Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

He appealed his convictions based on an alleged error in the jury instruction and a request to admit fresh evidence for a partial alibi.

He also appealed his sentence, specifically lifetime prohibition orders under s. 161(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, arguing their retroactive application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the fresh evidence application, finding no reversible error in the jury charge and that the fresh evidence lacked due diligence and cogency.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the retroactive application of s. 161(1)(a) and (b) to offences committed before their 1993 enactment was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as there was no compelling temporal justification for their retrospective application in 2005.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for uttering threats to burn property and breaching court orders.

The Ontario Review Board ordered her detention at a forensic mental health centre.

She appealed, arguing the Board erred in finding she posed a significant threat to the public and in failing to consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the treating psychiatrist's evidence that the appellant lacked community supports, had a history of non-compliance, and would likely revert to substance abuse and decompensate if released.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for several assaults, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

The appellant argued that a conditional discharge was appropriate and that his risk could be managed in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably concluded a detention order was necessary due to the appellant's lack of insight into his mental illness, his substance use, and the need for proactive intervention to prevent decompensation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for counseling perjury and attempting to obstruct justice.

He argued the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance while he was self-represented and erred by refusing to discharge his counsel after a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge provided reasonable assistance but erred in forcing counsel on the unwilling appellant.

This error prevented the appellant's main defence theory from being advanced in closing submissions, resulting in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and driving without an interlock device, specifically challenging the lifetime driving prohibition imposed following a 5-year penitentiary term.

This was his third impaired driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lifetime ban was within the trial judge's discretion and necessary for the protection of the public.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, which followed the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Police executed a search warrant at a multi-unit building but entered the respondent's basement apartment by mistake, as the warrant targeted a different unit and suspect.

Despite realizing the error, police continued searching for over an hour before obtaining a second warrant, which was also found to be facially invalid for failing to specify the unit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the warrants were invalid and that the serious Charter breaches warranted exclusion of the evidence.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for arson, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

She argued the Board erred in finding she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence indicating a high risk of decompensation and violent behaviour if the appellant discontinued her medication.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 13 years for attempted murder and breaches of firearms prohibition and recognizance orders.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider his youth, first-time custodial status, and rehabilitative prospects, and that the sentence was outside the acceptable range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that denunciation and deterrence are paramount for gun violence in public places, particularly as the appellant shot at a security guard multiple times while under prohibition orders.

The appellant, a mayor, faced a compliance audit of her election campaign finances which revealed apparent contraventions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The municipal council passed a by-law authorizing the commencement of legal proceedings and retained outside counsel to prosecute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to quash the by-law and strike down s. 81 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 81 is not impermissibly vague, does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, and that the delegation of prosecutorial power to outside counsel was lawful and administrative in nature.

The Crown appealed an order staying nine charges of fraud over $5,000 against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges arose from alleged misrepresentations of a publicly traded company's financial affairs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's assessment of the inherent time requirements and his allocation of institutional delay.

The Court found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown's accommodation of co-accused counsels' schedules contributed to the unreasonable delay, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two grounds: that the trial judge erred in dismissing a mistrial motion after jurors potentially heard inadmissible portions of a tape, and that the jury selection process was improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was best positioned to assess prejudice and cure it with instructions, and that the jury selection process complied with the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, arguing it was an illegal sentence under s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code which mandates a minimum one-year imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal agreed the sentence was illegal and held that a sentence of two years less a day would have been appropriate.

However, given the respondent's six months of pre-trial custody (credited 2-for-1), seven months served on the conditional sentence, and ten months on restrictive bail, the court declined to re-incarcerate him.

The court substituted a sentence of time served followed by two years' probation.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on drug trafficking charges.

Police officers responded to a 911 call about armed men and lawfully detained the respondent and his passenger in their vehicle.

After a pat-down search yielded no weapons, officers searched the vehicle and found cocaine and ecstasy in a zippered case in the glove compartment.

The trial judge found the extended vehicle search violated section 8 of the Charter as it was not reasonably necessary, and excluded the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officers could have easily verified the respondent's innocent explanation instead of conducting the extended search.

The appellant appealed her conviction for uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, arguing that the Crown failed to prove her identity as the caller and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to rely on the complainant's voice recognition evidence to establish identity.

The Court also found no reversal of the burden of proof and that the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with sexual offences arising from a large-scale police investigation.

During the trial, it emerged that the Crown had failed to disclose notes and a will-say statement of a former police officer who had contacted the mother of one of the complainants.

The trial judge recused himself from hearing a stay application due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and another judge heard the application.

The application judge found that Crown counsel had wilfully withheld the materials and ordered a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction to hear the matter, but erred in finding wilful non-disclosure.

The evidence showed the non-disclosure was inadvertent.

The Court held that a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown were not justified for inadvertent non-disclosure.

The stay and costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving two complainants.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately warn the jury against propensity reasoning and using evidence from one count to evaluate another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was adequate given the circumstances.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted solely to reduce the global sentence by one month to credit the appellant for post-conviction, pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but erred by providing the jury with examples of potentially confirmatory evidence that were not capable of confirming the informant's testimony.

The trial judge also erred by allowing the Crown to introduce highly prejudicial investigative hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's antecedents, including alleged ties to terrorism and the drug trade, to rebut a defence claim of an inadequate police investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two sexual assaults involving two sisters, one consisting of repeated abuse of a child over several years and the other a later sexual touching of the adult sister.

The Court of Appeal held the sentence was demonstrably unfit because the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to denunciation and deterrence, mischaracterized the conduct as out of character, and relied on unsupported hearsay opinions about risk.

A custodial disposition was required notwithstanding the historical nature of the principal offence, particularly given the later assault showing the misconduct was not isolated.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional sentence was set aside, a sentence of 14 months in the reformatory was imposed after accounting for time served on the conditional sentence, and a DNA order was directed.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of attempted murder arising from a gasoline-fuelled attack on his estranged spouse and her partner, and also appealed a lengthy penitentiary sentence.

The court held that expert reply evidence on accidental ignition was admissible because the ignition mechanism was only marginally relevant during the Crown's case and became a live issue after the appellant testified.

The court also rejected the challenge to the attempted murder charge, finding that, read as a whole, the instructions made clear that proof of intent to kill was essential.

Given the planned and deliberate nature of the offences and the catastrophic injuries inflicted, leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal after the accused was acquitted of impaired care or control and care or control over 80.

The Court of Appeal held that, to establish care or control of a motor vehicle, the accused's act or conduct in relation to the vehicle must create a risk of danger, whether by putting the vehicle in motion or in some other way.

Reconciling the Supreme Court authorities, the court concluded that an inoperable vehicle may still ground liability if it presents some danger in the hands of an impaired person, but no such danger was established on the facts presented.

It was therefore open to the trial judge to conclude that an impaired person sitting in an immovable vehicle in a ditch while waiting for a tow truck was not in care or control.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.