Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellants, convicted of aggravated assault, appealed both their convictions and their 15-month custodial sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of causation of injuries.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentences, concluding that the trial judge erred in principle by automatically ruling out a conditional sentence due to the violence involved and by failing to adequately weigh all relevant sentencing objectives, including restraint and rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal substituted the custodial sentences with 15-month conditional sentences, including a period of house arrest, while maintaining probation and ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation.

The central issue was whether police lawfully detained the appellant and his luggage for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes pending the arrival of a drug-sniffer dog, based on a confidential informant's tip.

The trial judge found the detention reasonable; the Court of Appeal found it violated the appellant's Charter rights under section 9 but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant also appealed his 12-month sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating him as a repeat offender and failing to apply sentencing principles for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made an error but upheld the sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for contempt of court and his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly compelled the appellant's attendance and that his refusal to testify constituted contempt.

The appellant was afforded ample opportunity to consult counsel and declined further time to consider his position.

The Court found the conviction unassailable and dismissed the appeal.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife at his second trial, following a hung jury at his first trial.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge erred in law by refusing to remove trial counsel from the record when counsel sought removal on grounds of ethical concerns and breakdown of the client-solicitor relationship.

The trial judge's refusal to grant the removal application created an appearance of unfairness and constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring a new trial.

The court also addressed several other grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of third-party suspect evidence, demeanour evidence, police officer opinion evidence, and hearsay statements, providing guidance for the retrial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction arose from an acrimonious divorce and custody/access dispute with his ex-wife.

The appellant alleged the trial judge demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias through improper intervention, unequal scrutiny of evidence, and imposing a sentence significantly exceeding Crown submissions.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in imposing a sentence substantially longer than Crown submissions without prior notice and opportunity for further submissions.

The sentence was reduced from 18 months to 12 months imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault following a violent altercation on a restaurant patio.

He appealed on two grounds, claiming the Crown's closing address was improper and that the trial judge's instruction on self-defence was erroneous.

The Crown's closing address did not misstate the legal test for self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, and any inappropriate comments were adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The trial judge's instruction on self-defence was thorough and proper, correctly identifying the three key elements of the defence without improperly adding proportionality as an additional requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.

During an appeal involving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant's trial counsel retained his own lawyers.

Trial counsel's lawyers inadvertently disclosed a letter between trial counsel and themselves to the appellant's appeal counsel.

Trial counsel brought a motion for the return of the document, asserting solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the letter was privileged, the inadvertent disclosure did not constitute a waiver, and the innocence at stake exception did not apply to abrogate the privilege.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug-related charges.

Police had entered a residence without a warrant after a 911 call reporting a domestic dispute and death threats.

The trial judge found the entry unlawful and excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the police acted lawfully under the exigent circumstances doctrine to protect life and safety.

The acquittals were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences after a handgun was found in the driver's footwell of a vehicle in which he was the sole passenger.

The driver was acquitted.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to assess his case independently from the driver's and by rendering an unreasonable verdict based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's opportunity, proximity to the firearm, and after-the-fact conduct.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to be present at his trial was violated when the trial judge held private, unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors during jury selection.

He also challenged the admission of statements made to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Court of Appeal held that while the private conversations were part of the trial and the appellant had a right to hear them, the procedural error caused no prejudice and was cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The evidentiary ground was also dismissed based on binding precedent.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of a mental disorder, appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board detaining him at a mental health facility.

The Review Board had concluded that the appellant posed a significant threat to the safety of the public, largely based on his history of medication non-compliance and marijuana use leading to mental deterioration.

The Court of Appeal found that the Review Board's conclusion was unreasonable, as the attending psychiatrist's opinion was uncertain and the appellant's history did not demonstrate a significant likelihood of physical violence.

The appeal was allowed and an absolute discharge was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the strangulation and drowning of his former partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a phone call where the deceased stated she was with the appellant shortly before her death.

He also argued the Crown engaged in improper cross-examination of defence witnesses and that the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction regarding a police officer's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statement was reliable, the improper cross-examination did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the lack of a limiting instruction was the result of a deliberate tactical decision by the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing a miscarriage of justice occurred due to ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming he was not advised of the potential consequences of pleading guilty to breaching his conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding the appellant fully appreciated the risk of a custodial sentence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the conviction for possession of property obtained by crime as the facts did not support the charge.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary because he was not re-cautioned, and that the trial judge failed to direct the jury on the issue of failure to retreat regarding self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to re-caution did not render the spontaneous statements involuntary and that the failure to retreat was never a live issue at trial.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The Crown appealed the imposition of a 20-month conditional sentence for domestic violence offences and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by underestimating the gravity of the offences and that a penitentiary sentence was clearly warranted.

However, because the respondent had already served almost 12 months of house arrest and completed a rehabilitation program, the Court declined to reincarcerate him and dismissed the appeal.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The conviction appeal was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the trial judge had accepted a guilty plea from a co-accused six weeks prior to the appellant's trial, during which facts implicating the appellant were read in.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, noting that trial judges routinely disabuse their minds of potentially prejudicial information from prior proceedings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in the sentence imposed and noted the appellant had almost completed the secure custody portion.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following the fatal beating of a homeless man.

They appealed their convictions, and one appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment for a challenge for cause, upholding the constitutionality of the peremptory challenge allocation in s. 634(2) of the Criminal Code, and finding the jury instructions regarding co-accused testimony, the failure to testify, and the review of evidence to be balanced and legally correct.

The sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years parole ineligibility was also upheld.

The appellant appealed a 3-year sentence for extortion and threatening, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the totality principle.

The appellant committed the offences while in custody for previous offences against the same complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 3-year sentence reflected the totality principle, as the offences would have merited a longer sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record had he not already been serving a substantial sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that based on the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's credibility on other charges resulting in acquittals, the confirmatory evidence needed to implicate the appellant in the crime alleged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and noting the appellant's concession that confirmatory evidence generally does not have to implicate the accused in the criminal aspect of the offences charged.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a shooting during a street confrontation, including attempted murder, maiming, and using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's jury charge on intent for attempted murder was deficient because it invited an inference of intent from the act of shooting alone without reviewing the surrounding circumstances relevant to intent.

Given the jury's repeated questions and the defence position at trial, the omission constituted non-direction amounting to misdirection on the attempted murder count.

The appeal was allowed in part, the attempted murder conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered on that count, while the other convictions were left undisturbed.

Sentencing submissions were to be filed in writing.