Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to address frailties in the complainant's evidence and material inconsistencies, and second, that the trial judge erred in her section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding defence delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her apportionment of delay.

The appellant received a two-year custodial sentence for a serious sexual assault of a 13-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and acquitted of transmitting an intimate image without consent after the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on the latter charge.

The trial judge ruled that a FaceTime call was not a 'visual recording' under s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code because it lacked the capability for reproduction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, and the accused appealed the conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the ordinary meaning of 'visual recording' includes a FaceTime call and does not require the image to be capable of reproduction.

The accused's appeal against conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge made no reversible errors in her jury instructions on consent or in handling objections to the Crown's closing address.

A new trial was ordered on the intimate image charge.

The appellant, a young Indigenous woman, pleaded guilty to importing cocaine.

The sentencing judge rejected her s. 15 Charter challenge to s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which precluded a conditional sentence for her offence, and imposed a 17-month custodial sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the provisions violated s. 15 by discriminating against Aboriginal offenders and s. 7 by being overbroad.

The provisions were struck down, and a sentence of time served was substituted.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse and one count of threatening bodily harm against his daughter.

On appeal, the appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to use evidence of the appellant's prior convictions for assault of his wife to determine whether the wife testified out of fear, and second, that the trial judge's review of the appellant's evidence was brief and unbalanced.

The Court of Appeal found no error in either ruling and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of attempting to purchase sexual services from a young person through an undercover police sting operation (Project Raphael).

He was sentenced to eight months in jail and two years of probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on Charter grounds and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the arrest was lawful and the trial judge properly applied the legal test for objective reasonableness.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to six months less one day to preserve the appellant's right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division, as a sentence exceeding six months would result in deportation as a permanent resident.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 12 years imposed for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and breaches of court orders.

The appellant had sexually assaulted his teenaged step-granddaughter on an ongoing basis for one and a half years, including various forms of sexual abuse.

The appellant had a prior conviction for sexual interference with the same victim when she was 10 years old and had also been convicted of sexually abusing the victim's mother in the 1990s.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit and within the appropriate range.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the sentencing judge was functus officio when imposing a non-communication order approximately one month after the original sentencing, finding it was a permissible administrative correction.

A 15-year-old appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 14-year-old complainant following a judge-alone trial.

The incident occurred at a beach near the Scarborough Bluffs where a group of young persons had gathered to celebrate a friend's birthday.

Both the appellant and complainant had consumed alcohol.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty, concluding that the complainant lacked capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication.

The Court of Appeal was divided: Justice Nordheimer (dissenting) would have allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding the conviction unreasonable because the timing of the sexual activity was uncertain and the evidence of incapacity was insufficient.

Justices MacPherson and Feldman (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and emphasizing the trial judge's credibility assessments and comprehensive reasons.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for 20 months of pretrial custody.

The trial judge had only given 1 month of enhanced credit for 44 lock-down days.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted 1.5 to 1 credit for the entire 20 months of pretrial custody, reducing the sentence accordingly.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including assaulting a police officer with a sawed-off shotgun while on his way to commit arson.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 8 years and 9 months, which significantly exceeded the Crown's submission of 6 years.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was too harsh and that the trial judge erred by 'jumping' the Crown's submission without notice.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges should advise counsel before significantly exceeding Crown submissions, the sentence imposed was warranted given the extreme seriousness of the offences and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he was denied a fair trial because he was unrepresented and the trial judge failed to adequately assist him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had chosen to proceed without counsel rather than delay the trial further, and that the trial judge's assistance was adequate and did not result in an unfair trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and threatening death, arguing the trial judge erred in answering a jury question during deliberations.

When asked if all twelve jurors had to agree on reasonable doubt, the trial judge answered affirmatively, failing to explain a juror's right to disagree.

The Court of Appeal held that this answer improperly conveyed an obligation to agree on a verdict, contrary to established Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent entrusted $5,000 to a courier who attempted to take $50,000 out of Canada without reporting it, leading to the seizure of the funds.

The respondent applied for a declaration that his interest in the funds was not affected by the seizure under s. 33 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding the respondent exercised all reasonable care.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent failed to make necessary inquiries about legal restrictions or steps taken by the courier to comply, and thus did not exercise all reasonable care.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the historic assault and sexual assault of his stepdaughter.

At trial, the judge repeatedly commented on the Crown's failure to call the complainant's older sisters and drew inferences about the family dynamics and the sisters' quick response to the allegations.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge impermissibly speculated about possible abuse of the older sisters by the appellant and used this speculation to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed a sentence of 18 months (12 secure custody, 6 community) for robbery with an imitation firearm.

The Crown conceded the trial judge erred by failing to consider open custody under the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown's argument that its appellate powers were limited to adjusting the custody levels, holding it could impose a new sentence.

Noting the young person's significant rehabilitation, the Court varied the sentence to time served (15 weeks) followed by community supervision and probation.

The appeal of the DNA order was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a condition of the respondent's conditional sentence that allowed him to leave the country for employment purposes for 15 days per month.

The Crown conceded the trial judge had jurisdiction under s. 742.3(1)(d) of the Criminal Code to make the order but argued it made the sentence manifestly inadequate or involved an error in principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle given the severe collateral consequences, the stringent house arrest conditions while in Canada, and the fact that the condition was the only viable road to rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the trial judge, who had departed from a joint submission by refusing to grant credit for pre-trial custody due to the appellant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as the proposed sentence in the joint submission was not contrary to the public interest and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to three years minus 106 days of pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant was convicted of indecent assault and gross indecency against his step-daughter for historical offences.

He appealed his convictions on grounds including improper cross-examination regarding his character, failure to give a propensity warning regarding his lifestyle, failure to give a warning regarding the lapse of time before charges were laid, and failure to stay a conviction under the Kienapple principle.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's cross-examination.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly emphasized general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the suggestion the appellant did not leave the scene with the intent to flee civil or criminal liability was totally destroyed by the evidence.

The Court held that regardless of whether the trial judge was correct in her treatment of the presumption, the result would necessarily have been the same.

The appellant appealed a speeding conviction based on a laser speed detection reading, arguing the Crown failed to prove the scientific reliability of the device absent expert evidence.

The court reviewed authorities concerning radar, speedometers, and newer laser technology, and held that although judicial notice of laser reliability had not yet been established, the Crown had adduced sufficient prima facie evidence of the particular unit's trustworthiness.

The combination of manufacturer-recommended testing on the date of the offence and an earlier comparison against an accurate radar unit by a qualified operator provided a sufficient circumstantial guarantee of reliability.

In the absence of contrary evidence, the conviction was upheld.