Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The moving parties sought an order under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing the appellants' appeal.

The underlying action, which alleged fraud against opposing counsel from previous litigation, had been dismissed as a frivolous and vexatious collateral attack on prior court orders.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the action and the subsequent appeal were devoid of merit and constituted an abuse of process.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants commenced a professional negligence action against their former legal counsel in March 2023.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred, as the appellants had threatened negligence proceedings in March 2019.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants knew or ought to have known of the material facts supporting their claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

This appeal concerned the quantum of class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium following a $153 million class action settlement for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge had awarded $25 million in fees and denied a $30,000 honorarium.

The appellants sought an increase in fees to $44 million and the honorarium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision on both fees and honorarium, finding no palpable and overriding error or misdirection on law.

The respondents (plaintiffs below) moved to quash an appeal brought by the appellant (defendant below) from two interlocutory orders.

The appellant had appealed orders dismissing his motion to vary a summary judgment order and a subsequent motion to set aside an order granting leave for a writ of possession.

The Court of Appeal determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory in nature, meaning jurisdiction for the appeal lay with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed orders dismissing her action and denying her motion to set aside the dismissal.

The lower court judge dismissed the action for failure to file notice of appointment of counsel or intention to act in person within 30 days of an order removing her former lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found the dismissal order deficient because it failed to include the required text of the applicable rules, the appellant had not been properly served with the motion, and no reasons were given for the draconian remedy.

The appeal court set aside both lower court orders and imposed a 14-day deadline for the appellant to file notice of appointment of counsel.

The appellant agreed to purchase a commercial property from the respondent for $9 million, subject to a vendor take-back mortgage.

The transaction failed to close after the parties could not agree on the terms of a secondary financing agreement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, allowing it to retain $1.2 million in deposits.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in interpreting the agreement's secondary financing and escrow deed provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation of the strict terms for secondary financing was commercially reasonable and supported by the record.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to strike her claim for negligent investigation on the basis that it was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued that the negligent investigation claim was interconnected with her breach of privacy claim, which the motion judge had allowed to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the two claims protect different legal interests and are distinct.

The motion judge's costs award was also upheld.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision denying her claim against her group disability insurer for benefits.

She argued the insurer had a common law duty to inform her directly of a potential claim, and that the limitation period should not run until they did so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no such common law duty exists for group disability insurers in these circumstances, and noting the insurer had complied with the statutory notification obligations under the Insurance Act.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the respondents' civil action based on statutory immunity under s. 38.1 of the Independent Health Facilities Act and abuse of process.

The respondents cross-appealed the striking of allegations relating to investigations under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeals and the cross-appeal, holding that while s. 38.1 provides immunity for losses resulting from specific regulatory orders, factual findings at trial are required to determine if any claimed losses fall outside this protection.

The abuse of process arguments were also left open for trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his statement of claim against the Attorney General of Quebec and its agents.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the Province of Quebec has procedural immunity against such a suit in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that while Quebec legislation permits suits against the Crown, it only renders Quebec liable to be sued in its own courts, not in the courts of other provinces.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a proposed class proceeding alleging the respondent bank received interest on cash advances in violation of the criminal interest rate provisions of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge refused to certify the action, finding that restitution and breach of contract claims lacked common issues and that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The Divisional Court affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and certified the class proceeding, holding that sections 23 and 24 of the Class Proceedings Act could be used to assess and distribute aggregate damages, thereby resolving the common issues problem.

The Court also found that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure to achieve judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification.

The appellant appealed an order allowing two limited partners to vote on the election of a new general partner for a limited partnership.

The appellant argued the limited partners were affiliated with and not dealing at arms length with the manager, and thus disqualified from voting under the partnership agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that there was no direct or indirect control establishing affiliation, and that the parties were dealing at arms length.

The appellants commenced an action against their former lawyers for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The lawyers brought third party claims against various entities involved in a real estate project.

The appellants and the third parties had previously settled other litigation and exchanged mutual releases containing 'no claims over' provisions.

The motions judge stayed the main action, finding it was an attempt to re-litigate settled matters and would inevitably lead to third party claims precluded by the releases.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay, except to allow the appellants to amend their statement of claim to assert a claim for an accounting of funds that was not subject to a third party claim.

The appellants sued their former solicitor for negligence, alleging he failed to properly calculate their damages in a real estate action and negligently advised them to accept a settlement.

The trial judge dismissed the claim and awarded the solicitor substantial indemnity costs from the date of a settlement offer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that even if the solicitor misunderstood the damages calculation, the settlement amount was a fair compromise and the appellants suffered no damages.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the trial costs to a partial indemnity basis, as the negligence claim was not frivolous and did not constitute misconduct.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The single judge had allowed a motion on short notice, granted an extension of time, and ordered the appellant's factum and compendium removed from the file because they contained fresh evidence not before the lower court.

The panel found the single judge exercised his discretion appropriately and was correct in his order.

However, on consent of the responding party to expedite the appeal, the panel varied the order to allow the materials to remain in the file, provided the moving party does not rely on the fresh evidence without leave from the panel hearing the appeal.

The motion to review was otherwise dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents had an ancillary right to park vehicles along a right-of-way and awarding damages for nuisance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that parking was an ancillary right based on over forty years of use and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the right-of-way.

The Court also upheld the nuisance damage award.

However, the Court varied the judgment regarding the cost of installing a holding tank, ordering the parties to split the cost equally due to mutual carelessness.

The appeal was allowed in part.

Following the release of the main decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario received further submissions on costs.

The Court ordered that the costs of the application for leave, the motion for leave to appeal, and the appeal be awarded to the appellant in the cause.

The appellant, a federal public servant, grieved his suspension and subsequent dismissal under the collective agreement.

After his grievances were partially allowed and he was reinstated, he brought a civil action against his employer and several individuals alleging discrimination, intimidation, conspiracy, and interference with contractual relations.

The motions judge struck out the statement of claim on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the exclusive jurisdiction model from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose under the collective agreement and the appellant was not deprived of an ultimate remedy.

The defendants, a church parish and a seniors' residence, sought a stay of execution of a trial judgment that handed control of the parish to the plaintiff Diocese after a failed attempt by the parish to secede.

Following the judgment, the Diocese took control and filed a notice of abandonment of the appeal.

The moving party sought to strike the abandonment and stay the judgment to use parish funds for the appeal.

The court dismissed the stay motion and allowed the notice of abandonment to stand, noting that the true protagonists (the seceding individuals) should seek intervenor status to pursue the appeal at their own expense rather than using parish funds.