Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CV-20-00636037-0000 and CV-20-00654082-0000
Date: October 3, 2025
Superior Court of Justice – Ontario
Re: Tanya Rebello, Plaintiff
And: Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto Police Chief Mark Saunders, Toronto Police Sergeant Renato Valdez, Toronto Police Constable Jaime Knox, Toronto Police Constable Alexi Prodanos, Defendants
And Between: Tanya Rebello, Plaintiff
And: Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto Police Superintendent Paul MacIntyre, Toronto Police Constable Trevor Perry, Toronto Police Constable Jordan McGrath, Toronto Police Constable Tiffany Lam, Toronto Police Constable Luigi Trovato, Toronto Police Constable Matthew Carles, Toronto Police Constable Ryan Martin, Toronto Police Constable Kayla Gerrits, Toronto Police Staff Sergeant James Giczi, Defendants
Before: John Callaghan J.
Counsel:
- Tanya Rebello, Self-Represented
- Cara Davies, for the Defendant
Heard: September 17, 2025
Endorsement
Introduction
[1] This is a further installment in ongoing litigation between the plaintiff and Toronto Police Services ("TPS") and its personnel. This is a motion by the TPS to strike two Fresh as Amended Claims. If struck, the plaintiff brings a motion asking for leave to amend the existing claims consistent with the Fresh as Amended Claim.
[2] The two claims address alleged interactions with the police in the 2018-2020 timeframe. There are cross-summary judgment motions that were scheduled by Justice Glustein. Those motions are to be heard over three days in March 2026. There is some concern that the schedule will need to be altered depending on the results of this motion.
[3] This motion was set by Justice Brownstone to be heard expeditiously due to the pending summary judgment motions.
Background
[4] In 2020, the plaintiff, who is self-represented, started two actions bearing Court File No. CV-20-00636037-0000, which was issued on February 10, 2020, and the action bearing Court File No. CV-20-00654082-0000, which was issued on December 31, 2020. There was a third action, but it was dismissed for delay.
[5] On April 1, 2025, the plaintiff purported to amend these two actions, referred to as the "February Fresh as Amended Claim" and the "December Fresh as Amended Claim" (collectively the "Fresh as Amended Claims"). The plaintiff purported to do so on consent of the defendants.
[6] The defendants deny having provided any consent. The defendants had previously consented to amendments of the claim in 2020 to correct some misnomers in the original pleadings. That consent was not used to amend the pleadings at that time. A second consent was provided in 2021 to correct further errors but that consent, too, was not used. In the following, I will refer to these as the "2020 and 2021 consents".
[7] On February 13, 2025, the plaintiff made a request that the defendants consent to her amending her claims. The next day, the plaintiff sought leave to file amended pleadings at a case conference. Justice Akbarali did not grant the request as the defendants had yet to consider the amended pleadings.
[8] After the case conference before Justice Akbarali, the plaintiff advised that she would be amending the claims further. Although she advised that she would forward the proposed draft amendments, none were forthcoming. In mid-March, the defendants advised they would not consent to any amendments.
[9] The Fresh as Amended Claims were issued on April 1, 2025. The registrar noted on the face page that the Fresh as Amended Claims were amended pursuant to r. 26.02(b), being on the consent of the parties. A search of the court record revealed that the earlier consents were filed on April 1, 2025.
[10] There was then further correspondence where the defendants accused the plaintiff of misusing the 2020 and 2021 consents. The plaintiff denied this and requested that, in any event, the defendants provide their consent to the amendments. The defendants would not do so.
[11] There was then a case conference before Justice Glustein. His Honour set the schedule for the summary judgment motions. His written endorsement did not address the issue of the amendments. After the case conference, the defendants' counsel wrote the plaintiff, indicating that it would follow the oral direction of Justice Glustein and address the amendments at the summary judgment motion. This engendered a further dispute, which begot another attendance at Civil Practice Court, where Justice Brownstone set this motion date to address the defendants' motion to strike the Fresh as Amended Claims and the plaintiff's request for leave to amend if necessary.
[12] In these Fresh as Amended Claims, the added text is not underlined, and the deleted text is not struck-through. There was no blacklined version filed on this motion. The extent of the amendments is not readily apparent as most paragraphs have been changed in some fashion.
[13] It is clear that the Fresh as Amended Claims consist of more than minor amendments. The claims are rambling and not easy to follow. However, it is clear new allegations are made, such as the addition of Detective Yung, and that an officer drew a gun or taser in an interaction with the plaintiff in 2018. There appears to be new relief sought, including a request for Charter damages and a prohibition order.
Issues
[14] The defendants request that the Fresh as Amended Claims be struck and the parties proceed as scheduled with the summary judgment motions. The defendants submit that the conduct of the plaintiff in filing the 2020 and 2021 consents was an abuse of process. The defendants say no leave to file further amendments should be granted.
[15] The plaintiff submits that she had the defendants' consent and that the Fresh as Amended Claims ought not to be struck. If they were struck, she submits that leave should be granted so she may amend her current claims to accord with the Fresh as Amended Claims.
[16] It took the defendants a considerable period of time to schedule the summary judgment motion. They do not wish to delay the motion but acknowledge there needs to be a change in the current schedule. However, in their view, any change in the schedule ought not to postpone the motion dates. The plaintiff says she has been side-tracked with these motions and needs a postponement of the summary judgment date.
The Motion to Strike
[17] It is clear that the plaintiff has misled and misused the court process. She advised the registrar that the defendants consented to the Fresh as Amended Claims when they had not. She used the 2020 and 2021 consents for this purpose. When asked to point to any other consent, she was unable to do so but brazenly submitted that she was entitled to use the 2020 and 2021 consents for the amendments in 2025 in respect of the Fresh as Amended Claims.
[18] The plaintiff is a sophisticated serial self-represented litigator. Since 2017, there are 42 cases on alone addressing her litigation. She is comfortable citing the Rules of Civil Procedure. This is not an inexperienced litigant who is unaware of the judicial process.
[19] It is clear that the plaintiff knew she did not have the consent of the defendants and chose to mislead the court rather than seek the order of the court when consent was refused. She knew the 2020 and 2021 consents did not relate to these amendments and resorted to them after having been told the defendants would not consent.
[20] Instead of acknowledging the obvious, she insisted that Justice Glustein had somehow sanctioned the Fresh as Amended Claims. That was not part of his endorsement. I suspect counsel for the defendants' email saying His Honour suggested that the issue of the Fresh as Amended Claims may be dealt with at the summary judgement motions is more likely the case, although I need not determine that one way or the other. However, the contention that Justice Glustein addressed and sanctioned the validity of the Fresh as Amended Claims is inaccurate.
[21] Taking a page out of the playbook "the best defence is a good offence", the plaintiff makes allegations of inappropriate behaviour on the part of counsel for the defendants. In part, the suggestion is that current counsel was represented as being counsel of record, yet her name was not on the material filed with the court. This argument has no merit. In this case, the City of Toronto, through its solicitors, is representing the defendants. It is the City of Toronto's solicitors' office that is counsel of record, and that has not changed. In any event, it is of no moment, and there has certainly been no evidence of abuse of process by the defendants.
[22] Returning to the plaintiff's use of the 2020 and 2021 consents, this is highly problematic and worrisome behaviour, which the defendants submit amounts to an abuse of process.
[23] The doctrine of abuse of process was described in Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), by Goudge J.A., dissenting (approved 2002 SCC 63, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 307) in the following terms at para. 55:
The doctrine of abuse of process engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is a flexible doctrine unencumbered by the specific requirements of concepts such as issue estoppel. See House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Waite, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 347 at p. 358, [1990] 2 All E.R. 990 (C.A.).
[24] As noted by Justice Goudge, the doctrine is flexible and is intended to preserve the integrity of the civil justice system. It is intended to ensure fairness by precluding "abuse of the decision-making process." The remedies are equally flexible and may include the striking of pleadings: Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, [2022] 2 SCR 220, at paras. 34-36.
[25] In Cashin Mortgages Inc. (Verico Cashin Mortgages) v. 2511311 Ontario Ltd. (Mortgages Alliance – Main Street Mortgages), 2024 ONCA 103, 170 O.R. (3d) 107, at para. 17, the Court of Appeal recently described the doctrine of abuse of process as follows:
It is a flexible doctrine that "evokes the 'public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper administration of justice'", and, as a result, "engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute[.]"
[26] In this case, I have no doubt that using the 2020 and 2021 consents for a different purpose, being to have the Fresh as Amended Claims issued in 2025, was an abuse of the judicial process. Rule 26.02(b) dispenses with judicial oversight of amendments where the parties consent. The procedure is based on a defendant knowingly agreeing to amendments to a claim by way of consent. That did not happen here.
[27] The plaintiff had asked for the defendants' consent and, when that was not forthcoming, she knowingly misused the earlier 2020 and 2021 consents. This behaviour was not only contrary to the judicial process set out in the rules but was knowingly undertaken by the plaintiff to achieve a judicial result which would otherwise be denied as there was no consent. The plaintiff deliberately circumvented the prescribed judicial process. This is the very definition of an abuse of process, and it goes to the heart of the integrity of the civil justice system.
[28] The appropriate remedy is to strike the Fresh as Amended Claims as they were issued in furtherance of an abuse of process. It is the only remedy that preserves the integrity of the judicial process and maintains a fair and level playing field between the parties.
[29] This motion was argued on the basis of abuse of process. However, aside from the doctrine of abuse of process, the Fresh as Amended Claims must be set aside as they were obtained contrary to r. 26.02(b), which only operates where there is a valid consent. As mentioned, consent of the parties is the requirement for dispensing with judicial oversight of amendments after the close of pleadings. As r. 26.02(b) was not followed, the Fresh as Amended Claims issued on April 1, 2025, is set aside, regardless of the accompanying abuse of process.
[30] The Fresh as Amended Claims are therefore struck.
Leave to File Amended Claims
[31] The plaintiff requests that she be able to file her Fresh as Amended Claims. The defendants request that leave be denied.
[32] It was not argued by the defendant that the amendments should be denied due to the abuse of process of the plaintiff in misusing the consents. Rather, it was argued that even applying the law pertaining to amendments shows that this request to amend should be denied. Accordingly, I will limit my analysis to whether the amendments give rise to the type of prejudice as set out in r. 26.01. Moreover, in this instance, I am satisfied that the amendments should not be denied due to the plaintiff's actions as the aim of procedural orders is to allow amendments that permit the parties to get to the real merits of the dispute: Finlay v. Van Paassen, 2010 ONCA 204, 101 O.R. (3d) 390, at para. 14, referring to r. 1.04(1) and r. 2.01. Of course, further and different abuses of process may require this court to strike pleadings or deny leave to make further amendments to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
[33] While, ordinarily, a court would permit leave to amend if the amendment is in proper form, there are circumstances where leave may be denied. Rule 26.01 provides that a "court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that cannot be compensated for by costs or an adjournment." However, the court has a residual discretion to deny an amendment. That principle was set out in Marks v. Ottawa (City), 2011 ONCA 248, 280 O.A.C. 251, in which Justice LaForme, at para. 19, stated the following:
Although the general rule is that amendments are presumptively approved, there is no absolute right to amend pleadings. The court has a residual right to deny amendments where appropriate: Daniele v. Johnson (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 498 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 11-15. Further, I would agree that the proper factors to be considered are those first set out in Simrod v. Cooper, [1952] O.W.N. 720 (H.C.J. Master) at p. 721, aff'd at p. 723 (H.C.J.), and quoted with approval in Vaiman v. Yates (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 696 (H.C.J.) at p. 698, which can be summarized as follows:
- An amendment should be allowed unless it would cause an injustice not compensable in costs.
- The proposed amendment must be shown to be an issue worthy of trial and prima facie meritorious.
- No amendment should be allowed which, if originally pleaded, would have been struck.
- The proposed amendment must contain sufficient particulars.
[34] The defendants argue that some of the amendments are beyond the limitation period and others simply have no chance of success. As mentioned, there is no blacklined version of the Fresh as Amended Claims. As such, the argument proceeded on the basis of those new pleas that were clearly discernable. Although asked for submissions on what was actually amended, the plaintiff provided no assistance of substance, notwithstanding this was her motion.
[35] On the limitation period argument, the February Fresh as Amended Claim adds allegations involving Detective Yung and allegations of an officer drawing a gun or taser. These are allegations added to the events that are said to have occurred in 2018, being seven years ago. There is a "Police Constable Francis Yung" named as a defendant in a June 2018 claim involving similar allegations that has since been struck.
[37] The December Fresh as Amended Claim includes an allegation that officers' unspecified conduct constituted intrusion upon seclusion without any further particulars, although there are no new facts pled. Even assuming those events took place on or around December 2020 when the original claim was issued, they would have taken place 4.5 years ago, well beyond the two-year limitation period established under the Limitations Act.
[38] An amended claim may be denied where it advances a new cause of action after the expiry of the two-year limitation period. The inquiry is a factual inquiry as to whether new facts giving rise to a new claim have been advanced. An amendment does not assert a new cause of action if the original claim contains all the facts necessary to support the amendments, such that the amendments simply claim additional forms of relief, or clarify the relief sought, based on the same facts as originally pled: Klassen v. Beausoleil, 2019 ONCA 407, 34 C.P.C. (8th) 180, at para. 28.
[39] Prejudice may include the expiry of a limitation period.
[40] I am satisfied that, as pled, the allegations against Detective Yung arise out of events that occurred more than two years ago. Those allegations cannot proceed.
[41] Similarly, the presence of a gun or taser are new facts. No such allegations were in the earlier pleadings. It is not clear what claim is being advanced on those facts. However, even if they support an existing claim, the allegation of the use of a weapon gives rise to a "fundamentally different claim" based on facts not originally pled: Klassen, at para. 28. As pled, this allegation happened more than two years ago and is therefore beyond the two-year limitation period.
[42] As for the other amendments identified, they are in the nature of requests for relief. A party may amend the relief sought for acts already pled: Klassen, at para. 28; 110997 Ontario Ltd. v. North Elgin Centre Inc., 2016 ONCA 848, 409 D.L.R. (4th) 382, at paras. 20-21. The plaintiff seeks to claim damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter for the alleged breaches of her Charter rights which are pled in the original claims. This plea may proceed. This plea is found at para. 67 of the February Fresh as Amended Claim and para. 97 of the December Fresh as Amended Claim.
[43] The request for a mandatory order directing the police to permanently remove reports filed "against [the Plaintiff's] name and date of birth" is also a request for relief and need not be struck at this time. The plea is found at para. 106 of the December Fresh as Amended Claim.
[44] The December Fresh as Amended Claim asserts at para. 66 that the actions of the defendants constitute an intrusion upon seclusion. It refers to the above paragraphs without specificity. While the amended claim is not in the same order as the original, the original claim has facts alleging privacy breaches. As such, based on the facts of the original claim, the plaintiff may add that amendment.
[45] Finally, the plaintiff further pleads that the police should be prohibited from issuing/filing reports against the plaintiff's name", unless certain conditions are met. It has not been explained how the court has the power to restrict the police in this fashion. Much of the work of the police is performed in furtherance of their statutory duty to serve and protect the public. In the absence of any such explanation, I do not find that this is a tenable claim, and it is denied.
[46] In conclusion, the Fresh as Amended Claims are struck. Leave to amend the pleadings is denied with the exception of the pleas for relief in paras. 66, 97 and 106 of the December Fresh as Amended Claim and in para. 67 of the February Fresh as Amended Claim. The plaintiff may add these paragraphs in the same wording to the original pleadings. She is to underline these as amendments to the original pleadings. She is to forward the amended claims to the defendants' counsel for review before being submitted to the court on Case Center. This is to be done within ten days of the release of this decision.
Schedule and Adjournment
[47] The plaintiff says that she has been delayed in meeting the schedule of Justice Glustein because of the time needed to respond to this motion. She advises that, as a self-represented person, she was not able to do both. The defendants acknowledge the schedule of Justice Glustein requires a slight adjustment but argue this may be accommodated while still meeting the March motion date.
[48] I have advised the parties that their schedules are not the only consideration. Booking and reserving dates impacts all users of the court system, and adjournments are not to be given lightly. Nonetheless, I am adjourning the hearing date to May 13-15, 2026. The new schedule will be as follows:
(i) Both parties to deliver their moving party motion records for their respective motions by December 8, 2025.
(ii) Both parties to deliver their responding motion records by January 9, 2026.
(iii) Both parties to deliver their reply records (if any) by February 9, 2026.
(iv) Cross-examinations to be completed by March 20, 2026.
(v) Both parties to deliver the factums for their respective motions by April 6, 2026.
(vi) Both parties to deliver their responding factums by April 27, 2026.
(vii) Both parties to deliver their reply factums (if any) by May 4, 2026.
[49] The above timing between events largely mirrors Justice Glustein's order. This schedule will be considered pre-emptory, meaning it will not be amended absent a truly significant reason.
Costs
[50] The defendants seek partial indemnity costs in the amount of $17,812. The defendants are entitled to costs.
[51] In their oral submissions, the defendants did not seek substantial indemnity costs, notwithstanding the conduct of the plaintiff is arguably within the bounds of conduct which warrant substantial indemnity costs as the conduct was reprehensible and worthy of the court's sanction: Davies v. Clarington (Municipality) et al., 2009 ONCA 722, 100 O.R. (3d) 66, at para. 40. However, that is not what is being requested.
[52] It was suggested by the plaintiff that costs should be in the cause. In my view, such an order fails to grapple with the very direct abuse of the process by the plaintiff and does nothing to deter possible abuse in the future. Indeed, in Rebello v. Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONCA 842, the court upheld a significant costs award against the plaintiff, observing, at para. 24, "[the moving party] has been repeatedly admonished for bringing meritless motions and proceedings based on unfounded allegations." In light of these comments and the plaintiff's conduct in this case, I am of the view that there is good reason that costs should be assessed now and be payable forthwith.
[53] In assessing the quantum of costs, the exercise is "to fix an amount of costs that is objectively reasonable, fair, and proportionate for the unsuccessful party to pay in the circumstances of the case": Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 587, at para. 61, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 40420 (April 27, 2023), citing Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.), at para. 26. This is not a mechanical exercise but rather involves the considerations of the criteria set out in r. 57.01 and an exercise in judgment.
[54] The plaintiff has unnecessarily created a significant amount of unwarranted work for the defendants. The proceeding required attendance at scheduling court and the preparation of materials. The record that was filed was over 2,500 pages. The conduct of the plaintiff was improper and her refusal to acknowledge her improper use of the 2020 and 2021 consents was the reason for this unnecessary motion. From the defendants' perspective, I accept that this was an important motion. I have reviewed the hours claimed and the rates proposed. While this is not a mechanical exercise, I find both to be reasonable. Having regard to these factors, I assess the costs at $13,500 payable forthwith. In my view, this amount is reasonable, fair and proportionate to the matters in issue. I also find this to be a reasonable amount that the plaintiff should expect to pay in the circumstances.
John Callaghan J.
Date: October 3, 2025