Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appeal arose from a dispute over whether a substantial contribution to a home purchase created a beneficial ownership interest under resulting trust principles.

The majority held the trial judge made a legal error by disregarding key third-party evidence probative of the transferor’s objective intention and allowed the appeal.

The court declared the appellants entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in the property, set aside the judgment and costs below, and remitted related sale and accounting remedies for case management.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible legal or factual error and concluding the transfer was supported by consideration.

The appellant challenged dismissal of a motion for leave to issue a third-party claim, arguing limitation issues were wrongly decided.

The court held the motion judge made no error in finding the claim was statute-barred and rejected arguments premised on separate proceedings and later party discussions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action and awarding costs, which was premised on their failure to pay previously ordered costs and to either appoint counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person after their lawyer withdrew.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the undisputed failure of the appellants to pay the prior costs award of $4,095.

No costs were awarded for the appeal itself.

The appellant's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against real estate agents was dismissed on summary judgment due to being commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued she did not discover the material facts until later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the discoverability period begins when the plaintiff knows or ought to have known the material facts, not the legal conclusion.

The court noted the appellant had previously pleaded the agents were her agents in a prior action, indicating knowledge of the material facts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded all-inclusive costs of $200,000 to the successful respondent, Ontario First Nations (2008) Limited Partnership, against the appellants, Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario.

The decision considered that this was the second level of appeal, the issues involved, and the respondent's success.

The moving parties, Thomas Patrick Farrell and The Midas Investment Corporation, appealed an order dismissing their action concerning the validity of two mortgages and sought a stay of the declaration of validity and enforcement of the mortgages pending the outcome of the appeal.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for stays pending appeal.

While a serious issue was found to exist (though barely), the court determined there would be no irreparable harm to the moving parties and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his action against the respondent under Rule 2.1.

The Court of Appeal found that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action against the respondent and was plainly frivolous and an abuse of process on its face.

The court upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the Superior Court justice's decision to dismiss the claim without inviting written submissions from the appellant.

The court noted that even if written submissions had been provided, based on the appellant's factum and oral argument, there would be no prospect of a different outcome.

Following a major appellate decision regarding the tolling of limitation periods in securities class actions, the successful parties in two of the appeals sought their costs.

The opposing parties argued for reduced costs on the basis of public interest, over-lawyering, and the fact that the court had overruled its own prior jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and significance of the proceedings.

Costs of $151,250 and $100,000 were awarded to the respective successful parties on a partial indemnity scale.

In three related securities class action appeals, the court reconsidered whether a statutory secondary-market misrepresentation claim under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act is time-barred unless leave is obtained within the s. 138.14 limitation period.

The court overruled Timminco and held that, for purposes of s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the statutory claim is asserted when the representative plaintiff pleads the statutory cause of action, the supporting facts, and an intention to seek leave within a timely commenced class proceeding.

The court also upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the s. 138.8 leave standard as screening out hopeless claims, while holding that the Green certification decision erred in failing to consider certifying common negligent misrepresentation issues other than reliance.

The plaintiffs' appeal in Green was allowed in part and the defendants' appeals in Silver and Celestica were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent regarding spray foam insulation services.

The appellant argued that its defence of equitable set-off required the entire matter to proceed to trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's factual distinction between the types of services provided, noting that the attic insulation and related set-off claims would still proceed to trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents were entirely successful in the appeals and settled their costs with the appellant Molson Sport & Entertainment Inc. They sought costs from the appellant Jonathan Vrozos, who took no position.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents payable by Vrozos in the amount of $49,768.00.

The appellants, Molson and Vrozos, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for intentional interference with economic relations, breach of contract, and fraud arising from the sale of exclusive water rights at a large concert.

Molson had sold exclusive water rights to Vrozos, who then sold them to the respondents.

Molson subsequently allowed other vendors to sell water and forced the respondents to supply free water to meet health requirements.

Vrozos also made unauthorized side deals and misappropriated funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and the award of punitive damages against Vrozos, correcting only the method of calculating damages against Molson and dismissing Vrozos's crossclaim against Molson for a management fee.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought clarification on whether the $85,000 costs award included the costs of the respondents' motions for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that these costs were inadvertently omitted and fixed them at $22,000 and $12,000 respectively.

The court declined to determine the scale of costs for the underlying summary judgment motions, leaving that issue to the motion judge.

The appellants perfected a construction lien, and the respondent moved to discharge it on the basis that the work was not lienable.

The motion was dismissed, and the respondent appealed to the Divisional Court.

While the decision was under reserve, the two-year period to set the action down for trial under s. 37 of the Construction Lien Act expired.

The respondent successfully moved to have the lien declared expired, which was upheld by the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that the time limits in ss. 37 and 46 are mandatory and are not suspended by a reserved judgment.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging that the respondents, former officers and directors of a renovation company, conspired to divest the company of its assets to prevent the appellants from realizing on a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had only pleaded the tort of conspiracy and failed to prove that they suffered special damages as a result of the respondents' unlawful conduct.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and entitlement to punitive damages.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his insurance company and broker following a house fire.

The trial judge found that the appellant had a financial motive to set the fires, misrepresented his insurance history to the broker, and had the best opportunity to commit the arson.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, motive, opportunity, or the overwhelming evidence of arson.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their civil negligence action against the respondents.

The appellants alleged that the plaintiff suffered a severe asthmatic attack caused by exposure to hardeners in ink mixtures at a trade show booth operated by the respondents.

The jury found that the hardeners were not present in the booth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's production order, the questions left to the jury, or the jury charge.

The court also held that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and not unreasonable.

The appellant, Starr Toof, appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for negligent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a used printing press to the respondent, J B Printing Limited.

During a pre-purchase inspection, Starr Toof's representatives made positive statements about the press's condition and failed to disclose damage to an important component.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct legal principles and that his findings of mixed fact and law regarding duty of care, reasonable reliance, and misrepresentation were entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error.

A dissenting opinion argued that no duty of care existed and that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that because the appellant was not involved in the accident and did not have first party insurance, she was not entitled to statutory benefits and had no recourse against the Fund under s. 6 of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act.

The appellant police services board appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that its officers unlawfully entered the respondent's home and unlawfully arrested him.

The officers entered the respondent's apartment without a warrant or consent to arrest him for failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal held that the officers were not protected from civil liability for trespass and false arrest by section 25 of the Criminal Code or the common law, as they lacked legal authorization to enter the dwelling following the Supreme Court's decision in Feeney.

The appeal was dismissed.