Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The Crown applied to revoke the appellant's bail release order under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code due to new charges.

The appellant cross-applied for a fresh bail release pending appeal.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the appellant committed an indictable offence while on release, leading to the revocation of the existing bail.

The court then denied the appellant's application for fresh bail, concluding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the appellant's detention was necessary in the public interest due to public safety concerns (risk of further fraud) and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, especially given the new charges and the weak nature of the appeal grounds.

The appellant, Jasper Atienza, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He raised three grounds of appeal concerning the trial judge's jury instructions: (1) whether the evidence showed only one vehicle at the shooting scene; (2) the probative value of post-offence association with co-accused Laurie Phan regarding planning and deliberation; and (3) inferring guilt from his failure to disclose his destination when leaving an apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The court affirmed the trial judge's discretion in reviewing evidence, noting the weakness of the two-car theory and that Ms. Phan's acquittal rendered any potential error regarding post-offence association harmless as it negated a joint planning theory.

The court also found no prejudice from the brief reference to the appellant's undisclosed destination.

The appellant, Joshua Brown, appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making available child pornography, and his three-year penitentiary sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds were unreasonable verdict and insufficient trial judge reasons.

The sentence appeal grounds included reliance on an incorrect volume of child pornography and unproven aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and reasons sufficient, and that the inference of guilt was the only reasonable one.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in considering 2,500 files instead of 500, this error did not impact the fitness of the significant sentence warranted by the large quantity of child pornography.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failing to stop at an accident, appealed her convictions and sentence.

The central issue at trial was the defence of necessity, claiming she drove due to fear for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to elicit evidence of the appellant's pre-trial silence regarding the alleged attack and by drawing an adverse inference from that silence, thereby breaching her right to silence.

The court held that the right to silence cannot be used to incriminate an accused or impeach credibility, and that suggesting a defence is a "recent fabrication" due to pre-trial silence undermines this right.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Salim Richard Glasner, appealed convictions for six drug-related charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds.

The appeal was based on the trial judge's alleged failure to provide sufficient reasons and to properly apply the law of possession.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons sufficient and that the evidence supported the finding of possession and control for most counts.

However, the Crown conceded one count (possession of oxycodone) due to lack of evidence of the appellant's knowledge and control over the specific drugs.

The appeal was allowed for that single count, and dismissed for all other convictions and the sentence appeal.

The applicant, Arthur Rule, sought leave to appeal his 22-month custodial sentence for possessing and accessing child pornography and bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted both applications.

The sentencing judge had misstated the law regarding the availability of conditional sentences for these offences and failed to adequately consider a conditional sentence as an alternative to incarceration.

Furthermore, the applicant demonstrated unnecessary hardship due to severe medical conditions requiring complex daily care that would be difficult to manage in custody.

The court found the appeal had sufficient merit and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, as there were no public safety or flight concerns.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding exclusive possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia seized from a bedroom rented by the appellant.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's finding of exclusive possession was undermined by the landlord's evidence that another tenant (referred to as the "tall skinny guy") may have entered the room.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's inference of knowledge and control based on temporal exclusive possession was reasonable given the evidence, including the appellant's rental of the room, the nature of items found, police surveillance observations, and the lack of evidence that the other tenant was present near the time of seizure.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as dependent on a successful conviction appeal.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing her application for mandamus and certiorari challenging the Director of the Special Investigations Unit's decision not to lay criminal charges against police officers involved in a shooting incident.

The application judge had dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds, finding it should be heard by the Divisional Court under the Judicial Review Procedure Act rather than by a single Superior Court judge under the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that applications involving criminal matters fall within the jurisdiction of the Criminal Code, not provincial legislation, and must be heard by a single Superior Court judge under the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault entered by a trial judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in law by considering both parties' failure to climax as part of his credibility assessment; and second, that the trial judge failed to consider potential collusion between the complainant's family members who testified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence against common sense understanding of human behaviour was not an error, and that collusion was neither alleged at trial nor had any air of reality.

Three appellants convicted of first and second degree murder appealed their convictions.

Two were convicted of first degree murder and one of second degree murder.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as inconsistent and unreasonable, and raised multiple grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury charge, including issues regarding post-offence conduct instructions, circumstantial evidence instructions, and the treatment of various pieces of evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed on the acquittal of one appellant on first degree murder.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts neither inconsistent nor unreasonable, and that the trial judge committed no errors in her charge to the jury.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a firearm.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the police officer acted in good faith and in admitting the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach during a vehicle search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's good faith determination and deferring to her s. 24(2) balancing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing that the warrantless search of his vehicle's trunk violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police stopped the vehicle, and after the driver failed a roadside screening test, the vehicle was to be towed.

The appellant's nervous demeanor and dissociation from the vehicle led police to search the trunk, where they found a handgun.

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 8 breach but applied the Grant framework, concluding that the firearm was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the officers' good faith, the reduced expectation of privacy in an impounded vehicle, and society's interest in adjudicating serious gun offences.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 21 years.

He appealed the parole ineligibility period, arguing it should be in the 16-18 year range proposed by the Crown at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not over-emphasize the brutality of the crimes and that the 21-year period was justified.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault following an altercation outside a bar.

The central issue at trial was identity, resting almost entirely on the evidence of an eyewitness.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the identification evidence, pointing to discrepancies in hair colour and height.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was fully alive to the potential frailties in the identification evidence and reasonably concluded the Crown had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80', raising two grounds.

First, he argued the roadside demand was invalid because the officer did not use the word 'forthwith', which was dismissed based on recent jurisprudence.

Second, he argued his section 7 Charter rights were violated because the technician failed to keep a printout of an aborted second breath sample analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, a qualified technician may determine in good faith that a sample is unsuitable and demand a further sample.

The results of the aborted analysis of an inadequate sample could not have assisted the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, harassment, and threatening his wife.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. test, assessing credibility due to interpreter issues, and failing to address inconsistencies and good character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and demonstrated no error in assessing credibility or applying the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to review his committal for trial on first-degree murder.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge impermissibly weighed evidence regarding specific intent, planning, and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, including poisoning allegations and the appellant's own statements, to support the committal.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

On consent of the Crown, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against conviction on two counts, struck the guilty pleas, and stayed the charges.

The sentence was varied to 20 months concurrent on the remaining convictions, followed by 12 months of probation.

The balance of the appeal was abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred during the jury selection process by failing to adequately instruct the triers on the challenge for cause process and by interfering with his peremptory challenge rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the triers were not instructed on the standard of proof or the need for unanimity.

Furthermore, the trial judge's failure to pre-screen prospective jurors for personal hardship forced counsel to waste peremptory challenges.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought to withdraw a guilty plea to welfare fraud over $5,000 on the basis that it was not voluntary.

The court held that the plea was entered after significant pressure arising from a pending obstruct justice charge, the prospect of immediate arrest and custody, and comments made by the presiding judge to an emotionally distraught accused caring for an infant.

Applying the governing law on the voluntariness of guilty pleas, the court concluded the plea was not made voluntarily and unequivocally.

The conviction and sentence were set aside and a trial was ordered.