Court of Appeal

This motion sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a Superior Court order terminating a residential tenancy agreement, ordering possession, and awarding significant arrears and costs.

The moving party, a tenant who had withheld rent for an extended period, argued confusion regarding the proper appellate court.

While the court acknowledged the moving party's intention to appeal and explanation for delay, it ultimately dismissed the motion due to the lack of merit of the proposed appeal and the moving party's conduct, which included blatant delay tactics and continued non-payment of rent.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order for extradition to the United States on charges including grand theft auto, vehicular homicide, and manslaughter while driving under the influence.

The applicant argued the Minister's decision was unreasonable, contravening s. 7 of the Charter due to concerns about racial discrimination and a failure to consider delaying extradition for health reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision reasonable and entitled to deference.

The court affirmed the Minister's conclusions that the applicant failed to establish racial persecution and that necessary medical care would be available in the United States.

Robert Vanier was convicted of two counts of perjury for making false statements under oath in Personal Information Forms (PIFs) submitted to the TSX and CNQ exchanges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 131 of the Criminal Code did not apply because the statements were not "permitted, authorized, or required by law" to be made under oath, and that he should have been charged under s. 134.

He also claimed a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statements were indeed permitted by law as they stemmed from the Securities Act and the exchanges' regulatory powers, and that there was no unreasonable delay.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the appeal at an all-inclusive amount of $10,000, payable by the appellant from their share of the estate to the respondent.

The appellant, Michael Smith, appealed his seven-year global sentence for firearm and drug-related offences, arguing a calculation error in pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found an inadvertent denial of procedural fairness due to the sentencing judge's initial comments regarding a 2:1 equivalency for pre-sentence custody credit, which was not fully applied in the final sentence.

The Court increased the "Duncan credit" for harsh custodial conditions from four to nine months, resulting in a reduced net sentence for the appellant.

The appellant, Belmar Roofing Inc., appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breach of contract and negligence for a defective roof installation.

The appeal primarily challenged the trial judge's reliance on the respondent's engineer's expert evidence, which the appellant argued was contradicted by a draft report and exaggerated the roof's danger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's acceptance of the engineer's testimony, as the engineer adequately explained the omission in the final report and maintained his opinion on the roof's hazards.

The court found ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and no basis to interfere with the damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside a Superior Court declaration that a proposed payment by estate executors to a law firm, in satisfaction of a Dubai judgment, would violate s. 83.03(b) of the Criminal Code due to alleged connections between the judgment creditors and a terrorist group.

The appellate court held that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to issue such a declaration, as it improperly interfered with prosecutorial discretion and provided no binding immunity from criminal prosecution.

The court emphasized that Rule 14.05(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 60(1) of the Trustee Act are procedural and do not create jurisdiction for declarations on criminal legality, especially when based on disputed facts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with probation.

The appeal raised numerous grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial bias, misapprehension of law, failures to assess credibility, non-disclosure, evidentiary inconsistencies, inappropriate limitation of amicus curiae, prejudicial media coverage, insufficient evidence, and Charter s. 11(b) issues.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the entire record and found no error, dismissing the appeal.

The Limited Partners of YG Limited Partnership appealed a motion judge's order denying them standing to oppose a creditor's (CBRE Limited) appeal of a disallowed proof of claim under s. 135(4) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that limited partners do not possess a direct economic interest in the claim sufficient for common law standing, nor are they granted standing under s. 135(4) or s. 37 of the BIA.

The court emphasized that the BIA is a complete code designed for expeditious resolution of bankruptcy matters, and equity owners are generally excluded from direct participation in creditor claim appeals.

The appellant was convicted of child luring, invitation to sexual touching, possession of child pornography, accessing child pornography, and weapons dangerous, receiving a global sentence of 34 months.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was unfit for a first offender with mitigating factors, and that the trial judge failed to resolve disputed aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the sentence unsupported due to unresolved aggravating factors.

The court substituted the sentence to 28 months (time served).

Additionally, the appellant successfully appealed overly broad terms of a s. 161 order regarding internet access, which the court directed the parties to amend by consent or the court would amend after two weeks.

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals: a dependant support appeal and a costs appeal.

The dependant support appeal concerned whether the deceased had a "settled intention" to treat a non-biological child as his own for the purpose of dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The application judge dismissed the dependant support claim, partly due to the mother's failure to disclose the child's true parentage.

The costs appeal challenged a substantial indemnity costs award against the mother and grandmother, which the application judge based on a finding of a "false narrative." The Court of Appeal dismissed the dependant support appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the deceased's knowledge of parentage was a relevant factor in determining "settled intention" given the short relationship.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal, finding no basis for the "false narrative" conclusion or egregious conduct, and substituted the costs award with partial indemnity costs.

The appellants, Limited Partners of a debtor in a bankruptcy proposal, appealed an order for directions regarding the process for an appeal of a proof of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as premature, finding that the motion judge had not made any final orders regarding the appellants' standing in the anticipated claim appeal, but rather had made directions "subject to the discretion of the judge hearing the appeal." The court held that the possibility of influence or an incorrect underlying conclusion on discretionary standing was not a basis for appeal.

Loukia Georgiou sought leave to appeal a lower court's dismissal of her application for relief from forfeiture of $9.3 million, which a U.S. court had ordered forfeited as proceeds of crime belonging to her son.

The funds were restrained in Canada under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The motion judge determined that the proposed appeal required leave under s. 35 of the Act, not an appeal as of right under the Criminal Code, and found that the grounds raised by the applicant did not constitute questions of law alone justifying leave.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Donavan Locke, appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his second and third actions (alleging deceit and conspiracy against his former common-law partner and her lawyers regarding a property transfer) and dismissing his own motions (including a constitutional question and criminal contempt).

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision, affirming that summary judgment was appropriate due to the appellant's lack of evidence and damages.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's motions, noting the constitutional question was "ill conceived" and there was no basis for criminal contempt.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to each respondent.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by imposing a "straitjacket" on the sentencing process by expressing a starting point for the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding that the trial judge carefully explained how a fit global sentence was reached, considering all mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and properly deducted credit for time served.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jerome Derby, appealed his global sentence for firearm-related offences, including discharge of a firearm with intent to endanger life and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

He argued that the trial judge erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for possession while prohibited, having already considered this as an aggravating factor, which constituted double counting.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the approach was erroneous and constituted double counting, and therefore allowed the appeal in part.

The appellant, Rolling Meadows Land Development Corporation, appealed judgments dismissing its motion to convert applications to an action, finding a purchase and sale agreement binding, and finding no breach of contract by the respondent, Pine Glen Thorold Inc. The appeal raised arguments concerning the refusal to convert applications, a claim of unilateral mistake in signing the contract, and the quantification of renovation costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decisions.

The court affirmed that the application judge was entitled to adjudicate the issues on the record, that no unilateral mistake was established given the appellant's sophistication and the contract's clarity, and that the renovation quantification was properly determined.

The appellant sought a reduction in his six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his difficult upbringing, that the sentence was comparatively too high, and that the lack of cash seized indicated his motivation was addiction rather than profit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons, noting the admitted quantity of fentanyl supported an inference of trafficking, including a financial motive, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant, a confidential informant, alleged a s. 7 Charter violation due to the disclosure of their informant status and sought a stay of proceedings, which was dismissed at trial.

The appellant also appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the alleged leak and no basis for an adverse inference, and the sentence appeal, concluding that despite the risks associated with divulging informant status, a conditional sentence was inappropriate and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, Gary Austin, was convicted of fraud and theft based on circumstantial evidence, where he received over $165,000 from fraudulent cheques drafted by a general manager of a company.

Austin appealed, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles from R. v. Villaroman regarding circumstantial evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge, when read as a whole, correctly applied the Villaroman standard by concluding that guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The court also found the reasons sufficient for appellate review, noting that speculative inferences of innocence, contrary to human experience, do not constitute reasonable doubt.