United States of America v. Olaniyan, O’Connor, and Balogun, 2025 ONSC 2374

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-213-MO/CR-23-214-MO/CR-23-215-MO
DATE: 2025-04-25
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
K. Aird, for the Applicant, Attorney General of Canada

- and -
ADEYANJU OLANIYAN, RACHEL O’CONNOR, and TIMOTHY BALOGUN
J. Bray, for the Respondent Olaniyan
S. Fishbayn, for the Respondents O’Connor and Balogun

HEARD: November 28, 2024, and February 24, 2025

EXTRADITION RULING
Mirza

Overview

[1] The extradition of the Respondents, Olaniyan, O’Connor and Balogun, is requested by the state of Arkansas, United States of America (US).

[2] The Minister of Justice has issued an Authority to Proceed (ATP) that applies to each accused Respondent pursuant to s. 15 of the Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18. This authorizes the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) to seek an order for Balogun, O’Connor and Olaniyan’s committal for extradition for prosecution on the basis of the Canadian offence of fraud contrary to s. 380(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.

[3] The Attorney General has submitted a Record of the Case (ROC) and a Supplementary Record of the Case (SROC) which summarizes the evidence and, as required by section 33(3) (b) of the Extradition Act, certifies that the evidence is available and sufficient under the laws of the US to justify prosecution.

[4] The ROC and SROC allege that since 2021 a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigation identified that Balogun, O’Connor, and Olaniyan were involved in a conspiracy to fraudulently acquire medical supplies from distributors and their client pharmacies. It is alleged that they worked together to arrange to intercept and obtain the shipped medical supplies using couriers. Their unlawfully acquired supplies were resold for profit and these proceeds were sent digitally to bank accounts controlled by some of the Respondents. It is alleged that dozens of US based pharmacies and medical supply distributors including Company 1, Company 2, and Company 3, suffered losses.

[5] The ROC, dated July 20, 2023, has been certified by an Assistant US Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas, as being available for trial and sufficient under US laws to justify prosecution in accordance with s. 33(3)(a) of the Extradition Act.

[6] On March 27, 2024, the Assistant US Attorney provided the AGC with a certified SROC.

[7] Counsel for the Respondents reasonably conceded that Balogun, O’Connor and Olaniyan are before the court and are the persons sought by the US.

Summary of the Grounds for Extradition

[8] The following is a summary of parts of the densely worded, single-spaced, ROC and SROC in relation to three Respondents. I have reviewed them multiple times. To be frank, it is difficult to capture the contents of the vast amounts of details and charts contained therein in this ruling. To the extent that I leave any particular relevant detail out from this summary or the analysis, it is part of the total available evidence that I refer to in this decision. Unfortunately, some repetition in the summary and analysis is unavoidable.

[9] The State of Arkansas alleges that the Respondents were using a call “spoofing” program from BSD Telecom to deceive pharmacies across the US into believing that they were legitimate suppliers of medical supplies such as diabetic strips. They then allegedly persuaded the pharmacies to disclose their confidential account information and used that account information to fraudulently acquire supplies from the actual distributors ultimately for resale through co-conspirators for their own profit.

[10] According to the ROC, a “Bluff My Call” customer can subscribe to certain Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) used to access the service. Once logged in, a user can place a phone call and input the data that appears on the recipient’s caller identification service, disguising themselves as a different entity. For example, a conspirator could use his own telephone number to make a call and, after inputting his PIN, would be able to enter the number of Company 1. The recipient of the call would see that the call came from Company 1. The caller could then pose as an employee of that Company.

[11] The ROC indicates that the US investigators acquired and analyzed a large body of financial records, internet protocol (IP) data, voice recordings, telecom service records for “spoof” calls, and information from co-operating witnesses.

[12] The FBI analysis of phone and financial data concludes that each iteration of the fraud was conducted using the same telephone numbers on the same accounts using the same spoofing service, all connected to the Respondents.

[13] The ROC states that Company 1 is a medical supplies distributor and the primary supplier for locations in Gentry and Fayetteville Arkansas. They receive orders for medical supplies to pharmacies, hospitals and clinics across the US. Mr. McKinney is Company 1’s director of investigations and is expected to testify that they receive orders by phone or internet portal. To place an order by phone, the customer must provide a unique account username and password. Once an order is placed, Company 1 gets a regional distribution hub to organize and transport them to the buyer, relying on couriers. Company 1 then bills the buyer.

[14] On October 19, 2021, Company 1 received a telephone order for medical supplies on behalf of Heartland Pharmacy in Fayetteville, by someone that had Heartland Pharmacy’s account information ordering $254,413.70 of medical supplies.

[15] On October 21, 2021, Company 1 received a telephone order for diabetic strips totalling $17,205.92, on behalf of Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry Arkansas, possessing the necessary account information.

[16] Mr. Cooper, director of operations for Heartland Pharmacy in Fayetteville, Arkansas will testify that Heartland Pharmacy did not place the orders for the Gentry or Fayetteville pharmacies. Heartland typically deals with the same courier company and delivery person. The order for supplies exceeded their cap of $250,000. Company 1 is not involved in the return process beyond a phone call and issuance of a credit. The pharmacy sends items back themselves. They order through the online portal not by phone. These numerous unusual circumstances are indicia of fraud. He reported the situation to the police around October 20, 2021 and returned the items for a credit on October 21, 2021.

[17] The intention was that once these distributors shipped the medical supplies, the Respondents were to again contact the victim pharmacies under the guise of being representatives of the distributors and tell the pharmacies that medical products were shipped in error, but would be collected by the distributors via courier, and that the pharmacy’s account would be reimbursed. However, contrary to their purported representations Balogun, O’Connor and Olaniyan diverted the supplies with the use of couriers and co-conspirators in the US, and resold them for profit.

[18] Ms. Holloway, pharmacist at Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry Arkansas will testify that on October 19, 2021, a woman who identified herself as Diane Shaw called, posing as an employee of Company 1 and claiming that Company 1 had shipped an order of medical supplies by mistake to Heartland Pharmacy, and that a courier would come to collect the package from the pharmacy. NWA courier, a package courier service in Bentonville, Arkansas arrived on October 19, 2021 and retrieved the package.

[19] Ms. Anderson, pharmacist at Heartland Pharmacy in Fayetteville, Arkansas will testify that in late September to early October 2021, a person called posing as being with the Arkansas State Board of Pharmacy, claiming they were required to update Heartland’s wholesaler information file for 2022. The caller convinced Ms. Anderson to provide their account number for Company 1. Further, on October 20, 2021, a woman called posing as working for Company 1 and that an order was shipped by mistake. The caller’s number appeared as Company 1. The caller said they would retrieve the package once notified that it had arrived. Anderson consulted with her supervisor and learned a similar scheme occurred in Gentry. Anderson called Company 1 and confirmed that the caller was not their employee.

[20] Mr. Decker of NWA Courier will testify that on October 19, 2021 he was contacted by Diane Shaw to collect packages from Heartland Pharmacies in Gentry and Fayetteville. Decker received an email from Diane Shaw setting out the terms of the delivery arrangement from Gentry to the local FedEx. The NWA Courier picked up the Gentry package and delivered it to the local FedEx. He also received an email with a shipping label to Ricardo Oliveras in Orlando Florida with a number ending in 7130. The sender address was not Gentry, Heartland Pharmacy but rather Maria Oliveras. The same shipping labels were used for the Fayetteville Pharmacy.

[21] However, before picking up the Fayetteville package, Decker was informed by local police and then the FBI that the package sent was the result of a fraud scheme. Law enforcement sent a different package in lieu of the package he planned to pick up and were aware of the shipping addresses provided by Diane Shaw.

[22] Sylvia Ortiz will testify that she lived at the address in Orlando Florida that was on the shipping address for Richard Oliveras. On October 20, 2021 she received a package from FedEx addressed to OIiveras, originating from Arkansas. In the package was what she believed to be insulin. She called the 7130 number and an unknown male answered and told her that the package belonged to her brother, which they would retrieve. At 9:40 a.m. an unknown male came to her home in a black Honda Odyssey and picked up the package from Ortiz. Ring doorbell camera captured the interaction, which was given to law enforcement.

[23] A second package arrived on October 25, 2021; Ortiz spoke with a man that told her a courier would retrieve the package and it was eventually picked up by a courier. This was a “dummy” package arranged for by the FBI. Surveillance was conducted and a black Honda Odyssey was observed driving by Ortiz’s home but not stopping. This vehicle was registered to Josue Rivera. The FBI identified Josue Rivera as the person that picked up the package on October 20, 2021. A courier retrieved the package and was interviewed, advising that a woman claiming to be Maria Oliveras gave instructions to collect and deliver to FedEx. Maria Oliveras is married to Josue Rivera.

Bluff My Call - Spoofing Accounts

[24] As described earlier, BSD provides a call spoofing service called “Bluff My Call.” The service allows account users to disguise themselves as other Companies or entities when making a call. Importantly, BSD records some calls placed using its services. Mr. Schwartz, BSD CEO, will testify that the service was used in a manner consistent with the scheme to induce account order data from pharmacies, order medical supplies from distributors, contact couriers and gather confirmation from pharmacies that medical supplies were available for collection from a hired courier.

[25] Special Agent (SA) Camp will testify that after reviewing the calls and comparing them with the base line comparison bank calls, they are consistent with O’Connor and Balogun’s voice.

[26] In the ROC, the FBI prepared charts showing the True Calling Number from which the calls were made in September and October of 2021. This demonstrated that the number is controlled by the Respondents; the Call Recipient such as the pharmacy; and the Spoofed Number used which was entered into the Bluff My Call Service, such as Company 1, so that it would show up for the recipient. Similarly, that method would be used to call Company 1, disguised as a Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry.

[27] SA Camp will testify that four True Call Numbers associated to O’Connor, Balogun and Olaniyan were used to call Heartland Pharmacy, Gentry. The number ending 9647, which is tied to a Rogers Communication Account for “John John” was used on September 29, 2021 posing as another pharmacy in Little Rock Arkansas. It was also used many times to call pharmacies around the US disguised as various state licensing agencies. The ROC states that O’Connor’s voice, as heard on the Bank of Montreal (BMO) where she identifies herself and provides personal information, matches with the Bluff My Call recordings using that same number to dupe a pharmacist of Company 1 and Company 2 account data.

[28] Mr. Beckman managing director of Telusion Inc. a telecommunications company that has a call forwarding service known as “Tossable Digits” will identify that virtual phone numbers were forwarded on October 19 and 20, 2021 to the number ending 2268 which is associated to Balogun. Further the packing slips sent to Ms. Ortiz displayed these virtual numbers and so if they were called, they would go to 2268, which was used to contact both Heartland Pharmacies and NWW courier. The IP addresses that accessed the account also used a PayPal account registered to “Paul Wilson” that paid Richie Hotshot Delivery. Searches in the US through Meta show that the same IP address also accessed O’Connor’s Facebook account. The IP address was registered to Bell Canada and belongs to Balogun.

Other Pharmacies and Suppliers Affected

[29] FBI agents have identified a similar fraud scheme being used against Company 2, a supplier of medical supplies to pharmacies, hospitals and clinics across the US. Orders can be made online or by phone with a unique username and password. In January of 2021, an order for supplies was placed on behalf of Keer Apothecary (KA) in St. Louis Missouri, and was the result of fraud. The FBI SA Berntsson set up a sting operation with KA and Company 2 where the conspirators were able to gain access to KAS account information to order supplies. On January 26, 2012, $150,000 of diabetic testing equipment and supplies was ordered from Company 2. The FBI used dummy packages and monitored their delivery. A woman contacted FedEx instructing them to consolidate the packages of supplies and deliver them to a UPS personal mail box unit # in Florida. That unit was tied to Individual 1.

[30] Company 2 is also a primary provider of medical supplies to a pharmacy in Greenwood Arkansas and on June 16, 2022 an order was made by that pharmacy for $1,556,470 in supplies. Consistent with the scheme, the pharmacy received a call from a female purporting to be from Company 2, claiming there was an issue with their account, and was able to get the technician to provide the Pharmacy’s username and password. Company 2 identified this order as the product of fraud, notified law enforcement, and stopped the order.

[31] Company 3 is a health care services company that distributes medical supplies to pharmacies, hospitals and clinics across the US. They also take phone orders where the client account number, email, shopping and name for the account are required. They have also been a target of the fraud scheme.

[32] SA Camp states that the same numbers used to commit fraud on the Gentry and Fayetteville Pharmacies were used to perpetrate fraud on Health Depot in Greenwood Arkansas. In the ROC at para. 69 in a chart, the FBI states more specifically that O’Connor’s voice is heard on calls to Heartland, Gentry, and Health Depot Greenwood using number ending 1539; and for those two pharmacies plus the Heartland Fayetteville location, using the number ending 9647. Balogun’s voice is heard using 2268 in relation to Gentry and Fayetteville, and using 9293 in relation to Gentry.

Co-conspirator Witnesses

[33] The FBI has interviewed co-conspirators and witnesses in the US. They have given information or statements to establish support proof of the identity of the Respondents, and to verify that they moved the proceeds of the fraud to bank accounts they control that are located in Canada.

Individual 1

[34] Individual 1 received the surveilled and tracked package in January of 2021 after arranging for its delivery from a contact that they knew as “John” and “Dream,” with whom they had been doing business for some months. This person is alleged to be Olaniyan. Individual 1 sent “Dream” wire transfers to bank accounts in Canada with the name Adeyanju Olaniyan. The direction was to label transfers as automobile sales despite being payment for medical supplies.

[35] SA Berntsson interviewed Individual 1 at their home in Florida. Individual 1 advised the FBI that they operate Company 4 that regularly received shipments of diabetic testing supplies and sold them. Individual 1 said that they did business with a Canadian company, DTS Management, and had invoices and business records. A search warrant was executed seizing Individual 1’s computer and phone. Individual 1 gave the FBI an invoice from DTS Management requesting payment for $24,388 of diabetic supplies on October 21, 2020 to be sent to Balogun at an address in Mississauga, Ontario. The FBI made a forensic extraction of Individual 1’s phone.

[36] Individual 1 provided law enforcement with an invoice obtained from “DTS Management” requesting payment for $24,388 for diabetic supplies sent on or about October 21, 2020. This was to be sent to “Timothy Balogun” at an address in Mississauga, Ontario.

[37] In para. 5 of the SROC, US authorities state that Individual 1 recorded a video call with Balogun on December 1, 2022. Further, that Individual 1 states that the person on this video is consistent with the person depicted in Exhibit “A” of the ROC, namely Balogun.

[38] Individual 1 states that the voice of the person on the video call is the same voice heard on their other calls with Balogun.

[39] SA West listened to the recording collected from Individual 1 and compared it to a Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) recorded call with Olaniyan obtained by a Toronto Police Services (TPS) production order. In the CIBC call, Olaniyan provides his name and account information. SA West believes that the bank call and Individual 1’s recorded call are the same person. See SROC at para.1.

[40] SA Camp is expected to testify that, based on financial analysis, resellers like Individual 1, who received medical supplies, sent wire transfers as payment for the products. It is alleged that according to a review of bank records Individual 1 sent more than $720,000 over the course of three years to Olaniyan’s CIBC bank account ending 115, for the purchase of medical supplies.

[41] SA Camp is also expected to testify that Individual 1 sent more than $120,000, over the course of four months to a Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) account ending in #808 that belongs to Balogun.

[42] The BSD data shows that Olaniyan used the same True Call Number to contact Individual 1 on WhatsApp, (9551), that he used to contact other entities in the US in a manner consistent with the scheme.

Josue Rivera

[43] The SROC states that Josue Rivera was interviewed and would testify to purchasing stolen supplies from an individual he knew to reside in Canada from at least 2021 until March 2023. The ROC explains that analysis of bank records demonstrate that Josue Rivera sent payment to Balogun’s CIBC account from his Bank of America account between June 2021 to October 2021 for substantial sums. According to the SROC, at para. 5, Rivera provided recorded voice messages from his phone with the person from whom he purchased the stolen supplies.

Canadian Investigation

[44] Some of the other materials gathered were based on co-operation with the TPS, which obtained warrants for the production of records held by Canadian companies such as banks and telecom services.

[45] Detective Constable (DC) Williams of the TPS obtained search authorizations to obtain records associated with Balogun, O’Connor and Olaniyan, including bank account information from TD, CIBC, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), and BMO pertaining to each applicable Respondent, along with telecommunications records from Telus Communications (Telus) and Rogers Communications (Rogers). These records were shared with the US authorities, who analyzed them with other US gathered evidence to establish evidentiary connections to the Applicants. This information assisted the FBI to correlate the Respondent’s true phone numbers with the spoofing numbers used and recordings.

[46] DC Williams connected Olaniyan’s International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) with phone numbers ending in 4889 and 9551, which Olaniyan used in CIBC business bank accounts, and to contact Individual 1 respectively, suggesting the user of the same number uses the same device.

[47] Further, at “Dream’s” request, who Individual 1 will identify is Olaniyan, Individual 1 also communicated with “Tim John’s Friend” on October 17, 2020, and they continued to discuss deals until Individual 1’s phone was seized in 2021. The number used ended with 7113. DC Williams correlated that phone number with CIBC bank accounts under Diabetic Inventory Management Inc., held by Balogun. Individual 1 will testify that using that number, Balogun asked him to email Balogun a wire receipt at timothy.balogun@yahoo.com.

[48] The TPS also obtained casino filings from January 18, 2018 to October 6, 2022, where Balogun conducted $2,246,335.40 in gambling transactions.

[49] DC Williams obtained, in Canada, IP address information that returns to Rachel O’Connor and matches with the PayPal information obtained by the US authorities. The IP address information shows it is registered to “Paul Wilson” and was used to pay delivery company and BSD.

[50] Further, CIBC bank account details have O’Connor’s phone number as ending in 0341. This same number appears on Bluff My Call records having contacted pharmacies in New Jersey and Georgia using spoofed identities consistent with the scheme.

[51] DC Williams reviewed booking photos for Balogun and O’Connor and a license for Olaniyan. Utility, telecom and banking records had Balogun and O’Connor at the same Mississauga address. Surveillance put Balogun at the house but not O’Connor. Olaniyan was seen at the same residence as on his license.

Voice Opinion Evidence

[52] In addition to the summary above that the FBI relies on voice evidence to identify the Respondents.

[53] Paragraph 1 of the SROC, states that SA West will testify that investigators were able to compare a voice recording made of “Dream” by Individual 1 with a CIBC recording (obtained by judicial order) where Olaniyan identified himself, account number and business Vegax Group. Based on their analysis of the voice, tone, and cadence they believe they are the same person, in particular Olaniyan.

[54] DC Williams also obtained audio recordings involving Balogun and O’Connor of phone calls made to banks. These calls were disclosed pursuant to my prior disclosure ruling of October 31, 2024. At the November 28, 2024 hearing, counsel advised me that the bank inadvertently redacted the identifying information from the audio disclosed. This was addressed and DC Williams took steps to follow-up to ensure the full and unredacted disclosure would be disclosed. At the February 24, 2025 hearing the court was advised the unredacted calls had been obtained and disclosed in December 2024. The calls were filed, and the court heard follow-up submissions from the parties.

[55] Some of the calls are summarized in the ROC.

[56] In a call to BMO dated May 13, 2021, O’Connor identifies herself by name, debit card number, and email address. During the call, O’Connor is heard talking, likely on another phone, identifying herself as an employee of the “Board of Pharmacy” seeking information about the call recipient’s primary supplier of diabetic test trips. See ROC at para. 55. The audio of this call was filed as an Exhibit and I will address it further in the analysis.

[57] This call is used as a point of comparison to other calls collected in the U.S. from the spoofing service.

[58] SA Camp will testify that the four “True Call Numbers” used to call Heartland Gentry are associated to Balogun (2268 and 9923), O’Connor (9647), and Olaniyan (9551).

[59] DC Williams also obtained from TD a recorded call of May 10, 2022, where Balogun gave the phone number ending 9293 as a contact number for several RBC and CIBC bank accounts for a company called “Diabetic Inventory Management.” See: ROC, at para. 57.

[60] According to the ROC, these Canadian bank call recordings are used by the US investigators, FBI special agents, as baseline comparators with recordings of a high number of calls obtained in the US from the Bluff My Call “spoofing service” to formulate opinions about nationalities and distinctive voices of the callers. They are relied upon to voice identify the Applicants.

[61] Paragraphs 54 and following of the ROC explain the correlations made by the investigators, relying on what they say are distinctive voices and self-identifiers that match with other records for O’Connor and Balogun:

SA Camp is expected to testify that Bluff My Call toll records demonstrate that the number (416) 300-9647 was used many times in a manner consistent with the scheme, i.e., frequently used to call pharmacies around the United States disguised as various state licensing agencies.
SA Camp is expected to testify that Bluff My Call recordings obtained pursuant to a search warrant demonstrate that a woman with O’CONNOR’s distinctive voice, as heard on the tape obtained from the Bank of Montreal, used (416) 300-9647 to call pharmacies under the guise of a distributor to dupe the pharmacist out of his/her Company-1 and Company-2 account data.
Detective Williams is further expected to testify that BALOGUN identified the

number (437) 240-9293 as a contact number on banks accounts for a company called “Diabetic Inventory Management” including Royal Bank of Canada bank accounts 1022441, 1022458, and 4001814, and CIBC accounts 1016903, 1017004, and 0203319. Additional recorded calls between BALOGUN and bank employees obtained by the Toronto Police Service pursuant to legal process capture BALOGUN identifying himself by name and the 9293 phone number to bank employees.

SA Camp is expected to testify that recordings obtained from Bluff My Call pursuant to a search warrant confirm that BALOGUN, as identified by his voice, used the number (437) 240-9293 consistent with the scheme. For example, on October 29, 2021 (shortly after the Heartland fraud) BALOGUN calls FedEx, using the alias “Paul” seeking to ship a package.
Bluff My Call toll records show that the number (437) 240-9293 was used on the platform more than 1000 times, many of which appear consistent with the scheme, i.e., calls placed to and from pharmacies and distributors under the guise of licensing boards, pharmacies, and distributors. In addition, recorded calls on this number reveal that O’CONNOR also used this number at various times, as identified by her voice. For example, on June 21, 2021, O’CONNOR calls Company-1 under the identity of Price Chopper Pharmacy in Wilkes-Barre Township, Pennsylvania using (437) 240-9293.
SA Camp is further expected to testify that Bluff My Call toll records show that the number (249) 733-2268 was used hundreds of times on the platform, many of which appear consistent with the scheme. Available recorded calls using this number demonstrate that a person whose voice is consistent with BALOGUN used the number to execute the scheme. For example, on October 5, 2021, BALOGUN’s voice, using (249) 733-2268, contacts Bausch & Lomb, a medical provider of eye-health supplies pretending to be Capital Wholesale Drug Co., a wholesaler in Columbus, Ohio, using the alias “Paul Wilson” (the same alias used on previously identified PayPal and FedEx accounts associated with the scheme).
SA Camp is expected to testify that on or about the same dates that the above numbers contacted Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry, Arkansas to perpetrate the fraud, as identified in the chart above, callers using the same numbers contacted Heartland Pharmacy in Fayetteville, Arkansas.

(Chart omitted)

SA Camp is expected to further testify that on or about the same dates that above numbers contacted Heartland Gentry, Heartland Fayetteville, and Company-1, (249) 733-2268 also contacted NWA Courier:

(Chart omitted)

[62] The SROC states at paras. 5 to 7:

Paragraph 58 of the ROC should be supplemented to include the following information regarding the identification of the voice of Timothy Balogun:

"SA West is also expected to testify that he used the following information to identify Timothy Balogun's voice: According to records obtained by Toronto Police Services through Judicial Orders for Royal Bank of Canada, Great Canadian Gaming, and TD Bank, Balogun, using number (437) 240-9293 (the number associated with Balogun's Diabetic Inventory Management Inc. accounts at Royal Bank of Canada, and Balogun's Great Canadian Gaming Account), called TD Bank identifying his name, business name, phone number, and account card number. Both SA Camp and SA West listened to numerous calls obtained from BSD Telecom originating from (437) 240-9293 and the recording from TD bank numerous times and in sequence. Based on the voice (including Balogun's unique accent) cadence, and manner of speaking, both SA Camp and SA West believe the voices in the recordings belong to the same person.

Individual-1 is expected to testify that Individual-1 also conducted and recorded a video call with Balogun on December 1, 2022. During the call, a person consistent with Balogun's photo at Exhibit A participated on the call. Individual-1 confirmed that the voice of the person on the video call is the same voice s/he heard on the calls with Balogun. SA West listened to the recorded calls numerous times and sequentially. Based on the voice (including Balogun's unique accent), his cadence and manner of speaking, SA West believes the voice on the recording is that of Balogun.

Josue Rivera, whom law enforcement recently interviewed in connection with the case, would testify to purchasing stolen supplies from an individual he knew to reside in Canada from at least 2021 until March 2023. Analysis of financial records confirms Rivera sent payment to Balogun-related accounts many times (see paragraph 75 of ROC). Rivera provided recorded voice messages from his phone with the person from whom he purchased the stolen supplies. SA West reviewed the recording, and based on the voice, intonation, cadence, topics discussed, and manner of speaking, believes the voice is consistent with the recorded BSD calls and recorded bank calls made by Balogun."

Paragraph 59 of the ROC should be supplemented to include the following information regarding the identification of the voice of Rachel O'Connor:

"SA West is also expected to testify that he used the following information to identify Rachel O'Connor as having used the number (437) 240-9293. Both SA Camp and SA West listened to numerous calls recorded by BSD Telecom originating from (437) 240-9293, and listened to other instances of O'CONNOR's voice, including the call set out in paragraph 55 of the ROC. Both SA Camp and SA West listened to the calls numerous times and in sequence. Based on the voice (including O'CONNOR's unique accent) cadence, and manner of speaking, both SA Camp and SA West believe the voices in the recordings belong to the same person." [Emphasis added]

Paragraph 60 of the ROC should be supplemented to include the following information regarding the identification of the voice of Timothy Balogun:

" SA West is expected to testify that he used the following information to identify BALOGUN's voice using telephone number (249) 733-2268. Both SA Camp and SA West listened to numerous calls obtained from BSD Telecom originating from number (249) 733-2268 as well as other calls containing Balogun's voice, including the one set out in paragraph 57 of the ROC. Both SA Camp and SA West listened to the recorded calls numerous times and sequentially. Based on the voice (including Balogun's unique accent), his cadence and manner of speaking, both SA Camp and SA West believe the voice on the recordings is that of Balogun." [Emphasis added]

[63] In the initial ROC at para. 27, Balogun’s voice was identified, in part, because of the US authorities’ opinion that Balogun has a distinct “Nigerian” accent. O’Connor’s voice was also identified by the police, in part because of her distinct “Canadian” accent. The AGC no longer relies on this paragraph in support of the extradition request.

The Law

Essential Principles

[64] The test for committal for prosecution is set out in s. 29 of the Extradition Act, which reads:

(1) A judge shall order the committal of the person into custody to await surrender if (a) in the case of a person sought for prosecution, there is evidence admissible under this Act of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada on the offence set out in the authority to proceed and the judge is satisfied that the person is the person sought by the extradition partner.

[65] Subsection 24(1) of the Extradition Act requires the Court to hold an extradition hearing upon receipt of an ATP.

[66] This Court’s statutory task is to determine whether there is evidence “… of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial. ” In other words, the requesting state is only obligated to show that the record would justify committal for trial in Canada. The quintessential question is whether or not there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty: United States of America v. Shephard, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1067, at p. 1080.

[67] In M.M. v. United States of America, 2015 SCC 62, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 973, at para. 36, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the purpose of the judicial phase of extradition proceedings:

The committal phase of the extradition process serves an important, but circumscribed and limited screening function. The role of the extradition judge is simply to decide whether he or she is satisfied that the person before the court is the person sought and whether “there is evidence admissible under [the Extradition Act and available for trial] of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada on the offence set out in the authority to proceed.”

[68] An extradition judge must consider whether there is sufficient evidence of the essential elements of the offence and any other conditions on which the prosecution bears the evidential burden of proof to justify putting the person on trial: United States of America v. Ferras, 2006 SCC 33, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 77, at para. 21; M.M., at para. 46 citing R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 828, at para. 29; R. v. Sazant, 2004 SCC 77, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 635, at para. 16; R. v. Russell, 2001 SCC 53, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 804, at para. 24.

[69] Where the prosecution’s evidence consists of, or includes, circumstantial evidence, the judge must engage in a limited weighing of the whole of the evidence (i.e. including any defence evidence) to determine whether a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty. In performing the task of limited weighing, the preliminary inquiry judge does not draw inferences from facts. Nor does she assess credibility. Rather, the judge’s task is to determine whether, if the prosecution’s evidence is believed, it would be reasonable for a properly instructed jury to infer guilt. Arcuri, at paras. 29-30.

[70] In Ferras, at paras. 53-54, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the extradition judge may engage in a limited weighing of evidence to exclude evidence that is manifestly unreliable, unavailable or unsafe to commit.

[71] In France v Diab, 2014 ONCA 374, 120 O.R. (3d) 174, at para. 134, leave dismissed [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 317, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed that, in light of Ferras, the test for committal is made out where the following is satisfied:

[134] In our view, the "dangerous or unsafe to convict" consideration in Ferras is addressed by the exclusion of evidence that is manifestly unreliable. The test for committal is made out where (1) evidence that is manifestly unreliable, and on which it would therefore be dangerous or unsafe to convict, is excluded; and (2) there remains evidence available for trial that possesses indicia of threshold reliability on each essential element of the corresponding Canadian offence, upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict.

[72] In M.M., at para. 71, Justice Cromwell adopted the following words of Justice Doherty in USA v. Anderson, 2007 ONCA 84, 85 O.R. (3d) 380, at para. 30:

[30] Evidence may be rendered "so defective" or "so unreliable" as to warrant disregarding it due to problems inherent in the evidence itself, problems that undermine the credibility or reliability of the source of the evidence, or a combination of those two factors. I would stress, however, that it is only where the concerns with respect to the reliability of the evidence, whatever the source or sources, are sufficiently powerful to justify the complete rejection of the evidence, that these concerns become germane to the s. 29(1)(a) inquiry.

[73] In keeping with the restricted function of the judge at the committal phase, the Supreme Court in M.M. also highlighted, at para. 64, (quoting USA v. Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, at para. 122) that extradition judges must guard against allowing extradition hearings to become trials:

[64] While the role of the extradition judge in scrutinizing evidence has been somewhat enhanced to ensure Charter compliance, it remains the case that an extradition hearing is not a trial and it should never be permitted to become one: Schmidt, at p. 515. The process is intended to be expeditious and efficient so as to “ensure prompt compliance with Canada’s international obligations.”

[74] Section 32 of the Extradition Act sets out the type of evidence admissible at the committal hearing.

32 (1) Subject to subsection (2), evidence that would otherwise be admissible under Canadian law shall be admitted as evidence at an extradition hearing. The following shall also be admitted as evidence, even if it would not otherwise be admissible under Canadian law:

o (a) The contents of the documents contained in the record of the case certified under subsection 33(3);

o (b) The contents of the documents that are submitted in conformity with the terms of an extradition agreement; and

o (c) Evidence adduced by the person sought for extradition that is relevant to the tests set out in subsection 29(1) if the judge considers it reliable.

Exception — Canadian evidence

(2) Evidence gathered in Canada must satisfy the rules of evidence under Canadian law in order to be admitted.

[75] Section 33 explains the contents of the record of the case (ROC).

Record of the case

33 (1) The record of the case must include

o (a) In the case of a person sought for the purpose of prosecution, a document summarizing the evidence available to the extradition partner for use in the prosecution; and

o (b) In the case of a person sought for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence,

▪ (i) A copy of the document that records the conviction of the person, and

▪ (ii) A document describing the conduct for which the person was convicted.

Positions

[79] The AGC submits that the ROC and SROC establish that each of the three Respondents was engaged in a fraud scheme, contrary to s. 380 of the Criminal Code of Canada. They submit that the combined record establishes that each of the Respondents worked to deliberately deceive pharmacy employees by posing as a supplier to access their private account information. They could allegedly then deceptively pose as the pharmacies to the suppliers, in order to order supplies on credit, all with the intention to divert them and resell for profit to acquire the proceeds.

[80] Each of the Respondents submit that the ROC and SROC does not justify extradition.

[81] Olaniyan argues that the evidence tendered in support of committal is insufficient, unreliable and does not support the inferences relied on by the Requesting State. While the ROC describes a large-scale fraudulent scheme which has received significant investigative attention, it does not contain evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict Mr. Olaniyan for the Canadian offence listed in the Authority to Proceed. First, the banking evidence summarized in the ROC provides no transactions that are connected to the incidents of fraud alleged. Second, the telecommunications evidence summarized in the ROC relies upon speculative inferences that are unsupported by the evidence. Third, the communications alleged to have occurred between Mr. Olaniyan and the confidential informant in the Requesting State are unconnected to incidents of fraud. Fourth, the voice identification evidence that the Requesting State has provided is inadequate and unreliable.

[82] The Respondents Balogun and O‘Connor had the same counsel. They each submit the total evidence insufficient to justify their respective extradition.

[83] Their counsel submits that despite larger claims of over $100 million of “intended” fraud losses, there appears to be, in total, only 5 specific allegations in the ROC and SROC. And there only appears to be one case of fraud actually resulting in a loss – October 19, 2021, from the Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry, Arkansas. The amount of this loss was $17,205.92.

[84] They also submit that the voice evidence is unreliable and should be disregarded. In particular, that the meaning of terms such as intonation, cadence etc. used by the US authorities are not sufficiently explained and that examples are not provided. Further, the Respondents submit that these terms are designed to convey the appearance of details but are meaningless.

[85] Overall, they submit that the case for identifying the persons who committed the fraud is insufficient and does not establish even a prima facie case against them.

Analysis

Fraud

[86] The ATPs list the Canadian offence of fraud as applicable for each of the accused Respondents. In Canada, fraud, is contrary to section 380(1) of the Criminal Code:

Fraud

• 380 (1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service,

o (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars; or

o (b) is guilty

▪ (i) of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or

▪ (ii) of an offence punishable on summary conviction, where the value of the subject-matter of the offence does not exceed five thousand dollars.

[87] Fraud is dishonest deprivation. Fraud involves the use of deceit, falsehood, or any other means that reasonable persons would consider dishonest to obtain or acquire property, money, or anything of value. R. v. Zlatic, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29. Any property, money, valuable security or service is something of value.

[88] Deprivation includes, but does not require, that the victim suffer actual economic loss. It is enough that the victim is induced to act to their financial detriment by the accused’s conduct. The victim’s financial interests must be at risk, but the victim(s) do not have to lose any money or anything of value as a result of the accused’s conduct.

[89] “Deceit” is an untrue statement made by a person who knows that it is untrue, or has reason to believe that it is untrue, but makes it despite that risk to induce another person to act on it, as if it were true, to that other person’s detriment.

[90] “Falsehood” is a deliberate lie.

[91] “Other fraudulent means” is a term that covers more ground than either deceit or falsehood. It includes any other means, which are not deceit or falsehood, regarded as dishonest according to the standards of reasonable people.

[92] All three means do not have to be proven. Any one is enough. It does not matter whether the accused thought that what s/he was saying and (or) doing was not dishonest, or thought that neither the victim(s) or anyone else would suffer harm in the end as a result.

[93] The actus reus of fraud is established by proof of a prohibited act, be it an act of deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, and by proof of deprivation caused by the prohibited act which may consist in actual loss or in the placing of the victim's pecuniary interests at risk. The mens rea consists of subjective awareness that one was undertaking a prohibited act (the deceit, falsehood or other dishonest act) which could cause deprivation in the sense of depriving another of property or putting that property at risk. R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5.

[94] While most frauds involve either deceit or falsehood, fraud by "other fraudulent means" encompasses all other means which can properly be stigmatized as dishonest. The dishonesty of "other fraudulent means" has, at its heart, the wrongful use of something in which another person has an interest, in such a manner that this other's interest is extinguished or put at risk. A use is "wrongful" in this context if it constitutes conduct which reasonable decent persons would consider dishonest and unscrupulous. Zlatic, at p. 45.

[95] The accused must knowingly, i.e. subjectively, undertake the conduct which constitutes the dishonest act, and must subjectively appreciate that the consequences of such conduct could be deprivation, in the sense of causing another to lose his pecuniary interest in certain property or in placing that interest at risk.

[96] The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused meant to say and or do those acts that amount to deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means and knew that saying and or doing them could put the economic interests of the victim(s) at risk.

Voice Evidence of Balogun and O’Connor

[97] Balogun and O’Connor rest a significant part of their argument against committal for extradition on the basis that the voice recognition evidence by the FBI is manifestly unreliable. Olaniyan adopts their arguments.

[98] I will address this argument first given its prominence to their position that if this evidence is excluded, extradition should not be ordered.

[99] First, O’Connor identifying herself on the lawfully obtained BMO call recording while also being heard speaking on another call taking place at the same time, posing as an employee of a Board of Pharmacy and seeking information about the primary supplier of diabetic test strips, is directly admissible evidence of knowledge and participation in the fraud scheme. It is also circumstantial evidence of the modus operandi: contacting victims and deliberately deceiving them with an intention to acquire information to use to cause them a risk of financial deprivation within the fraud scheme alleged. Two specific examples from BSD recordings are described at para. 26 of the ROC that are consistent with O’Connor’s behaviour in the BMO call.

[100] This bank recording is used by the FBI as a point of comparison to identify O’Connor as being involved in the scheme in Arkansas. SA Camp will say that based on a comparison of the Bluff My Call recordings and the BMO recording, that a woman with the same voice as O’Connor used the phone number ending in 9647 to call pharmacies under the guise of a distributor, to contain their Company 1 and Company 2 account data (ROC, at p. 15).

[101] Second, the AGC conceded that they were not relying on paragraph 27 of the ROC where the FBI relies on distinct Canadian and Nigerian accents.

SA Camp is expected to testify that he reviewed a representative sample of the calls and noticed that the voices in many of these calls are the same woman with a distinct Canadian accent and a man with a distinct Nigerian accent, making calls consistent with the scheme. [Emphasis added]

[102] In my disclosure ruling, I held that there was an air of reality to the argument that the FBI’s claims of O’Connor having a distinct “Canadian” accent and Balogun having a distinct “Nigerian” accent were manifestly unreliable. These Canadian bank calls obtained by production order were ordered disclosed.

[103] Given my concerns that the FBI conclusion of hearing a distinct Canadian and Nigerian accent is manifestly unreliable, together with the AGC’s concession that this part of the ROC is not relied upon, I do not rely on this part of paragraph 27 of the ROC in making my decision in this ruling.

[104] Third, I find that the other voice evidence summarized by the FBI in the ROC and SROC, which is based on the contents of comparison of baseline recordings obtained from Canadian banks with recordings collected in the US to facilitate the frauds, are admissible.

[105] In the SROC, at paras. 3-5, SA West states that when comparing the Canadian bank recordings to numerous recordings obtained in the US, the police based their identification of both O’Connor and Balogun on the sound of their voice, intonation, cadence, similarities in phrasing, and manner of speaking.

[106] The SROC at para. 1 states that, in addition to the investigation connecting the person Individual 1 knows as “Dream” to Olaniyan through bank transfers, Individual 1’s recording of “Dream” was compared to a call made by Olaniyan to CIBC where he identifies himself by name and account number. SA West believes they are the same person based on voice, cadence and tone.

[107] There is merit to the Respondents’ position that the FBI officer’s opinion evidence alone that the voices match, subject to trial litigation, could be inadmissible, because the FBI special agents are in no better position than the trier of fact to assess the situation under scrutiny. See: Graat v. The Queen, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819, at p. 836; R. v. Leaney, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 393. This argument may be relatively stronger in relation to the voice opinion evidence concerning Olaniyan given the limited comparator recordings.

[108] As I recognized in the disclosure ruling at paras. 96-98, there is no evidence that FBI officers are previously familiar with the Respondents voices to be able to identify purported distinctive qualities: United States of America v. Guevara-Mendoza, 2018 BCCA 55, at para. 44; USA v. Johal, 2011 BCSC 1068, at paras. 39 - 51. I also acknowledged that the Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that voice identification evidence ought to be treated with extreme caution and is not admissible in some cases where there is inadequate foundation for an opinion: R. v. Portillo (2003), 176 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 41-43; R. v. Clouthier, 2012 ONCA 636, at para. 19; R. v. Quidley, 2008 ONCA 501, 232 C.C.C. (3d) 255, at para. 36; HMTQ v. Savoy, 2000 BCSC 296, at paras. 35-36.

[109] When admissible, juries (and judges) should be reminded that witness confidence in the voice identification does not substantially correlate to the accuracy of identification.

[110] The challenges with voice identification and the specific facts of the case must be carefully evaluated by the trier of fact: R. v. A.W., 2024 ONCA 564, 439 C.C.C. (3d) 530, at para. 46 and 55; R. v. Pinch, 2011 ONSC 5484, at para. 75; see also R. v. Masters, 2014 ONCA 556, 313 C.C.C. (3d) 275, at para. 47.

[111] After considering the bank call recordings tendered at this hearing and full submissions of all counsel at the extradition hearing, it is important to comment on two points that arise from this area of the law. First, the voice opinion evidence will be admissible, even if weak, as long as it has a sufficient foundation. In the extradition context, the court must be mindful of the impact of the distinct statutory regime and certification of the record as acknowledged above.

[112] In R. v. I.T., 2024 ONSC 5781, at para. 46, Justice Nakatsuru provides a useful summary of this first point, albeit not in the extradition context:

[46] Voice identification evidence is admissible in Canadian courts under the general rules of admissibility, and “[w]hen tendered through a lay witness, it is not considered opinion evidence and there are no special preconditions to admissibility”: R. v. Shanker, 2023 ONSC 5812, at para. 34, citing C. Sherrin, “Earwitness Evidence: The Reliability of Voice Identifications” (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall L.J. 819-862. See also R. v. Pinch, 2011 ONSC 5484, [2011] O.J. No. 5024, at para. 70 and the cases cited therein. Nevertheless, for such evidence to gain admissibility, the party tendering it must lay a foundation for the witness’s ability to identify the voice. For example, by adducing evidence that the witness had more than fleeting exposure to the voice in circumstances where the witness could connect the voice to a particular person: R. v. Portillo (2003), 17 C.R. (6th) 362 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 39-43; R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 4592 (C.A.) at para. 4. Generally, the “inherent frailties” of voice identification go to weight rather than admissibility: R. v. Badgerow, 2008 ONCA 605, 177 C.R.R. (2d) 342, at para. 9, leave to appeal refused, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 483, and R. v. Williams, 23 O.R. (3d) 122. However, if in the circumstances of the specific case, the reliability of the evidence is so suspect, it may not be admitted as its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect: Pinch, at para. 75.

[113] In I.T., the voice identification of the accused in audio recordings was ruled admissible based on the witness’ opportunities to become familiar with the accused's distinct speech patterns through interviews and interactions during intake at a youth center.

[114] In Pinch, at paras 67-80, Justice Hill reviewed the law relating to voice identification and voice recognition in a criminal trial, explaining how its admissibility may be established:

[70] Non-expert evidence as to voice identification, or listener evidence, is comprised of the following three sub-groups. A witness may provide recognition evidence on the basis of acquired familiarity with a speaker’s voice. This evidence of fact may include a victim ( R. v. MacKinaw, 2010 ABCA 359, at paras. 11-13; R. v. Willis, 2002 MBCA 138, at paras. 4, 11 (aff’d (2003), 2003 SCC 12, 173 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) ), friend, family member, co-worker, etc. or, in some instances, a police witness exposed to the subject’s speech during the investigation or after arrest ( see R. v. Castro (2001), 2001 BCCA 507, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 255 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 20-1 (leave to appeal denied, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 533); Robb, at pp. 167-8). A second grouping, most frequently a police witness, includes someone who “ acquire[s] specialist knowledge by listening to a sample of the speech of a known person and comparing it with a recording of a disputed voice”: Flynn, at para. 14. Controversy exists as to whether persons in this sub-category should be referred to as “ ad hoc experts” or simply as witnesses with special knowledge purporting to make an identification: …[emphasis added]

[115] With respect to the police officers’ testimony as to voice identification, Hill J. noted the following:

[74] While not forgetting that police officers are not generally experts in voice identification, they, like other witnesses, must set out the basis for their voice identification: R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462, at para. 116 (“She did not say what was distinctive about his voice”); Chenia, at para. 102; Flynn, at para. 51; Omerod (2001), at p. 621. Where the evidence discloses no foundation for a witness’ purported voice identification, the evidence has “no probative value”: R. v. Portillo (2003), 176 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 40-2; R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 4592 (C.A.) (Q.L.), at para. 4. At para. 63 of the Flynn case, the court stated:

The increasing use sought to be made of lay listener evidence from police officers must, in our opinion, be treated with great caution and great care. In our view where the prosecution seek to rely on such evidence it is desirable that an expert should be instructed to give an independent opinion on the validity of such evidence.

[75] “There are difficulties with voice recognition which cannot be overlooked”: Willis, at para. 26 per Twaddle J.A. dissenting in the result. Depending on the circumstances of the case, any number of factors will affect the reliability of voice identification and in turn relate to misidentification, false positives and factual miscarriages. Consider the following factors some of which impinge upon the reliability of voice recognition, others upon voice identification, and some upon both:

Is the witness sufficiently familiar with the witness’ voice to be able to recognize it: Chenia, at para. 102
The quality of the voice sample and its size or length and repetition of exposure: Flynn, at paras. 47-51, 62; R. v. Davies, [2004] EWCA Crim 2521, at para. 33
Given the susceptibility of memory error and degradation, what is the delay period between hearing the speaker’s voice: Omerod (2001), at pp. 600, 603, 606-7; L.M. Solan and P.M. Tiersma, “Hearing Voices: Speaker Identification in Court”, (2003), 54 Hastings L.J. 373, and pp. 376, 400-1
While it has been observed that “ all voice descriptions must be treated with extreme caution” (Omerod (2001), at p. 603 (emphasis of original)), is there some peculiarity, mannerism or distinctive feature to the subject’s voice that would make it more readily identifiable; are there “internal patterns” distinctively associated with this person: Williams, at p. 164
What was the pre-trial procedure used for voice identification – can suggestiveness be eliminated – for example, were mistakes or changes made or did the purported identification take place in the context of hearing a particular taped phonecall/overheard speech with a contemporaneous description of the voice and identified speaker or only after repeated listening to the call or after acquiring knowledge of a circumstantial confirmatory event
“A voice comparison exercise should be carried out by someone other than an officer investigating the offence” as “[i]t is all too easy for an investigating officer wittingly or unwittingly to be affected by knowledge already obtained in the course of the investigation”: Flynn, at para. 51; Omerod (2002), at p. 777
Was a voice identification parade conducted: Davies, at paras. 33-6
The confidence level of the witness in purporting to make an identification - while confidence does not substantially correlate to reliability, the witness’ lack of confidence is certainly probative
Is the trier aware of the difficulties which the telephone imposes on voice identification because of the loss of acoustic information: O’Doherty, at p. 6
The phenomenon that different utterances of a given word by a given speaker are not acoustically invariant such that intra-speaker variability exists as well as inter-speaker variability: NRC, On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification, at pp. 16-23; Omerod (2002), at p. 780; Solan and Tiersma, “Hearing Voices...”, at pp. 401-3
Account must be taken of the witness’ age and hearing ability as those factors impact upon the accuracy of identification: Omerod (2001), at p. 620; Solan and Tiersma, “Hearing Voices...”, at p. 410
The dangers and potential prejudice of cross-racial voice identification evidence: J.K. Son, “In-Court Racial Voice Identifications: They Don’t All Sound The Same” (2004), 37 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Rev. 1317, at pp. 1325-9; B. Kohler, “Racial Voice Identification: Judicially Condoning the Bogus Science of ‘Hearing Colour’” (2004), 77 Temple L. Rev. 757, at pp. 761-779; Solan and Tiersma, “Hearing Voices...”, at pp. 432, 435
Has the trier adverted to the fact that the speaker may have been disguising his voice ( Williams, at p. 165) or otherwise that the speech is not “normal” for that person on account of illness, intoxication, drowsiness, stress, emotional state, etc.: Solan and Tiersma, “Hearing Voices...”, at pp. 403-5
Did the person purporting to make a comparative identification, where at least one of the sources was taped conversation, have access to high quality and non-distorting equipment: Flynn, at para. 51 (“the sophisticated equipment used by experts”); Chenia, at para. 94 (“infra-red headphones”)
Is there circumstantial evidence whether from content, surveillance or otherwise tending to confirm the identified subject as the speaker: R. v. Vu, 2011 BCCA 112, at paras. 70-82; Williams, at pp. 164-5, 167-8; Mackinaw, at para. 17; Davies, at paras. 30-1, 36; Colman, at paras. 19, 27, 29; Solan and Tiersma, “Hearing Voices...”, at p. 386 (“when the circumstantial evidence is robust, the risk of error is rather low”)
Are events following a particular conversation, in which a person was identified as the speaker, consistent with the purported identification, for example was an arranged meeting carried through: Williams, at p. 164
Whether careful notes were made by police officers of the dates and times when they attempted to recognize voices on tape: Flynn, at para. 54.

[116] The net effect is that the law therefore permits the trial judge to admit evidence regarding voice identification with the appropriate evidentiary foundation. This is useful guidance in an extradition application.

[117] Second, when the voice opinion evidence is not ruled inadmissible for lack of foundation, it is for the trier of fact, with proper cautions and careful scrutiny to determine what findings of fact or identification can be made. Voice identification evidence requires careful consideration itself because of its inherent frailties and dangers. I have considered this important issue and evidence carefully because of the hazards of voice misidentification, mindful of my duties in the extradition context.

[118] In my view, the totality of the ROC and SROC contains a reasonable foundation for the admissibility of the FBI special agents’ opinion based on an analysis involving the comparison the voices on the collection of recordings (from the bank, Individual 1, and BSD or Bluff My Call data).

[119] Further, the FBI reasonably relies on additional circumstantial evidence connectors that support that the Respondents are involved in the fraud scheme. This compilation of evidence serves to distinguish this case from other limited cases where there was no foundation. The total evidence demonstrates that this voice identification evidence is not manifestly unreliable and is capable of supporting extradition.

[120] O’Connor, Balogun and Olaniyan self-identify on Canadian Bank recordings and provide specific personal information that enhances their reliability. I find that the recorded calls contents before me are of sufficient length, content, and clear quality for a listener to observe their voice, manner of speaking, phrasing, intonation, tone, and cadence and then compare them to other calls collected during the investigation.

[121] I recognize that voice traits such as intonation and cadence are subjective and prone to concerns about error derived by tainting, assumptions, and flawed identification process. However, although the recordings must be scrutinized meticulously at trial by the trier of fact before a final determination should be made, that does not mean the FBI’s analysis as explained in the ROC and SROC is inadmissible on the facts of this extradition application. The voice evidence is an important part of the FBI’s case, but it is part of a wider compilation of evidence that reasonably relates to the Respondents.

[122] In the BMO call, O’Connor identifies herself by name, debit card number, and email address. While apparently speaking on another device, she can be overhead stating that she is an employee of the “Board of Pharmacy” seeking information about the call recipient’s primary supplier of diabetic test strips. This happens more than once.

[123] The ROC states that the Bluff My Call number associated with O’Connor, 9647, was used many times in a manner consistent with the scheme disguised as various state licensing agencies.

[124] As the SROC explains at para. 5 and following, Balogun called TD bank and identified his name, business name, phone number, and account card number. Both SA Camp and SA West listened to numerous calls from BSD from number 9293 and compared them to the TD call and determined that the voices on the TD call and the BSD data sound like the same person. SA West listened to the recorded calls sequentially and believes they are the same person.

[125] Further, Individual 1 recorded Balogun on December 1, 2022 and identifies Balogun. Individual 1 also identifies “Dream” as their contact and has numerous bank transfers sent to Olaniyan’s bank account for payments.

[126] Josue Rivera also provided voice messages from the person he bought stolen supplies from. SA West reviewed those recordings and believed that the voice is consistent with Balogun’s on the recorded bank calls.

[127] The bank call recordings were filed as exhibits at the extradition hearing. I have reviewed them.

[128] I am satisfied in this case that the total evidentiary foundation reasonably grounds the FBI agents’ view in the ROC and SROC that the recordings involve the same people, namely each of the Respondents, factoring the total information and traits exhibited: SROC, at paras. 3-7.

[129] At this stage, based on the total evidence collected, there are sufficient identification connections coupled with similar voice traits: intonation, cadence, phrasing and accent. This court must accept that part of the ROC and SROC as accurate. However, the FBI officers’ opinion can be challenged by the Respondents at trial where it is for the trial judge to decide ultimate admissibility and weight. It will be for the trier of fact to ultimately determine whether voice identification has been established.

[130] Certification of evidence in the record as set out in s. 33(3)(a) of the Extradition Act raises a presumption that the evidence in a ROC is reliable. This follows from the principles of comity between Canada and the requesting state. Certification is the indicium of reliability that Parliament has prescribed for evidence in these circumstances. Unless successfully challenged, certification establishes reliability: Ferras, at para. 52.

[131] The presumption of reliability may be rebutted by evidence showing “fundamental inadequacies or frailties in the material relied on by the requesting state”: M.M., at para. 72, citing Anderson, at para. 31.

[132] In this case, the Respondents did not call any evidence to rebut the presumption. They did not provide an adequate basis for this court to find that the Respondents’ self-identification and relaying of personal information to Canadian banks was not reliable and that these recordings did not provide a suitable comparator for the US collected calls. They relied on primarily on legal arguments to submit that the FBI comparison was inadmissible lay opinion and that an expert was required.

[133] I must contextualize that in United States of America v. Yang (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 52, at paras. 51-52 (Ont. C.A.), Rosenberg J.A. emphasized that if such evidence is admissible in the US it is because their experience is that this kind of evidence can be weighed by the judicial official and will be accorded the weight it deserves.

[134] A further important to recognize is that the ROC is a summary of the requesting state’s evidence serving as a necessary way to communicate to this court the evidence collected during the investigation and its ability to establish the elements of the offence fraud. Certification establishes that the evidence actually exists and is available for trial: Ferras, at paras. 57-58; Extradition Act, s. 33(3). It appears to me that the Respondents have not recognized this over-arching purpose, focusing their argument that the FBI opinion evidence that the voices are similar is inadmissible without a qualified expert, rather than also considering that the records filed are a summary of relevant, material and admissible recording evidence that sufficiently supports the offence is made out so that the Respondents can be tried in the US.

[135] Where there is certification of the record, this court has a duty to accept the FBI’s analysis in the ROC and SROC in support of identification.

[136] The voice evidence is not the only identification evidence. There is a considerable body of circumstantial evidence that proves identification. For instance, there is the call data comparison that correlates the true call numbers (and IMEI) with the Respondents. Their voices are heard on these calls as compared to the baseline bank recordings. Also, Individual 1 provided identification evidence relying on past experience, a recording of a call, in combination with a photo identification of Balogun. Individual 1 also recorded “Dream,” and did receive a package after arranging for delivery from the person they knew to be “Dream” and “John.” Individual 1 will say that they were doing business with Dream and John for months, and that John is Olaniyan.

[137] This is not a case where concerns about the reliability of the evidence are enough to prompt the outright rejection of the evidence: Anderson, at para. 30.

[138] I find R. v. Dixon, 2019 ONCA 698, at paras. 3-6 and 11, instructional on this point. Here the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s voice identification where the level of familiarity was limited. The witness and the accused went out on a dinner date, and then went back to the accused’s apartment where they watched television and had a couple of drinks. This was the only contact they had before the phone call giving rise to the voice identification evidence. The Court looked to the totality of evidence and upheld the trial judge’s findings:

[11] The trial judge found that the nature and extent of R.J.’s previous face-to-face contact with the appellant “allowed her to be sufficiently familiar with Mr. Dixon’s voice to be able to recognize it.” The trial judge recognized that “the weakest” aspect of R.J.’s evidence was her “struggle with articulating specific objective criteria for voice recognition.” However, R.J. testified that she recognized the appellant’s voice because he spoke in a particular manner. Moreover, in finding the appellant guilty, the trial judge also relied on the content of the telephone call, which he found added “significant weight to the voice identification analysis.” In this call, the appellant identified himself as the caller. The details of the call (i.e., concerning the night the two went on a date and the charge that he was facing at the time) clearly pointed to the appellant as the caller.

Balogun

[139] The ROC establishes that there is sufficient evidence that Balogun engaged in the offence of fraud over 5 thousand dollars, contrary to section 380 of the Criminal Code, thereby justifying his extradition.

[140] After excluding the unreliable ethnic accent conclusion evidence at para. 27 of the ROC, I am satisfied that based on the totality of evidence available for trial that there are indicia of reliability on each essential element of the corresponding Canadian offence, upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict: M.M., at para. 64.

[141] As noted above, I accept the AGC position that the FBI’s voice identification of the accused Respondents is admissible.

[142] The ROC and SROC establish that Balogun used the Bluff My Call service to call pharmacies, using a True Number, connected to him, but spoofed as either Heartland Pharmacy to call Company 1, or Company 1 when calling the Heartland Pharmacies. This was done to execute the fraud scheme. See: ROC, at paras. 50, 52, and 61.

[143] The ROC and SROC sufficiently establishes that Balogun deliberately obtained from the Fayetteville Pharmacy, through intentional deceit and fraudulent means, their account information, and used it to order supplies from Company 1, putting the pharmacy and / or Company 1’s financial interests at risk for over 5 thousand dollars. Further, Balogun participated in a scheme to use that fraudulently obtained pharmacy account information to knowingly deceive Company 1. This was accomplished by selling supplies on Gentry and Fayetteville Pharmacies’ accounts with the intention to defraud or cause risk of financial deprivation to Company 1, and diverting the delivery of the order for resale, while not paying for the order.

[144] Balogun repeatedly used the Bluff My Call spoofing service to facilitate the fraud. He called the Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry, Arkansas, on October 19, 2021 from various “True Calling Numbers.” For two of those calls, the spoofed number was that of Company 1. Balogun is identified as the “True Caller” for one of the calls placed on October 19, 2021. The True Calling Number associated to Balogun ends 9293.

[145] Balogun is further noted as the “True Caller Identity” for two calls placed to Company 1 on October 18, 2021 and October 19, 2021. In these calls, the spoofed identity was that of Heartland Pharmacy, in Gentry, Arkansas.

[146] On or about October 20, 2021, another True Call Number associated to Balogun (2268) contacted the Heartland Pharmacy in Fayetteville, Arkansas to perpetuate the same type of fraud. On October 19 and 20, 2021, this number contacted NWA Courier multiple times to retrieve the supplies. The courier’s evidence noted above is further evidence of the fraud scheme.

[147] Telusion Inc. is a telecommunications company that maintains a call-forwarding service known as “Tossable Digits.” The spoofed number used to contact NWA Courier described above, was a “virtual phone number.” Based on the FBI’s review of Telusion toll data, the spoofed number forwarded calls on October 19 and 20, 2021 to the number associated to Balogun (2268).

[148] The packages sent to the residence of Sylvia Ortiz referenced above displayed numbers that if dialed would be forwarded to Balogun’s associated number (2268), which was used to contact both Heartland Pharmacies and NWA Courier.

[149] The True Calling Number associated to Balogun matches the 9293 number used by Balogun as a contact number on bank accounts for a company called “Diabetic Inventory Management.” Toronto Police obtained recorded calls of Balogun offering this phone number in conversations with bank employees.

[150] SA Camp assessed the four “True Call Numbers” used to call Heartland Pharmacy Gentry, identified in the chart in the ROC (at para. 52), and the association each number has to Balogun, O’Connor, and Olaniyan.

[151] The recordings obtained from Bluff My Call pursuant to a search warrant confirm that Balogun, as identified by his voice, used the number 9293 consistent with the scheme.

[152] Bluff My Call toll records show that the same number ending 9293 was used on the platform more than 1000 times, many of which appear consistent with the scheme, i.e., calls placed to and from pharmacies and distributors under the guise of licensing boards, pharmacies, and distributors.

[153] In addition, recorded calls on this number reveal that O’Connor also used this service.

[154] SA Camp determined that recordings obtained from Bluff My Call pursuant to a search warrant confirm that Balogun, as identified by his voice, used the number 9293 consistent with the scheme. For example, on October 29, 2021 (shortly after the Heartland fraud) Balogun is heard calling FedEx, using the alias “Paul” seeking to ship a package. This is clear evidence of continuing deception to commit the fraud against the pharmacies and suppliers.

[155] SA Camp is further expected to testify that Bluff My Call toll records show that the number 2268 was used hundreds of times on the platform, many of which appear consistent with the scheme. Available recorded calls using this number demonstrate that a person whose voice is consistent with Balogun used the number to execute the scheme.

[156] For example, on October 5, 2021, Balogun’s voice, using number ending 2268, contacts Bausch & Lomb, a medical provider of eye-health supplies pretending to be Capital Wholesale Drug Co., a wholesaler in Columbus, Ohio, using the alias “Paul Wilson” (the same alias used on previously identified PayPal and FedEx accounts associated with the scheme).

[157] The SROC, at para. 7, indicates that both SA Camp and SA West listened to numerous calls obtained from BSD Telecom originating from number 2268 as well as other calls containing Balogun's voice, including the one set out in paragraph 57 of the ROC.

[158] The ROC states that based on the numerous calls, sound of the voice, cadence and manner of speaking, both SA Camp and SA West believe the voice on the recordings is that of Balogun.

[159] Individual 1’s evidence, as a co-conspirator that is cooperating with the FBI, also connects Balogun (and Olaniyan which is detailed below) directly to the scheme. Individual 1 received and then sold medical supplies for profit and sent proceeds to Balogun. Individual 1 said that they did business with Balogun and Olaniyan in relation to medical supplies.

[160] The ROC establishes how Individual 1 is implicated and now co-operating. In January, 2021, the Respondents used fraudulently obtained information to order approximately $150,000 USD of diabetic testing equipment and supplies from Company 2. The FBI prepared a dummy package and placed a tracking device in the package to determine its destination. The package was tracked to a personal mailbox at a UPS store in Florida that belonged to Individual 1.

[161] SA Berntsson worked with Keller Apothecary and Company 2 to allow the conspirators to gain access to Keller Apothecary’s account username and password. On January 26, 2021, the conspirators used this information to order approximately $150,000 of diabetic testing equipment and supplies from Company 2. SA Berntsson confirmed with Keller Apothecary that it did not order these supplies. The order of supplies was never processed and shipped.

[162] Instead, SA Berntsson prepared “dummy” packages and placed a tracking device in the packages to determine its destination and ultimate recipient. The packages were picked up from Keller Apothecary by a courier, on January 27, 2021.

[163] SA Berntsson watched the courier deliver the package to a FedEx location in St. Louis, Missouri. SA Berntsson spoke with employees at the FedEx location, who relayed that they received information from a female caller identifying herself as “Laura Fisher” directing FedEx to consolidate the contents of the packages and deliver them to personal mailbox #654 at a UPS Store in Florida. The package was directed to the UPS store in Florida.

[164] SA Berntsson lawfully obtained through the U.S. legal process account information for personal mailbox #654, which returned to Individual 1.

[165] SA Berntsson conducted surveillance of the UPS store in Florida, where he witnessed and photographed a person collecting the tracked packages in a dark colored Volvo bearing a Florida license plate, registered to Individual 1. SA Berntsson followed Individual 1 to their house, where he conducted an interview.

[166] Individual 1 indicated that they operated Company 4 from their residence and regularly received shipments of diabetic testing supplies at the residence, and sold them on various internet platforms. Individual 1 indicated that they maintained invoices and business records on the premises, to include records related to a Canadian company, “DTS Management,” with whom they had been doing business.

[167] Individual 1 provided law enforcement with an invoice they obtained from “DTS Management” requesting payment for $24,388 for diabetic supplies sent on or about October 21, 2020, to be sent to “Timothy Balogun” at an address in Mississauga, Ontario.

[168] In para. 5 of the SROC, US authorities state that Individual 1 recorded a video call with Balogun on December 1, 2022. Further, Individual 1 is willing to testify that the person on this video is consistent with the person depicted in Exhibit “A” of the ROC, namely Balogun. Individual 1 states that the voice of the person on the video call is the same voice heard on their other calls with Balogun.

[169] In other words, it is not just the FBI’s voice evidence opinion that the ROC relies upon, but also Individual 1’s experience with Balogun and Olaniyan, and their identification of them: Johal, at para. 50. This is sufficient to make out a prima facie case. Whether the degree of contact between them is in fact sufficient to establish identification beyond a reasonable doubt will be for the judge or jury to decide at trial.

[170] FBI financial analysis indicates Individual 1 sent more than $120,000, over the course of four months, to a TD account ending in #808 that belongs to Balogun.

[171] This body of evidence establishes that Balogun deliberately used deceit to knowingly deprive pharmacies of their account information to order supplies of over 5 thousand dollars, on their accounts and against their financial interest. The information shows that the deceit was intentional to acquire and then use that information to deceive suppliers, in order to sell medical materials on credit to those accounts, causing them financial risk. Yet, the schemer’s intention was to intercept those supplies for resale, while the suppliers would not be paid.

[172] The ROC connects the Respondents to the scheme. Recorded calls on this number reveal that O’Connor also used this 9293 number at various times, as identified by her voice. For example, on June 21, 2021, O’Connor calls Company 1 under the identity of Price Chopper Pharmacy in Wilkes-Barre Township, Pennsylvania.

O’Connor

[173] The ROC and SROC establish that O’Connor participated in the fraud scheme to intentionally deceive pharmacies to give up their account information, in order to fraudulently order materials from suppliers in excess of 5 thousand dollars, with no intention of paying for them, knowingly causing risk of financial harm to the pharmacy and supplier Company. The goal was to get the supplies on the pharmacies’ credit by deceit and then knowingly divert them for resale and profit, with the proceeds going to the accounts of Balogun and Olaniyan.

[174] There is circumstantial and direct evidence of O’Connor’s involvement in the ongoing fraud scheme. The total evidence is sufficient and reliable to support reasonable inferences upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict Ms. O’Connor for the offence of fraud.

[175] As noted above, the Toronto Police Service obtained a compelling audio recording from the BMO dated May 13, 2021, involving O’Connor and the bank’s customer service employee. In the recording O’Connor voluntarily identifies herself to the BMO service representative by name (Rachel O’Connor), debit card number, and email address. She does so to get their assistance about unusual activity in her account. Important to the fraud allegations, at the outset of the call, Ms. O’Connor is specifically heard speaking on another device, in which she identifies herself calling from the “Board of Pharmacy” seeking information and stating they are doing some “auditing” and “we need to know who your major supplier is for diabetic products such as test strips.” Specific comments of this nature are repeated three times, and are clear evidence of involvement in the scheme.

[176] In this same call, the BMO service representative advises Ms. O’Connor that her bank account had been suspended earlier in the month and she is asked if she has access to her email address. She is initially not responsive, occupied on the other call, and is heard a third time representing herself as from the “Board of Pharmacy” and asking “to know who your major supplier are for diabetic products such as test strips.” She concludes the call with the other person about the test strips, and then returns to the BMO call after the service representative is waiting for a response, stating “Hello?” a few times in an effort to get a response. During this call, Ms. O’Connor provides her email address which starts with the name Rachel (inaudible)@gmail.com and is sent a temporary password to restore access to her bank account.

[177] Ms. O’Connor’s voluntary self-identification to the Bank and provision of contact information, while being overheard also claiming to be from the Board of Pharmacy and repeatedly seeking supplier information, together with the length, content and quality of the recording, establish that that the voice evidence is reliable circumstantial evidence that connects her the total evidence about the nature of the fraud scheme in Arkansas in the fall.

[178] The ROC also links O’Connor to a phone number ending 0341 from Rogers Communications. Analysis of Bluff My Call recordings indicate that this number was used to contact pharmacies in New Jersey and Georgia. See: ROC, at paras. 82-84.

[179] The connection between O’Connor and the Arkansas frauds is established through the Bluff My Call spoofing service, used to call the Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry, Arkansas on September 29, 2021, from a number ending 9647 registered to Rogers Communications.

[180] On or about September 29, 2021 and October 19, 2021 the True Call Number 9647 contacted the Heartland Pharmacy in Fayetteville, Arkansas to perpetuate the fraud.

[181] According to the FBI as explained in the ROC, O’Connor’s voice, as self-identified and heard on the recording from BMO, is the same to those analyzed on the Bluff My Call recordings from the US. The number 9647 was used to call pharmacies in Arkansas at the relevant time under the guise of a distributor to dupe the pharmacist out of their Company 1 and Company 2 supplier account data.

[182] The FBI has assessed that the same numbers 1539 and 9647 used to commit the fraud on both the Heartland pharmacies in Gentry and Fayetteville, Arkansas, were also used to perpetrate the attempted fraud on Health Depot in Greenwood, Arkansas.

[183] Based on voice comparison evidence, the FBI believes O’Connor’s voice is heard on those calls. As noted above the basis for this belief is reasonable and admissible in the total circumstances. See the chart called “summary of numbers used” at para. 69 of the ROC.

[184] Ms. O’Connor was recorded clearly in Canada claiming to be an employee of a Board of Pharmacy seeking supplier information of diabetic test strips. This is sufficient evidence of intentional deception of posing as an employee under a false pretense to access information consistent with the exact same scheme subsequently executed months later in Arkansas.

[185] There is also circumstantial evidence that further connects Ms. O’Connor to the scheme. FedEx user account 663839560, registered to “Paul Wilson,” was used to input data for shipping labels associated with the shipment of supplies from the Gentry and Fayetteville Heartland Pharmacies. This same FedEx account tracked a separate package from IP address 209.141.137.244. This IP address returns to “Rachel Connor” at 530 Hancock Way, Mississauga, Ontario (ROC, at paras. 79 and 82).

[186] Although the ROC explains O’Connor’s involvement in a different manner compared to Balogun and Olaniyan, the total information still establishes a sufficient case that she knowingly participated in the fraud conspiracy to warrant committal for extradition.

[187] I have considered that the BMO call and Arkansas fraud are separated by months, and this arguably weakens the connection to O’Connor’s involvement in the allegations in Arkansas. However, the BMO call is direct evidence of the scheme and voice analysis evidence must not be viewed in isolation. When connected with the FBI analysis of the Rogers communication data tying O’Connor with the common number 9647 with the Bluff My Call recording data and voice analysis, there is sufficient evidence of O’Connor’s involvement in the Arkansas fraud in the fall of 2021.

[188] The ROC sets out how this same method overhead on the BMO call, was used to defraud the two Arkansas pharmacies and suppliers. Ms. Anderson, pharmacist at Heartland Pharmacy in Fayetteville, Arkansas states that in late September to early October 2021, a person called posing as being with the Arkansas State Board of Pharmacy, claiming they were required to update Heartland’s wholesaler information file for 2022. The caller convinced Ms. Anderson to provide their account number for Company 1. Further, on October 20, 2021, a woman called posing as working for Company 1, and stating that an order was shipped by mistake. The caller’s number appeared as Company 1. The caller said they would retrieve the package once notified it had arrived. Anderson consulted with her supervisor and learned a similar scheme occurred in Gentry. Anderson called Company 1 and confirmed that the caller was not their employee.

[189] Similarly, the pharmacist from Heartland Pharmacy in Gentry, Arkansas says that on October 19, 2021, a woman, who identified herself as Diane Shaw, called, posing as an employee of Company 1 and claiming that Company 1 had shipped an order of medical supplies by mistake to Heartland Pharmacy, and that a courier would come to collect the package from the pharmacy. NWA courier, a package courier service in Bentonville, Arkansas arrived on October 19, 2021 and retrieved the package.

[190] The ROC states that the recorded calls from the US shows that a woman with the same distinct voice as O’Connor used the phone number ending in 9647 to call pharmacies under the guise of a distributor, to obtain their Company 1 and Company 2 account data (ROC, at paras. 56 and 69).

[191] The total evidence about the nature and execution of the scheme establishes that O’Connor knowingly participated in the plan that involved the use of courier companies to collect and then redirect the supplies on October 19, 2021 from Heartland Pharmacies in Gentry and Fayetteville. Based on an email from “Diane Shaw,” the NWA Courier picked up the Gentry package and delivered it to the local FedEx for delivery to Ricardo Oliveras in Orlando, Florida. The sender address was for Maria Oliveras and the same shipping labels were used for the Fayetteville pharmacy. To be clear, I recognize that it is not established that O’Connor is necessarily Diane Shaw or the “woman” but it has been shown that O’Connor is part of the overall scheme where the couriers were used.

Olaniyan

[192] The total evidence is sufficient and reliable to support reasonable inferences relied on by the Requesting State upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict Mr. Olaniyan for the Canadian offence of fraud. His involvement in the fraud scheme designed to obtain profits from the resale of the fraudulently obtained medical supplies is supported by the following information in the ROC and SROC.

[193] Individual 1’s bank records, obtained through U.S. legal process, detail a series of payments over the course of three years totaling nearly $720,000 USD, to bank accounts associated with Olaniyan’s CIBC and TD accounts.

[194] Josue Rivera, referred to above, sent more than $46,000 USD, over the course of seven months to accounts belonging to Olaniyan. See ROC at paras. 71-77.

[195] There are also repeated and significant financial transfers between Olaniyan and Balogun. They are generally proximate to when Individual 1 and Rivera are sending transfers to Olaniyan and Rivera for the proceeds from the resale of the supplies.

[196] Pursuant to a search warrant, extraction and analysis of Individual 1’s device, the FBI found Individual 1’s WhatsApp messages with Olaniyan from April 2020 until February 2021, which detailed the identification and negotiation of prices for, purchase, and payment terms of medical supplies, primarily diabetic test strips.

[197] Individual 1 identified Olaniyan on their phone as “Dream.” Further, Individual 1 voice recorded "Dream." Individual 1 states that they purchased supplies from “Dream,” and “John” and sent payment to “Dream” by wire transfer to bank accounts in Canada bearing the name Adeyanju Olaniyan. Individual 1 says that Olaniyan directed them to label wire transfers as payments for automobile payments or sales despite being payments for medical supplies. This is clear evidence of continuing deliberate deceit to cover the fraud scheme.

[198] Individual 1’s evidence about being a seller of medical supplies and working with “Dream” and “John” identifying John as Olaniyan, assists to establish identification when tied together with the bank information and recordings.

[199] FBI agents reviewed the voice in the recording obtained by Individual 1 and another recording, gathered through Judicial Orders obtained by TPS for CIBC, in which an individual identifying themselves as Adeyanju Olaniyan spoke with a CIBC employee regarding an account belonging to Adeyanju Olaniyan operating as Vegax Group. In the call, the person provided the bank employee his name and account number. See SROC at para. 1

[200] The FBI listened to the recordings numerous times and sequentially. Based on the voice, cadence, and tone of the recordings, SA West believes the voices on the recordings belong to the same person, namely Olaniyan.

[201] Canadian bank records show Olaniyan identifies his telephone number as one with the same IMEI as the number that “Dream” or Olaniyan used to contact Individual 1. This is evidence that the user of the two numbers used the same physical device.

[202] DC Williams states that CIBC accounts for Olaniyan operating as “Monic & Morgan” and accounts for Olaniyan operating as “AMBM,” identifies Olaniyan’s phone number. Records obtained from Rogers detail the IMEI for that same number. Records received from Canadian telecommunications provider Telus reveal that the number that “Dream” Olaniyan used to contact Individual 1 has that same exact IMEI. DC Williams will say that in his experience, this likely means that the user of the two numbers used the same physical device.

[203] The FBI analysis shows that Olaniyan used the Bluff My Call service posing as various entities to contact pharmacies, UPS stores and other related entities which serves as circumstantial evidence of involvement in deception. See: ROC, at para. 70.

[204] This total body of evidence is sufficient to establish that Olaniyan intentionally engaged in deception to pharmacies or couriers consistent with the scheme; and worked directly with co-conspirators to sell medical supplies for profit that he knew were intentionally acquired by deception would cause risk of financial deprivation to pharmacies or suppliers.

Conclusion

[205] I am satisfied that the there is significant circumstantial evidence and direct evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer identity for each of the Respondents’ involvement in the fraud scheme. In other words, the evidence proffered by the requesting state in these proceedings meets the test for committal by establishing sufficient evidence for committal that Balogun, O’Connor and Olaniyan are the persons who engaged in the alleged fraud over five thousand dollars.

[206] Having considered all of the evidence, I conclude that there is sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could find: 1) that each of the three Respondents are the persons who engaged in the prohibited conduct described in the Records of the Case, and 2) that there is admissible evidence under the Extradition Act of criminal conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada for the offence of fraud over 5 thousand dollars contrary to section 380 of the Criminal Code.

[207] I therefore order that all of the Respondents, Balogun, O’Connor and Olaniyan, be committed into custody to await surrender, pursuant to s. 29 of the Act.

[208] Pursuant to s. 38(2) of the Extradition Act, I am obliged to inform each Respondent that you will not be surrendered until after the expiry of 30 days and that each of you has a right to appeal the order I have made and to apply for judicial interim release or bail.

[209] Finally, under s. 38 of the Act, I direct that the following documents be transmitted to the Minister of Justice: a copy of the committal order, and all exhibits introduced at this hearing, together with this ruling. I do not intend to make a report to the Minister of Justice under s. 38 of the Act.

[210] The extradition applications are granted.

Mirza, J.

Released: April 25, 2025

2025 ONSC 2374

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-213-MO/CR-23-214-MO/ CR-23-215-MO

DATE.: 2025-04-25

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Applicants

and -

ADEYANJU OLANIYAN,

RACHEL O’CONNOR, and

TIMOTHY BALOGUN

Respondents

EXTRADITION RULING

Mirza, J.

Released: April 25, 2025

United States of America v. Olaniyan, O’Connor, and Balogun, 2025 ONSC 2374

Case Summary

United States of America v. Olaniyan, O’Connor, and Balogun, 2025 ONSC 2374

Overview

Summary of the Grounds for Extradition

Bluff My Call - Spoofing Accounts

Other Pharmacies and Suppliers Affected

Co-conspirator Witnesses

Individual 1

Josue Rivera

Canadian Investigation

Voice Opinion Evidence

The Law

Essential Principles

Positions

Analysis

Fraud

Voice Evidence of Balogun and O’Connor

Balogun

O’Connor

Olaniyan

Conclusion

Cited By (1 case)

United States of America v. Olaniyan, 2025 ONCA 542

Appeal History

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Legislation 2