Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: 2026-02-13 Docket: COA-25-CR-1501
van Rensburg, Thorburn and Gomery JJ.A.
Between
His Majesty the King — Respondent
and
Jason Wallace — Appellant
Jason Wallace, acting in person
Geoff Haskell, appearing as duty counsel
Jacob Millns, for the respondent
Heard: February 2, 2026
On appeal from the sentence imposed by Justice Fergus C. O'Donnell of the Ontario Court of Justice, on November 7, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONCJ 663.
Reasons for Decision
1Jason Wallace appeals from his sentence of 12 months in custody, less pre-sentence credit of 5 months, leaving 7 months to serve. He was also ordered to serve two years of probation.
2The appellant pled guilty to disobeying a court order issued under the Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 12, Sched. 2. That order prohibited him from contacting or communicating with, or being within 500 metres of, the complainant. The appellant admitted that, upon seeing the complainant in a casino, he approached her, tapped her on the shoulder, and asked her if she was winning. He remained standing behind the complainant for ten minutes before walking away.
3The appellant contends that the sentencing judge failed to respect the jump principle. He argues that, since he had never received a sentence longer than 90 days for past breaches of court orders, a 12-month custodial sentence was unwarranted.
4We disagree. As the sentencing judge correctly observed, the jump principle is not iron-clad. In certain circumstances, it is appropriate to impose a significantly more onerous sanction for an offence than an offender has previously received for the same or similar offences. Departure from the jump principle may be merited where rehabilitation is not a significant factor; where the offender has a lengthy criminal record; or where previous sanctions have been ineffective in deterring the offender: R. v. Simeunovich, 2023 ONCA 562, 168 O.R. (3d) 632, at para. 22, leave to appeal refused, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 48.
5All three circumstances arise here. The appellant has a lengthy criminal record that includes 18 convictions for disobeying court orders, including orders with respect to the complainant. According to a psychologist who has counselled the appellant, although the appellant exhibited some insight into his behaviour"he rigidly defended his actions and beliefs" and "appeared to enjoy challenging social policies and laws and living a lifestyle that may often straddle the law." 1
6We endorse the sentencing judge's observation that:
At a certain point, an offender with multiple breach convictions ought not to be surprised if a subsequent sentencing leads to a leap rather than a step. Such a leap represents a realization that for some offenders incremental increases (or even sentences matching previous sentences for similar offences) are incapable of bringing out any awareness on the offender's part of the seriousness of his or her pattern of disregard for court orders. This is such a case.
7The appellant contends that the sentence is unfit. We again disagree. The sentence falls within the range of sentences that may be imposed for a non-technical breach of a court order: see e.g., R. v. Duivenvoorde, 2018 ONCA 158; R. v. Exell, 2015 ONCA 704; and R. v. Jacobson.
8Specific deterrence and public safety are important sentencing objectives in this case. In a victim impact statement, the complainant described how the appellant's actions and behaviour had caused her "significant emotional distress, financial hardship, and a pervasive sense of fear."
9We find no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge's decision. He made no errors in law or principle, and the sentence imposed is not demonstrably unfit.
10The appeal is dismissed.
"K. van Rensburg J.A."
"Thorburn J.A."
"S. Gomery J.A."
