Court of Appeal

The Bank of Montreal, a creditor, sought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property by Roufat Iskenderov to Elena Lazareva.

The motion judge applied a ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The appellants appealed, arguing the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, holding that the two-year limitation period from the date of discovery under the Limitations Act, 2002 applies to fraudulent conveyance actions, not the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court found its previous decision in Anisman (ONCA) was wrongly decided due to a lack of historical context.

The discoverability issue was ordered to be tried together with the fraudulent conveyance claim.

The appellant vendor appealed a summary judgment that granted specific performance to purchasers of three townhomes and dismissed the vendor's motion for forfeiture of deposits.

The transactions failed to close on the scheduled date due to delayed mortgage funds.

The motion judge found the vendor in anticipatory breach for prematurely terminating the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS), ruling that the "time is of the essence" clause did not impose a specific closing time and that the vendor acted unreasonably.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the interpretation of the "time is of the essence" clause or the finding of anticipatory breach and bad faith.

The Court also denied leave to appeal the costs award, finding no error in principle or irrationality in the quantum.

Lin Yang appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the sole defence witness, Ze Yi Xu, who offered exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two material errors in assessing Mr. Xu's credibility: a misapprehension of evidence regarding vehicle availability and an illogical reasoning error concerning Mr. Xu's delay in informing the police.

These errors were deemed essential to the trial judge's rejection of the witness's testimony.

The appeal was allowed, and a retrial was ordered.

This appeal arose from a dispute between siblings over inherited family companies.

The trial judge found that the parties had an agreement regarding company ownership, that the appellant breached his fiduciary duty to the respondent, and was unjustly enriched.

The appellants challenged these findings, arguing there was no binding agreement, no fiduciary relationship, and that the promissory estoppel claim was invalid and statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the existence of an ownership agreement, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The Court noted that the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim did not affect the outcome.

This appeal addressed whether a Band Council Resolution (BCR) could be enforced as a by-law under the Indian Act.

Hiawatha First Nation sought a permanent injunction to stop three of its members from building a gas station on the reserve, relying on a BCR that imposed a moratorium on new businesses.

The application judge granted the injunction, treating the BCR as a by-law.

The Court of Appeal found that a BCR is distinct from a by-law and does not have the force of law to create rights and duties for band members or third parties under the Indian Act.

The court emphasized that law-making authority under the Indian Act, particularly when affecting proprietary rights, requires adherence to specific by-law formalities.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the injunction based on the BCR was set aside.

This appeal concerned a failed residential real estate transaction where the buyers' financing fell through, leading the sellers to terminate the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) and retain the deposit.

The sellers subsequently resold the property for a higher price.

The buyers sought specific performance, damages, or relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the sellers were entitled to terminate the APS as they were ready, willing, and able to close, and that relief from forfeiture was not warranted, despite the sellers realizing a profit on the resale.

The court also addressed the duty of honest performance and the effect of anticipatory repudiation.

This is a consolidated appeal from anti-SLAPP motions dismissing defamation actions.

The actions arose from tweets and an email suggesting the appellant's medical clinic discriminated against the LGBTQ community.

The motion judge dismissed both actions, finding the communications were fair comment.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred regarding Evans-Bitten's fair comment defence, concluding there were grounds to believe malice would defeat it.

After conducting the public interest weighing, the Court found the public interest in allowing the appellant's action against Evans-Bitten to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting her expression, given the substantial harm and low public interest in protecting gratuitous personal attacks.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the action against Kirkconnell and Smith, finding no grounds to believe their fair comment defence would fail due to recklessness.

The appellant, Laura Coristine, appealed her convictions for six counts of assault against her ex-husband, Jim Quinn.

She argued that the trial judge misapprehended her evidence and erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend some minor aspects of the appellant's evidence, these errors did not amount to a miscarriage of justice given the overall assessment of credibility.

The court also found no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, including his consideration of the complainant's motive to lie, the "unusual" nature of some allegations, and the proper use of notes as an aide mémoire.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Rene Hamouth, appealed convictions for multiple firearm-related offences and his sentence.

The appeal challenged the lawfulness of the search warrant (Garofoli issue), the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis regarding the exclusion of firearms and ammunition, and the finding of possession of firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, except for one count related to a non-restricted firearm (Winchester shotgun), which was substituted from s. 95(1) to s. 92(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court upheld the trial judge's Garofoli analysis, his s. 24(2) analysis (including the consideration of the Crown's concession to exclude incriminating statements and the lack of causal connection between the Charter breaches and the discovery of firearms), and the finding of possession.

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against its property.

The appellant argued the mortgage was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act because the individual who executed it had fraudulently assumed control of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the mortgage was not a forgery, the corporation was not a 'fictitious person', and the individual did not falsely hold herself out as the registered owner.

The doctrine of deferred indefeasibility did not invalidate the mortgage, and partial summary judgment was appropriate.

The appellant, Mario Oliveira, appealed two lower court decisions: the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action due to a breach of the deemed undertaking rule, and a finding of contempt for non-compliance with injunctive orders concerning a confidential union member list.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the wrongful dismissal action and the contempt finding.

However, it set aside the 89-day intermittent jail sentence for contempt, replacing it with a 14-day conditional sentence (house arrest), and reduced the contempt costs from $75,000 to $50,000.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to set aside a Notice of Sale and stay a pending sale related to a vendor takeback mortgage default.

They argued the redemption amount was inflated due to an illegal interest rate and unjustified charges, prejudicing their ability to obtain financing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the issue moot as the property had been sold and no stay was sought pending appeal.

The court noted evidentiary problems and stated that the questions of amounts owing were better suited for adjudication in the outstanding mortgage action.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) were found entitled to costs.

The court determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis, as the appeal was not entirely without merit and the appellants' conduct was not criticized.

Costs were fixed at $12,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Claude Séguin appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for trafficking, possession of methamphetamine pills, and possession of criminally obtained property, as well as his 12-year incarceration sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged violations of his linguistic rights (right to a French trial), inaccurate transcription of proceedings, an erroneous finding of fact regarding his control over a storage room where fentanyl was found, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that Séguin had explicitly chosen to proceed in English, the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and supported by evidence, and there was no merit to the claims of transcription errors or ineffective counsel.

The court also found no error in the imposed sentence, noting the serious nature of the offences and the large quantity of fentanyl involved.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his drug dealing partner.

At trial, he claimed self-defence, abandoning his initial statements to police that the victim was killed during a robbery by unknown intruders.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter delay application, excluding expert evidence on 'fight or flight' syndrome, and admitting statements made to police.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay or expert evidence rulings, but held that the appellant was psychologically detained at the police station earlier than the trial judge found.

The failure to advise him of his right to counsel violated ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, requiring exclusion of the statements under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

This costs endorsement arises from a motion to add intervenors, which the court found was largely designed to delay an s. 87 application.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario sought costs.

The court ordered costs payable by the moving parties/proposed intervenors/appellants and Rochagné Killian on a substantial indemnity basis, finding the motion gave rise to significant unnecessary legal expenses and delay.

Dag Hrvoic appealed a trial judgment that found equal shareholdings between him and Melissa Hrvoic in a co-founded company and ordered him to purchase Melissa's shares.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on the shareholding agreement, company valuation, the application of the "clean hands" doctrine, and the commencement of the limitation period for Melissa's claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusions, including the existence of an agreement for equal shareholdings and the proper application of the Limitations Act.

The appellant brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario from a Superior Court of Justice order.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as there was no right of appeal to that court from the order below.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the respondent was awarded costs.

The appellant, Nathalie Mouralian, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for the appointment of a "litigation guardian counsel" to assist with her appeal, citing serious mental health challenges and a brain injury.

The motion was dismissed for two reasons: first, the court lacked authority to appoint a "litigation guardian counsel" as the appellant required counsel, not merely a guardian; and second, the medical evidence provided did not establish mental incapacity as required by Rule 7.04(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and sections 6 or 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The moving parties, a former lawyer and his professional corporation, sought an urgent order to pay the net proceeds of a condominium sale into court, pending their motion to extend time for an appeal from an underlying judgment.

The judgment had declared a trust invalid and ordered the discharge of a mortgage and return of assets to an estate, which the moving parties had failed to comply with, leading to a contempt finding.

The moving parties argued the payment was necessary to protect a beneficiary's interests and alleged estate mismanagement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the allegations of mismanagement incredible and the payment into court unnecessary.

The court noted the moving parties' history of obstruction, non-compliance with court orders, and unlikelihood of the appeal proceeding due to unpaid costs.