially raised by their grandparents. He felt unwanted by his parents. He says he was beaten and witnessed violence. At the age of 7, he began living with his single mother in Kingston, while his father moved to the United States, and then to Canada. Mr. Ritchie describes his father as having been loving and caring, but says he felt abandoned by him.

[38] At age 11, Mr. Ritchie moved to Canada to live with his father and older sister. This move is described as having been abrupt and forced, with Mr. Ritchie's sister saying that it was unhealthy for Mr. Ritchie as they were being sent to live with their father for the first time. Mr. Ritchie had a difficult relationship with his father. His mother tried to visit but was denied access. He was forbidden to have contact with his maternal family in Jamaica. He witnessed his father abusing his sister. He felt he received a lack of attention from his stepmother. His issues were compounded by the challenges of balancing his Jamaican cultural identity with assimilating into Canadian culture.

[39] Mr. Ritchie's mother came to Canada a couple of years after he did, but she was not permitted to have contact. When he was 14, his mother was awarded custody of him through the courts and he moved in with her. By this point, Mr. Ritchie was resentful and felt angry. He and his sister had difficulty navigating their relationship and Mr. Ritchie felt abandoned. His father stopped speaking to him after he left. He and his mother did start to reconnect.

[40] Mr. Ritchie lived with his mother and her partner, whom he liked and with whom he had a positive relationship. As his peer group engaged in criminal activities, his mother's partner served as a strong Black role model for him.

[41] When reflecting on his educational background for the IRCA Report, Mr. Ritchie described his early years of primary education as positive. He attended all Black schools in Jamaica and described himself as a strong learner who felt connected to the school and to his cultural and racial identities. He also observed that it was not all positive in Jamaica as this was a time of corporal punishment. He recalls having been beaten at school in Jamaica.

[42] Mr. Ritchie describes his transition to school in Canada as having been difficult and says he had feelings of marginalization and discrimination. In a system of all White teachers, he felt alienated and socially isolated. His father did not emphasise education as his grandparents had in Jamaica. He had no Black teachers, though he did forge friendships with Black students.

[43] Mr. Ritchie describes experiencing racism at school that left a lasting impression on him. In high school, he felt targeted and on one occasion says he was attacked by three White students. He was arrested, charged and expelled. He transferred to a school where he had two Black teachers and felt supported and encouraged. He graduated with grades in the 60s and 70s.

[44] Overall, Mr. Ritchie's education was impacted by systemic anti-Black racism, a lack of cultural connection and the fact that there was an absence of Black teachers until high school. In high school, Mr. Ritchie began selling cannibis. He continued this after graduation.

[45] After graduating, Mr. Ritchie enrolled in a paralegal course at Humber College between 2012 and 2015. He said he failed a course and did not compete the program because he was wrongfully charged with assaulting a peace officer and had a drug trafficking charge.

[46] Mr. Ritchie describes having had financial challenges through his childhood and into early adulthood. While his mother always worked to provide for him, she struggled to meet their basic needs.

[47] Mr. Ritchie had his first job at 15 as a dishwasher and line cook. He then had short term factory jobs and brief periods of unemployment His longest jobs were at Kelsey's as a line cook for three years, and then a year or two at Turtle Jacks. His last job was as a Manager at Big Rig Kitchen and Brewery. When applying for other mainstream jobs, he said he was met with racism.

[48] Mr. Ritchie moved out of the home at 18 and moved in with Ms. Virgioni, with whom he lived for a number of years.

[49] Mr. Ritchie began using cannabis regularly in Jamaica before he was 11 and was using it every day. He also began using opioids a couple of times a month, starting at the age of 17. In addition, he reported using Percocet's and occasionally oxycodone. In 2021, he started using hallucinogenic mushrooms, which helped to wean him off opioids. He reported having used MDMA for the first time on the day of the offence.

[50] Mr. Ritchie was involved in a car accident in 2017, after which there was a first psychiatric assessment of him conducted.

[51] Mr. Ritchie was shot in December 2019 at which time there were 17 shots fired at his car, with bullets hitting his knee and face. He claims not to know why his car was shot. His mother reported that after this, Mr. Ritchie lived with her and became addicted to pain medication.

[52] His mother also reported that he sometimes acted strangely. On one occasion, she called the police and he was taken to Credit Valley Hospital, assessed and sent home. The IRCA Report suggests that Mr. Ritchie has experienced panic attacks, constant pain and auditory hallucinations of gunshots, which have contributed to his suicide attempts.

[53] Credit Valley Hospital reports indicate that on January 6, 2020, Mr. Ritchie's sister called 911 after seeing him take 5 tablets of morphine. He reported suffering PTSD from having been shot. He also reported being homeless and unable to work, but said that he paid for private school for his son, costing $10,000 a year. The assessor noted inconsistencies in his story and he was discharged from Emergency.

[54] His mother also described him coming to her home one day and looking "battered". Mr. Ritchie was taken to the hospital and put on a Form 1, but soon left without receiving any help.

[55] Hospital records show that on March 21, 2020, he was taken to hospital after threatening to his mother to jump off Niagara Falls. There was no evidence of distress or depression and no evidence of psychosis. Mr. Ritchie was diagnosed as having Situational Crises, anxiety disorder, a history of PTSD, Cannabis disorder and Personality disorder and was discharged.

[56] The IRCA Report author reports that in 2021, Mr. Ritchie's mental health deteriorated after his experienced the loss of his stepfather and cousin, followed by having a friend shot and killed.

[57] Today, Mr. Ritchie has a close relationship with his mother and sister, as well as with a friend. While he maintains contact with his maternal grandmother in Jamaica, he is not close to his extended family.

[58] He told the author of the IRCA Report that he is understands why he cannot be part of his son's life and that he is remorseful for the situation. He said that he had wanted his son to have both parents, noting that now he has neither.

ii) Additional Information from the IRCA Report

[59] This Report was prepared to assist in determining an appropriate sentence for Mr. Ritchie by providing helpful context relevant to him and his life. The Report was prepared by Coleen Sparks, a forensic cultural assessor, and reviewed by Dr. Camisha Sibblis, an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Criminology and Director of the Black Scholars Institute at the University of Windsor. The stated purpose of this IRCA Report is:

…to provide information pertaining to the impact of race and culture on Mr. Ritchie's life narrative. This report is submitted to support the court in delivering an appropriate, individualized sentence, while taking into consideration Mr. Ritchie's socio-cultural context as an African Canadian man of Jamaican descent. This social history offers a comprehensive analysis of the impact of anti-Black and systemic racism on his lived experiences, including those within the criminal justice system.

[60] To prepare the Report, Ms. Sparks interviewed Mr. Ritchie on two dates, and interviewed members of his family and others who know him through the Moors Science Temple of America and John Howard Society. She reviewed extensive documentation including the ASF relating to the facts of this offence, Mr. Ritchie's school records, medical records, psychiatric assessments and criminal record.

[61] The IRCA Report provides very helpful historical information about the history and experience of Black people in Canada and in Ontario. It also sets out the history of immigration from Jamaica to Canada, a path that Mr. Ritchie took as a child. The Report includes considerable relevant and interesting research information about the varied impacts of social constraints, like those experienced by Mr. Ritchie, on Black men in Canada. This is informative context for understanding Mr. Ritchie.

[62] The Report reflects on Mr. Ritchie's exposure to violence, community instability, discrimination, racism, intergenerational trauma, parental separation and abrupt relocation at a young age, all of which have impacted his life narrative.

[63] For instance, the violence Mr. Ritchie witnessed as a young child in Jamaica, his father's departure, and his abrupt move to Canada left him feeling socially isolated, abandoned, unloved and unwanted. He entered a White school system where he lacked role models and Black teachers. He moved from living with his father to being back with his mother at age 14, another difficult change. He faced financial insecurity, despite having a loving mother. He wanted to be self sufficient, but that led him to selling drugs. He felt targeted, isolated and unsupported at school, where he had no Black teachers until high school. After graduating, he struggled with maintaining employment, and continued to experience racism.

[64] Mr. Ritchie's traumatic experiences, including racism and discrimination, have contributed to him having difficulties with challenging situations and to have trouble self-regulating. He became detached from social interactions. He became distrustful and paranoid. The shooting incident no doubt impacted his feelings of safety and contributed to his growing dependence on substances. He seems to have had feelings of depression for years.

[65] Since being incarcerated, the IRCA Report suggests that Mr. Ritchie has felt marginalised, isolated and struggled with his mental health. All of these feelings were magnified by the December 2023 ICIT incident.

[66] The Report highlights that mental health support is often less accessible in Canada to people of African descent, both due to a lack of physical proximity and because there is a cultural mistrust of non-Black providers. Mr. Ritchie has had limited access to supports, particularly from Black providers.

[67] The Concluding Remarks of the IRCA Report include the following:

Several social constraints have a significant impact on him, including race, gender, culture, racism, discrimination, trauma, and loss. The contextualized presentation of his individual circumstances unfortunately placed him in environments, communities and situations which made him more susceptible to criminality. Mr. Ritchie's life trajectory towards criminal activities is multifaceted and influenced by his lack of social support, systemic barriers and discriminatory experiences that transpired over the course of his life.

Later his traumatic experiences continued while remanded into custody at Maplehurst Correctional Complex provided an additional traumatic experience for Mr. Ritchie, which triggered past ACE's and traumatic experiences, causing an impact on his mental health, especially since he was not provided his mental health medications for two days.

This IRCA, set out to identify mitigating social constraints that negatively impacted Mr. Ritchie's social narrative as an African Canadian man of Jamaican descent in Ontario. Specifically, social constraints that impacted his trajectory into crime. Mr. Ritchie is motivated to continue to educate himself, receive counselling, and work towards employment considerations for the future, and to maintain positive connections with his religion and family. These positive choices will help to improve his well-being and offer a better life path moving forward.

iii) Criminal Record

[68] Mr. Ritchie's criminal record is lengthy, with 13 prior convictions. While, as indicated already, he pleaded guilty to offences relation to Ms. Virgioni in March 2022, he also pleaded guilty to other offences that day including dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, flight while pursued by a peace officer, and dangerous operation of a conveyance. He also has prior convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking from 2014 and for failing to comply with a recognizance and possession of excess cannabis in 2019.

iv) Mental Health and Psychiatric Evidence

[69] Mr. Ritchie has had two formal psychiatric assessments.

[70] The first assessment was by Dr. Felix Yaroshevsky in August, 2018, well before this offence. His Report was prepared for the purpose of assessing Income Replacement Benefits and was to determine if Mr. Ritchie had suffered any psychiatric / psychological impairments from his November 10, 2017 motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred when he was T-boned by another vehicle that fled the scene.

[71] Dr. Yaroshevsky reported that Mr. Ritchie had experienced chronically and persistently low mood throughout his life. He believed that Mr. Ritchie met the criteria for Persistent Depressive Disorder, which was exacerbated by the accident. He also observed that Mr. Ritchie has a pervasive pattern of detachment and neither wanted nor enjoyed close relationships with others. While there was no evidence of psychosis, Dr. Yaroshevsky concluded that Mr. Ritchie was suspicious of those around him and believed that people have negative thoughts about him because his is Black. Dr. Yaroshevsky concluded that his thinking was paranoid, but that his suspicious beliefs fell short of being delusional. He diagnosed a Schizotypal Personality Disorder.

[72] Some, but not all of Mr. Ritchie's medical records while in custody have all been produced and are summarised in the section of this Judgment dealing with the Charter claims, as Mr. Ritchie submits he was deprived appropriate medical treatment while in custody, and that this led to a breach of his s. 12 rights.

[73] Following Mr. Ritchie's guilty plea on June 25, 2024, at the request of the defence, an Order was made under s. 21(1) of the Mental Health Act for Dr. Roland Jones to conduct an assessment of Mr. Ritchie. Dr. Jones was asked to prepare a report as it related to: (1) the mental condition of Mr. Ritchie including information about his psychiatric background in order to the place the criminal conduct in context and to assist with sentencing, and (2) treatment recommendations and ways to assist in preventing relapses.

[74] Dr. Jones' Report was completed in September 2024. He interviewed Mr. Ritchie on two days in July 2024, once for 2 hours and once for an hour. He had access to: the ASF respecting the offence, all of Mr. Ritchie's medical reports from Maplehurst, Mr. Ritchie's criminal record, the reasons for committal after the preliminary inquiry, and he had a telephone interview with Mr. Ritchie's mother.

[75] To Dr. Jones, Mr. Ritchie reported that at the time of the murder, he had consumed mushrooms, cannabis and, for the first time MDMA. He had slept, woken up, and believed he was possessed or in psychosis. He claimed not to recall the murder itself and said, "I remember asking the lady for food, and remember having a machete and two coyotes approaching". Mr. Ritchie told the doctor that it was either automatism or he was possessed, and that he does not know what happened and would not have done this in his right mind. He told Dr. Jones that he feels terrible about the murder and that he does not know why it happened.

[76] Dr. Jones recognized that there are several discrepancies between the history Mr. Ritchie provided and the information from collateral sources. As a result, he concluded that it is difficult to be clear about a diagnosis and says it is unclear if Mr. Ritchie has any psychotic illness. He observed that while Mr. Ritchie and his mother reported bizarre behaviour, that he talked to himself and about aliens, and that he reported hearing voices, there had been no signs of psychotic illness during previous mental health assessments, nor in the first few months after his incarceration. The reports from him did not begin in custody until the fall of 2022. In January 2023, he was assessed, diagnosed with psychosis and prescribed anti psychotic medication.

[77] Dr. Jones concluded that Mr. Ritchie does not meet the criteria for schizophrenia as his symptoms are mild and unobtrusive. He may have unspecified schizophrenia spectrum disorder or personality disorder. He observes that because Mr. Ritchie was seeking a psychiatrist assessment related to the criminal proceedings, his symptom reporting may be unreliable, exaggerated or fabricated and that feigning or simulation of symptoms cannot be excluded.

[78] Dr. Jones concluded that Mr. Ritchie has a Cannabis Use Disorder and Opioid Use Disorder and Hallucinogen Use Disorder, all in remission because he is in custody. He has features of schizotypal and antisocial personality disorders. He has a significant history of aggression, which he denies or minimizes. He conveyed to Dr. Jones no sense of remorse for this offence and was mostly concerned about its impact on him and his family. The symptoms he experiences of heightened paranoia, increased social isolation, hostility, defensiveness, increased anxiety and cognitive distortions could reasonably be explained by his personality disorder. He substance use could have induced psychotic symptoms, though he reported symptoms in custody after not taking the substances, making induced psychosis unlikely.

[79] In his submissions on behalf of Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Pieters suggests that Dr. Jones' Report should be viewed with skepticism as it "throws ice on Mr. Ritchie's mental health issues". The suggestion made was that while the assessment Order was made at the request of the defence, a proper assessment was not done and that there were reasons to challenge and question it. It was argued that the assessment of Mr. Ritchie was not as thorough as it should have been and that it could be seen as biased or dismissive. Mr. Pieters reminds me that in the IRCA Report, there is a suggestion that Black people's mental health concerns can be too easily dismissed.

[80] With respect, I find the defence suggestions quite unfair. Dr. Jones was not requested to provide a comprehensive forensic psychiatric report. Had the defence thought such a report was necessary for this sentencing, it could have sought one privately or asked that one be ordered. This was not done. Dr. Jones did what he was asked to do.

[81] I also observe that Mr. Pieters did not seek to have Dr. Jones called as a witness so that he could question him about anything that he was concerned about, including any suggestion that he was too dismissive of Mr. Ritchie's mental health concerns or affected by anti-Black racism. I recognize that Dr. Jones identified the need to be alive to the possibility that Mr. Ritchie was malingering. I do not think this was unreasonable or surprising, given the circumstances. I see no basis upon which to find Dr. Jones' Report unfair or biased. It provides helpful information respecting Mr. Ritchie's current mental health status, which I accept.

v) Letters of Support

[82] A number of letters of support for Mr. Ritchie were filed.

[83] Mr. Ritchie's mother wrote in support of her son. She says that despite having significant challenges and hardships, he remains a caring individual who loves his family and friends. She describes him having grown up in a close knit community in Jamaica. She says that witnessing traumatic events as a child including violence inflicted on his grandmother, and his uncle being shot and killed, impacted him. His move to Canada also brought challenges, including cultural adjustment, struggles for employment and being targeted by racism. She says he was bullied and unsupported in school and that he was charged when acting in self defence against bullies. After graduating, she says he worked, but had prolonged pain that led to his reliance on narcotics. The shooting he experienced in December 2019 left him with further physical and emotional scars. While he enrolled in a paralegal training program, he was devastated by the loss of her partner and his cousin. She says he has suffered from depression since. His mother asserts that he is a good person who loves and respects those around him but struggles to express his need for help.

[84] Mr. Ritchie's sister describes him as a kind and responsible person who is dedicated to his family and those in need. She describes him as ambitious and hardworking, pointing out to him having wanted to become a paralegal and beginning a program at Humber College. She also describes him as having been a good father to his son. She says that the December 2019 shooting changed her brother. He became paranoid and had mental health issues, often trying to kill himself by overdosing. She said he would hear voices but did not want to seek help for fear of being labeled "crazy". She worried as he turned to substance abuse. She recalls his devastation at losing his step-father and then his cousin in 2020. She thought when he was released from jail in 2022, that things were better.

[85] Since his incarceration, his sister believes she had seen a desire in him to learn, grow and make amends.

[86] Mr. Ritchie's cousin also wrote a letter of support. She describes him as a generous, educated and family oriented person. She says that after he was shot, he was changed. She saw that he had mental health challenges and that he became angry easily. Even though he was in and out of jail, she said that he was a loving father to his son. She hopes that with help, he will be able to combat his "mental crises".

[87] Natasha DeRouche, a Violence Disruption Worker at Think 2wice International also provided a letter of support. This organization offers culturally sensitive trauma informed services and support to communities affected by incarceration and gun violence. She has known Mr. Ritchie for 5 years and says that the murder conviction does not align with the person she knows. She says Mr. Ritchie is a person of integrity, respect, resilience, ambition and compassion. He has experienced the effects of gun violence and it has caused him to suffer with PTSD and affect his mental health. She feels he has expressed genuine remorse for his actions and that he is committed to addressing his challenges through counselling.

[88] Kudjo Adwe Ei, Divine Master of the Moorish Science Temple of America writes that Mr. Ritchie contacted the Moorish Family Services Department, which focuses on conflict resolution, youth mentoring, relationship advocacy and overcoming substance abuse. He has been involved in supporting Mr. Ritchie while in custody by sending him spiritual literature and speaking with him. He feels that Mr. Ritchie takes full responsibility for his actions.

vi) Mr. Ritchie's Letter of Apology

[89] At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Ritchie read a letter of apology. In it, he recognized that he has failed his son, his family and his community and says that he feels reprehensible. He says that he deeply regrets what he did and that he will forever be sorry. He goes on to say that he was not in the right state of mind at the time of the murder because of substances and his delusions, but nevertheless that he takes full responsibility.

Analysis

[90] In this analysis, I have explained my reasons for the period of parole ineligibility that I have decided is appropriate for this offence and this offender, bearing in mind the overarching legal principles respecting parole ineligibility, the appropriate range of sentence, the Charter arguments advanced by Mr. Ritchie and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

a. Legal Principles respecting parole ineligibility

[91] In assessing the statutory considerations set out in s. 745.4 and determining whether parole ineligibility should be increased from the minimum of 10 years, all of the objectives of sentencing are relevant: R. v. McKnight, [1999] O.J. No. 1321 (C.A.), at para. 9. This requires consideration of the purpose of sentencing set out in s. 718 and of the fundamental principle of proportionality set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. Consideration must also be given to the other sentencing principles set out in s. 718.2 of the Code: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 30; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6.

[92] Determining an appropriate period of parole ineligibility is a fact sensitive process: R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 18. The primary purpose of setting parole ineligibility is to give effect to the principles of denunciation of the conduct and harm to the community, and deterrence. Rehabilitation, while not excluded from consideration, plays a less significant role than in other sentencing situations: McKnight, at para. 39.

b. Parole ineligibility periods

[93] Both counsel have provided me with cases in which courts have fixed the period of parole ineligibility for those convicted of second degree murder. While none of these cases is factually identical, they provide some assistance in identifying the appropriate range for this case.

[94] The Crown says that the correct range is 18-20 years of parole ineligibility, taking into account the aggravating and mitigating factors here. The defence submits that the range is 12 to 13 years.

[95] While I reviewed all of the authorities, I find the following to be of the most assistance:

• R. v. Owusu-Ansah, [2015] O.J. No. 7260; aff'd 2024 ONCA 192: The accused ambushed the victim on her way to work while she was hiding from him at a shelter and he was under a court condition not to contact her. He inflicted 25 knife wounds on her and, when she fell, retrieved a gas can and torched her, oblivious to whether she was alive or dead. He was a highly possessive person who endangered women, as shown by his criminal record. While the jury acquitted of first degree murder, the offence involved some significant planning. Parole ineligibility was set at 22 years, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

• R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 NCCS 155: The accused pled guilty to second degree murder of a woman with whom he was in an intimate relationship. Their relationship was filled with bouts of jealousy, pleas for forgiveness and promises of reform. In the week before the murder, he threatened to kill her. This was a savage and brutal killing in which the accused stabbed the victim multiple times in her residence. There were elements of planning. He had a lengthy record for offences of violence and was in violation of a conditional sentence order at the time of the killing. The court was satisfied that the accused had an established pattern of violence from which it could reasonably be inferred that he presented a high risk of re-offending in a violent manner. Parole ineligibility was set at 21 years.

• R. v. Schwalm, 2025 ONSC 864: The accused pleaded guilty to the second degree murder of his wife, the mother of his two young children. He strangled her in the family home, put her body into her car, dressed her in hiking clothes and drove to near their ski club. He staged a road collision and then, after dousing the interior of the car and his wife's body with gasoline, set it on fire. He had a financial motive in the anticipated insurance payout, devised a plan to cover up the murder and callously lied to their children about where their mother was. While this was a brutal murder of an unarmed victim in the family home, the offender had no record, had shown remorse by pleading guilty and accepting responsibility and had a previously pro-social life. He was sentenced to 20 years of parole ineligibility.

• R. v. Mahmoud, Feb 18, 2022, OSCJ unreported: The accused went unannounced the apartment where his former partner and their young boys were living. He had a knife. They argued and he stabbed her to death and decapitated her. Counsel jointly recommended parole ineligibility be set at 18 years. The accused had mental health issues including psychotic depression and anxiety. Of significance were the mitigating factors of a guilty plea during the pandemic when courts were backlogged and the fact that the accused was a first offender.

[96] The defence relies on cases in which the parole ineligibility was much lower. I find them to be quite different, factually from this case. They include:

• R. v. Morales, 2023 ONSC 1607: A 15 year period of parole ineligibility was imposed on an offender who strangled and killed his intimate partner in their home while their children were in the apartment, though unaware of what he had done. He hid it from them, taking them to a relative's home and then absconded to Mexico where he lived for 14 years before being arrested. While he had no prior convictions, there was a history of violence in the relationship. He spent 7 months incarcerated in Mexico and then a further 2 ½ years under onerous conditions in Maplehurst. He apologized and expressed remorse.

• R. v. Thompson, 2023 ONSC 6934: The accused pled guilty to second degree murder. He and the victim had been in a 4 month relationship. At his home one evening, he became upset with things he found on her phone and about her attitude to him. He began to slap her and then, in a fit of jealous rage, stabbed her repeatedly in the face and neck until she stopped moving. He inflicted 21 stab wounds and non-fatal blunt injuries. The offender had a significant record, though his record for violence was limited and very dated. He had a history of abusing substances, which explained his criminal record. The trial judge found that if he addressed his substance abuse issues, he had a real prospect of rehabilitation and would be capable of a healthy, positive long term intimate partnership. Parole ineligibility was set at 14 years.

• R. v. Randhawa, 2024 ONSC 1326: The 66-year-old accused stabbed and killed his wife of many years while they were on their evening walk. He pled guilty, expressed remorse, had no criminal record and spent time under particularly onerous conditions of pre-sentence custody. There was no suggestion that this was planned. Parole ineligibility was set at 13 years.

c. The Charter claims

[97] As I have indicated, Mr. Ritchie makes numerous claims of Charter violations. The most serious arguments made relate to the December 2023 ICIT deployment. But there are other claims made in relation to what is said to be the failure of Maplehurst to meet his mental and physical health needs, his dental care needs and his nutritional requirements.

[98] I begin by reviewing the legal principles that inform the Charter analysis.

i) Legal Principles

(a) Section 8

[99] Section 8 of the Charter protects from unreasonable search and seizure. Mr. Ritchie says that during the ICIT incident, compelling him to strip naked and then removing him from his cell in his boxer shorts, parading him to the hall, forcing him to sit there while his cell was searched and then returning him to his cell without clothes violated his s. 8 rights. Further, it is alleged that his s. 8 rights were violated by the seizure from his cell of various items that were never returned to him.

[100] Section 8 protects against unreasonable search and seizure. The starting point is that a claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This analysis is sensitive to the factual context: R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, at paras. 16-18. Canadian law recognizes that individuals have different expectations of privacy in different places. As a result, the cases distinguish between personal privacy, territorial privacy and informational privacy. So, for example, privacy of the person, which protects bodily integrity, has the strongest claim for constitutional protection. Similarly, individuals have a high expectation of territorial privacy in locations where their most intimate and private actions are most likely to take place, such as their homes. Their reasonable expectation of territorial privacy is reduced when the location is one where less intimate activities take place, such as in commercial spaces or private cars. At the bottom end of the spectrum is the territorial privacy that can be reasonably expected by inmates in prisons: R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, at para. 22.

[101] Those who are incarcerated have a substantially reduced level or privacy. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that: "Imprisonment necessarily entails surveillance, searching and scrutiny. A prison cell is expected to be exposed and to require observation": Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 at para. 5. This does not mean, however, that inmates lose any reasonable expectation of privacy simply because they are incarcerated. The reasonableness of their expectation of privacy depends on the privacy interests at issue.

[102] Provincial legislation, the Ministry of Correctional Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.22, authorizes searches of provincial institutions in s. 23.1:

Searches

23.1 (1) The superintendent of a correctional institution may authorize a search, to be carried out in the prescribed manner, of,

(a) the correctional institution or any part of the correctional institution;

(b) the person of any inmate or other person on the premises of the correctional institution;

(c) the property of any inmate or other person on the premises of the correctional institution

[103] Regulations under that Act, R.R.O.1990 Reg. 778 set out the manner in which searches are to be conducted. Under s. 22.3, "Searches of inmates and other persons and of their property that are authorized under this Regulation must be conducted in a respectful manner and must take into account any applicable accommodation needs under the Human Rights Code."

[104] In the two CSOI Investigation Reports, there are references to numerous policies that regulate how searches must be done, including when ICIT may be deployed.

[105] The Searching for Weapons policy states that, "Given that regular, routine searches are deemed Level 1, the following search levels will define the requirements for searching outside of routine practices:

Level 4: Search of a contained areas or the institution with cell extractions by ICIT, use of handheld metal detectors and searches by designated correctional officer search teams.

Level 5: Search of the institution with cell extractions by multiple ICIT teams, use of handheld metal detectors and searches by correctional officer search teams.

[106] Discussion of the constitutionality of the strip searches at issue here must begin by defining what is meant by a "strip search". In R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, at para. 47, the majority adopted the following definition:

…the removal or rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a person so as to permit a visual inspection of a person's private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), or undergarments.

[107] Significantly, this is not the definition in the relevant Regulation 778. The Regulations adopt a broader definition that does not require the removal of clothing so as to permit the visual inspection of a person's private areas. Rather:

"strip search" means an inspection that is not conducted as part of a medical examination or treatment,

(a) of the body after all clothing on the top or bottom half of the body, or on the entire body, has been removed and of any clothing or other personal possessions that the person was required to remove; or

(b) of the body after all clothing on the top or bottom half of the body, or on the entire body, that is ordinarily worn over underwear has been removed and of any clothing or other personal possessions that the person was required to remove;

[108] No strip searches of inmates are authorized except in accordance with Regulation 778, s. 24. This requires there to be reasonable grounds to believe that (a) the inmate is carrying contraband that can be hidden on or within the body, (b) that it is needed to confirm the existence of contraband or recover it and (c) using a less intrusive search method would not be effective at locating contraband or is not operationally feasible.

(b) Sections 7 and 12

[109] The state misconduct said to ground Mr. Ritchie's claims of ss. 7 and 12 violations resulting from the ICIT incident are for the most part the same and very similar to the s. 8 claims. To be clear, these claims include the following:

• The psychological effect that the deployment of flash-bang in his unit had on him due to his PTSD from being shot;
• Being strip searched in his cell;
• Parading him from his cell, through the institution to the hall in his boxer shorts, which he found to be humiliating;
• Zip-tying his wrists and forcing him to march through the institution with his arms over the shoulders of the ICIT members in a manner that was uncomfortable;
• Compelling him to sit cross-legged on the floor for just over an hour while staff patrolled behind them with tactical gear. This caused his legs to become swollen and numb;
• Witnessing the ICIT officers in tactical gear with shields, batons and stun guns intended to control and intimidate inmates;
• Returning him to his cell in the same manner and then not providing him with any clothes beyond his boxer shorts for 37 hours;
• Not providing him with all of his medications on December 22 and 23, 2023;
• Being under lockdown from 3:40 p.m. on December 20 to December 24, 2023 at 10 a.m.;
• Living with a temperature reduction on the unit between December 21 and 24, 2023, including when inmates did not have clothes or blankets, conduct that Mr. Ritchie and others perceived as punitive.
• Being denied access to counsel on December 23, 2025 when his lawyer attended at the jail and was turned away.

[110] Section 7 of the Charter provides that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

[111] Section 7 claims proceed in two steps. First, the claimant must establish on a balance of probabilities that there has been a deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person. At the second stage, the claimant must show that this deprivation was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice: R. v. Kloubakov, 2025 SCC 25, at paras. 136-137; R. v. J.J., 2022 SCC 28, at para. 116.

[112] State interference with bodily integrity and serious state imposed psychological stress constitute a breach of an individual's security of the person when the state has interfered with a person's ability to control their physical or psychological integrity. However, not all interference with psychological integrity violates s. 7. An applicant must show that there has been "serious state imposed psychological stress". This means: (1) that the harms must result from the actions of the state and (2) that the psychological prejudice must be serious and profound: Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, at paras. 55-57, 81-83; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at paras. 59-60.

[113] The effects of state interference are assessed objectively. It is their impact on the psychological integrity of a person of "reasonable sensibility", not of exceptional stability or peculiar vulnerability. It need not rise to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but must be greater than ordinary stress or anxiety: G.(J.), at para. 60; R. v. Donnolly, 2016 ONCA 988, at para 109.

[114] Applicants face a high bar to show that state misconduct while in custody rose to the level of a s. 7 breach. As Watt J.A. observed in Donnolly, at paras. 108 and 120-121:

[108] The descriptive "serious state-imposed psychological stress" fixes two requirements that must be met before the security of the person interest protected by s. 7 becomes engaged. First, the psychological harm must be state imposed, that is to say, the harm must result from actions of the state. And second, the psychological harm or prejudice must be serious. It follows that not every form of psychological prejudice or harm will constitute a violation of s. 7: Blencoe, at para. 56-57. In other words, there is something qualitative about the type of state interference that ascends to the level of a s. 7 infringement: G. (J.), at para. 59; Blencoe, at paras. 56-57. Nervous shock or psychiatric illness are not necessarily required, but something greater than "ordinary stress or anxiety" is: G. (J.), at paras. 59-60.

[120] As we have previously seen, it is not every state interference with an individual's psychological integrity that engages s. 7. Where, as here, the psychological integrity of a person is at issue, security of the person is restricted to "serious state-imposed psychological stress". The state conduct must have a serious and profound effect on a person's psychological integrity. These effects are to be assessed objectively, with a view to their impact on the psychological integrity of a person of reasonable sensibility.

[121] The trial judge's finding of infringement eschews any objective assessment in favour of a consideration of the effects on this respondent, a person with enhanced susceptibility to anxiety and stress as a result of OCD.

[115] Section 12 protects individuals from being "subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment". As explained in R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, at para. 32, the underlying purpose of s. 12 is:

…"to prevent the state from inflicting physical or mental pain and suffering through degrading and dehumanizing treatment or punishment. It is meant to protect human dignity and respect the inherent worth of individuals" (Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147‑0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32, at para. 51). Dignity evokes the idea that every person has intrinsic worth and is therefore entitled to respect, irrespective of their actions (Bissonnette, at para. 59).

[116] While this case is about treatment of an inmate, not about punishment, the test to establish a s. 12 violation is the same. A claimant must show that treatment was both cruel and unusual: Ogiamien v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 ONCA 667, at para. 7.

[117] The threshold to establish a s. 12 breach is high. The impugned treatment must be not merely disproportionate or excessive, but "must be so excessive as to outrage standards of decency and abhorrent or intolerable to society": R. v. Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58, at para. 45; R. v. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13, at para. 24.

(c) Section 9

[118] Mr. Ritchie makes a s. 9 Charter claim in relation to the ICIT intervention on the basis that the restrictive confinement that he and 191 other inmates faced was unlawful and arbitrary.

[119] Section 9 provides that "everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned". Lawful detentions are not arbitrary within the meaning of s. 9 unless the law authorizing it is itself arbitrary: R. v. Grant, 2003 SCC 32, at para. 54.

(d) Section 15

[120] Mr. Ritchie is a Black African Canadian from Jamaica who has mental disabilities. He says in his affidavit that be believes that the non-compliance by Maplehurst staff and management with the applicable legislation, Regulations and policies was as a result of systematic and institutional racism. He points out that the ICIT deployment was made as a result of a Black inmate's altercation with a White staff member and submit that the effect of it was to amplify the disadvantages already faced by those who like him who are marginalized and vulnerable because of anti Black racism and mental disability.

[121] The Section 15 of the Charter states:

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

[122] The section reflects "a profound commitment to promote equality and prevent discrimination against disadvantaged groups": Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5, at para. 332. To establish a violation, a claimant must demonstrate that the impugned law or state action does two things:

• On its face or in its impact, creates a distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds; and
• Imposes a burden or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating disadvantage.

R. v. Sharma, 2022 SCC 39, at para. 29; R. v. Fraser, 2020 SCC 28, at para. 27.

[123] There is no doubt that s. 15 protects from adverse impact discrimination and that facially neutral treatment can breach s. 15 because of its disproportionate effect on protected groups.

[124] The first stage of s. 15 will be met if an applicant can show that a state action indirectly targeted protected groups for differential treatment by its impact on members of that group. This can be shown, for instance, if a policy means that protected groups are denied benefits or forced to take on burdens more frequently than others. Ideally, claims of adverse effects discrimination should be supported by evidence about the circumstances of the claimant groups and about the results caused by the particular policy at issue, though both types of evidence are not necessarily required. Importantly, s.15 does not require that the state action created the systemic disadvantages. Nor does it required that claimants show that all members of a protected group were affected the same way: Sharma, at paras. 51-76.

[125] At the second stage, the question is whether the policy or state action had the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating disadvantage. Here the goal is to examine the impact of the harm to the group, be it economic, social, psychological or physical harm: Sharma, at paras. 76-81.

ii) The ICIT Incident and Alleged Charter breaches flowing from it

[126] Much of the evidence relating to the December 2023 ICIT deployment is undisputed. The Agreed Statement of Facts filed as Exhibit 9 helpfully sets out areas of agreement as to what happened respecting the ICIT deployment.

[127] Additional evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing included affidavits from a number of Maplehurst staff, including former Maplehurst Superintendent Wong, about the ICIT deployment (marked as Exhibit 12) None of these witnesses testified.

[128] Also filed were Institutional Policies of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services as well as the two CSOI Investigation Reports, dated October 31, 2024 and April 23, 2025.

[129] In addition, there was an Inmate Statement made by Mr. Ritchie on December 31, 2023, an affidavit sworn by him on November 11, 2024 and his testimony on the sentencing hearing.

[130] The Ministry of the Solicitor General's Institutional Crises and Intervention Team (ICIT) is comprised of officers with training and techniques to control rebellious, non-compliant, aggressive, violent or potentially violent inmates in a disciplined and professional manner. Its purpose is peaceful resolution of an institutional crises through a disciplined use of force. It may also be authorized as a preventative measure for risk mitigation.

[131] Interventions by the Ministry are to be at a level that is necessary, consistent with the nature and immediacy of the threat posed. A threat level assessment must be conducted to avoid unnecessarily subjecting inmates to strip or other searches.

[132] In terms of background, on December 20, 2023, Correctional Officer ("CO") Lecinski was assaulted by inmate Richard Wuol on Unit 8C. The officer suffered significant injuries and was taken to hospital. An emergency Code Blue, indicating officer assistance was required, was called and correctional staff responded. Inmates were directed to their cells.

[133] The Staff Sergeant deemed the inmates' behaviour as "rebellious and out of control" and requested all staff respond to Unit 8. Within 20 minutes, all Unit 8 members were secured in their cells.

[134] Lockdown of Unit 8 began at about 3:40 p.m. on December 20, 2023 and continued until December 24, 2023 at about 10:00 a.m.

[135] Mr. Ritchie was housed in Unit 8B. He was not on the Unit where this incident took place, and had nothing to do with it. He learned about it when the Code Blue was called. Inmates were talking about it.

[136] The following day, on December 21, 2023, Maplehurst Superintendent Wong approved the deployment of ICIT to strip search inmates in all wings of Unit 8 (8A-8F) to search for weapons. The justification was what staff perceived as "rebellious and out of control inmates" after the assault on the officer. This "level 4 search" is a search of a contained area with cell extractions, use of handheld metal detectors and searches. In the cell search that took place, no metal detectors were used and no weapons were located.

[137] According to the April 23, 2025 CSOI Report, on December 22 and 23, 2023 the ICIT entered all five wings of Unit 8. They wore tactical gear. Some had pepper spray launchers. Strip searches were conducted with officers looking through the hatch, and directing inmates through the strip search process. They had inmates put their hands through the hatches and "flex cuffs" or "zip ties" were applied to their wrists. They were extracted from their cells wearing only their boxer shorts. They were escorted to a hall in the Unit 8 rotunda. They were seated facing a wall while their cells were searched. They were then returned to their cells.

[138] The evidence as to what happened to Mr. Ritchie during the ICIT incident was described by him and shown through a series of videos which were entered as exhibits.

[139] Prior to entering Unit 8B, the ICIT members deployed a "flashbang" into the Unit at 12:04:15. Mr. Ritchie was on the upper level of cells. Mr. Ritchie testified that as a result of the flashbang, he had a flashback to the time when he had been shot and that this added to his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and anxiety.

[140] The ICIT entered Unit 8B at about 12:04:49 p.m. Two officers went outside his door and instructed the inmates to strip naked. Mr. Ritchie described having been told to remove his boxer shorts, and then to turn around, squat and bend over and spread his buttocks. He was given no explanation for why he was asked to do this. He did not ask as he said he was fearful because of the way that they came in and their "aggression" towards inmates. At the time, he did not understand the reason for the ICIT deployment. He was not touched by anyone during this. He did as he was told and was then told to put his boxers on.

[141] Mr. Ritchie agreed that he had not mentioned anything about being told to strip naked in his Inmate Statement and that in fact, what he reported was "after they asked us to strip down to our boxers and zip tied our wrists…", with no mention of ever being naked. Despite this, the Crown does not contest Mr. Ritchie's claim that when the ICIT members came to his cell, before they zip tied his wrists, he was told to strip naked, squat, turn around and to spread his buttocks.

[142] After putting his boxer shorts back on, Mr. Ritchie's wrists were zip tied, his cell door was opened and he was removed at about 12:09 p.m.

[143] The video depicts Mr. Ritchie with his wrists zip tied and his arms up on the correctional officers. He described the officers as twisting his wrist and thumb to control where he went. He was paraded through the nursing station at 12:11 p.m. and his photograph was taken (as shown in Exhibit 13). He was asked if he was ok and said he did not respond.

[144] Mr. Ritchie was then taken, at 12:11:42 p.m. into a hall where other inmates were. He was required to sit on the floor, cross-legged looking at the floor, with his hands on his pelvic area.

[145] The video depicts Mr. Ritchie sitting on the floor shortly after 12:12 p.m. There are other inmates sitting in the same manner. Some of the correctional officers are holding devices with bright lights on them which the Crown described as flashlights with laser lights. Mr. Ritchie said that the inmates were not able to move in the hall unless permitted. He was unable to stretch out his legs.

[146] In his affidavit, Mr. Ritchie said that he was punched and handled roughly by the ICIT officers. He made no mention of any of this in his examination in chief. Initially, under cross-examination, Mr. Ritchie agreed that what was done physically to him in the ICIT extraction was that his wrists and arms were twisted up and over the shoulders of the officers, that his thumbs were used to control him and that he had to sit on the hall floor. He was then asked about an allegation in his affidavit, which he had not mentioned during his examination in chief, that he had also been punched and handled roughly. He said that he had been and that one of the ICIT members "kinda gave me a jab to the rib". He claimed to have forgotten about it. He agreed that he had not mentioned it in his Inmate Statement made shortly after this incident and said that he had forgotten to mention it there as well.

[147] I cannot conclude from the evidence as a whole that there was a punch. Mr. Ritchie inexplicably failed to mention it in his Inmate Statement or examination in chief. He confirmed under cross-examination that he had testified about everything that occurred to him. There is no evidence supporting his claim in any video I was shown. His evidence about the punch is too unreliable to accept.

[148] It is agreed that Mr. Ritchie was returned to his cell at about 1:19 p.m. He described having been grabbed by the arms and told to get off the floor and then moved in the same position with his hands twisted over the officer's shoulders while he was commanded on how to move.

[149] He described himself as feeling nervous. He said that the fear that the officers instilled in him and other inmates was strong and that he "felt like an animal". As a result of the gunshot wounds he had previously suffered, he said his legs were numb and also said that that his buttocks and wrists were in pain.

[150] Mr. Ritchie agreed that he had been asked by a nurse after the cell extraction if he was ok or if he had any pain or injuries. He said nothing because he was fearful about his wrists being bent and his hands twisted. He said he had seen other inmates say yes, and that they received worse treatment and were more twisted.

[151] An Accident/Injury Report was completed that day. It indicates that Mr. Ritchie was assessed post extraction and that there were no injuries reported or noted. He was asked about this under cross-examination and said that he had seen another inmate screaming and that he thought it related to what he had told the nurse.

[152] Mr. Ritchie said in his affidavit that he did not receive his medication on December 20 or 21, 2023. The absence of his required medications meant that his pain felt worse and that his PTSD flared up.

[153] Under cross-examination, his evidence was clarified. His medical records show that an entry on December 22, 2023: "Due to operational safety concerns from a Search on Unit 8, an order has been obtained by MD to hold all nonessential meds on Dec. 22 and Dec. 23, 2023." Mr. Ritchie corrected his evidence and agreed that he got all of his medications on December 20 and 21 but did not get all of them on December 22 and 23, as he only received those that he normally takes in the evening of the 23rd.

[154] The Medical Administration Record reveals:

• He did not get vitamin D on the 22nd or 23rd;
• He did not receive his iron supplement, Feramax on the 22nd or 23rd as it was a medication he took only in the morning;
• He did not get either morning or evening dose of his Buspiron, a medication for anxiety on the 22nd. On the 23rd, he did not get his morning dose, but did get his evening dose;
• He did not get his melatonin, a sleep aid, on the evening of the 22nd but got his evening does on the 23rd. He takes one dose a day, in the evening;
• He did not get is Remeron, a medication for depression and sleep, on the 22nd. He did get it on the 23rd. He takes one dose a day, in the evening;
• He did not get either dose of his Naprosyn, an anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxant, on the 22nd. On the 23rd, he did not get his morning dose but did get his evening dose;
• He did not receive his Abilify, a medication for the voices and gunshots that he hears in his head, which he takes once a day in the morning, on either the 22nd or the 23rd.

[155] Mr. Ritchie was provided with linens at about 3:30 p.m. on December 22, 2023. Mr. Ritchie described how after being returned to his cell, he had only boxer shorts to wear for close to 2 days. He then agreed with the Ministry records that it had been about 37 hours. He had a sheet and his underwear, but no blanket or shoes or socks.

[156] Mr. Ritchie's evidence is that there were fluctuations in temperature from December 20 and that things became increasingly "perilous" on the 22nd. It is agreed by counsel that Mr. Ritchie and other inmates complained about being cold during the ICIT deployment and that they viewed it as punitive.

[157] Exhibit 8 confirms that the temperature dropped by 2 degrees Celsius between December 21 and 24. Over December 22 and 23, the temperatures on A and B Wing were between 19 and 20 degrees. The CSOI investigation could not substantiate that this was punitive. But, the fact that inmates did not have clothes may have contributed to their claim it felt punitive. The air flow was intended to clear the unit of the toxicity from the flashbang.

[158] Mr. Ritchie described the impact of the ICIT incident on him. He said that it was depressing and that he felt targeted and racially profiled because he was Black. He felt belittled, stressed, traumatized and in pain.

[159] In his evidence, Mr. Ritchie said that after the ICIT incident, he lost from his cell numerous things that he had kept there including: his notes of disclosure, documents for his preliminary inquiry and trial, poems he had written and his chess board. He said that he had made a request for his personal belongings back, called the Office if the Ombudsman and documented the situation. He never got his items back.

[160] In his affidavit, Mr. Ritchie also says he was denied a professional visit with counsel on December 23, 2023. He understands that despite the fact that an internal Maplehurst memorandum dated December 22, 2023 said that professional visits were to continue, he was denied a visit as his lawyer was turned away.

[161] Finally, Mr. Ritchie states in his affidavit that he believes that the marked non-compliance with the applicable legislation, regulations, correctional policies and procedures at Maplehurst was as a result of systemic and institutional racism. He notes that it was after a Black inmate had a confrontation with a White staff member that everyone experienced the violence, intimidation and humiliation that followed the ICIT deployment. He says that he experienced the impact of anti-Black racism because of the intersecting factors of his race, colour, place of origin, religious identity and creed.

[162] The first CSOI Report concluded that Maplehurst authorities had not completed the requisite threat level assessment and that the ICIT deployment was "unnecessary, excessive, and unproportionate [sic] to the threat posed by Unit 8 [inmates]." The second CSOI Report found, among other things, that there had been excessive force used on one inmate (not Mr. Ritchie), and that those officers and five others had engaged in a "code of silence" about it, and some were found to have been untruthful to the CSOI about it. Other deficiencies in the planning and execution of the ICIT deployment were also found. The details of these two reports need not be summarized in this decision.

[163] The Crown accepts all findings made by CSOI.

[164] There is no question that what happened in the period of December 21-24, 2023 at Maplehurst is very concerning. Superintendent Wong's deployment of ICIT to Unit 8 in response to the assault on a correctional officer by inmate Mr. Wuol was excessive and disproportionate to meet any threat of weapons that existed. Those employed to manage jails are entrusted and expected to do so in accordance with the legislation and policies that are designed to protect the safety, security and human rights of both inmates and staff. Undeniably, Maplehurst management and staff failed to comply with the legislation and policies under which they operated, and with standards of respect and decency that are expected and required. While the CSOI Reports do not find that what occurred was punitive, it is difficult to conclude otherwise.

[165] The decision to deploy ICIT set into motion systematic violations of the rights of those inmates housed in Unit 8, men who were presumed innocent of the charges they faced and were any awaiting their trials. They were treated in a manner that is antithetical to Canadian values and the expectations of the criminal justice system.

[166] The role of the court in this sentencing is not to right the wrongs of what occurred in Maplehurst in December 2023. It is to assess the impact of what was done on Mr. Ritchie and to determine what remedy he should receive for any breaches of his Charter rights.

[167] In my view, the ICIT incident violated a number of Mr. Ritchie's Charter rights.

[168] I begin with s. 8. Analysis of the multiple s. 8 claims here turns on Mr. Ritchie's expectation of privacy.

[169] Mr. Ritchie's privacy interest in the property in his cell is both territorial and informational. His unchallenged evidence was that he had personal items including shoes, insoles, notes he had made about disclosure, documents for his preliminary inquiry and trial and poems he had written all taken when his cell was searched. These items were never returned to him. The Crown has not called any evidence to the contrary or challenged Mr. Ritchie's evidence.

[170] In view of the very reduced expectation of privacy in a custodial facility, I cannot conclude that Mr. Ritchie had an expectation of privacy in his cell generally. The Regulations confer a broad power to search inmates' cells and property. Mr. Ritchie had no reasonable expectation that his cell would not be opened and the items contained within it would not be inspected: R. v. Johnston, 2014 ONSC 5789, at paras. 46-47; Weatherall. However, he was entitled to be searched only in a manner that was authorized by law and was reasonable, and was entitled to expect that his items would not be unreasonably seized.

[171] While the search of Mr. Ritchie's cell was authorized by law, and it was reasonable for the items located to be examined, no explanation has been provided as to why the items he has identified were never returned to him. In my view, the seizure and retention of these items has not been justified by the Crown. I conclude that the seizure and retention of the items seized from his cell was unreasonable and violated Mr. Ritchie's s. 8 rights.

[172] The Crown concedes that at a more general level, the manner in which the search of Mr. Ritchie's cell was conducted, with the deployment of ICIT for all inmates in unit 8, was unreasonable.

[173] I begin with the concerns that arise from the ICIT search of Mr. Ritchie personally, including the strip search.

[174] There is no evidence that there were reasonable grounds for any strip search of Mr. Ritchie at all. Requiring him to strip naked in front of his cell mate, to turn to the ICIT member and to spread his buttocks was a particularly invasive strip search. This is the sort of intrusive strip search that the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized can be humiliating, degrading and traumatic: Golden, at para. 83. I find that this unjustified naked strip search violated Mr. Ritchie's s. 8 right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

[175] I am also satisfied that the manner in which this strip search was conducted violated Mr. Ritchie's s. 7 rights. It was unauthorised, unreasonable, and unjustified in these circumstances. It was degrading and humiliating.

[176] Little turns on the fact that this strip search breached Mr. Ritchie's s. 7 rights as well as his rights as protected under s. 8: R. v. S.C. 2025 ONSC 1887 at paras. 148-150. I echo, however, the comments of Campbell J. at para. 151 in S. C that: "the extent of the departure from constitutional standards is illustrated by the fact that non-compliance with the Charter can be so convincingly demonstrated under more than one section."

[177] The parties do not agree on how to analyse what occurred after Mr. Ritchie's removal from his cell.

[178] The Crown casts it as all part of the unreasonable deployment of ICIT to search Mr. Ritchie's cell, and so confines its concession to one of a s. 8 breach. In other words, the Crown submits that all of the various claims made by Mr. Ritchie, as set out at paragraph 109, are part of that unreasonable search and nothing more.

[179] I accept the Crown concession that the manner in which the search of the cells was carried out was unreasonable and in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

[180] However, because Mr. Ritchie goes further and suggests that what occurred after ICIT was deployed also led to breaches of his ss. 7, 9, 12 Charter rights, I will consider those arguments next.

[181] In assessing the other Charter claims, I have considered the totality of Mr. Ritchie's treatment during and immediately after the ICIT deployment. Included in this I consider: the use of the flash bang, the removal of Mr. Ritchie from his cell in his boxer shorts, with his hands zip tied, taking him to the hall using excessive force by the ICIT members, compelling him to set cross legged on the floor for just over an hour while the staff patrolled behind him, and returning him to his cell where he was not given any clothes for 37 hours, during which time the temperature on the unit was lowered.

[182] Having done so, I have concluded that Mr. Ritchie's s. 12 claim must succeed. In my view, his mistreatment during the ICIT incident rises from beyond just being difficult, to being disproportionate and excessive.

[183] The Crown points to cases in which courts have found that harsh conditions of incarceration do not necessarily rise to the level of being s. 12 violations. I accept this. But this is not a case of there having been lengthy lockdowns for staff shortages or harsh conditions of incarceration such as a deprivation of pain medications or clean linens because of the COVID pandemic as occurred in Ogiamien and R. v. Biever 2023 ABCA 138. What occurred, cumulatively, was more concerning.

[184] To be clear, in the absence of any justification, Mr. Ritchie, along with other prisoners, was strip searched naked and required to walk through the jail with zip cuffs on his wrists in his underwear. He was accompanied by two members of the ICIT, who controlled his movement by using the unnecessary force he described. The way he was told to sit, with the ICIT members patrolling in their riot gear behind him, had the effect, likely intentionally, of instilling fear in him. So concerned was he that he declined to make any complaint to the nurse after. It was degrading, and frightening.

[185] Like the other inmates, when Mr. Ritchie was walked back to his cell, he remained on lockdown, without clothes or blankets, for 37 hours. Exacerbating the effect of this was that the temperature in the unit was lowered. I accept that the CSOI Reports could not conclude that the lowering of temperatures was punitive. I also accept that the air flow was to clear the unit from the flashbang. It is hardly surprising, however, that when they had no clothes, were under lockdown and had just been paraded through the jail in their underwear, Mr. Ritchie felt that that this was punitive and intended to disrespect and belittle inmates.

[186] A further important aspect of what occurred for Mr. Ritchie after the ICIT deployment was his deprivation of medications doses in both the morning and evening of December 22 and the morning of December 23, 2023. This followed a Directive that for operational safety reasons on Unit 8, inmates were not to be given nonessential medications on the 22nd or 23rd.

[187] Mr. Ritchie did not receive any medications during the period when they were withheld, and received his first medications in the evening of the 23rd. There was no medical evidence adduced about whether the medications withheld from him were essential or not. He testified about the effects that he suffered. He also shared with the author of the IRCA that he felt that the denial of his medications contributed to his mental health being destabilized, and that he felt increased anxiety and agitation as a result.

[188] Mr. Ritchie's mental and physical health required him to receive regular doses of multiple medications. It is not clear that there was ever an assessment conducted as to which of Mr. Ritchie's medications fell within the "nonessential" category. While it seems to me unlikely that all of his medications was "nonessential", I do not have the evidence to make that finding and need not do so. Given the absence of a proper basis for the operational safety concerns, there was no basis for any of Mr. Ritchie's medications to be withheld at all.

[189] I conclude that the treatment Mr. Ritchie received as a result of the ICIT deployment was both cruel and unusual. In addition to violating s. 8, it also violated s. 12. It was an unnecessary and excessive response against all inmates to what Mr. Wuol had done. Mr. Ritchie was treated in a manner that, viewed cumulatively and objectively was abhorrent. It rose to the level of being in breach of his s. 12 right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment.

[190] Mr. Ritchie submits that this same treatment also rises to the level of being a s. 7 violation. I am not persuaded that much turns on whether, in addition to violations of ss. 8 and 12, there is also a violation of s. 7 for the ICIT deployment (beyond the s. 7 violation I have identified for the naked strip search).

[191] The s. 7 inquiry considers whether there was psychological harm caused by the unjustified deployment of the ICIT and whether that psychological harm was serious and profound.

[192] I accept that, on the basis of the same facts, and for the same reasons as I have found violations of ss. 8 and 12, Mr. Ritchie's s. 7 rights were also violated by the unjustified ICIT deployment, which violated his security of the person and caused him psychological harm that was serious and profound, as described in his evidence.

[193] I turn now to the s. 9 claim made by Mr. Ritchie. I do not accept his submission that his restrictive confinement was unlawful and arbitrary and in violation of s. 9. Respectfully, neither of the authorities relied upon by the defence, R. v. Miller, [1985] 2 SCR 61 and Almrei v. Canada (Attorney General), support his argument of a s. 9 violation in these circumstances. There was no s. 9 violation.

[194] Finally, I turn to the claim of a s. 15 violation.

[195] Counsel for Mr. Ritchie submits that the ICIT deployment created a "distinction based on disability". It is agreed that he is a person with mental health disabilities as well as a physical disability due to having been shot in the leg. It is submitted that while the ICIT deployment was neutral on its face, it created a disproportionate impact on these with disabilities. To the author of the IRCA Report, he explained the effects on his mental health of the ICIT deployment, including increased anxiety and agitation and being left feeling dehumanized and devalued.

[196] In his affidavit, Mr. Ritchie stated that he believed that the improper deployment of the ICIT was as a result of systemic and institutional racism. Other than the fact that it was a Black inmate who assaulted a White correctional officer, there is no evidence offered as to why this is his belief.

[197] On its face, the deployment of the ICIT was neutral. It targeted all inmates in Unit 8 for equal treatment. They were to be strip searched and removed from their cells so that searches of their cells could be conducted. But, what lies at the heart of an adverse effects claim is that the impact of state action that is "facially neutral" could be felt disproportionately by an enumerated or analogous group: Jacob v. Canada Attorney General) 2024 ONCA 648, at paras. 72-73.

[198] The question, therefore, is whether the ICIT deployment had the effect of placing members of protected groups at a disadvantage. To be sure, all inmates were affected by the inexcusable deployment of ICIT in this instance. But what must be asked is whether there is evidence that Black inmates and inmates with disabilities were disproportionately impacted when compared to inmates who were not Black or did not have disabilities: Sharma, at para. 40.

[199] There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the ICIT deployment disproportionately impacted Black or racialized inmates. While Mr. Ritchie believes that inmates were targeted after a Black inmate assaulted a White correctional officer, there is no evidence in this record to support his belief. I reach that conclusion recognizing that anti-Black racism, both overt and implicit, exists in Canadian society, and no doubt exists within custodial facilities. But the ICIT deployment did not target Black or racialized inmates. It targeted all inmates on Unit 8, regardless of their background. Further, there is just no evidence that Black inmates were disproportionately impacted, when compared to other inmates, by the ICIT deployment.

[200] Similarly, the ICIT deployment did not target disabled inmates. When, as here, the impact of the deployment was facially neutral, the claimant must present sufficient evidence to prove that the state action created or contributed to a disproportionate impact on the basis of a protected ground. In other words, Mr. Ritchie must demonstrate that the ICIT deployment created or contributed to a disproportionate impact on inmates with mental health and physical disabilities, compared with other inmates who did not have the same mental health and physical disabilities.

[201] Mr. Ritchie's affidavit and testimony provide some evidence about the manner in which he believes that his personal mental health and physical disabilities were affected by the ICIT deployment. The Crown acknowledged that that he was affected in the manners that he has described. I accept this.

[202] The difficulty I find with his s. 15 argument is that there is no evidence that those with disabilities were, by comparison, disproportionately affected when compared with inmates who did not have these disabilities. I recognize that it might be intuitive to think, for example, that those who suffer from PTSD as a result of being shot might have a more negative response to the flashbang than others without that disability. But the law requires there to be evidence that amounts to more than "a web of instinct": Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28, at paras 50-75; Sharma, at para. 44.

[203] I am not satisfied that Mr. Ritchie has met his evidentiary onus of showing that the ICIT deployment had a disproportionate effect on those, like him, who are Black or have mental and physical disabilities. As a result, I cannot conclude that he has met the requirements of the first step.

[204] Given my conclusions on the first step, I decline to consider the second step and dismiss the s. 15 claim.

[205] At the same time, I make the following observation. There is no question that Mr. Ritchie has experienced racial discrimination – both before his incarceration and since. He has also suffered as a result of mental and physical health challenges – again both before his incarceration and since. He perceives the ICIT deployment to have been the result of racism. He also believes that his mental health deteriorated as a result of it, which I accept.

[206] While I cannot find a s. 15 Charter violation, I accept that this incident took a toll on his mental and physical well-being.

iii) Conclusions on the ICIT Charter breaches

[207] Counsel agree that the remedy for whatever Charter violations are found from the ICIT incident should be a reduction in the period of Mr. Ritchie's parole ineligibility. This remedy is not without precedent. For example, in R. v. Marshall, 2020 ONSC 5360, when Goldstein J. found a s. 12 breach of the offender's rights on the basis of him having spent 27 months in segregation, he treated this violation as a mitigating factor that warranted a reduction in the parole on sentence. In that case, he reduced the offender's parole ineligibility period by 27 months (from 18 years to 15 years and 3 months) because he had spent 27 months in segregation. See also: R. v. Hall, 2021 ONSC 6169.

[208] I agree that on the basis of the Charter violations I have found, Mr. Ritchie's parole ineligibility period must be reduced.

iii) Alleged Charter violations unrelated to the ICIT deployment

[209] I turn now to the Charter arguments that are advanced in relation to allegations separate from the ICIT incident. While the defence written materials advanced claims of ss. 7,12 and 15 violations, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Pieters abandoned the ss. 7 and 15 arguments and submitted that Mr. Ritchie's complaints support findings of s. 12 breaches.

(a) Alleged Denials of Medical Care

[210] In his affidavit, Mr. Ritchie says he has a history of PTSD, anxiety, depression and other mental health needs and that was been prescribed various medications to assist. He asserts that while he was in custody, his psychological and mental health needs were not met. He alleges that this was as a result of anti-Black racism and that his denial of adequate medical and mental health care was cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of s.12 of the Charter.

[211] Some, but not all of the Maplehurst medical reports were filed on sentencing. All of them were provided to Dr. Jones when he prepared his Report. Accordingly, I have relied on both the medical records produced and what is contained in Dr. Jones' Report to summarize the treatment that Mr. Ritchie received. While I acknowledge that this evidence is hearsay through Dr. Jones, no suggestion was made that anything written in Dr. Jones' report was inaccurate.

[212] On July 10, 2022, Mr. Ritchie asked to see a psychiatrist about his trauma from being shot. A letter from counsel to the jail dated July 20, 2022 sets out that as of that date, Mr. Ritchie had requested to see a psychiatrist but had not yet met one.

[213] He was seen by a psychiatrist for his PTSD, anxiety and depression on August 22, 2022. At that time, he reported that he was doing well and had no auditory hallucinations. He requested a CAMH assessment.

[214] Mr. Ritchie requested to see a psychiatrist again on October 17, 2022 and again asked for a psychological assessment. On October 24, 2022, Dr. Jones reports that Mr. Ritchie was seen by a psychiatrist and reported that his mood was good but can fluctuate and that he was having nightmares 2-3 times a week.

[215] On November 19, 2022, Mr. Ritchie asked for medications for anxiety and depression. November 23, 2022, he asked to see a psychologist for help with his trauma and mental illness. On December 5, 2022, he asked to see a psychiatrist about medication as his anxiety was "becoming unbearable" and his depression was "daunting". On December 15, 2022, he asked for help and medications for his anxiety, depression and other undiagnosed mental illnesses he may have.

[216] On December 19, 2022, Dr. Jones says that he was seen by a psychiatrist, to whom he reported that he had been feeling anxious and that his mood was down. His thoughts were organized, his appetite was good and he was not psychotic. He was prescribed Buspirone 10 mg twice daily, and the dose of nightly melatonin was increased.

[217] On January 23, 2023, Mr. Ritchie filled out an Inmate Statement form in which he expressed concerns that he was undergoing severe stress, depression, anxiety, delusions, paranoia, pain, phantom pain and possibly bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. He felt that the treatment he was receiving was insufficient and was in violation of his s. 7 Charter rights. He again requested a psychiatric diagnosis from CAMH.

[218] On January 30, 2023, Dr. Jones reports that Mr. Ritchie was seen by a psychiatrist and reported that his mood was down and that he felt paranoid and feared for his safety. He was diagnosed as having psychosis and prescribed an antipsychotic (Abilify) and Prazosin. The notes reflect that he did not want more medications for sleep and that he did not want anti-depressants.

[219] In November, 2023, he reported still hearing voices and gunshots and that he had paranoid delusions.

[220] Mr. Ritchie met with psychiatrist Dr. Glancy on December 13, 2023. Included in the notes are that they discussed Mr. Ritchie's history of auditory hallucinations and paranoia and that "meds fine seem to help". The notes also indicated that "No reported, or overt evidence of, any current delusional beliefs" and, in respect of "Thought Process", the comment was "Organized thoughts. No thought disorder." Mr. Ritchie agreed that at the time, he was doing fairly well and managing well and was being given his medications.

[221] The plan set out by Dr. Glancy was to continue the rest of his current treatment and medication, to re-book for the psychiatric clinic in 4 weeks and to increase his Abilify. Mr. Ritchie testified that in his follow up meetings, he was just asked how he was doing, was seen for five minutes and was given his medications. His counsel submits that Dr. Glancy failed to do an appropriate mental health assessment.

[222] In his testimony, Mr. Ritchie said that he had been seeing a psychologist and getting help for his mental health issues before being incarcerated. He also testified that there was a psychiatrist at Maplehurst who he saw after 30-60 days but that it was only for medications. He testified that he never saw a psychologist or social worker while at Maplehurst. He repeatedly asked for referrals to CAMH and said he did not receive one.

[223] In terms of other medical treatment, Mr. Ritchie agreed that after the ICIT incident, he had been concerned about his knee. The medical reports indicate that he was to be seen by a doctor on January 18, 2024, but this was rebooked for February 1, 2024. He agreed that he had reported that day that he had constant knee pain from having been shot and that despite being on Lyrica and Naprosyn, he felt that the Lyrica should be increased. He agreed that they discussed this and that the doctor had increased his Lyrica. There was a notation in the medical records that he should be seen at Sunnybrook for follow up.

[224] I cannot conclude from the evidence adduced on the sentencing hearing, including Mr. Ritchie's evidence and the medical records, that the standard of care that Mr. Ritchie received for his mental health issues in custody fell below what would was reasonable.

[225] The records reflect that he made many requests to for psychiatric appointments. While true that he did not always see a psychiatrist immediately after making a request to do so, the records do reflect that he saw a psychiatrist on a number of occasions, often following his requests. The notes reflect that there were discussions beyond merely what medications he was taking, and that there were discussions about medications. Often, the psychiatrists' notes that reflect what Mr. Ritchie reported about his mental health in these meetings was quite different from what he had said in the requests to see the psychiatrist, and different from what he said in his evidence was at sentencing. The notes reflect that his concerns were being addressed. His evidence is that they were not. I cannot conclude on this record that his mental health treatment amounted to cruel and unusual treatment.

[226] Similarly, in respect of his other medical issues, such as his knee pain, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the medical treatment he received was inadequate.

[227] I find that there was no s.12 violation in the medical treatment that Mr. Ritchie received.

[228] I do conclude, however, that Mr. Ritchie's time in custody has been made more difficult because of his perception that his mental and physical needs were not met in a timely and appropriate way. This is a mitigating factor to consider on sentence.

(b) Alleged Denial of Dental Care

[229] Mr. Ritchie says in his affidavit that he was denied proper dental care. He has provided documentation showing numerous requests to see a dentist for what he repeatedly describes as unbearable pain. He testified that his wisdom tooth caused excruciating pain and that he did not see a dentist for over 6 months despite many requests.

[230] The medical records confirm that Mr. Ritchie made numerous requests to see a dentist. On July 10, 2022, he requested to see a dentist as he said he was in excruciating pain and needed a molar filled. The note on his request indicates "July 25, 2022 remains on dental list". He made further requests of a similar nature asking to see a dentist because of the pain his teeth were causing on September 4, 2022 (again there is a note "Sept 27, 2022 on dental list"), November 10, 2022, November 23, 2022 (with a note "Dec. 2, 2022 dental list") ; December 6 (with a note "Jan 4, 2023 on dental list"), December 16 (with a note "on dental list Jan 4, 2023") and December 18, 2022 (with a note "Booked / on list") .

[231] The records indicate that on December 6, 2022, Mr. Ritchie had Tylenol ordered, if needed, to alleviate the pain in his teeth. The records reflect that he was already on the list for a dental assessment / issues. He was seen again about his teeth twice in December, and appears to have been provided with oragel and Tylenol. The medical records provided do not document when, if ever, he was seen by a dentist and what dental treatment he received. Nor is there evidence as to how or when his dental issues were resolved.

[232] I accept that between July and December 2022, Mr. Ritchie had an ongoing dental concern that he raised repeatedly and regularly. The records reflect that he was on a dental list. There is no evidence as to what that means. It is unclear whether he was ever assessed by anyone in this period or why he was not seen by a dentist sooner.

[233] I accept that the failure of Maplehurst to provide more responsive and timely dental care was very difficult for Mr. Ritchie. On the evidence, however, I do not find that this was cruel and unusual punishment in that it was so excessive as to outrage standards of decency and be abhorrent or intolerable to society. While I find no s. 12 violation, I find that the inability of Mr. Ritchie to receive timely dental care in jail made his time in custody more onerous and is a mitigating factor on sentence.

(c) Alleged Denial of Proper Nutritional Needs

[234] In his affidavit, Mr. Ritchie says that he requested to be provided with plant-based meals at the beginning of his incarceration and that he did not receive meals consistent with his dietary restrictions.

[235] Mr. Ritchie testified that his dietary concerns and restrictions were not met. He says he was deprived of meals because he was repeatedly provided with falafels to which he had indicated he was allergic.

[236] On July 3, 2022, Mr. Ritchie made a request for a non-meat diet because of his religion. He indicated he could eat fish. A letter from counsel to the jail dated July 20, 2022 indicated that he was not receiving meals consistent with his dietary restrictions and asked that this be looked into.

[237] On August 11, 2022, Mr. Ritchie again asked to have no meat and only a fish diet. On September 1, 2022, he indicated that he was pescatarian and could eat fish and vegetarian, but was receiving the wrong diet.

[238] On February 21, 2023, Mr. Ritchie complained that he kept getting falafels when he had stated that he was allergic to them and cannot eat them. There is no evidence that before this he had ever provided anything in writing that he had an allergy to falafels.

[239] Mr. Ritchie agreed under cross-examination that it was not until February 21, 2023 that he first indicated in writing that he continued to be given falafels when he had made a request stating that he was allergic to them. Asked why had not said anything earlier, he said that he preferred to sell the falafel for noodles. He said that he had complained verbally, but had no explanation for not complaining about the falafels in writing. He also testified that he had not appreciated before that he had a falafel allergy. I observe that while his medical documentation had included that he had an allergy to shellfish, there was no notation about any falafel allergy until February 2023.

[240] There is a "Diet Authorization Form" dated February 26, 2023 on which Mr. Ritchie documented having an allergy to falafel.

[241] Mr. Ritchie experienced two difficulties respecting his meals.

[242] First, Mr. Ritchie seems to have received meals with meat from the time of his incarceration on June 18, 2022 at least until September 1, 2022. There is no evidence as to why this was. There is also no evidence as to how often this occurred or whether, when he complained, he received something different at the time.

[243] Second, Mr. Ritchie was provided with falafels, to which he came to believe at some point that he had an allergy. He does not appear to have told anyone about the allergy until February 2023. In fact, in his evidence he indicated that he was content to sell them for other food he preferred. It is unclear whether he was given the falafels as a substitute for the meat he could not eat.

[244] I accept that Mr. Ritchie's dietary needs and restrictions were not always accommodated. He should not have been receiving meat at all, once he indicated that he was pescatarian. However, particularly in the absence of an evidence as to the frequency of this occurrence, and whether he received any substitutions at the time, I cannot conclude that it rose to the level of cruel and unusual treatment and find no s. 12 violation.

[245] In respect of the falafels, while Mr. Ritchie received unwanted falafels, he did not complain initially as he was content to sell them for something he wanted. Moreover, it appears that once a complaint of an allergy was made, Mr. Ritchie's needs were met. This cannot amount to cruel and unusual treatment.

[246] There is no s. 12 violation resulting from Mr. Ritchie's dietary needs not being met.

e. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

[247] I find that the following factors are aggravating here:

• This was an exceptionally violent and gruesome murder. The nature of the injuries inflicted on Ms. Virgioni suggest that Mr. Ritchie brutally and repeatedly attacked her with a knife, and then savagely cut her neck so deeply that she was almost de-capitated;

• Mr. Ritchie committed this murder in Ms. Virgioni's home, a location in which she was entitled to feel safe, secure, and free from intruders;

• Mr. Ritchie used a weapon. He took a knife and unsheathed it prior to breaking into the apartment;

• Mr. Ritchie committed this murder knowing that their young son was present in the home at the time. The boy was woken by their argument and told by Mr. Ritchie to return to bed. He awoke to discover his dead mother. The callousness of Mr. Ritchie's decision to kill the victim and leave their son to discover his mother's lifeless body is almost unimaginable. What effect this will have on the boy is difficult to predict. But that it will affect him forever hardly seems a stretch;

• Mr. Ritchie killed his former intimate partner. Murders committed following the breakdown of a relationship cry out for denunciatory sentences;

• There appears to have been significant premeditation by M. Ritchie. He had threatened to cut Ms. Virgioni's head off before, more than once. He arrived at her home in the early morning hours, knowing she was there. He surreptitiously entered, wearing a mask to disguise himself and armed with a knife. This was a far cry from a spontaneous offence;

• This was a relationship in which there is a well documented and admitted history of violence and threats towards Ms. Virgioni, for which Mr. Ritchie has been convicted. This is a significant aggravating factor;

• Mr. Ritchie was under a court order to have no contact with Ms. Virgioni and acted in breach of that order. He had contacted her in breach of court orders before. I infer that Mr. Ritchie has no respect for court orders, preferring instead to do as he chooses;

• Mr. Ritchie's conduct after the murder suggests that he was more interested in evading capture than anything. He fled, taking evidence of the offence with him, knowing his son would find his mother. He stole a car and lied to police;

• Mr. Ritchie comes before the court with a significant criminal record as set out at paragraph 68; and

• This offence has had a devastating effect on Ms. Virgioni's family. The victim impact statements reveal a family that is left bereft. Not only is Ms. Virgioni's family devastated. The community also is shocked and appalled by this sort of heinous killing, the product of jealousy and a desire to control.

[248] There are, at the same time, some mitigating factors to consider.

• Mr. Ritchie pleaded guilty, knowing that he would receive a life sentence and that there was no guarantee if or when he would ever be released. That was a public admission of responsibility for this killing. While the Crown could have mounted a formidable case of first degree murder on the evidence that it had available, guilty pleas are indicative of remorse and may be one step towards rehabilitation.

• The guilty plea is also important because it brought the legal process to an end. It spared Ms. Virgioni's family from having to watch a trial and re-live the horrors of what happened to her. It spared witnesses from testifying. That said, it was not an early guilty plea and the family members were called to testify at the preliminary inquiry;

• Beyond the guilty plea, Mr. Ritchie apologised in court at the sentencing hearing for what he had done. While I appreciate that this was difficult for Ms. Virgioni's family to hear, Mr. Ritchie was under no obligation to say publicly that he was sorry for what he did and regrets it and knows that what he has done has caused only pain for their son. That he did so demonstrates to me that there remains some hope and prospect for his rehabilitation;

• Mr. Ritchie has the strong support of some of his family members and of members of the community;

• It is agreed that harsh conditions of incarceration may be a mitigating factor on sentencing, including the determination of parole ineligibility: R. v. Lamba, 2024 ONCA 778 at paras. 24-25; R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344. The question here is about the extent of this mitigating factor in this case. Mr. Ritchie advanced a number of manners in which he says he was mistreated at Maplehurst, both during the ICIT incident and at other times. I have found that there were violations of his ss. 7, 8 and 12 Charter rights as a result of the ICIT deployment. I have also concluded that there were other circumstances that constituted harsh conditions of incarceration including the delays in Mr. Ritchie receiving timely and appropriate mental health and dental care and the fact that not all of his dietary restrictions were met. While these were not breaches of s. 12, they are important mitigating factors;

• In addition to those, there are other "harsh conditions" including:

  • i. Lockdowns and triple bunking, for which there are 2 sets of records:

    The first, dated November 13, 2024, covers the period Mr. Ritchie was at Maplehurst from June 19, 2022 until July 4, 2024 and then from November 5 to 8, 2024. This is a total of 949 days. In this period, there were partial lockdowns 68 times and full lock downs 239 times, for a total of 307 occurrences of lockdown. He was triple bunked on 4 occasions. The second set of records cover the period from November 5, 2024 until May 13, 2025, a total of 189 days. In this period, there were partial lockdowns 39 times and full lockdowns 81 times, for a total of 120 occurrences. He was triple bunked for 182 days or virtually the entire time.

    The total lockdown up to the date of the sentencing hearing was 427 days or better than 25% of his time. I can safely assume that over the 3 months since the sentencing hearing, there has been at least another 23 days of lockdown, for a total of 450 days.

  • ii. Mr. Ritchie testified about the negative impact on inmates of triple bunking. I accept his evidence that that this number of lockdowns and the triple bunking have had very negative effect on his mental health and accept that they are an important mitigating factor to be considered.

• The evidence contained in the IRCA Report makes clear that Mr. Ritchie has faced some significant traumas and challenges throughout his life. The IRCA contextualizes these and reveals that many are connected to his identity as a Black man with mental health challenges. I accept that Mr. Ritchie has faced challenges in his life because he is a Black man with mental health challenges. I also accept that his mental health vulnerabilities exacerbated the effect of the harsh conditions of custody on him. I take these into account in crafting a fit sentence.

[249] At the same time, it is important to remember that while Mr. Ritchie has some mental health challenges and experienced anti-Black racism, there is no evidence of any nexus between these experiences and this murder.

[250] I also note that there is an absence of evidence to suggest that the risk to the public that Mr. Ritchie poses, given his history, has attenuated while he has been in custody. No evidence has been adduced of him having been involved in any rehabilitative programming or counselling to assist with his rehabilitation. The only conclusion I can reach is that he remains a violent and dangerous individual who poses a serious threat to the community.

Conclusion

[251] This is, factually, one of the most gruesome and horrific second degree murder cases I have encountered in a decade on this court.

[252] Having reviewed the cases filed by counsel and the circumstances of this offence and offender, I reject the defence position that the proper range of parole ineligibility, but for the Charter breaches, is 12 to 13 years. The authorities upon which the defence relies lack many of the significant aggravating factors that are present here. None of them have Mr. Ritchie's degree of planning. None are as vicious and brutal as his killing. None have the cruelty of leaving a child to find their deceased mother. In none was there anything approaching Mr. Ritchie's pattern of disobeying court orders in relation to the victim.

[253] I find that the appropriate range is 20 to 22 years of parole ineligibility. Absent the Charter violations arising from the ICIT deployment, I would have imposed a period of parole ineligibility period of 20 years.

[254] However, the parole ineligibility period must be reduced on account of the Charter breaches that followed the ICIT deployment.

[255] Two further points must be made.

[256] First, regardless of the period of parole ineligibility imposed, Mr. Ritchie's sentence is life imprisonment. I am not deciding whether he should be released on parole, but rather how much time he must serve before he will be eligible to be considered by the Parole Board: Schwalm, at para. 76. There is no guarantee that he will ever be released.

[257] Second, whatever reduction in parole ineligibility is made on account of the Charter violations cannot lead to the imposition of an unfit sentence. The parole ineligibility period must protect the public, denounce this terrible offence and acknowledge its devastating effects on Ms. Virgioni's family.

[258] How much to reduce Mr. Ritchie's parole ineligibility because of his mistreatment between December 20 and 24, 2023, and the effect that it had on him after, as I have set out, is not an easy question.

[259] After carefully reflecting on the need to craft a fit sentence, that gives effect to the principles of sentence, and what happened at Maplehurst, and to balance all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, I have decided that Mr. Ritchie's parole ineligibility period should be reduced by two years to 18 years. In my view, this strikes the right balance. It gives effect to the seriousness of what occurred at Maplehurst, but is fit and proportionate for murder that Mr. Ritchie committed.

[260] Mr. Ritchie: Please stand.

[261] Mr. Ritchie, you have been found guilty of second degree murder. As I am required to by law, I impose on you a sentence of life imprisonment. You are not eligible for parole until you have served at least 18 years in custody, beginning on June 18, 2022.

[262] In addition, the following ancillary orders are made:

(i) A weapons prohibition order for life pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code;

(ii) A DNA order pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code; and

(iii) A non-communication order pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code respecting his son, E.R and Concetta Virgioni.

J.M. Woollcombe J.

Released: August 14, 2025