Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against two children under the age of 16 years.

The trial judge found that the appellant had committed sexual offences against both complainants in a park in Brantford on a single occasion in August 2019, and that he had also sexually abused one complainant over an extended period in the family home prior to the park incident.

The appellant was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: alleged errors in the W.(D.) analysis, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and misapprehension of DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant, Roger Wain Foreshaw, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising six grounds of appeal.

Key issues included the trial judge's prohibition of cross-examination on a witness's record suspension, the absence of a Mayuran instruction regarding an alleged confession, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule, alleged misstatements of evidence in the jury charge, errors in the third-party suspect instruction, and a finding of no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in prohibiting cross-examination on the record suspension, this error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions on the other grounds, affirming the conviction.

An appeal concerning the interpretation of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The respondent was convicted in the United States of conspiracy and fraud, sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, and ordered to pay a $26 million USD forfeiture money judgment.

American authorities discovered $9.2 million CAD in a Canadian bank account believed to belong to the respondent and obtained a restraint order.

The respondent appealed the motion judge's decision upholding the restraint order, arguing the funds were not proceeds of crime or offence-related property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that "proceeds of crime" should be interpreted broadly in the context of mutual legal assistance to respect differences in foreign legal systems and to fulfill Canada's international treaty obligations.

The appellant was convicted in Jordan of murdering his ex-wife in the United States and served six and a half years of a 15-year sentence before being released under a general amnesty.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition from Canada to stand trial for the same murder.

The extradition judge committed the appellant, finding he lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant's double jeopardy claim, and the Minister of Justice ordered his surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review application, holding that the committal judge correctly identified the limits of his jurisdiction and that the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable, as the United States did not participate in the Jordanian prosecution and the potential sentence of life without parole did not shock the conscience.

The appellant was convicted under s. 127 of the Criminal Code for breaching an interlocutory injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protests near clinics.

She appealed, arguing the prosecution was an abuse of process due to Crown delay in the civil proceeding, and that s. 127 was unconstitutional on division of powers and Charter s. 7 grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process, characterizing the argument as an impermissible collateral attack, and upholding the constitutionality of s. 127.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing and trafficking large amounts of cocaine and was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that his potential deportation could affect his eligibility for day parole.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that speculation regarding the effect of immigration status on day parole eligibility is irrelevant to determining the appropriate sentence.

The appellant was convicted of abducting her child in contravention of a custody order.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of necessity to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence because the appellant had other reasonable legal alternatives, such as participating in the family court proceedings to address her concerns about the child's safety, rather than abandoning the process and abducting the child.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and a 12-month custodial sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no need for the warning as the trial judge was aware of the witness's problems.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder on three grounds: the admission of drop cloths and a shovel as evidence of planning and deliberation, the use of evidence regarding a gun from a prior home invasion, and the admission of evidence found in his vehicle despite an error in the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the physical evidence had sufficient probative value, the gun evidence was properly admitted for motive and identity with appropriate limiting instructions, and the search warrant error was a minor technical breach that did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for break and enter, uttering a threat, and possession of a weapon.

He argued that the identification evidence was unreliable and that he was prejudiced by the loss of the weapon (a nightstick) before trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the identification evidence supported by the appellant's own statement and circumstantial evidence, and no prejudice from the missing weapon.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the four-year term for a home invasion to collect a drug debt was within the appropriate range.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences related to a credit card fraud and manufacturing operation found in their home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred knowledge and participation from the presence of false credit cards and manufacturing equipment.

The sentence appeal for the first appellant was dismissed, including a restitution order.

However, the sentence appeal for the second appellant was allowed in part to set aside the restitution order against her, as there was no evidence of her ability to pay.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge erred by holding a property owner must call police before using force against a trespasser.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal.

The Court noted that while requiring a property owner to call police before using force would be an error inconsistent with s. 41 of the Criminal Code, the appellant used excessive force even on his own version of events, as the trespassing complainant was not creating a disturbance.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years and nine months imprisonment for sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge placed undue emphasis on his position of trust, claiming he was a fraudster rather than a genuine healer, and that the sentence was disproportionate due to immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant used his purported position as a religious consultant and healer to fraudulently obtain consent for sexual acts, and that the sentence was fit regardless of immigration consequences.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdict was not unreasonable, as there was direct evidence from the complainant identifying one of the appellants, which was confirmed by independent evidence.

However, the Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed based on the challenge for cause procedure.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his criminal convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her treatment of a prior inconsistent statement, misapplied the burden of proof under R. v. W.(D.), and failed to consider his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately considered the relevant factors, properly applied the burden of proof, and correctly rejected the appellant's evidence as it was inconsistent with the credible evidence.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay two charges of sexual interference due to a 31-month delay between the accused's arrest and the proposed trial date.

The trial judge had attributed delays caused by the defence's difficulties in serving third-party record materials to systemic or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in this characterization, determining that approximately 15 months of the delay should not be attributed to the Crown.

The remaining 16 months of systemic delay fell within the acceptable range for matters in the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, wearing a disguise, and carrying a concealed weapon, as well as his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding identification evidence and the use of an imitation firearm.

However, the Court allowed the appeal against the attempted robbery conviction, finding that the appellant's actions of observing a credit union while in possession of a disguise and imitation firearm did not go beyond mere preparation.

The attempted robbery conviction was quashed, and the total sentence was reduced by one year.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for sexual offences against a child complainant, arguing errors in the admission of similar fact evidence, narrative evidence surrounding the complaint, limitations on cross-examination, and disclosure of a prior prosecution file.

The court held that prior sexual assault evidence involving another child was properly admitted as highly probative, and that evidence of non-sexual abuse was admissible to explain the relationship, fear, delayed disclosure, and context of the assaults.

It also found that the complaint narrative evidence was admissible, that the cross-examination issue had not been preserved, and that no prejudice arose from incomplete disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed and a publication ban was imposed to protect the identity of the complainant and other witnesses.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for first degree murder arising from the death of a young child in his care following an admitted sexual assault and repeated blows to the head.

He argued the trial judge inadequately charged the jury on the intent required for murder and erred in refusing an offence-based challenge for cause.

The court held the evidentiary record overwhelmingly supported the requisite intent and the jury charge, read as a whole, was legally sufficient.

It also held that offence-based challenge for cause was unavailable absent evidence connecting attitudes about the crime to prejudice against the accused.

The appeal was dismissed.