Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-03-13
Docket: COA-24-CV-1212
Coram: J.C. MacPherson, Grant Huscroft, J. Dawe JJ.A.

Between:
Tanya Rebello
Plaintiff (Appellant)

and

His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario as represented by the Attorney General for Ontario, the Premier of Ontario and Ministry of the Attorney General
Defendants (Respondents)

Appearances:

• Tanya Rebello, acting in person
• Adam Mortimer and Bhavini Lekhi, for the respondents

Heard: 2025-03-11

On appeal from the order of Justice Robert Centa of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 1, 2024, with reasons reported at 2024 ONSC 6097.

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

[1] In April 2018, ServiceOntario erroneously transferred the registered ownership of the appellant’s vehicle to an auto parts company. Although this mistake was corrected relatively quickly, it has led to extensive litigation with a complicated procedural history.

[2] We dismissed the appeal after hearing the appellant’s submissions, with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

A. Procedural Background

[3] At different times, the appellant commenced four different actions that named different defendants but made substantially overlapping claims. Her first action was commenced in 2018, but was dismissed in March 2019 because the appellant had not complied with the 60-day notice period in s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, which was in force at the time. The appellant unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal the dismissal of this action to the Divisional Court, to this court, and to the Supreme Court of Canada: Rebello v. Ontario (March 29, 2018), Toronto, CV-18-599902 (Ont. S.C.), leave to appeal to Div. Ct. refused, CD-207-19 (October 4, 2019), leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused, M50954 (June 23, 2020), leave to appeal refused, [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 390.

[4] The appellant then commenced two other actions in 2019, which included similar or identical claims relating to the April 2018 vehicle registration issue, but named different defendants.

[5] In May 2021 the second of the appellant’s two 2019 actions was dismissed as abandoned. Her recent efforts to appeal this dismissal order to this court were unsuccessful: Rebello v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 127.

[6] In September 2021, the appellant’s motion to amend her first 2019 action to add the Crown in right of Ontario (“Ontario”) as a defendant was dismissed by an Associate Judge. She appealed to the Divisional Court, but also commenced a new fourth action that largely replicated the claims in her first 2019 action, but named Ontario as a defendant.

[7] In July 2022, the Divisional Court allowed the appellant’s appeal from the dismissal of her motion to amend her first 2019 action, and granted her leave to amend the statement of claim in this action to add Ontario as a defendant: Rebello v. Ontario, 2022 ONSC 4094 (Div. Ct.). However, the appellant chose to pursue the new action that she had commenced in 2021 while her Divisional Court appeal was pending.

[8] The appellant’s 2021 action proceeded to a summary trial in December 2022, and was dismissed as limitations-barred in January 2023: Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 601. The appellant unsuccessfully appealed this order to this court: Rebello v. Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONCA 842, leave to appeal to S.C.C. requested, 41647.

[9] On November 1, 2024, Centa J. dismissed the appellant’s first 2019 action. He did so in part on the basis that the paragraphs of her statement of claim regarding the April 2018 registration transfer duplicated claims that had already been dismissed at the summary trial of her 2021 action, and were thus an abuse of process. He also found that the appellant should not be granted leave to amend her pleadings.

[10] The appellant is now appealing to this court from the order of Centa J. This is the appeal now before us.

B. Analysis

[11] The appellant advances three grounds of appeal against the order dismissing her action, and also seeks to appeal the costs award the motion judge made against her.

[12] First, she argues that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by dismissing her claims against Crown counsel, the Premier of Ontario, the Attorney General, and the judiciary as not disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

[13] In her pleadings, the appellant made allegations against the Crown lawyer who had obtained the March 2019 order that dismissed the appellant’s 2018 action for non-compliance with the Proceedings Against the Crown Act. The appellant alleged further that the Attorney General and the Premier of Ontario had been negligent by not preventing Crown counsel’s alleged misconduct, and that the Superior Court of Justice was negligent in permitting the appellant’s 2018 action to be dismissed without being heard on its merits.

[14] We see no error in the motion judge’s decision to strike these claims as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. He correctly noted that Crown counsel owed no duty of care to the appellant, and that Crown counsel and the judiciary were also protected by the common law doctrine of absolute privilege: see e.g., Amato v. Welsh, 2013 ONCA 258, para 1. The motion judge found further that none of the appellant’s pleaded claims against the Premier of Ontario and the Attorney General were “of the sort to give rise to a private law duty of care owed … to Ms. Rebello”, and that her pleadings were also “bald and conclusory and contain no material facts or particulars sufficient to survive a motion to strike”.

[15] These were findings the motion judge was entitled to make on the record before him. We also see no error in his decision to refuse leave to amend, on the basis that the claim contained “radical defects that are incapable of being cured”. He explained:

I was not provided with a draft amended statement of claim or any proposed language that would solve the defects that I have identified. In these circumstances, I would not grant leave to amend the statement of claim for a third time. [Footnotes omitted.]

We see no error in the motion judge’s reasons that would justify our interference.

[16] The appellant’s second ground of appeal is that the motion judge erred by finding that her action was an abuse of process because it replicates the same claims she had also made in her 2021 action, which she unsuccessfully took to summary trial in 2023. She argues that because her 2021 action was ultimately dismissed as limitations-barred, rather than being decided on the merits, it is not an abuse of process for her to continue to use her 2019 action as a vehicle for litigating her claims. The appellant also argues as her third ground of appeal that the motion judge erred by not adjourning the motion to await this court’s decision in her appeal from the decision that had dismissed her 2021 action as limitations-barred.

[17] We would note that while the motion judge found that many of the appellant’s claims in her 2019 pleadings were duplicative of ones she had also made in her 2021 action, he also found that others – notably, her allegations of mistreatment by the Ontario Provincial Police – duplicated claims she had previously made in a different 2017 action, in which the motion judge had previously granted summary judgment against her in 2023: Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 3574, aff’d 2024 ONCA 718, leave to appeal requested, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 462.

[18] As this court noted in La Française IC 2 v. Wires, 2024 ONCA 171, para 8, “[a]buse of process is a broad, flexible doctrine”, that “serves as an adaptable judicial tool to address circumstances that threaten the fairness and integrity of the court’s process and the administration of justice.”

[19] In the circumstances here, we see no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that it was an abuse of process for the appellant to attempt to litigate her claims by commencing multiple duplicative actions. To the extent that the appellant has any legitimate grievance that her claims have never been adjudicated on their merits, this is a consequence of her own litigation choices. She made the decision to use her 2021 action as her primary litigation vehicle, and to take this action to summary trial, in circumstances where she ought to have known there was a substantial risk it would be dismissed as limitations-barred. The motion judge did not err by concluding that it would be an abuse of process to permit the appellant to proceed with her largely duplicative 2019 action, while simultaneously pursuing an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from the decision of this court dismissing her 2021 action.

[20] We are also not persuaded that the motion judge erred by not adjourning the motion to await this court’s decision in the appellant’s appeal from the dismissal of her 2021 action. A judge’s decision “whether to grant or refuse an adjournment is discretionary and thus attracts a high degree of deference from this court”: McGregor v. Pitawanakwat, 2017 ONCA 77, para 13. The motion judge declined the appellant’s adjournment request because he decided that a decision by him dismissing the appellant’s 2019 action would not prejudice her appeal to this court from the decision dismissing her 2021 action, and vice versa. We see no error in this conclusion, or in the motion judge’s exercise of his discretion in this case.

[21] We would accordingly dismiss the appellant’s appeal from the order striking her statement of claim and dismissing her action.

[22] Finally, the appellant also seeks to appeal the motion judge’s decision to order that she pay $6,243.55 as costs of the motion.

[23] Since the appellant’s substantive appeal is being dismissed, she is required to seek leave to appeal the motion judge’s discretionary costs award: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 133(b). As explained in McFlow Capital Corp. v. James, 2021 ONCA 753, para 50:

To grant leave, there must be “strong grounds upon which the appellate court could find that the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion”. This includes errors in principle or a costs award that is plainly wrong. [Citations omitted.]

[24] Ms. Rebello has not sought leave. In any event, even if she had done so, we see no basis for interfering with the motion judge’s exercise of his discretion to award costs to the successful party on the motion, or to fix the amount of these costs in the amount that he did.

C. Disposition

[25] In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Leave to appeal the motion judge’s costs award was not sought, but would not have been granted in any event. Costs of the appeal are fixed at $3,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable by the appellant to the respondents.

“J.C. MacPherson J.A.”
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”
“J. Dawe J.A.”