ODC 2013

The appellant appealed a judgment terminating her membership and occupancy rights in a non-profit housing co-operative.

The co-operative's board had voted to evict her following complaints about her behaviour, but suspended the eviction subject to receiving no further complaints.

After receiving more complaints, the co-operative lifted the suspension and obtained an eviction order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the board's decision was reasonable, procedurally fair, and free from a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy after the Board found he had assaulted the building superintendent.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law by failing to consider his personal circumstances, including his lack of a criminal record, financial situation, and ties to the community, as required by section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the tenant had adduced little to no evidence on these factors before the Board, and the Board had properly considered section 83 based on the evidentiary record before it.

Following a previous costs endorsement, the court considered the written costs submissions of the corporate intervener, which had been inadvertently overlooked.

The court fixed the corporate intervener's costs at $6,000 and ordered the responding party (applicant in the main proceeding) to pay them.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board and a subsequent review decision.

The presiding Board member had conducted an independent and secret investigation of facts.

The Divisional Court found this to be a fundamental breach of procedural fairness and natural justice, rendering the member without jurisdiction.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) order directing it to cease collecting personal information from wine club members and to destroy previously collected information.

The LCBO argued the IPC breached procedural fairness by issuing the order without prior notice that such a remedy was being contemplated.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the IPC failed to provide adequate notice of the potential consequences of the privacy complaint investigation, thereby depriving the LCBO of a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of remedy.

The IPC's order was quashed and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

The landlord brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of an eviction order pending the tenant's appeal.

The tenant had fallen into arrears after a social housing agency discontinued paying its portion of the rent, a decision the tenant was challenging via judicial review.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the accumulation of rental arrears did not constitute demonstrable and unusual hardship for the landlord.

Furthermore, lifting the stay would likely render the tenant homeless and remove his incentive to pursue the judicial review, which could ultimately result in the arrears being paid.

Following the quashing of an application for judicial review on the basis that it was an abuse of process, the successful respondents and interveners sought costs.

The court awarded costs to the respondents, noting the awards should reflect the finding of abuse of process.

The court also awarded partial indemnity costs to the individual interveners, who had been added as parties with a direct interest in the proceedings.

Total costs of $30,350 were ordered against the applicant.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her class action certification motion, conceding that the proposed class definition before the motion judge was defective.

On appeal, the plaintiff sought to certify the proceeding based on a newly drafted class definition and restated common issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an appeal is not the proper forum to raise fundamental new issues that alter the landscape of the litigation, and that any motion based on a reconstituted class definition should be brought at first instance.

The plaintiffs and four defendants (the Teskey defendants) sought leave to appeal a decision regarding the certification of a class action arising from a propane facility explosion.

The motions judge had refused to certify claims against the Teskey defendants in strict liability, nuisance, and under the Occupiers' Liability Act, but certified a claim in common law negligence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the refusal to certify those claims against the landlords.

The Court granted the Teskey defendants' motion for leave to appeal the certification of the common law negligence claim, finding good reason to doubt whether the landlords owed a duty of care to neighbours based on the lease provisions.

EllisDon applied for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision that admitted a photocopy of a 1958 working agreement and found the unions were estopped from enforcing it for only two years.

The Divisional Court held that the OLRB erred in law by admitting the document as a business record or ancient document without assessing its reliability.

Furthermore, the Court found that the OLRB's decision to limit the estoppel to two years was unreasonable, as EllisDon had permanently lost the opportunity to seek a legislative solution.

The Court quashed the OLRB's decision and dismissed the unions' grievances, ruling the estoppel must be permanent.

The Municipality of North Middlesex appealed two decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal regarding a Renewable Energy Approval under the Environmental Protection Act.

The Tribunal had struck the Municipality's Notice of Constitutional Question and refused to grant it public interest standing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal correctly applied the law, did not err in principle, and provided compelling reasons.

The successful appellant sought costs of the trial and the appeal.

The respondents argued that no trial costs should be awarded because the judgment amount fell within the Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, noting the Small Claims Court limit was $10,000 when the claim was issued, the defendants had launched a $65,000 counterclaim, and the plaintiff had made a reasonable early offer to settle for $15,000.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the appellant trial costs fixed at $25,000 and appeal costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant gas station owner suffered business interruption and equipment damage when a cracked fill-pipe allowed water to contaminate its underground fuel storage tank.

The respondent insurer denied coverage under an all-risks policy, arguing the loss was not fortuitous.

At trial, the judge granted the insurer's motion for non-suit, finding the appellant failed to prove the exact cause of the crack via expert evidence.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held the trial judge erred in law.

The appellant only needed to adduce evidence that the loss was not expected in the ordinary course of business, which it did through testimony from an experienced contractor and the owner.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was entered for the appellant.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Licence Appeal Tribunal, which refused to allow them to carry on their motor vehicle sales business pending a fresh licence application.

The applicants had negligently failed to renew their licences before expiry.

The Divisional Court held that the Vice Chair's decision was reasonable and that the Registrar had no obligation to permit them to operate while unlicensed.

Furthermore, the court found the judicial review application to be premature as it did not meet the test for reviewing interlocutory tribunal decisions.

The application was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, York University, sought leave to appeal an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation on a property and authorizing its sale or mortgage to fund the defendants' legal representation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's assessment of the equities, particularly the consideration of the personal circumstances of a non-owner defendant in a fraudulent conveyance claim.

The court also noted the importance of clarifying the legal principles for discharging such certificates to guide future cases.

The appellant, a recipient of Ontario Disability Support Program benefits, appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The Tribunal had upheld the Director's decision to recover an overpayment resulting from a rent reduction ordered by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The appellant argued the rent reduction constituted damages for breach of contract and should be exempt from income calculations under the regulations.

The Divisional Court held the Tribunal correctly interpreted the regulation to exclude only damages for pain and suffering or actual expenses from injury.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's procedural practice of bifurcating human rights challenges from the merits of the appeal, finding it consistent with procedural fairness.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision to the Divisional Court and brought a motion to stay the appeal pending the completion of a related Superior Court action alleging mortgage fraud.

The respondent sought to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding it would constitute an improper collateral attack on the Board's proceedings.

However, the court granted the appellant an extension of time to perfect the appeal, conditional upon her making monthly payments to the respondent to maintain the property.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for unpaid commissions.

The trial judge had dismissed the claim, finding the contract was with the appellant's numbered company and the limitation period had expired.

The Divisional Court found the trial judge erred in making these findings without hearing evidence.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the appellant had previously initiated the same claim through her company more than two years before issuing the current claim, meaning the action was clearly statute-barred.

The respondent Board brought a motion for directions in advance of an appeal, seeking to redact personal and confidential information concerning the victim from both its Reasons and the Hearing Brief.

The appellant, who was found by the Board to have sexually assaulted the victim, opposed the redactions.

The Divisional Court held that the Board must provide an unredacted copy of its Reasons to ensure transparency and procedural fairness, but upheld the majority of the redactions in the Hearing Brief to protect the victim's privacy interests.

The defendant appealed an interlocutory order that dismissed his motion to strike the plaintiffs' civil contempt motion for lack of particulars, but ordered the plaintiffs to provide clear and concise particulars.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the contempt motion, finding that the motions judge erred in applying the test for adequate particulars by failing to recognize the strictissimi juris nature of civil contempt proceedings.

The court also held that the motions judge erred in principle by granting the plaintiffs an unsolicited right to amend their defective motion without balancing the relevant factors.