Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-19-599144 Date: November 3, 2025 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Tanya Rebello Plaintiff

And:

Police Unit Commander Mark Barkley, Police Inspector Joanne Beaven-Desjardins, Police Chief Mark Saunders, Toronto Police Service Board, Police Unit Commander Reuben Stroble, Police Inspector Warren Wilson, Police Detective Andrew Johnstone, Police Constable Francis Yung, Police Constable Jean Breese and Police Constable Christopher Mitchell

Defendants

Before: Associate Justice Josefo

Appearances:

• Tanya Rebello, for the Plaintiff, self-represented
• Cara Davies, counsel for the Defendants

Date Heard: October 30, 2025

Date of Decision: November 3, 2025

Endorsement

What the Motion is About/Overview of Relevant Facts

[1] The plaintiff moves to set aside the October 31, 2024 Order of the registrar, made pursuant to Rule 48.14, which dismissed for delay this action commenced June 5, 2018 ("18 action"). Plaintiff also sought to extend the set-down deadline for this 18 action until June 30, 2026. That June 30, 2026 date is the same set-down deadline ordered for two other actions brought by the plaintiff: CV-20-636037 and CV-20-654082 (collectively referred to herein as the "20 actions").

[2] Plaintiff also moves to amend the 18 action statement of claim. Given limited court time available when the motion was argued, I informed the parties that I would only hear the motion to set aside the dismissal order. If I found in favour of the plaintiff on this aspect of the motion, then the motion to amend pleadings would be subsequently heard by me.

[3] The 18 action involves various allegations against the Toronto Police pursuant to dealings which plaintiff had with various officers in or about 2017-2018. The plaintiff was apparently not satisfied with how her complaints were handled regarding, inter alia, neighbours about whom she complained, her property manager and others allegedly smoking in a common hallway of her building, as well as allegations including conspiracy, and how her complaints were investigated regarding the (alleged) theft of her VIN number by a car dealership, with alleged involvement by Service Ontario employees. The plaintiff seeks over $200 million dollars in this claim of 25 pages. While I acknowledge, as defendants submitted, that the claim is in places hard to follow and seemingly repetitive, defendants brought no cross-motion pursuant to Rule 25.11.

[4] The 20 actions also involve allegations against the Toronto Police, yet for the time period between approximately 2018 through 2020. These allegations include, inter alia, that members of the police force "threatened, bullied, terrorized, intimidated, and invaded the plaintiff's privacy in…her residence," and that various members of the police force "filed multiple false reports" in her name, regarding incidents in which she was not involved (see, for example, paragraphs 1a, and 6-14 of the 20 action ending in 54082).

[5] The 20 actions referenced above, and this 18 action were, on consent on May 14, 2021, ordered to "have a trial together or one immediately after the other, subject to the discretion of the trial judge", by Master McGraw (now, Associate Justice McGraw). In his Endorsement of that date, Associate Justice McGraw explained why he did not order the parties to examinations for discovery as the plaintiff sought— because the defendants intended to bring a summary judgment motion. He thus directed that a timetable be addressed at CPC, which timetable would lead to either cross-examinations on affidavits or examinations for discovery, as the CPC Judge concluded.

[6] Yet, from my review of the comprehensive motion record, despite defendants attempting to move this matter forward for hearing of their summary judgment motion, ever since first informing the plaintiff on January 9, 2019 of the intention to bring one, plaintiff did all she could do to stymie that process. See, for one example in that regard, plaintiff's email of March 13, 2025 to counsel for defendants. Therein, plaintiff references the March 12, 2025 Endorsement of Justice Dow. Justice Dow refused what was the plaintiff's second attempt to set aside the Registrar's dismissal Order in this 18 action, which Order had then been made approximately five months earlier, and he directed the plaintiff to bring the appropriate motion. Plaintiff's email of March 13, 2025 demonstrates, inter alia, plaintiff's resistance to bringing said motion to an Associate Justice:

"Also, Justice Dow's procedural order at CPC Court can be overridden by the Case Conference Judge hearing this matter, which will not be Justice Dow under any circumstances. I am not waiting until January 2026 for a motion which a Case Conference Judge can decide right away without a motion. Also, so we are clear, I DO NOT CONSENT TO ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, it will be only a summary trial for all three actions…[ as written, including in capital letters ]"

[7] As alluded to above, the attendance before Justice Dow was the second time that plaintiff sought to set aside the dismissal Order in this 18 action at a case conference. She had first approached Justice Akbarali on February 13, 2025, when before her on a different Application (CV-25-00734506-0000), which Application was ultimately dismissed as an abuse of process. Addressing the plaintiff's request to set aside the dismissal order, Justice Akbarali stated as follows:

"Third, I decline to set aside the administrative dismissal or to vary the timelines by which the oldest two of Ms. Rebello's actions must be set down for trial. The respondent did not consent. It notes that, while the actions were ordered tried together, they were not ordered consolidated. The oldest of the claims dates from 2018, and the respondent alleges presumed prejudice. The question had not been prepared for discussion at this case conference. Accordingly, it is not appropriate for me to make an order without the consent of the respondent, until the issue is properly canvassed."

[8] After not succeeding before Justice Akbarali, then trying unsuccessfully for the second time to obtain what she wanted from Justice Dow, the plaintiff, pursuant to her March 13, 2025 email referenced above, next approached Justice Glustein for her third try. At a case conference on May 16, 2025, plaintiff asked Justice Glustein to set aside the within dismissal Order. Justice Glustein extended the set-down deadlines of the 20 actions to June 30, 2026, and he also set a timetable for the summary judgment hearing process for these two actions. Yet he did not set aside the dismissal Order in the 18 action. Instead, Justice Glustein directed the plaintiff (as had Justice Dow, previously) to bring the appropriate motion before an Associate Judge.

[9] For her fourth try, on October 15, 2025, the plaintiff asked Justice Papageorgiou at a case conference to set aside the dismissal order. The court again refused and directed that this motion be heard by an associate judge on an urgent basis, given the risk to the timetable earlier put in place by Glustein, J. for the pending summary judgment motion to address the two 20 actions.

[10] Finally, the plaintiff sought to bring this motion, which was scheduled before me on October 30, 2025 on an urgent basis. The plaintiff asserted before me that the urgency of this motion was because of the May 2026 return date for the defendants' summary judgment motion for the 20 actions, with plaintiff's deadline for delivery of materials rapidly upcoming. In my view, however, any urgency was self-induced; it was strictly and solely due to the actions of the plaintiff in deliberately choosing not to heed the direction which she was repeatedly given. This motion could and indeed, should, have been brought much earlier, and on a non-urgent basis. Considering that the plaintiff did not bring this motion for almost a full year, it cannot be found that the plaintiff moved with alacrity to seek to set aside the dismissal Order of the registrar.

[11] Beyond all this prevarication regarding this motion, the plaintiff also did not proceed with alacrity in this within action. Pleadings closed July 9, 2018. The defendants delivered their draft (November 1, 2019) affidavit of documents with Schedule "A" productions, and later followed with the sworn version (on January 30, 2020). By contrast, plaintiff only delivered her sworn affidavit of documents on January 30, 2023. I find no acceptable explanation for this three year delay. Overall, nothing of much consequence has happened in this action from the more than six years from when it was commenced until the registrar administratively dismissed it.

[12] Despite being given clear guidance in the process to follow by several jurists, starting in 2021 with Associate Justice McGraw, who urged then that the parties work out a summary judgment timetable at CPC, the plaintiff has not heeded such guidance. She has, in essence, since she commenced this action, chosen to follow her own direction.

[13] That included the plaintiff repeatedly serving notices of examination on the defendants, trying to push the defendants to discoveries. Yet doing that was contrary to the McGraw Order. Associate Justice McGraw clearly struck out in the draft Order presented to him any requirement for discovery. As discussed above, he instead told the parties to attend CPC to arrange a timetable for either discoveries or cross-examinations, given the defendants' intention to pursue a summary judgment motion. Notably, in his Endorsement, he offered to make himself available to assist the parties, if they wished. There is no record, however, of plaintiff ever seeking to pursue that assistance.

[14] The plaintiff is representing herself. Normally, the Court offers much latitude for individuals in that circumstance. Yet this lay litigant is, as the record shows, well experienced in litigation. There are, since 2017, 42 reported decisions on involving this plaintiff. In Rebello v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 202, the Court of Appeal found that she had engaged in an abuse of process given multiple claims addressing the same or similar matters. Further, in Rebello v. Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONCA 842, the Court of Appeal upheld a large cost award against the plaintiff, finding that:

"[24] The trial judge also found as a fact that the appellant is an "experienced litigant," who would well have known the consequences of proceeding as she did. Indeed from 2018 onwards, a review of reported costs decisions indicates that the appellant has had at least six other costs awards against her. She has been repeatedly admonished for bringing meritless motions and proceedings based on unfounded allegations. Of course, the appellant is not to be punished for prior litigation in which costs have already been determined. The costs award must address the current litigation before the court. The point to be made is simply that, because of her prior experience, the appellant was on notice that frivolous litigation could lead to a substantial costs award.

[25] As this court very recently advised the appellant, a self-represented litigant is not exempt from costs: Rebello v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2024 ONCA 718, at para. 17."

[15] Recently, in Rebello v. Toronto Police Services Board et al., 2025 ONSC 5358, which involved the 20 actions, Justice Callaghan found at paragraph 17 that the plaintiff had "misled and misused the court process" when she took a consent from a prior amended pleading and used such consent from the defendants for that prior occasion to attempt to have approved by court order current amendments (to which defendants had not consented). At paragraph 22, plaintiff's conduct is called "highly problematic and worrisome", and ultimately, it was found to be an abuse of process.

[16] The plaintiff objected to the defendant referring me to this decision of Callaghan, J., asserting that as it is under appeal I could not consider it. I disagree. Unless and until it is overturned, I am entitled to reference it, so long as it is relevant. Given it, along with some of the other cases involving the plaintiff, discusses the plaintiff's experience in litigation, which she put in issue by claiming to be not particularly knowledgeable, I find it to be relevant.

[17] In this within matter, the plaintiff has also taken a concerning step: On October 6, 2025, she sent an email to the Assistant Trial Coordinators ("ATC") for Associate Judges, but she did not include in her motion record what her email stated. Her email was also not copied to counsel for defendant, whom she knew was on the record in this matter. I further find that plaintiff knew that she should have copied counsel for defendant on such correspondence to the court.

[18] In her motion record, the plaintiff only included the October 6, 2025 response of an ATC who, based on what was stated to her, was led to believe that the within 18 action had been "automatically dismissed in error". Yet, of course, the plaintiff was aware, having been given repeated direction, that she had to bring a motion to set aside the dismissal. No other jurist concluded that the dismissal by the registrar was in error, which could be automatically set aside on request. Rather, the other jurists whom the plaintiff approached had instructed her to bring this within motion.

[19] If a lawyer had acted in this fashion (writing to the court ex-parte; not including all relevant materials in a motion record, acting contrary to prior judicial direction), I would have concluded that the lawyer was engaged in "sharp practice". While again, the plaintiff is not a lawyer, she knows better than to write to the court absent copying counsel opposite, and not putting in her motion record all relevant evidence. She also I find knew, by the time she wrote to the ATC, that her only remedy was by way of motion to an Associate Judge. Yet she continued trying short-cuts and attempted an "end-run" around counsel opposite. This was improper.

Initial Conclusions

[20] Having reviewed the pleadings, I conclude that the 18 action is different from the 20 actions. While, if all was in order, these three matters involving the Toronto police and various officers as defendants could proceed together as Associate Justice McGraw had ordered, the dismissal of the 18 action does not preclude or prevent, somehow, the other two actions from being addressed at the upcoming summary judgment motion and, if so determined, subsequently at trial. The 20 actions are, I find, sufficiently stand-alone from the 18 action that they can proceed without the 18 action.

[21] Further, that, on May 14, 2021, there was a consent Order that these three cases be tried together (or one after the other as the trial judge deems best), in my view does not preclude that any of these could be administratively dismissed if past the five-year deadline (plus the then applicable Covid extension). As Akbarali, J. noted in her above-referenced Endorsement, these three cases were not consolidated so that the timeline for the most recent one arguably would apply to the earlier case. Indeed, the record shows that the 20 actions were also soon to be at risk of automatic/administrative dismissal until Justice Glustein ordered an extension of time for them.

[22] The above leads to my conclusion that there was no error made by the registrar when the 18 action was dismissed for delay more than six years after the action was commenced. The plaintiff took no steps to agree with counsel for defendant for a timetable Order; she did not seek a status hearing. Rather, she did nothing to preserve the action before it was dismissed, and she also took few substantive steps beyond an exchange of affidavits of documents (and the plaintiff was late doing this, too) to move the case forward for the over six years prior to dismissal. After the dismissal, as discussed above, the plaintiff, again, chose to resist directions given by various judges, until she finally accepted that she had to follow essentially the same process as all other litigants in Ontario.

[23] Rule 37.14(1)(C) provides that a person "affected by an order of a registrar" must move to set aside that order with a notice of motion "served forthwith". In this case, again, the plaintiff did not move with the necessary alacrity which the Rule requires. Rather, as the history above shows, she resisted bringing this motion for nearly a year, while the 18 action continued to stagnate.

Applying Relevant Case-law to Further Conclusions

[24] Beginning with the 2011 decision of Master Dash in Reid v Dow Corning Corp., 2011 O.J. No. 2365, to demonstrate that a registrar's order should be set aside, the plaintiff must:

i. establish a satisfactory explanation for her delay,

ii. lead satisfactory evidence to explain her intention to advance this action within the time limits, but only inadvertently failed,

iii. show that she moved forthwith to set aside the dismissal order as soon as it was known by her, and,

iv. lead evidence showing that the defendants have not suffered prejudice.

[25] It was held in Reid that these factors are considered together, with the court's objective to balance the interests of the parties to the action, along with the general public interest in timely civil justice. In Prescott v. Barbon, 2018 ONCA 504, at paragraphs 14 and following, the Court of Appeal reiterated its agreement with the Reid decision, further noting (paragraph 15) that the Reid test is not rigid or one-size-fits-all. Rather, it is to be applied contextually, with the four factors weighed to determine an overall just result in the circumstances of the individual case.

[26] In this matter, I am unable to find that the plaintiff has provided a satisfactory explanation for her delay. Neither her October 16, 2025 affidavit, nor her supplementary affidavit of October 24, 2025, justifies her delay in the context of this case as factually described herein. The reasons why this case was delayed was due to plaintiff doing all that she could to try to avoid a summary judgment motion, and in not heeding direction from the court.

[27] I have already several times discussed the May 14, 2021 Order of Associate Justice McGraw that the three actions be tried together, and have explained why this was not a panacea, nor an inoculation against the matter being dismissed. I agree with defendants that Rule 6.01 does not have as its purpose excusing parties from meeting timelines and deadlines, but rather it, inter alia, intends to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. Moreover, Rule 6.01(2) allows the Court to provide additional direction, if such is appropriate in the circumstances. That could include a time extension, for example. Other than Associate Justice McGraw noting that he would be available for the parties, no time extension or timetable Order was made by him.

[28] In this case, the parties were directed to attend at CPC to address a process and timetable. Again, due to the plaintiff's intransigence, that was long delayed. Yet her deliberate delay in attending CPC to address a timetable, and her choosing to ignore the directions given, cannot be either a satisfactory explanation for her delay, or which demonstrates only inadvertence in missing a deadline.

[29] Again, the plaintiff did not move "forthwith" to seek to set aside the dismissal Order. Rather, she deliberately ignored the requisite process, going so far as to try to have the order removed surreptitiously, when she knew that this (writing to the ATC ex-parte) was not the approach to follow.

[30] Turning to the issue of prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiff relies on the "occurrence reports" of the Toronto Police which remain available to the defendants. Such documents may be of some use, akin to an officer testifying by using her or his notes in court to refresh their memory. Yet in my view there comes a point when, even with notes (and it depends on how good or not good those notes are; how much detail is recorded, which will vary by each person involved in writing these reports), the events are simply too old and stale. Despite an attempt to jog or refresh memory, by notes or other means, stale events simply cannot be recalled, putting all these many defendants to this 18 action at a serious disadvantage. The existence of the General Occurrence reports in my view do not discharge the plaintiff's burden of establishing that the defendants have likely not suffered prejudice due to the years of delay in this case.

[31] In this 18 action the matters involved occurred in 2017-2018. Thus, at the most recent, this is seven years ago. As we are nearing the end of 2025, moreover, it will soon be eight years and counting. That is a very long time. There is a plethora of defendants to this action, with varying degrees of involvement alleged. Life has moved on for each of them over the nearly eight years since this action was commenced. The plaintiff has, again, not established that the defendants, or any of them, would likely not suffer prejudice given that passage of time. Ahead, I discuss that prejudice is now presumed in law based on the passage of sufficient time alone.

[32] Moreover, the plaintiff has not shown an intention to move her case(es) forward (referring in the main to the 18 action but also the two 20 actions). Rather, she has taken stances that can fairly be described as vexatious as well as, in my view, seemingly contrary to her own interests as a plaintiff if she truly wanted to move her cases forward. Her conduct has led to multiple (unnecessary) court appearances through her "Judge-shopping" and trying to get a result to her liking, which resulted in much wasting of time; as well, the plaintiff has been involved in conduct consisting of abuse of process while the 18 action has stagnated, not moving forward.

[33] Considering cases which stagnate or languish, it is appropriate to, in conclusion, refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barbiero v. Pollack, 2024 ONCA 904. Barbiero did not involve an automatic dismissal by the registrar, but rather a motion brought by defendant seeking a dismissal for delay pursuant to Rule 24.01. Yet I find the general principles articulated by the Court in Barbiero nevertheless to be informative, and also, applicable to this matter. At paragraph six of the decision, the Court reiterates that the onus is on a plaintiff to move a case forward:

[6] I begin the analysis by recalling that this court repeatedly observes that the party-prosecution character of our current civil court adjudication system imposes on the party who initiates a claim the burden of moving a proceeding to its final disposition on the merits. As a result, the consequences of any dilatory regard for the pace of litigation falls on the initiating litigant, absent resistance from a defendant to proceed to a final disposition on the merits (of which there is no evidence on the facts of this case)…

[34] So too, in this case, there is no evidence of resistance from defendants or by their counsel. Rather, defendants have tried diligently to move the matters involving this plaintiff to summary judgment. It is the plaintiff herein who has failed to move her case forward.

[35] While Barbiero involved a very old (21 years) class proceeding, at paragraph seven the Court made clear that: "Those principles and consequences [described in paragraph six, above] apply to all civil proceedings…".

[36] At paragraph eight, the court concluded that "…an action will be dismissed for delay where the delay (i) is inordinate, (ii) inexcusable, and (iii) results in a substantial risk that a fair trial of the issues in the litigation will not be possible because of the delay, whether through an unrebutted presumption of prejudice or by evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant's ability to have the case adjudicated on its merits."

[37] In my view, defendants have established those three factors (inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff, such being deliberate and thus inexcusable, and with a substantial risk that a fair trial is no longer possible) in this 18 action for reasons discussed herein. Moreover, the Court in Barbiero, at paragraph 15 and following, makes clear that the passage of time, in and of itself, "can constitute sufficient prejudice to dismiss an action for delay". At paragraph 22, referencing Rule 48.14, which applies to this within action, the Court stated:

[22] Rule 48.14(1)1 provides that the registrar shall dismiss an action for delay where it has not been set down for trial or terminated by any means by the fifth anniversary of the commencement of the action. Consequently, if an action has not been set down for trial within those five years, the action crosses the line and begins to move into the realm of "inordinate" delay…

[38] In this matter, given more than six years of delay before the registrar's dismissal order, the 18 action had crossed the line and was in the realm of inordinate delay. Absent any reasonable explanation for this delay, which I find has not been provided, I decline to set aside the Order of the registrar. The 18 action thus remains dismissed.

Disposition/Costs/Order

[39] The motion of the plaintiff is dismissed for reasons herein. I do not set aside the October 31, 2024 Order of the registrar. This 18 action thus remains dismissed. Accordingly, in the result, the proposed pleading amendments to this action need not be considered.

[40] Assuming that the parties will not be able to agree upon costs, we can have a short Zoom hearing to address costs. I have the defendants' costs outline and plaintiff costs submission, yet wish to provide the parties with an opportunity for brief oral submissions. To that purpose, ATC Ms. Sharma may be contacted to schedule a zoom case conference.

[41] If the parties can agree on a straight-forward Order, absent the cost quantum (unless, of course, the parties agree on the cost quantum; if so, it then can be filled in to the Order), such may be sent to ATC Ms. Sharma. Otherwise, I will settle the Order when we convene to address costs.

Associate Justice Josefo

Date: November 3, 2025